comrades should not have taken it l3nng down.

But there is another test, and probably a more persuasive one. That
is the test of my own writings. These show, beyond doubt, that I fol-
lowed no line but that of my own intelligence. The detailed proof is



818 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION

too voluminous to recount, but I hope you will bear with me while I
recite a few highlights.

In his charges from the Senate floor Senator McCarth}^, that pro-
found political scientist, said that the Communist line from 1935 to
1939 was pro-Chiang Kai-shek. But during that same time, I was
critical of the Nationalist Government whenever and wherever I
thought they were wrong.

In 1935 and 1936 I wrote a number of articles on Mongol affairs
that were critical of the Chinese policy under Chiang Kai-shek. In
the August issue of Tien Hsia, a Chinese magazine, I wrote that the
Chinese ought to have a Mongol policy that would convince the Mon-
gols that "association with China can be made more advantageous
for the Mongols themselves than association w4th either Japan or the
Soviet Union." This and other articles caused the Russians to accuse
me of favoring Japanese imperialism.

In 1936, in Moscow, I disagreed with the Russian experts on the
whole question of ISIongolia. In Pacific Affairs, June 1937, 1 criticized
two Russian articles on politics in Inner Mongolia, one of them by
Voitinsky, a top Russian writer on the Far East. Voitinsky called Te
Wang, tiie Inner Mongolian nationalist, a "reactionary." I praised
Te Wang, a close friend of mine, for attempting "a democratic coali-
tion of Mongol nationalists."

The Russians thought well of a Kuomintang general named Fu
Tso-yi. I criticized him severely. Ten years later this general whom
the Russians praised made a deal with the Chinese Communists; while
my friend, Te Wang, is listed by the Chinese Communists as a war
criminal.

In these years the Communists, of course, hoped that the Japanese
assault upon China would strengthen the Chinese Communists. I, on
the other hand, kept demanding a tougher American policy toward
Japan and kept warning people that unchecked Japanese aggression
was building up Connnunism. In Amerasia, December 1939, 1 wrote :

Backing Japan today * * * ^^n only mean Bolshevism in Asia.

From 1939, after the Hitler-Stalin pact, according to Senator Mc-
Carthy, the Communists turned anti-Chiang until after Hitler invaded
Russia in June 1941.

In 1939 I published very little, because I was finishing a book called
Inner Asian Frontiers of China — a book that was later translated into
Chinese in Chungking, but has never been translated in any Com-
munist country that I ever heard of. In the winter of 1939—40, after
Russia's invasion of Finland, I was a member of the local Baltimore
committee for aid to Finland.

In 1940, the Communists wanted American policy to parallel that
of Russia. I wrote, in Amerasia, August 1940, that we would not get
anywher(



by trying to decide whether we should have a policy "parallel" with Britain or
"parallel" with Russia. Wh.it America must decide is wliether to hack a Japan
that is hound to lose, or a Cliina that is bound to win.

On September 30, 1940, I wrote in a personal letter to Admiral
Harry E. Yarnell

Senator Tydtngs. You might identify Admiral Yarnell. As I
recall, he was then in charge of the Asiatic Squadron of the United
States Navy — or was he?



STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 819

Dr. LATTnroRE. T \\vM aot to know Adniirnl Yaniell, Senatoi-, when
he was in a Navv post in Hawaii. After that he was Connnander of
the China Stjuadron. We knew each other for a good many years
and whenever we met we exchanged opinions. At the time that I
wrote this letter he liad recently retired from active service.

Senator Tydixos. All right.

Senator McMaiiox. Is he alive?

Dr. Lattimore. I am not sure, sir.

Senator Tydixos. I think he is. T am not snre. I am pretty certain
he is.

Dr. Lattimore (reading) :

I do not think it is practical iwlitics to negotiate witli the Russians about
their ideas and our ideas of the future of the Far East. There is too little in
common between the two nations on such elementary things as the meaning
of words.

This, let me point out, Avas a long time before other people began to
refer to the difference in the meaning of words between us and the
Russians.

In the spring issue of Virginia Quarterly Review, 1940, 1 urged that
American policy should give the government of Chiang Kai-shek the
kind of support that —

would give the Chinese Regular Arnty and the Kuoniintang the degree of lielp
they need to maintain tlieir ascendancy under Chiang Kai-shek —

and

guarantee that the Chinese Communists remain in a secondary position, because
it would strengthen those Chinese who are opposed to Communism.

In June 1041, just before the German attack on Russia, whai Com-
munist hostility to Britain was most violent, I praised the British
for their recovery after Dunkirk, and "a morale * * * ^yi^id^ gi^.
abled the people to face courageously a still dark future."

The next significant date is the year 1943, when Senator McCarthy
specifically accuses me of following a switch in the Communist line,
attacking Chiang Kai-shek. The truth is once more the exact opposite.
In that very year I published America and Asia, in w^hich I referred
to Chiang Kai-shek as "a world statesman of real genius,"' adding that
"throughout an already long political career he has grown steadily
greater and greater."

It Avas also in 1943 that my wife and I Avrote the Making of Modern
China, in which we summarized Kuoniintang history in a way that
did not please the Communists.

This book was republished in 1947, under the title China, A Short
History. In spite of this opportunity to change our minds and tag
along after the Communists, my wife and I included the same com-
ments.

Russian reviewers of the book were scathing. One called Chiang
Kai-shek and his followers "a clique of traitors,'' and abused us on
accoinit of our sympathy toward them. This reviewer called me per-
sonally a "libeller of the Chinese Communist Party." Another ac-
cused us of trying "to prove that the Kuoniintang" regime is a pre-
paratory stage preparing the future development of democracy, and
that its dictatorship thereby differs from a Fascist dictatorship.'''

There is one more test, on China policy.



820 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION

Senator.TyDiXGS. Doctor, I will say, while you pause there, for the
information of the committe, it appears that you may finish this state-
ment at our morninor session.

Dr. Lattimore. Yes, sir.

Senator Tydings. I will therefore ask you if you want to come back
at 2 :30 for cross-examination ; and, if we finish the cross-examination,
we have already scheduled an executive meeting this afternoon.

I say that for the information of the press and also for the com-
mittee members.

Go ahead, sir.

Dr. Lattimore. The Communists attacked General Marshall's mis-
sion in China just as Kohlberg and McCarthy are now doing. The
Communists accused him of double-dealing. In April 1946, while
General Marshall w^as still in China, I wrote in a syndicated news-
paper article, "His policy can be unreservedly described as in the
American interest as well as in the Chinese interest." Over Town
Meeting of the Air, on the first anniversary of General MarshalVs
famous report on China, January 6, 1048, I broadcast the opinion
that General Marshall's mission was his '"first brilliant success as a
diplomat."

Senator Tydings. For those that would like to leave the room, we
will take a minute's recess. If you want to leave the room, please do
so now. If you wish to leave the room, please move rapidly. The
committee desires to go ahead with the testimony.

All right. Doctor, go ahead.

Dr. Lattimore. Over Town Meeting of the Air, on the first anni-
versary of General Marshall's famous report on China, January 6,
1948, lV3roadcast the opinion that General Marshall's mission was his
"first brilliant success as a diplomat." An American Marxist publi-
cation. Science and Society, criticized my wife and me for "giving
General Marshall's famous and ill-fated mission a marshmallow
treatment."

The truth is, gentlemen, that the Comnuinist line has zigzagged all
over the map, while I have held what I believe to be a steady course
of my own, changing emphasis and direction only as the facts and
situations altered.

In some of its twists and turns, the Communist line at times coin-
cided with the course I was following, just as for a time it coincided
with the program of the American and British Governments in the
war against Hitler. This does nothing to prove that the American
and British Governments, or T as an individual, were Communists.
It proves only that at times the Communists, for their own reasons,
followed the same course that we did.

There is one additional point that I want to stress. I should like
to make it clear beyond any doubt that I did believe for a lono- time —
longer than the facts justified, I am afraid=-in the ability of Chiang
Kai-shek to stop the advance of communism by instituting a few,
necessary reforms. I clung to my faith in Chiang's ability to free
himself and to revitalize the Nationalist Party until 1946, when I began
to support General Marshall's policy of salvaging as much as could be
salvaged of the Nationalist l*arty and the generalissimo's personal
position. General Marshall recognized the futility of this hope before
I did; and finally, in 1947, I followed General Marshall in accepting
the fact that the Kuomintang was beyond salvage.



STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 821

Perhaps, witli my Ion*! years of specialized study, I shotdd liave been
ahead of General Marshall in seeing the shaj)e of things to come. Per-
haps I should have foreseen that the corruption and decay of the
Nationalist Party were so far advanced by 194() that it was useless
to write and hope for its salvation. I can explain this lack of foresight
only because I had not spent any substantial time in China since 194-1;
and because, not being consulted by the State Department. I had no
access to the intelligence on which the Department was basing its
jiolicy.

But, certainly, my error was in exactly the opposite direction from
the Communist position. As you know, during this period the Com-
numists were howling for Chiang's blood. I, however, was striving in
every way that I could to advocate support for him as long as there
was the faintest hope that his failing touch on the political pulse of
China would enable him to build a political following.

I liave already briefly traced the history of my position. Let me
now quickly comment upon some aspects of my relations with the
Generalissimo which are not covered by my published writings.

China was invaded by Japan in 1937. During that war I supported
the generalissimo's efforts to hold together the coalition with the
Chinese Connnunists in the war against Japan. I also agreed with
liim that the great problem with the Connnunists was their alien
loyalty. I urged him to solve this problem by drawing over to his side
a wider coalition than the Connnunists could assemble.

In July 1941, as I have testified, I became the Generalissimo's politi-
cal adviser. He suggested to President Roosevelt the idea of a British-
Soviet-Chinese alliance, to improve China's position during the war
and safeguard China's interests after the war. He asked me to draft
a memorandum on the possibility of recovering Chinese sovereignty
over Outer Mongolia. To make this point quite clear, I should add
that even in 19-11 most people believed that Outer Mongolia had passed
permanently under Russian control ; but I, as can be documented from
my books, still believed that it was possible to bring Outer Mongolia
back into union with China.

In my memorandum to the Generalissimo, I included a recommenda-
tion to take-care of the danger that, after detaching Outer Mongolia
from its Russian connection, the Chinese Communists might make a
bid for influence among the Mongols. The passage reads as follows :

It is recommended that China immediately adopt political methods that will
decrease the present Communist influence in Outer Mongolia, and prevent the
Chinese Communists from replacing the Russians as a source of Conununist ideas
and influence in Outer Moneolia.

Senator McMahox. Are you going to give us the Avhole thing?

Dr. La'itimore. If you wish it. Senator; I can submit the entire
memo. I would personally prefer not to do so, because this is something
that can l^e regarded as part of the state papers of another country.
I have nevei- yet i)ublished any of them in full. I do intend to turn over
all such documents eventually to the Roosevelt Library. But they are
not documents of this Government.

Senator ^NIcMaiiox. I think. Dr. Lattimore, that you should sub-
mit the whole document. And the committee will have in mind,
I should think. Mr. Chairman, what the witness says about it and
the necessity for treating it with discretion.



822 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION

Senator Tydings. The chairman makes the request that the docu-
ment be handed to the Chair. Its contents will not be disclosed, if you
let us have it, beyond the committee members, and it will be returned
to you. You might keep it so it won't get mixed up with the exhibits
and hand it to me personally afterward.

Dr. Lattimore. Yes.

Senator Hickexlooper. Do I understand correctly. Dr. Lattimore,
that you were at that time adviser to Chiang Kai-shek ^

Dr. Lattimore, That is correct.

Senator Hickenlooper. You were adviser to Cliiang Kai-shek as
the result of appointment of Mr. Koosevelt, President of the United
States?

Dr. Lattimore. No, sir. Chiang Kai-shek asked President Roose-
evelt to recommend someone to act as his adviser.

Senator Hickenlooper. And it was in pursuance of that request
that

Dr. Lattimore. Following tliat i-equest, my name was submitted

Seiuitor Hickexlooper. By the President 'i

Dr. Lattimore. By the President.

Senator Hickexlooper. Did you receive any compensation or ex-
penses, or any other pay or reward from the American Governmenl,
during that period of time, at all?

Dr. Lattimore. No, sir; none wliatever.

Senator Hickexlooper. You were paid entirely by the Chinese
Government ?

Dr. Laitimore. Paid entirely by the Chinese Government.

Senator Hickexlooper. I merely wanted to determine if you were,
as a matter of fact, responsible to this Government in connection with
this matter.

Dr. Lattimore. No; I was not responsible to this Government in
any vi'ay.

Senator Tydixgs. We will treat the paper as a private paper and
will not broadcast it.

Senator INIcMahox. I might say that I am so interested in this
exhibit that I think it is very important, Mr. Chairman, that we do
examine the whole thing, and that is the basis of my request for it.

Senator Tydixgs. All right. Senator. I am pretty sure we will get
the paper, and keep it in private, and the committee will have access
to it.

Go ahead, Doctor.

Dr. Lattimore, But let me move on to 1943 when, according to
McCarthy, the Communists and I had turned against Chiang Kai-
shek. I was then an official of the Office of War Information. That
was the year I published America and Asia, which I have already
mentioned, in which I called Chiang Kai-shek "a world statesman
of real genius."

At the very end of this year 1943 — I had resigned as Chiang's
adviser at the end of 1942 — I was notified by Mr. K'ung Ling-kai,
the nephew of Madame Chiang Kai-shek, that the Generalissimo and
Madame would like to make me a present of $5,000. I ask permission
now to file the correspondence for the record.

Senator Tydixgs. You may insert it in the record at this point.



STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY IISTS'ESTIGATION 823

December 28, 1943.
Mr. OwKN Lattimore,

Oflicc of ^y(ll• Information, San Francisco, Calif.
Dear Mm. Latti.mouk: I have just r«H'oived a message from Chnngkins? asking
me to send to you the sum of $r),noi> from the Generalissimo and Rladaine, and
therefore write to inquire in what form would you wish me to send the funds
to you.

With best regards,
Yours sincerely,

(Signed) K'ttng Ling-Kai.
(Typed) L. K. K'ung.



January 17, 1944.

Mr. LING-KAI K'tTNG

32 Bates Street, Cambridge, Mass.

Dear Mr. K'ung : Your yetter of December 28th has just been forwarded to
me from San Francisco. I am very nuich touched by the thoughtfulness of the
Generalissimo and Madame Chiang, and I hope you will convey to them my
appreciation and gratitude.

However. I find that it is impossible for me to accept this generosity, for the
reason that since returning from China I have been working not only in a
Government office but an office which is directly under the jurisdiction of the
executive branch, and, therefore, of the President. This makes it imperative
that in my personal relationship with the Generalissimo there should be no
suggestion' of benefits received. I am also going to send a personal letter of
thanks to the Generalissimo.

With cordial good wi-shes for the new year.

Yours very sincerely,

Owen Lattimore,

Director of Paeific Overations.



January 17, 1944.

Mr. Owen Lattimore,

Director, Office of War hiformation,

San Francisco, Calif.
Dear Mn. Lattimore : On December 28, 1943. I wrote you a letter informing you
of a remittance of $.5,000 from the Generalissimo and Madame and inquiring in
what form you would wish ine to send the funds to you.

I trust the letter has duly reached you and hope to receive a reply at your
early convenience.
With best regards.
Yours sincerely,

K'ung Ling-Kai.



January 17, 1944.
Via diplomatic air pouch.

His Excellency Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek,
Chungking, China.

Dear Generaussimo : Yesterday I was very much moved by the receipt of a
New Year message in the form of a gift from you and Madame Chiang, through
Mr. K'ung Ling-kai. (Mr. K'ung's letter was a little late in reaching me, because
it had been sent to San Francisco, and had to be returned to me here in Wash-
ington.)

That you and Madame Chiang should remember me in this way affects me
profoundly. Your thoughtfulness confirms my own feeling that though I have
returned to America and am no longer in your .service in an official or formal
sense, yet a lasting association has been established through my period of service
in China. It recalls to me the cordial way in which you urged me, when I left
China, not to regard myself as having resigned, but as being on leave, or even
on a kind of lend-lease to the President's service. The possibility that I might
some day be able to return to your service and the service of China is a hope
that I warmly cherish.

68970—50 — pt. 1 53



824 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION

However, on carefully considering all the circumstances. I have decided to ask
Mr. K'ung not to deliver your gift to me. The governing consideration is that,
while I hold an official American appointment. I ought not to accept even an en-
tirely personal favor of this kind, even from one so highly placed as yourself in
shaping the history of the world. Thei-e is also a special circumstance which
reinforces my decision : namely, that the Government appointment which I hold
is under the jurisdiction of the executive branch and therefore of the President
himself. On consultation at the White House I am informed that my request to
you to allow me not to accept your gift is approved.

With warm and loyal wishes for victory in this year, and for the health and
well-being of yourself and Madame Chiang,
Sincerely as always,

Owen Lattimore,
Director of Pacific Operations.

Dr. Lattimore. I do not know just what Mr. Kung's motive may
have been in presenting this gift, but I doubt very much that it in-
dicated that the Nationalist Government, which shoukl have known
my views, believed that I was a Communist agent. On the other
hand, perhaps I missed a chance of getting in on the ground floor of
the China lobby. The fact is that, being devoted to the Generalis-
simo, it seemed to me possible to decline the gift since I was an Amer-
ican Government servant who could not properly receive such a gift.

I did decline it, as the correspondence shows.

Senator Green. You say you were a Government servant at the
time ?

Dr. Lattimore. Yes, sir.

Senator Green. In what capacity?

Dr. Lattimore. I was Director of Pacific Operations for the Office
of War Information.

Senator Ttdings. What year was that?

Dr. Lattimore. That was at the very end of 1943.

Senator Ttdings. Go ahead.

Dr. Lattimore. Now, gentlemen, I realize that it might be possible
to select passages from the writings of a man who is the author of

II books and more than a hundred magazine and newspaper articles,
to prove almost anything. I also know that it is not possible for you
to read all of my writings — I'd hate to undertake it myself.

Senator Hickenlcoper. Mr. Chairman, about the proposed gift of
$5,000, at the time Dr. Lattimore was an official of the Government,
isn't it true that it is illegal for an employee of the American Gov-
ernment under such circumstances to accept gifts from foreign gov-
ernments without consent ?

Senator Tydings. I don't know if it was from a foreign govern-
ment. Dr. Lattimore will have to say whether it was the Government
of China or a personal gift from someone in the Government of China.

Dr. Lattimore. It was re])resented to me, Senator, as a personal gift
from the Generalissimo and Madam. I may say that I never got as
far as considering the legal aspects of the question because the first
thing that occurred to me was that it was simply unbecoming and I
therefore took the steps that I did take.

Senator Ttdings. Whether it came from a government or an in-
dividual, you didn't get the money?

Dr. Lattimore. I did not, sir.

Senator Ttdings. All right; go ahead.

Dr. Lattimore. I think that the best judges of my position, how-
ever, are the people who have read my books and articles. I have not



STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 825

the slightest desire to prove innocence by association, which I regard
as about as fallacious as trying to prove guilt by association. But I
want to submit to you the opinion of American scholars and experts
who are familiar with my work and with the problems of China and
the Far East to which my work relates. These people, I suggest, are
best qualified to appraise my views and to testify as to their inde-
pendence.

In the mass of mail that has come to me since McCarthy's first attack,
there are about 170 letters from people who have a professional knowl-
edge of my writings and work and of the Far East. The writers of
these letters include almost everyone who has a reputation as a scholar
or writer on the Far East.

Some of these people completely disagree with my analysis and
conclusions; some partially disagree with me. But all of them unite
in the conclusion that there is nothing in my writings which indicates
in any manner that I am subversive or a Communist agent or fellow
traveler, or that anything that I have written provides a basis for
questioning my integrity or loyalty.

I have these letters here and will be delighted if the committee
will arrange to have them examined. I also have a list of signers
of these letters which I offer for the record.

Senator Tydixc.s. "We will take the list of signers for the record as
exhibit 85, and unless the committee desires them later we will let
that phase of the matter rest in abeyance.

Dr. Lattimore. Perhaps a few quotations from some of these letters
will be of interest. A letter from 48 teachers and scholars concerned
with Asiatic studies attests my "personal integrity as a scholar" and
my "loyalty as an American citizen.'' Fifteen social scientists, in-
cluding Quincy Wright, professor of international law at the Univer-
sity of Chicago, wired to several Senators to the same general effect.

You may find of particular interest a letter from Paul Linebarger,
professor of Asiatic politics in the School of Advanced International
Studies here in "Washington, D. C. Professor Linebarger has opposed
my view for many years. He writes :

There is a' case against Lattimore's views. I have tried to malve it as a
Federal employee, as a G-2 officer in Stilwell's headquarters, as a Joint Chiefs
of Staff liaison officer to the OWI, and as a postwar private scholar. But the
case is one which can be made honestly ajrainst the views. To make it a charge