of purely military information?
Mr. Service. No, sir; I was not.
Senator Lodge. Were you cleared for the most secret information
regarding troop movements ?
Mr. Service. No, sir.
Senator Lodge. Regarding dates and hours at which tactical devel-
opments would take place ?
Mr. Service. No, sir.
Senator Lodge. Regarding the location of guns or air fields or supply
depots or other military installations ?
Mr. Service. No, sir.
Senator Lodge. Regarding phase lines?
Mr. Service. No, sir. I do not know what that phrase means.
Senator McMahon. There has been some suggestion or some dis-
cussion about the meaning of "military plans" a^ incorporated in this
Service, according to this transcript, says, "Well, what I said about
the military plans is, of course, very secret."
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1415
The next remark is that of Jaffe :
Yes. Well, that was talked around about.
Skrvick. That plan was made up by Wodonieyer's staff in his absence. They
g:ot orders to make some reconniicndatious as to what we should do if we
landed in Communist territory. They had several
Jaffk. To cooperate with them?
Skrvice. Well, yes. That is what we planned, and they showed me the plans
they had drawn up, and if we cooperated with Chunskins troops, if we were
recovt>ring territory, in other words, when we were in Chungking territory we
would have to go on cooperating with them. Those were tlie orders. But if
Me landed in territory where the Communists were, without any question they
would be the dominant force.
What I "want to find out is, Does the subsequent conversation which
details the phm based upon territory that was invaded refer to this
remarks of yours in which you are quoted as saying, "Well, what I said
about the military plans is, of course, very secret"?
Mr. Service. Yes, I think it was. My recollection is that this refers
to a memorandum which I was consultant about, which was a sugges-
tion of what policy we should follow in the event of a possible landing.
Senator INIcMahon. And did you speak of that in terms of it being
a military plan?
Mr. Service. Yes, a staff memorandum which I saw in the prepara-
tory stages while the officers were working on it.
Senator McMahon. And the essence of the military plan that you
discussed with Jaft'e was the political decision to cooperate with the
Chungking Government if you landed in Chungking territory, and
with the Communist forces if they landed in Communist territory ?
Mr. Service. Precisely, sir, although that was not a final decision.
It was merely something that wasbeing drawn up as recommendations.
Senator McMahox. Well now, the rest of this testimony is along
the same lines. "Why would they have to cooperate with the Com-
munists ? " asks Jaffe, and you said,
Chungking, of course, has been putting pressure on us trying to get us to agree
to take in Kuimintang, Comintern, government officials, wherever we landed. As
far as we know, we had not been given any power to do that. But if you get
Hurley there, for Hurley to be consistent, why you'd get Hurley putting hi*
influence probably behind- —
Hurley has- all the way down the line always only recognized Chiang Kai-shek.
Our job is to strengthen Chiang Kai-shek and to support him and to bring all
the forces in China under Chiang Kai-shek's control. If he says all this, public
is going to be just sitting there laughing.
'WHiom did you mean by that ?
Mr. Service. That is incomprehensible.
Senator McMahon. "And he is going to have a hard time refusing to
take in Chungking officials."
Mv. Service. We get into this area
Senator ISIcMahox. That you can't identify ?
Mr. Service. No, sir. It doesn't seem to logically hang together.
Senator ]\ICi\lAiiox. What I want to make clear, so I can understand
it, if I can ixet it clear, is that you are now telling us that the statement,
"Well, what I said about the military plans is, of course, very secret"
referred to the military plan of cooperating with the Communists
where the Commmiists were in control and with Chiang where Chiang
was in control ?
Mr. Service. That is my recollection.
68970 — 50— pt. 1 90
1416 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY mVESTIGATIOlS
Senator Loek^e. Mr. Service, did you ever have any highly secret
information regarding proposed utilization of the road net?
Mr. Service. Will you repeat the question, sir ?
Senator Lodge. Were you ever cleared to be a recipient regarding
information relative to proposed utilization of the road net in your
Mr. Service. I don't understand the question, sir. I don't know
what you mean. The terms are not intelligible to me ; I'm sorry.
Senator Tydings. May I take advantage of this lull ? I have been
called to my office, and the chances are I won't be able to get back here
before lunch. Can you gentlemen meet this afternoon at 2 : 30 and
go ahead with this ? I apologize for interrupting the interrogation.
We will meet at 2 : 30, and Senator McMahon, if you can preside, I
would like for you to do it. I will be in and out, and we will go along
with the interrogation. I won't be absent all the time, but I may be
Senator Lodge. I was trying to find out whether you were in that
very small group that received highly secret information regarding
proposed use of roads for military purposes.
Mr. Service. No, sir ; I was not.
'■ Senator Lodge. Do you remember roughly what the troop list was
in your theater, in a general way ?
Mr. Service. It would have to be the wildest guess. I do not re-
Senator Lodge. Do you remember how many American-equipped
Chinese divisions there were?
Mr. Service. As a matter of public knowledge the original pro-
gram was, I think, 20 or 19, and it was later increased to 39, but that
is just from the press, from open sources.
Senator Lodge. Do you think that if you had known as much about
the status of American public opinion and the realities of the Ameri-
can press as you knew about the realities of Chinese opinion and the
Chinese press you might possibly have conducted yourself a little
differently when you got to Washington in 1945?
Mr. Service. Yes, sir; I certainly would have.
Senator Lodge. Do you think it would be desirable for Foreign
Service officers to be at least briefed and kept up to date on develop-
ments in the United States so that they won't be entirely ignorant
of what is going on in this country ?
Mr. Service. I think, sir, that a great deal more is done now than
was done m 1944 and 1945.
(Discussion was continued off the record.)
Mr. Morris. May I ask a question in connection with this paper?
Mr. Service, when you make the statement —
That plan was made by np Wertemeyer's staff in his absence. They got orders
to mal^e some recommendations as to what we should do if we landed in Com-
munist territory. They had several —
and then there is a break, and again you say —
Well, yes, that is what we planned, and they showed me the plans they had
drawn up, and if we cooperated with Chungking troops, et cetera.
Weren't they talking about particular plans there, Mr. Service?
Weren't you talking about particular plans made up by Mr. Wede-
meyer's staff ?
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1417
Mr. Service. My recollection is only that I discussed it with some
•officers workinj^: on the memoranda.
Mr. Morris." You said, ''They showed me the plans they had drawn
Mr. Service. My recollection is I was simply speak in<r of the memo-
randa they had drawn up as to possible alternatives. They came and
talked to me because I had also written some memoranda on the same
]Mr. Morris. Wedemeyer is a military man; Wedemeyer's staff is
Mr. SER^^CE. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. And if they showed you a plan in all likelihood it would
be a military plan, or at least partly military ?
Mr. Service. It was a military plan that involved highly political
Mr. Morris. That is true. I grant you that.
Mr. Ser\^ce. It was not a specific plan in the sense of movements
of troops or numbers of troops. It was simply a memo suggesting
policy under such and such circumstances.
Mr. Morris. So you do recall what happened ?
Mr. SER\^CE. I have a vague recollection, as I have said, of some
of the officers coming to me and showing me the memorandum on
which they were working. It was a brief memorandum, in my recol-
lection. It is very, very hazy now.
Mr. Morris. Wlio were the men on Wedemeyer's staff who showed
it to you ?
Mr. SER^^CE. I don't remember.
Mr. Morris. You remember what was the plan and you don't re-
member who showed it to you ?
Mr. Service. I don't recall with any clarity or completeness what
was in it. It was simply a policy memorandum on what our policy
would be with several alternatives. It was not final, it was not ap-
proved. General Wedemeyer was away. In any case, final policy
would have to be approved at the highest level here in the United
Mr. Morris. But a plan drawn up by a military staff — that is a
military term^would not be a supposititious thing.
Mr. Service. I think, Mr. Morris, my use of the word "plan" was an
extremely loose one, and in its context a very unfortunate one. As
I told Senator Lodge, I misspoke. My recollection of this is simply
a policy memorandum of what should be our policy under such and
Mr. Morris. Yet you say, "Well, yes, that is what we plan, and
they showed me the plans they had drawn up." That is something
more than supposititious policy, isn't it, "the plans that they had
drawn up"? They are talking about particular plans already accom-
Mr. Service. I am not a military man, and I have used these terms
extremely loosely. It was not any positive plan. I have never at
any time seen any military plan for landing opefations.
Mr. Morris. May I make a recommendation to the chairman that
we try to determine, if possible — here there is reference to Wede-
meyer's staff, and the time is pretty well defined — that we make an
1418 STATE D-EPARTME;NT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATIOlSr
effort to find out from Wedemeyer's staff as then constituted what
plans were shown to Mr. Service ? At least we will make an effort..
I think that is pertinent, don't you, Senator ?
Senator Loekje. I think that is a fair request, Mr. Chairman, that
the committee counsel address an inquiry and see whether they have
such a record, and if they have it, we ought to know it.
Senator Green. Is that the consensus of opinion ? Am I supposed
to be acting as cliairman?
Senator Lodge. I have just made an appeal to you, Mr. Chairman,
that Mr. Morris' request that the committee counsel obtain for the
committee a statement gleaned from the records of General Wede-
meyer's headquarters as to what persons were shown these military
plans, if they have such a record.
Senator Green. Is there objection ? If not, counsel is so instructed.
Mr. Morris. When you returned from Chungking, by what route
did you come ?
Mr. Service. I came back via India and north Africa.
Mr. Rhetts. You are talking about 1945 now ?
Mr. Morris. Just prior to this incident.
I just broke in there while we were talking about this particular
Senator Lodge. I would like you, Mr. Mon-is, to ask whatever ques-
tions you want to ask.
Mr. Morris. You never discussed future plans with Mr. Penfield^
did you ?
Senator McMahon. Mr. who ?
Mr. Morris. We had testimony on Friday, and in fact I would
like to reintroduce into the record at this point a letter Mr. Penfield
has written to Mr. Service, to the effect that they were trying to work
out a safe way of conununicating with each other. I think the stenog-
rapher has it. Mr. Service certainly knows who Mr. Penfield is^
because we had extensive testimony about a particular letter Mr.
Penfield wrote to Mr. Service, in which they were trying to determine
some safe way to communicate.
Mr. RiiETTS. If you are jzoing to reintroduce it, reintroduce the
identification as to who Mr. Penfield is.
(Discussion was off the record.)
Mr. Morris. I think Mr. Service recalls very well the letter I am
talking about. In that letter Mr. Penfield mentions that he is a
Future Plans officer.
Mr. Service. He was attached to, perhaps, the Plans Section.
Mr. Morris. He said particularly, "I am a Future Plans officer."
Did you have any discussions with Mr. Penfield ?
Mr. Service. No, sir. I did not receive that letter from Mr. Pen-
field until after my return to the United States, and I don't believe
I ever wrote to him. I had not seen him for over a year previous to
that time, and I didn't see him until long after that.
Mr. Morris. Had he communicated with you in any other way ?
Mr. Service. No, sir.
Mr. Morris. That was the only letter you received?
Mr. Service. Yes, sir.
Mr. Morris. Even though he said you would have to work out a
safe plan to communicate with each other ?
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 1419
Mr. SEmacE. That letter was taken by General Wedemeyer to
Chiuigkin<»', and did not reach me — it was written on the assumption
that I would be remaining in China, and it would be beneficial to him
if he could receive coj)ies of these background memoranda which I was
writing on the political situation in China, and that was the only
reason, I think, that he wanted whatever copies of my memoranda I
would be able to send him, because they were giving current informa-
tion on the situation in China. But I never had any occasion to dis-
cuss plans with him at all. I never actually discussed anytlii]ig with
him or communicated with him during this period.
Mr. IMoRRis. I think you were asking questions, Mr. Morgan.
INIr. Morgan. Go ahead with your questioning, Mr. Morris.
Mr. Morris. I have finished. I just wanted to ask those questions
about that particular section of the transcript. I have other ques-
tions, but they are not related to that transcription.
Mr. IVIoRGAN. I do want some indication on the record as to what this
specific request was that was made of the chairman. I unfortunately
stepped out at the moment. I suppose, Mr. Morris, being on the
staff, you will indicate specifically what it is you want in connection
with the question you asked Mr. Service, in order that we can intel-
ligently make an inquiry from the appropriate officials in Washington.
Mr. Morris. I say, from reading the transcription, it was apf arently
definite that Mr. Service was talking about some particular plan that
had been shown to him by some members of General Wedenieyer's
staff. Since we are talking about a particular plan that was; at the
time in existence, I suggested that we make a reasonable effort to
determine what the plan was.
Mr. INIoRGAN. We will make the request. I just wanted to make
clear whether we needed to develop any other information 1 o make
our search more intelligible at this time. Do you feel we hav(> all the
information we need to get this now?
Mr. ]MoRRis. I think we should check with Wedeme^^er's staff at
the time, and not confine ourselves strictl)'^ to the record, to see if they
recall the incident.
Mr. Morgan. Being on the staff, I would appreciate your assistance
in helping us develop that information.
Now, Mr'. Service, a question I would like to ask you about h»ire that
I was not clear on. Jaffe says, "Hurley's fighting Chungking then?"
And Service's reply is, "Yes."
INIr- Ser\t:ce. I'm sorry ; it doesn't make sense. I don't kno .v what
Mr. Morgan. That is what I was disturbed about, on the basis of
jour prior testimony. In what sense doesn't it make sense?
Senator Green. In what sense does it make no sense, then'^
Mr. Service. He might have said logically, and I am onlv trying
to reconstruct and I have no positive recollection, "Then Hi.rley is
fighting Chungking's battles?" or "Hurley is fighting for Chung-
king?" Those are things that possibly a hearing of the record might
help us to bring out. I am not sure. I might be able to und( rstand
something that the stenogi'apher, trying to transcribe it, was unable
to catch. I am not sure.
Senator McMahon. May I break in with one question ?
Senator Green. Yes ; go ahead.
1420 STATE D'EPARTMEAT? EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Senator McMahon. Mr. Service, did you ever write a memorandnm
expressing your opinion on the specific question as to whether or not
cooperation should be had with the Conununists on landings in Com-
munist territory and with Chiang Kai-shek in Chiang's territory?
Mr. Service. I did not write a memorandum specifically on that
subject, sir, but there is some general reference to the problem in at
least two memorandums which I wrote.
Senator McMahon. Were those two memorandums the ones you"
gave to Mr. JafFe ?
Mr. Service. No, sir. I believe they were not. One of them is a
memorandum which I drafted with Mr. Ludden on February 14, 1945.,
Mr. JMoRuis. Will that go into the record ?
Mr. Rhetts. On that question, Mr. Morris, this is one of that whole
series of 125 documents which have been used and are exhibited in
the Loyalty Board proceedings, of which we have said we hoped and
affirmatively desired be made available to this committee by the State
Department, but we have no authority to do that.
Mr. Morris. I will just request it, inasmuch as we are going to take
an extract out of the whole thing for the record.
Mr. Service. I see this does not mention the disposition of forces
in any landing operations. It is addressed to the general problem of
keeping ourselves free to use all forces who can assist in the defeat of
Senator McMahon. That would be a natural corollary of that.
Mr, Morris. Will you identify it further, so it can be produced?
Mr. Service. It is a memorandum on the subject Military Purpose
of Our Far Eastern Policy, dated February 14, 1945, signed by Ray-
mond P. Ludden and John S. Service.
The first paragraph states :
American policy in the Far East can have but one immediate objective, the
defeat of Japan in the shortest possible time v^ith the least expenditure of
American livi s. To the attainment of this objective, all other considerations
should be suboi-diiiate.
It is rather difficult to summarize, but I point out the hampering
effects of working only with one party, and I go on to say that at pres-
ent there exists in China a situation closely paralleling that which
existed in Yugoslavia prior to Prime Minister Churchill's support
of Marshal Tito. That statement was as follows :
The sanest and safest course for us to follow is to judge all parties and fac-
tions dispassionately by the test of their readiness to fight the Germans and
thus lighten the burden of Allied troops. This is not a time for ideological pref-
erences for one side or the other.
That was quoting Mr. Churchill.
I go on to say :
A similar public statement issued by the Commander in Chief with regard to-
China would not mean the withdrawal of recognition or the cessation of mili-
tary aid to the Central Government. That would be both unnecessary and un-
wise. It would serve notice, however, of our preparation to make use of all
available means to achieve our primary objective.
Now, in another paper whicli Mr. Ludden and I prepared just
prior to this, we summarized at the suggestion of General Wedemeyer
all of the various factors that made it wise for us to keep ourselves
in a flexible position and ready to use and able to use any forces that
could be of substantial assistance to us, and in that Mr. Ludden and I
STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INA^ESTIGATION 1421
listed the ]nx)bleins which might confront us if there were any bind-
ings of the coast of China, of being in a position to use whatever
forces we found organized and able to give us effective support.
Senator McMauon. What was, if you know, General Wedemeyer's
position in this controversy?
Mr. Service. I do not know. He was interested in having our state-
ment of the problem.
Senator McMahon. In military developments what policy was
Mr. SER^^CE. I also do not know what policy was finally chosen.
There never were any landings, and the situation actually never arose.
Senator McMahon. That is what I wanted to get in the record.
My memory was sure that the problem never arose because there were
no landings, but I wanted to make sure that on the record that was
stated, because I though possibly there might have been some brief
skirmishes which I did not remember.
Mr. Service. I do not know what the final policy was, or whether
anv final policy was adopted.
Mr. Morgan. Incident to my contemplated interrogation with re-
spect to this conversation between Mr. Service and Jaffe, I believe a
great many of the questions which I had in mind have already been
discussed. However, since Mr. Mclnerney is here, and in order that
our record may be somewhat complete on this matter, can you indi-
cate for our record, Mr. JMcInerney, as to how long the transcript of
this conversation has been made available to you, or how long it has
been available to you in the Department of Justice?
Mr. ^IcIxERNEY. That transcript which you have before you was
made available to us last week, I believe on June 21, and it was made
available to us pursuant to your request for it.
Mr. Morgan, AVhat I want to know, Mr. Mclnerney, if you can
help me. is whether you and Mr. Hitchcock at the time of the handling
of tliis matter from a prosecuting standpoint in 1945 were cognizant
of this conversation ?
Mr. McInerney. This conversation was contained in the summariza-
tion and contained in an FBI report dated approximately June 1, 1945.
Mr. Morgan. Does the sunnnarization accurately reflect the sub-
stance of this conversation?
Mr. McInerney. I would say generally, yes. It is incomplete, but
speaking generally I would say so.
Mr. Morgan. Did it indicate to you, on the basis of the summary
which we do not have before us, that Mr. Service had said he had
passed on military ]:)lans to Mr. Jaffe?
Senator Green. That does not appear in the transcript, either.
Mr. Morgan. The statement to which I am referring, Senator, is
the one we have been referring to this morning, in which Mr. Service
purportedly said, "What I said about the military plans is, of course,
Mr. jNIcInerney. I would say in response to your question that it
contained no more than the transcript you have before you, and per-
haps a little less, because it was a summarization.
Mr. Morgan. Thank you.
Senator McMahon. Did you know when you received this advice-
in 1945 that this was secured by an intercept?
1422 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION
Mr, McInerney. From the face of the report it was described as
coming from a confidential informant.
Senator McMahon. It was the choice of that and that they had
somebody nnder one of the desks ?
Mr. McInerney. You could speculate along those lines, although I
must admit that I knew from my experience that such was not the
Senator McMahon. I think that was a fair deduction from the
physical set-up, that it was probably by wire instead of by eaves-
Mr. Morris. Mr. McInerney, if there had been a direct microphone
in the apartment, a direct microphone intercept, would you have
proceeded to consider that as evidence admissible in court?
Mr. McInerney. Apart from its inadmissibility, it had been re-
ceived by us with the caveat which was read by the chairman at the
commencement of the session here.
Mr. Morris. Who wrote the caveat?
Mr. McInerney. The FBI. It is the FBI caveat.
That is from the FBI memorandum of May 29, 1945, introducing
the case to us.
Mr. Morgan. Is that the caveat reading,
Most of the foregoing information regarding the contacts made by the various
principals and the documents which were exchanged were obtained through
highly confidential means and sources of information which cannot be used in
Mr. McInerney. That is correct.
Mr. Morris. Is that an FBI or Justice Department caveat?
Mr. McInerney. That is an FBI caveat.
Senator Green. Does that end that line of questioning?
Mr. Morgan. I believe so.
Senator Green. It is 1 o'clock. I believe we had better take a recess
until half past 2.
(Whereupon, at 1 p. m., a recess was taken to reconvene at 2 : 30 p. m.
of the same day.)
(The hearing was resumed at 2:45 p. m.. Senator Green, acting
chairman of tlie subcommittee, presiding.)
Senator Green. I think we had better proceed, Mr. Morgan. Have