adviser. I served with him there for about 9 months.

After several yeai-s back at Columbia, I was called back into public
service by Governor, now Senator, llerbeil H. Lehman, who in 1943
asked me to come to Washington as Chief of the Division of Training
and Personnel in the Office of Foreign Relief and Rehabilitation Opei^
ations which he was then organizing. In December of that year, I
served as Assistant Secretary General of the P'irst Conference of the
United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, commonly
known as UNRRA, and in 1944 I served in a similar capacity at the
United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods.
iNIeanwhile, during a period from 1942 to 1945, I was the associate
director of the Naval School of Military Government and Administra-
tion, established at Columbia University at the request of the United
States NaA^y Department. In that school we trained some 500 officers
for service in occupied areas in the Pacific area. During part of that
time, I was also serving as consultant to the Navy Department in
Washington, as a lecturer at the Army School of Military Government
at the I'niversity of Virginia, and 'as a lecturer in the Navy War
( ^ollege at Newport. I had previously lectured at the Navy War Col-
lege in 1931, 1939, and 1941. I might add that since the war I have
also delivered two lectures at the National War College in Washing-
Ion, and in 1948 was invited to become a member of the National
War College staff. I was unable to accept this appointment because of
my duties with the Department of State.

Just before the San Francisco Conference in 1945 the then Solicitor
General, ^Ir. Charles Fahy, and I served, together with I^Ir. Green
Tlackworth, as members of a committee of jurists who pre]-)ared a pre-
liminary draft of the statute of the International Court of Justice. I
then served with the United States Delegation to the United Nations
Conference at San Francisco as an assistant on judicial organization,
and thereafter continued as a consultant to the Department of State.
In 1947 I was appointed as the United States member of a UN com-
mittee on the Codification and development of international law.

On January 3, 1948, I was appointed deputy United States repre-
sentative on the Interim Committee of the General Assembly of the
I nited Nations. On April 14, 1948, my apopintment as United States
representative to the second special session of the United Nations Gen-
eral Assembly was confirmed by the United States Senate. On June
1, 1948, the Senate confirmed my appointment as deputy United States
representative in the United Nations Security Council. On March 1,
1949, my appointments as United States Ambassador at Large and
also as United States representative to the third regular session of the
General Assembly were confirmed by the Senate, and last September
26 I was again confirmed by the Senate as a United States representa-
tive to the fourth regular session of the General Assembly.

So niiich for the record of my career. It does not read like the
record of a Communist, a pro-Communist or a fellow traveler.

At the beginning of my statement I said that the insinuations which
liad been leveled against me had the effect of impairing the confidence



230 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVE'STIGATION

of otlier government in the United States and its representatives. I
made that statement because it would be impossible to reconcile the
actions I have taken both in the course of my recent trip to Asia
and in the course of the last 2 years with the Department of State with
"an unusual affinity for Communist causes." I shall submit to the
committee for insertion in the record, a collection of extracts from
statements which I have made on the subject of communism. Merely
by way of illustration I would like to read from a statement which I
made in the Political Committee of the General Assembly last
December in the debate on China, and I was speaking, sir, to the chair-
man of the committee. There I said :

* * * I hope, Mr. Chairman, it will be crystal clear that the United States
policy is against imperialism everywhere. We flatly reject it for ourselves and
we condemn it when practiced by any other state. We condemn it specifically
as revealed in the Soviet-Russian continuation of Tsarist-Paissian imperialism
in the Far East. Our concern is that China, India, and all Asia be safeguarded
against Soviet Russia or any other aggression.

That is the end of the quotation. , xi -j

I believe that I should be judged not merely by what I have said
but also by what I have done. 1 have already indicated that I. have
had the honor of representing the United States m the Security
Council of the United Nations, in the Interim Committee of the Gen-
eral Assembly of the United Nations, and in one special and two
regular sessions of the General Assembly. The proceedings of these
bodies are public and their records are published. ^ .

I shall submit, sir, for insertion in the record, official authenticated
copies of sections of the proceedings of the organs of the Jnited
Nations in which I acted; and also, copies of statements wnich I have
made to the press, and over the radio in the course of my Asian trips.
I have these here for insertion.

Senator Tydings. They will be inserted in the record at this point,
and I am not sure that you want the whole records, or just sections of
it that are pertinent, or that pertain to you? ,

Ambassador Jessup. I am quite content, sir, merely to have inserted
in the record the excerpts which will be marked as showing particular
passages in my statements dealing with the questions of international

communism. .,, , . ^ i • ..i a ^

Senator Tydings. Those excerpts will be inserted m the record at

this point, and should the committee desire, the whole record will be

available for further examination.

(The matter referred to is as follows :)

Exhibit 2 — Jessup
Statements by Ambassadob Jessup on the Subject of Communism

(1) Excerpts from statement to the Security Council on October 4, 1948.

(2) Excerpts from a statement to the Security Council on October 19, 1J48.

(3) Excerpts from a statement to the Security Council on October 25, 1J4J.

(4) Excerpts from statement to the Security Council on January 11, 194y.

(5) Excerpts from a speech on February 18, 1949.

(6) Excerpt from a speech on March 12, 1949.

(7) Excerpts from a speech on April 7, 1949.

(8) Excerpts from a speech on August 24, 1949.

(9) p]xcerpts from a speech on September 6, 1949.

(10) Excerpts from statement in Committee I of the General Assembly on

Novcmlier 2S, 1949. „ , . tt • at v..,

(11) Excernts from a speech to the English Speaking Union on November

28, 1949.



STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 231

(lii) ExciM-pt from statement to Committee I of the General Assembly, on
December (i, 19-19.

(LS) Text of statement to the General Assembly on DecemlxT 7, 1949.

(14) Excerpts from statement to the press, Hons Kong, January 18, 1950.

(15) Excerpts fi'om a broadcast over Radio RIalaya, on Febi'uary (i, 1950.
(Iti) Excerpts from speech over Kadio Thailand on Felinuiry 17, 1950.

(17) Excerpts from statement to the New Delhi press on February 23, 1950.

(18) Statement to the Security Council on October 6, 1948.

ExCERi'T From Statement by AMn.\ssADOR Jessup tn the Security Council of the

UN on October 4, 1948

The source of this speech can be found in the official records of the Security Council, three-
hundred-and-sixty-flrst meeting, October 4, 1948 [No. 113], at pages 24-26

The Government of the United States believes in the purposes set forth in
article 1 of the Charter and in the principles stated in article 2 of the Charter.
It is because we believe in these purposes and principles that we have joined in
referring this case to the Security Council. The representative of the U. S. S. R.
made a number of references to the desirability of respecting signatures to inter-
national agreements. I would like to point out that the Charter of the United
Nations is an international agreement and that it bears the signature of the
U. S. S. R.

In accordance with our obligations under article 33 of that Charter, the Govern-
ment of the United States, in agreement with the Governments of France and the
United Kingdom has made every elTort to remove the threat to the peace created
by the U. S. S. R., through direct discussions with the Government of the Soviet
Union. The systematic periodic evasion and repudiation of the promises by that
Government has made further i-ecourse to these direct discussions futile. Mean-
while, the U. S. S. R. continues, in violation of its obligations under the Charter,
to apply force or the threat of force against the Governments of the United
States, France, and the United Kingdom.

The representative of the Soviet Union has intimated, as liis Government has
already alleged, that the illegal U. S. S. R. blockade measures were imposed in
retaliation for the lawful steps relating to currency taken by the Western Powers
in the western zones but, as I shall explain later to the Security Council when
we come to the substance of the question, the U. S. S. R. measures and the motive
liehind them were revealed some months before the currency measures of the
Western Powers were put into effect.

Any such argument on the part of the U. S. S. R. will not succeed in obscuring
the actual situation which confronted the Governments of the United States,
France, and the United Kingdom and to which I have just referred. Faced with
that situation, the three Governments were confronted with the following alterna-
tives. One, they could have supinely bowed to the U. S. S. R. use of force ; or two,
they could in turn have resorted to force to meet the force of the U. S. S. R. ;
or three, they could have recognized the fact stated in article 24 of the Charter
that the Security Council has "primary responsibility for the maintenance of
international peace and security * * *".

The Governments of the United States, France, and the United Kingdom chose
that third alternative. It was the only alternative consistent with the obligations
of a mi'iiiber of the United Nations. It was a recognition of the conviction of the
three Governments that the United Nations is and will remain the cornerstone
on which the structure of peace must be built.

The Government of the U. S. S. R. has been loud in its protestations of support
for the United Nations. If these protestations had been sincere they would have
welcomed an opportunity to invoke the assistance of the Security Council in
bringing about a termination of the present serious situation in order that all
questions and issues between them and the Governments of the United States,
France, and the United Kingdom might be solved by peaceful means. The Gov-
ernment of the U. S. S. R. has not taken that course. It repudiates the ma-
chinery of pacific settlement established by the United Nations. The U. S. S. R.
•It-nies that the United Nations is an organ to which the peoples of the world
can tnrn for help in maintaining international peace and security.

Again, at this point. I would cite to the representative of the U. S. S. R.
the great Latin maxim to which he has referred, pacta servanda sunt. The
U. S. S. R., in repudiating the machinery of peaceful settlement, and repudiating
its obligations under the Charter, is trying to secure for itself unihiteral free-
dom to resort to force. It is evidently unwilling to have the Security Council
68970 — 30 — pt. 1 16



232 STATE DEPARTMET^'T EMPLOYEE LOYALTY n^'EOTIGATION

and the public opinion of tlie world examine the record in this case. The
Gove r meTof the United States, acting in accord with the Governments of
France Ind the United Kingdom, is, on the other hand, ready and willing to
ha?e this Council of this great world organization examine the records and
iSike its condition to the maintenance of international peace and security.
If the U S S R wants peace, let it welcome a resort to the United Na ions,
the instrument of peace. If the U. S. S. R. intends to support the United Na-
t ms let iT ac-;,ept the established procedures of the United Nations. We for
on -Dai t CO fntend to support the United Nations, and we are therefore invoking
ft LferU?e resort to diict discussion with the U. S. S. R. has failed to remove
letlu-eat to peace resorting to it in the hope that the Security Council, m dis-
clSi^eS its Sponsibilities under the Charter, can make its contribution where
other means have failed.

Excerpt From Statement by Ambassador Jessup in the Security Council of
Excerpt ^ijoM^ of October 19, 1948, Concerning the Berlin Question

[Source: Official records of the Security Council three hundred and sixty-eighth meeting

(iVO. lib), pp. Oi— 0-J

There is an aspect of the blockade measures which I particularly wish to re-
emT)hasize to th^ members of the Council. As I pointed out before, under a series
of^inteimational agreements, the four occupying powers undertook responsibiU-
Hes for me population of the sectors of Bt-rlin cmuiitted to their charge. The
hlockade s a method used by the U. S. S. R. for the expansion of its power m
uteisreVard of these joint responsibilities and with a callous indifference
S the effect of their measures on the population of the western sectors.

I woukl also remind the Council that it was not until a month alter the blockade
wnsimnsed that the U S S. R. made its offer to supply food and coal to the
wSteâ„¢ sec o rs. It was thus clear that it originally contemplated putting this
TesSie on the poindation, in an attempt to break their spirit and it was on y
after the succels of the airlift was demonsfated that an attempt was made to
counter the airlift with an offer of Soviet supplies. ^,t,,,.,i

This is the blockade which Mr. Vishinsky says is entirely mythical.
. Hs contention that there is no blockade has been amply disi.roved by the
facts The Soviet interpretation will, in any event, be somewhat disputed by the
21 million people who are the direct object of Soviet power politics, who are
faced with a choice between accepting the real and potential hardships of die
blockade or accepting Soviet political food and political coal and, hence, Soviet
ancl CommunS polifical domination. Their choice has been clear and unmis-
takeable from the beginning. They have chosen hardship and freedom, msjs
a hopeful sign for the future peace and securi y of ^"^'^If ' /^f, ^he f ke o^^^^^
the four povvers undertook the occupation of Germany. Let us not foiget that at

''''^^^S'V^l^l^^i^eement together, now and in the future, the other
measuretnecessai-y to assure that Germany never again wiU threaten her ii^eigh-
bors or the peace of the world. It is not the intention of the Allies to destioy or
eiismve the German people. It is the intention of the Allies that he German
peoi'le be Sven the opportunity to prepare for the eventual reconstruction of their

"'5Ct wra?;;ed'arp' tS^m'^^Th^^^ of the Soviet Union, using the

harsh in^l-ifment of the blockade, has. indeed chosen a strange way m Be,i^
to live up to its agreement to democratize German political lite. Thanks to the
airbridS and to the support given to it by the Berliners, the Government of the
Soviet Union has not succeeded in its purpose.



Excerpt From Statement by Ambassador Jessup in the Security Council of
THE UN on October 25, 1948, Concerning the Berlin Question

[Source : Official records of the Security Council, three hundred and seventy-second meeting
'â–  (No. 120), pp. 11-13]

I have listened in vain, as he was speaking, for any suggestion in his remarks
that he too like the representatives of the three western Governments, was
amirou-hin"-' this draft resolution in a spirit of accommodation, in a^i effort to
set e the prob em of Berlin. On the contrary, he flatfootedly asserted that they



STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INVESTIGATION 233

would contiuue the threat of their blockarle measures until the mark of the
Soviet Zone was established as the sole currency, not by free agreement but under
Soviet dictation.

The main issues wiiicb are before the Security Council have been made very
clear in our proceedings. A resolution, which was eminently fair, has been
put iH'fore us through the efforts of the six (Jovernnients which led to its formu-
lation. It .^eems to me that we must now ask what the Soviet Union wants.

Does the Soviet Union want a meeting of the Council of I'oreign Ministers
to discuss Berlin, or the unification of Germany which has always been, and
still is. the aim of the three western Governments, or to discuss the questions of
Germany as a wholeV The U. S. S. R. Govermnent can have such a meeting without
tlie threat of force. We have told them that before. We repeat that promise.
We have indicated our acceptance of the principle in our approval of the draft
resolution which is before us.

Does the Soviet Union want the Soviet zone mark established as the sole
currency in Berlin under four-power control, as Premier Stalin himself sug-
gested? They can have that without maintaining a blockade. We have told
them so before, and we tell them so again.

Does the Soviet Union want assurance that we do not want to use the four-
power cimtrol of the currency in Berlin to control the general economy of the
Soviet zone outside Berlin? They can have such assurance witliout threat
or violence. We liave made that clear before. We make it clear again.

Does the Soviet Union want guarantees to prevent the use of transport fa-
cilities for black-market operations in currency in Berlin? They can have such
guarantees without resorting to duress. Again, it is a matter which we have told
them before we would do, and we are ready to say so again. If the U. S. S. R.
Government will remove all the restrictions imposed on transportation, communi-
cations and commerce, subsequent to March 30. 1948, between the western zones
and Berlin, the United States Government will undertake to provide the safe-
guards for the western mark B and the eastern mark of the Soviet zone and
presented by the United States representative during the course of the Berlin
discussions.

As I understood the representative of the Soviet Union in his remarks a few
moments ago, he argued that the blockade measures which liave be?n imposed
by the U. S. S. R. were imposed to protect the economy of the Soviet zone
against the western mark. However, as I have had occasion to point out to
tlie Security Council before (thi-ee liundred sixty-third meeting), the blockade
measures began in January, reached a focal point on March 30, and the westerii
mark was not introduced until June 24. I think it necessary to point out again
that the matter or i-estrictions on traffic has nothing to do with the question
of safegimrds to prevent movements of currency. The removal of the blockade
restrictions imposed upon land and water commmiications by the U. S. S. R.
would restore the normal channels of supply and transport which are now
confined to the airlift. In effect, this would merely substitute the normal
ground means of transport for the present air means.

The United States never intended to use currency as a means of adversely af-
fecting tlie economy of the Soviet zone. The objective of currency reform is to
improve economic life and not to destroy it. If, on the other hand, the Soviet
Union wants to drive us out of Berlin — where we have an acknowledged right
to be — that result they cannot get by maintaining their threat to the peace. We
have stated that position over and over again, and that simple fact should now
be clear. If the U. S. S. R. wants us to work out the technical details of tlie first
four questions I put, under the duress of the maintenance of the blockade
measures, instead of throught the process of free negotiation, again the answer
to the question is "No." In short, the Government of the Soviet Union can obtain
all it says that it wants without maintaining the blockade. With the blockade,
it can get neither what it says it wants nor what its actions seem to suggest it
actually does want. It is the blockade which is the barrier, and it is the U. S. S. R.
which can lift the blockade.

Even now, despite the fact that the Soviet Union has seen fit to indicate that
it intends to bhjck the efforts of the Security Council of the United Nations,
if it wishes to end the threat to the peace which it created, the Berlin ques-
tion eaii l>e settle<i on the basis of the program suggested in the draft resolution
which is now before the Security Council. The three western Governments have
indicated their acceptance of the principles contained in that resolution. If the
Government of the U. S. S. R. would give recipi-ocal assurances that that pro-
gram suggested in that resolution would be carried out, it can be done.



234 STATE DEPARTMENT EMPLOYEE LOYALTY INYE'STIGATION

Excerpt From Statement by Ambassador Jessup in the Security Council on

January 11, 1949

r Source- Official records of the Security Council, three-hundred-and-ninety-eighth meeting
"• (No. 2), i)p. 9-10]

When this question of Indonesia was being discussed in the Security Council
in Paris, the Soviet Union, speaking both through its own representative and
through the representative of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, followed
its familiar prtjrvdure of endeavoring to cloak its own improper actions by
seeking to phn-e ti e blame on someone else. The representative of the U. S. S. R.
(three hundred ..n-i ninety-first meeting) and the representative of the Ukrainian
SSR (three hundred ninety-third meeting) both insinuated that the Government
of the United States was in some way responsible for the action of the Nether-
lands in resorting to hostilities against the Indonesian Republic. It thus be-
comes necessary to point out again certain salient facts. , „^ ^ ^ r, ^ ^

In the tirst place, it was the Government of the United States which took
the initiative in convening an urgent meeting of the Security Council when
it became apparent that the Netherlands was resorting to military action in
Indonesia (S/1128). It was the Government of the U. S. S. R. which endeavored
to prevent the Security Council from acting promptly by insisting that the
Council meeting should be deferred for 3 days. Every other member of the
Council attended the three hundred eighty-seventh meeting on December 20
except the two Soviet representatives. _

The United States also took the initiative, in conjunction with the repre-
sentatives of Colombia and Syria, in proposing a resolution (S/1142) to the
Security Council to deal with the situation, but the U. S. S. R. representative re-
fused to support this resolution (three hundred ninety-second meeting) . He later
tried to cover up this further attempt to block Security Council action by intro-
ducing a resolution of his own (S/1148 and S/1148/Corr. 1) which he knew
could not be adopted by the Council. M.n-e fundamental, however that these
obstructionist tactics in the Security Council, is the fact that the U. S. b. R. is
fundamentally opposed to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and has
itself, through the Communist Party, which is, of course, its moutlipiece through-
out the world, sought to undermine and overthrow this Government.

No one doubts that the Communists in Indonesia like the Communists through-
out the world are responsive to and act in accordance with instructions from
Moscow The Communist revolt against the government of President Soekaino
and Premier Hatta was itself an effort on the part of the Government of the
U S S R to overthrow the Indonesian Republic. Furthermore, when the re-
sumption of hostilities by the Netherlands Government against the Indonesian
Renublic took place, the official Communist Party line, as printed m the Com-
munist press, instead of deploring this action, openly gloated that it was a
punishment for the government of President Soekamo and Premier Hatta,
which had successfully put down a Communist revolt. ^ ^v a • ^

The Communist line which, I repeat once more, means the hne of the Soviet
Government, accused that distinguished statesman of the Indonesian Republic,
Mr Hatta, of being a traitor to his country. At the very time when editorials
wei-e appearing to this effect in the Communist Party organs in Pans, the
USSR representative on the Security Council sought to cover up the actual
Dolicv of his Government by identifying liimself with the Council's endeavors to
secure the release of Mr. Hatta and other political prisoners (ninety-second