ander Hamilton, who was a leading proponent of tilting the balance
toward a strong executive, would gag at the thought of swallowing
such a dose of Presidential power.
Moreover, Congress would find it necessary to spend a greatly in-
creased amount of time and energy in enacting budget authority to
meet the needs of the Nation as viewed by the elected representa-
tives of the people. The tensions between the executive and legisla-
tive branches would rise to the boiling point as Congress found it-
self more and more subservient to an aggressive and politically
partisan President. The Nation would suffer the consequences of
such a power shift, and the constitutional system of checks and bal-
ances would be reduced to rubble. With the occupant of the oval
office in possession of such swollen power, the chief executive
would not only become the chief legislator; he would also be a king,
in everything but name only. And what's in a name, when a pickle
by any other name smells just as sour?
The proponents of enhanced rescission power for the President
argue that his current rescission authority, limited as it is, has met
with little success because Congress, they say, has been unrespon-
sive to his requests. The facts are otherwise.
Mr. President, I will put into the RECORD a table that will show
that for the fiscal years 1974 through 1992, the Presidents during
those years proposed for rescission, $61,635,857; total amount of
proposals enacted by the Congress, of those that the President re-
quested, $19,557,337,366; and an additional amount of rescissions
initiated by the Congress of $36,210,728,246.
Another way of looking at it, 1974 through fiscal year 1992, as
of February 26, 1992, the number of rescissions proposed by Presi-
dents was 920; number of Presidential proposals accepted by Con-
gress 324; number of rescissions initiated by Congress on its own,
351.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that that table be print-
ed in the Record at the conclusion of this speech.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Wellstone). Without objection,
it is so ordered.
(See exhibit 1.)
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, the rescission authority which now ex-
ists works well. Congress has not ignored Presidential rescission
proposals; and, in fact, as I have stated. Congress has enacted a
great number of rescissions on its own.
Another aspect of enhanced rescission authority that concerns me
is the leverage that such authority would give the President over
the Nation's priorities.
The President is presently limited to a choice of either vetoing
the whole bill or letting it become law with or without his signa-
214
ture. If the item veto power were to be given to the President —
which, I beheve, could only be accomplished by an amendment to
the Constitution — Congress could limit the effectiveness of that
power simply by showing fewer items and more lump sums in an
appropriations act. However, with the grant of enhanced rescis-
sions power to the President — which can possibly be achieved by
statute — he could sign the appropriations act into law, following
which he could, for all intents and purposes, effectively accomplish
the equivalent of a veto of a part or parts of the act by rescinding
whatever budget authority he found objectionable, thus placing the
burden on the Congress to pass a new bill reinstating the rescinded
authority, plus, in the event of a Presidential veto of that bill, an
additional burden of producing a two-thirds vote in both Houses to
"screw it to the sticking place."
Surely, Congress would have to be infected with a collective mad-
ness to seriously contemplate handing to any President, Democrat
or Republican, such power — let Mr. Clinton get in the White
House; let Mr. Tsongas get in the White House; let Mr. Brown get
in the White House. They are Democrats. If this Senator from West
Virginia is here, let them try getting enhanced rescissions or the
line-item veto through this Senate.
I will do everything I can to stop it. And why my Republican
friends do not take the same stand, I cannot understand. But if it
were a Democratic President, the shoe would be on the other foot
for them. I daresay they would not want to be handing that Presi-
dent enhanced rescissions powers or line-item veto authority. They
would not want him to have that. It would be different then.
But whether he is a Democrat or a Republican, I am against it.
Surely, Congress would have to be infected with a collective mad-
ness to seriously contemplate handing to any President such a
blackjack, even though it be clothed with the velvet-sounding
name: enhanced rescissions. It may sound like the voice of Jacob
to the ears of the unwary, but, in reality, it is the hairy hand of
Esau, and Congress should never let itself be fooled into giving its
blessing to such a perverse proposal.
Mr. President, the item veto and the enhanced rescissions pro-
posal are currently being advocated most vigorously and most vocif-
erously by the WTiite House and by Republican Members of the
House and Senate, who have had, for the last 13 years, a President
of their party in the Oval Office. But powers created for the use
of one President will remain to be used by another. It cannot be
turned on and off at will. A conservative George Bush today may
be followed by a liberal Jimmy Carter tomorrow — who knows, or a
liberal Michael Dukakis — or vice versa. Then where would we be?
The shoe would pinch my Republican friends in the Senate.
What if a Democrat were the occupant of the big house at 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue? Would our Republican colleagues then suffer
a vomitive aversion to enhanced rescissions and the item veto?
Would not this seemingly precious metal then be seen for what it
really is: fools gold? Would not the wax in their item-veto wings
melt if our Republican colleagues were forced to fly into the heat
of a Democratic Presidential sun? Ah, would they be like Hector on
the field to die, to save sweet item veto's honor; or, like a perfumed
Paris, would they turn and fly? And what about the cherished
215
friends of enhanced rescissions on the Democratic side of the aisle?
Would they so lovingly salute the banner of enhanced rescissions
if the assault weapons mobilized beneath its tattered folds were in
the hands of a White House brigade led by Commander in Chief
Ronald Reagan or George Bush? To ask these questions is to an-
swer them. Perhaps it £ill depends on whose ox seems to be getting
gored.
Let us briefly survey a few of the likely targets of a line-item
veto or enhanced rescissions under a President Carter or a Presi-
dent Reagan †” one, a Democrat; the other, a Republican.
On February 21, 1977, President Carter announced several water
projects which he claimed did not merit continued funding in the
fiscal year 1978 budget. Congress was able to prevent the elimi-
nation of funds for almost all of these projects by appropriating
money in the Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill.
However, if President Carter had been vested with line-item veto
or enhanced rescission authority, the list of projects that he pub-
licly opposed in this one bill, and which would likely have been
candidates for a line-item or enhanced rescission authority, include:
PROJECT, STATE
Applegate Lake, Oregon.
Atchafalay River and Bayous Boeuf, Black and Chene, Louisiana.
Bayou Bodcau, Louisiana.
Cache Basin, Arkansas.
Grove Lake, Kansas.
Hillsdale Lake, Kansas.
LaFarge Lake, Wisconsin.
Lukfata Lake, Oklahoma.
Meramec Park Lake, Missouri.
Richard B. Russell Dam and Lake, Greorgia, South Carolina.
Tallahala Creek, Mississippi.
Yatesville Lake, Kentucky.
Columbia Dam, Tennessee.
Fruitland Mesa, Colorado.
Savery-Pot Hook, Colorado, Wyoming.
Auburn, California.
Narrow Unit, Colorado.
Oahe Unit, South Dakota.
Mississippi River, Gulf Outlet, Louisiana.
Tensas Basin, Arkansas, Louisiana.
Bonneville Unit, Central Utah Project, Utah.
Central Arizona Project, Arizona.
Garrison Diversion, North Dakota.
In February of 1981, President Reagan presented his "Program
for Economic Recovery" to the Nation. In his budget reform propos-
als, he called for eliminating or reducing various programs within
a number of agencies including the following:
This is for my friends on the Democratic side of the aisle who
embrace the line-item veto, who embrace enhanced rescission.
Well, here are the items that were in the budget reforms pro-
posed by President Reagan in 1981:
216
DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
Child Nutrition Programs.
Food Stamps.
Dairy Price Supports.
Alcohol Fuels and Biomass Loans.
Rural Electrification Administration.
Farmers Home Administration Direct Loans.
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
Economic and Regional Development (including the Appalachian
Regional Commission).
Various National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Pro-
grams.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Inland Waterway Subsidies.
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION
Impact-aid for Schools.
Vocational Education.
National Institute on Education.
Institute of Museum Service.
Guaranteed Student Loan Programs.
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Synthetic Fuels.
Fossil energy.
Alcohol fuels subsidies.
Energy regulation.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Social Security Benefits.
AFDC Welfare Benefits.
Medicaid.
National Institutes of Health.
Medical Services for Merchant Seamen.
Health Professions Education.
Health Maintenance Organization.
National Health Service Corps.
Regulation of Health Care Industry.
DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT
Subsidized Housing Levels.
Subsidized Housing Rents.
Solar Energy and Conservation Bank.
Community Development Support Assistance.
Rehabilitation Loan Fund.
Neighborhood Self-Help Development.
DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR
Improve Targeting of Conservation Expenditures.
Youth Conservation Corps.
1
217
DEPARTME^^^ OF LABOR
Unemployment Insurance.
Federal Employees Injury Compensation (FECA).
Unemplo3rment Compensation for Ex-Servicemembers.
Trade Adjustment Assistance.
Black Lung.
Comprehensive Emplo3niient and Training Act (CETA).
Young Adult Conservation Corps.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
Highway Safety Grants.
Mass Transit Operating Subsidies.
Amtrak Subsidies.
Northeast Corridor Improvement Project.
Low Volume Railroad Branchlines.
Cooperative Automotive Research.
Subsidies for Airway and Airport User Fees.
OTHER AGENCIES
Acceleration of Mineral Leasing.
CAB Airline Study.
Export-Import Bank.
Postal Service Subsidies.
Water Resource Development Construction.
EPA Waste Treatment Grants.
Corporation for Public Broadcasting.
NASA Reductions.
National Consumer Cooperative Bank.
National Endowment for the Arts and Humanities.
National Science Foundation.
As in the examples given under President Carter, although Con-
gress was able to restore funding for many of the above programs,
had President Reagan been vested with line-item veto or enhanced
rescission authority, he would have been able to use such power
against the wishes of Congress.
During the 1988 Presidential election, Democratic candidate Mi-
chael Dukakis publicly announced his opposition to two Depart-
ment of Defense weapon systems — the Midgetman and the MX mis-
sile. Had he been elected President and had he been given line-
item veto or enhanced rescission authority, it is likely that he
would have exercised that power to reduce or eliminate one or both
of these systems.
So I say to my Republican colleagues: "The old order changeth,
jdelding place to new." Tennyson's words are as true in politics as
in other fields. Some day the Presidency will again be in the hands
of a Democrat. You cannot eat your cake and have it too.
Mr. President, an old bluegrass song carries a line: "I'm traveling
down a long, lonesome highway, and there's no turning back."
Thoughtful Senators know that once enhanced recission power is
ever given to the President — which, God forbid — it will never be
taken back by Congress.
So I say to my Republican friends, give this President enhanced
rescission authority, give it to him, and then when a Democratic
218
President is in that White House — as one will be as sure as the
splendid Sun crosses the heavens — that power will never be given
back to the Congress. It is a one-way ticket and there is no bend
in the road. It is a train that will never return. Any legislation that
might in the future seek to negate a President's power of enhanced
rescission would be summarily vetoed.
So you pass this legislation — and it is offered by Senators on the
Republican side now — ^you pass it. If it should become law, the day
will come when you will rue it. You will never get the power back.
Try to pass legislation to retrieve it. The Democratic President will
veto it. It will take a two-thirds vote to override the veto, and you
probably will never get two-thirds.
I can remember a time in 1937 when the Republicans had only
17 Senators — 17; 17 Republicans in the Senate. Better not give
that much power to the President — any President.
Such a fateful shift of power over the purse would permanently
alter the constitutional system of checks and balances and separa-
tion of powers. I warn Senators that once we go down that road,
there will be no turning back:
"The moving finger writes; and, having writ,
Moves on,
"Nor all your piety nor wit
Shall lure it back to cancel half a line,
"Nor all your tears wash out a word of it."
That completes my third speech, Mr. President.
EXHIBIT 1
l^'^mt Total amount pro- '*r„';!'°' Total amount of U""],^*;,"! Total amount of te-
nmT«Hhl posed by President ZZlJl proposals enacted ^^^^ITl scissions initiated
7S7 'orre^^cission >'-^g^^ by Congress '"g^^^^ by Congress
Fiscal year:
1992 U 16,700,000 25 1,382,377,000
1991 30 4,859,251,000 22 1,332,955,000
1990 11 554,258,000 8 513,302,000 68 2,322,145,000
1989 6 143,100,000 1 2,053,000 9 212,313,000
1988 61 3,860,653,067
1987 73 5,835,800,000 2 36,000,000 50 5,699,509,675
1986 83 10,126,900,000 4 143,210,000 5 6,668,450,000
1985 244 1,854,800,000 98 173,699,000 11 5,451,074,000
1984 9 636,400,000 3 55,375,000 8 2,181,515,000
1983 21 1,569,000,000 10 280,605,100
1982 32 7,907,400,000 5 4,365,486,000 3 16,927,000
1981 166 15,361,900,000 101 10,899,935,550 43 3,678,590,600
1980 59 1,618,100,000 34 777,696,446 30 3,003,950,100
1979 11 908,700,000 9 723,609,000 1 47,500,000
1978 12 1,290,100,000 3 55,255,000 2 61,964,000
1977 20 1,926,930,000 11 1,277,090,000 2 5,200,000
1976 50 3,582,000,000 7 148,331,000
1975 87 2,722,000,000 38 386,295,370 1 4,999,704
1974 2 495,635,000
Grand total
1974-92 920 61,635,857,000 324 19,557,337,366 351 36,210,728,246
'As Feb. 26, 1992.
Source: GAD.
Mr. BYRD. I have two or three additional speeches. I do not
know what the wishes of the leadership may be. I am sure that
Senator Sasser is ready to present a point of order. But I told Sen-
219
ator McCain that, should I elect to put in a quorum, I would notify
him. Let me see if I can ascertain what the wishes of the leader-
ship may be.
THE GAO REPORT ON THE LINE-ITEM VETO
Mr. BYRD. Mr. President, something has been said today about
the report entitled "Line-Item Veto, Estimating Potential Savings."
That was the title of the report by the General Accounting Office.
The purpose of that report, according to its cover letter, was to
provide a better basis on which to debate the basis of Federal line-
item veto proposals.
Well, having read the report, I am prepared to state that it in
no way achieves its stated purposes. I have thought rather well of
the General Accounting Office over the years. The General Ac-
counting Office is an arm of the Congress, and why the General Ac-
counting Office would allow itself to be used to stick a knife in the
back of the Congress is a little beyond me.
Cassius died by turning the same dagger upon himself that he
had plunged into the veins of Caesar.
Apparently, the General Accounting Office wants to do the same.
And it is my guess that it will get a little bit of that same knife
that it has used on the Congress. In all my years in Congress, that
is the weakest report that I have seen from the General Accounting
Office — shabby. It is fatally flawed.
Its basic premise assumes that the President would have applied
the line-item veto to all items to which objections were raised in
statements of administration policy during fiscal years 1984
through 1989. Yet the report itself states on page 2 that these esti-
mates are subject to a variety of uncertainties, and other adminis-
tration documents indicated that they may overstate the savings
that would have occurred. A special one-time 0MB report in 1988
indicated that the President would have vetoed much smaller
amounts than those that the SAP's — statements of administration
policy — identified as objectionable for that year.
Armed with this knowledge, the GAO should have concluded that
it was not possible to issue a report that could state with any cer-
titude what amounts of appropriations would have been line-item
vetoed.
Furthermore, page 7 of the report indicates that 71 Federal pro-
grams would have been terminated. If in fact these programs were
not terminated but were objected to in SAP's in more than 1 of the
6 years, did the GAO count the savings every time the termi-
nations were recommended?
I will give one more example. I know for a fact that the President
proposed several times to terminate Amtrak. So if the President
proposed the termination of Amtrak in each of the 6 years, 1984
through 1989, did the GAO count the savings in every one of those
years, duplicating the savings?
The President asked for the termination each year. The Congress
did not terminate Amtrak, but the General Accounting Office, in its
lousy report, does not allow for that fact. It uses the total cumu-
lative figure over those 6 years, as if it had been a different item
in each year that had, indeed, been terminated by the Congress. So
it overstates the savings by sixfold, in that instance. Imagine the
220
arm of the Congress — the GAO — letting itself be used to enhance
the destruction of the constitutional powers, the basic constitu-
tional power of the Congress, the power over the purse.
Let me take some excerpts from the budget overview hearing of
the Senate Appropriations Committee held on February 18, 1992.
Mr. Darman was the witness.
Mr. Darman said, "so it shows, once again, that from the per-
spective of at least appropriations, appropriations is not where the
fundamental problem is * * *."
Then, in another instance, in referring to the Federal budget, he
said that it was about $1.5 trillion —
"About a trillion and a half dollars a year," If you say to them,
"But by the way, the reason the deficit is so out of control is that
we only look at about $500 billion of that each year. The other tril-
lion we just leave alone."
What Mr. Darman had reference to there was entitlements and
mandatory items. That is one of the areas of the budget that is not
only getting out of control, it has been out of control. And it is get-
ting worse.
But the point I am making here is, the line-item veto would not
give the President of the United States an opportunity to get at
that. He could not go back and line-item the entitlements and
mandatories.
Where the Presidents have missed the boat has been on those oc-
casions when they could have vetoed authorization bills coming to
the White House that established new programs, new gind costly
programs.
I am talking with reference to the fact that the budgets have got-
ten out of control, the deficits are eating us up, and the
mandatories and entitlements are going to swallow us whole. They
are going to eat us alive.
So that was the time for the Presidents to have exercised their
veto. Once those are in law and they are required to be funded and
they are not controllable by the Appropriations Committee, they
are automatic. The formulas are set by law. Then the horse is out
of the bam. That is what is happening to the budget.
Supporters of the line-item veto and the enhanced rescissions
presume, Mr. President, and would have people believe, that it is
the Appropriations Committee that is responsible for the enormous
deficits that we are running. The Appropriations Committee has
control over only a minor portion of the budget. As I will shortly
indicate, and point out to the Senate, the uncontrollable portions
of the budget are the parts that are really causing the runaway
deficits, but the President cannot line-item veto those areas of the
budget. They are set by law. The only way they can be changed
would be by another law passed by the Congress and signed by the
President.
The chart which I am about to show will point out that between
the years 1981 and 1997 mandatory items and entitlements will
have accounted for $2,524,000,000,000 above inflation in those
years. This line represents the cumulative real increase in entitle-
ments in the years 1981 to 1997, and with the horizontal line rep-
resenting, let us say, inflation in this instance or baseline. The
viewers will note that in the bar to their far left, entitlements and
221
mandatory will be $2,524,000,000,000 over inflation in those years.
Defense will be $733 billion over inflation. Foreign operations $27
billion under inflation. And domestic discretionary funding, cumu-
latively speaking, during those years will amount to $655 billion
under inflation — under inflation.
But the point again is this: While defense and domestic discre-
tionary — and I will point out those two bars on the chart again, de-
fense and domestic discretionary — go through the appropriations
process; in this year we are about to be in, fiscal year 1993, domes-
tic discretionary will be 12.7 percent of the budget and defense will
be 19.2 percent. So that is about 32 percent of the total budget that
the Appropriations Committee will have control over. But for enti-
tlements and mandatory, the Appropriations Committee will have
no control over them.
Now as to appropriations, between the years 1945 and 1991, let
me call your attention to the fact that in those years — 1945
through 1991 — the Presidents of the United States requested a
total of $11,710,201,833,552. How much did the Congress appro-
priate in those years? It appropriated a total of
$11,521,432,604,188. In other words, Congress appropriated
$188,769,229,364 less than all the Presidents in those years re-
quested. So let the Appropriations Committees not be blamed for
the budget deficit.
And when we talk about a line-item veto, that is what the Presi-
dent will be line-iteming. He will be line-iteming appropriations.
Appropriations, as I have just stated, has not been the culprit.
The Appropriations Committees have not been the culprits, and yet
there are those in this Senate who want to adopt an amendment
giving to the President line-item veto power; they cannot give him
that by statute but they want to try it. But they can give him by
statute, I think, enhanced rescissions, which is by far worse than
the line-item veto, and it would be directed at appropriations.
Why take the gun to the innocent entity?
Mr. Reagan was the chief proponent, as I say, in recent years of
the line-item veto.
Let us just take his budgets. What did he request in the 8 years
when he was President? He requested a total of
$4,587,429,688,727. How much was appropriated?
$4,571,282,018,726. In other words. Congress came under Mr.
Reagan by a total of $16,147,670,001.
So I hope those who feel that the Appropriations Committees
have been the culprits will see that the facts do not support their
assertions. And I am talking about those Presidents as well who
think that, because that is what they are driving at. When they
talk about the line-item veto, they are talking about vetoing appro-
priations bills. And what I am saying is that the Appropriations
Committees are not responsible for the deficits. I have just proved
it.
I ask unanimous consent, Mr. President, that the tables showing
all of the appropriations from 1945 through 1991 be printed in the
Record.
There being no objection, the tables were ordered to be printed
in the Record, as follows:
222
REGULAR ANNUAL, SUPPLEMENTAL, AND DEFICIENCY APPROPRIATION ACTS COMPARISON OF
BUDGET REQUESTS AND ENACTED APPROPRIATIONS
Administration requested Enacted appropriations