factious injustice. It was an important principle in this and in the
State Constitutions," he said, "to check legislative injustice and en-
croachments." The question to insert "%" in place of "W was car-
ried by a vote of 6 to 4, with New Hampshire divided.
On Thursday, September 13, Madison sought to amend the lan-
guage "if 2Lny bill shall not be returned by the president within ten
days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him,"
by inserting between the words "after" and "it," the words "the day
on which," in order to prevent a question whether the day on which
the bill is presented, ought to be counted or not as one of the ten
days. The amendment by Madison was defeated, 3 to 8. There was
no further action regarding the veto power, and the Convention
completed its work four days later on Monday, September 17.
Mr. President, my study of the Convention debates clearly shows
that the discussions that took place regarding the veto power were
few and were engaged in only briefly. The discussions revolved
around three questions: (1) whether the veto power should be given
to the Executive alone or jointly to the Executive and members of
the Judiciary; (2) whether the veto should be an absolute negative;
and (3) the number required for a legislative override of the Execu-
tive veto — with the discussions concentrating finally on a % re-
quirement in preference to a % majority.
There was no mention whatsoever of an item veto. The President
was given a qualified negative only — not an absolute one — and it
seems clear from the debates that its use was not anticipated, as
the item-veto advocates would have us believe, "to be frequently
and forcefully used as an essential internal control on government."
The argument by item-veto proponents that "Congress has erod-
ed the veto power" and that the item veto is needed to restore that
President's veto to its original vigor and purpose as intended by the
Framers is not borne out by the record. The primary purpose in
giving the President a veto power, as the record of the Convention
debates clearly indicates, was to allow him to defend himself
against encroachments by the legislative branch.
Our experience with the veto over the past 200 years has shown
that its use has become more frequent during the last century than
during the preceding one, and that the veto power has not been
"eroded" — contrary to the claims that the item veto is necessary to
restore the President's veto power to its "original vigor." The facts
show that the veto power has been used vigorously by several
Presidents and with comparatively few overrides.
Franklin D. Roosevelt is the champion with respect to vetoes,
and he is fairly closely followed by Grover Cleveland with excellent
records, with few overrides.
In the early years, the veto was used sparingly. President Wash-
ington vetoed only two bills. From Washington's Presidency until
238
June 29, 1990, Presidents have exercised their veto power 2,482
times, of which 1,051 were pocket vetoes. Of the 1,431 regular ve-
toes, only 103, or 7 percent, have been overridden, the first over-
ride occurring under John Tyler, the Nation's 10th President.
Mr. President, the reason I do not have the number of vetoes
brought up to date is simply this: This series of speeches I had pre-
pared 2 years ago, or close thereto, because I felt that there would
come a time when I would need to say a few words on the subject
matter. So at that time, I prepared these speeches, and that is why
I had the date of June 29, 1990, as the date up to which I had
counted the number of vetoes that had been exercised. So I have
not brought the speech up to date from June 29, 1990.
I thought I should make that explanation for the record.
Two Presidents vetoed legislation with exceptional frequency:
Cleveland, in two terms, exercised the veto 584 times, while Frank-
lin Roosevelt vetoed 635 bills, with all but one occurring during his
first three terms. President Bush at the time I prepared this
speech back in 1990, had one pocket veto and twelve regular vetoes
on the scoreboard, with no overrides. With an average over these
200 years of only one override out of every 14 regular vetoes — and
with President Bush batting a perfect score, 13 vetoes and no over-
rides — it is clear that the "qualified" Presidential veto has, in prac-
tice, proved almost absolute in regard to bills of general interest to
the Nation. It should not stretch one's imagination too far to com-
prehend the utter futility of attempting to override an item veto if
a President were to be given such power over matters of interest
only to a limited area or region. In recognition of this difficulty,
some Senators have advanced the proposal that a President's line-
item veto be overturned by only a simple majority in both Houses,
rather than two-thirds. At the Federal level, may I say, how could
a relaxed requirement of only a majority veto be squared with the
Framers' requirement of a two-thirds supermajority? Moreover, if
only a simple majority were needed to override a veto. Congress
would have to spend an inordinate amount of time in attempting
to override vetoes of items of less than national significance, items
important only to a region or a few States or Congressional dis-
tricts.
We need only review the experienced difficulties encountered in
States whose constitutions give their governors item-veto power to
readily see that serious constitutional questions are inherent in
such a proposal if it were to be put in place at the Federal level,
regardless of the size of the number required to override. State
courts have had to grapple with the interpretation of the word
"item." It is confined to dollar amounts? Or does it also comprehend
"substance" as well as dollar amounts?
I must caution my Senate colleagues regarding another fact that
is often overlooked in the debate over the item veto: the equality
between the two Houses would be negated regarding appropria-
tions bills. This inequality would apply equally to enhanced rescis-
sions. The Constitution requires that vetoed bills be returned by
the President to the House in which the bill originated. Since regu-
lar appropriations measures customarily originate in the House of
Representatives, the Senate being thereby limited to the offering of
amendments, vetoed appropriations bills are, and will likely con-
239
tinue to be, returned by the President to the House. If the House
were to decide not to attempt an override of Presidential rescis-
sions or of item vetoes or if a House effort to override should fail,
the Senate would never be given a second chance to reenact the ap-
propriations it had originally supported. Only in the unlikely event
of a House override would the Senate get a second try at bat. The
House would always have a choice as to whether or not to go for
the override. If it chose not to try, its decision would automatically
deny the Senate the opportunity, even in instances where the items
vetoed or rescinded by the President had been added in the Senate.
Hence, the President could insure his veto against an override sim-
ply by choosing to veto only those items added by Senate amend-
ments — amendments in which the House itself had little or no in-
terest, and concerning which the House would be most unlikely to
mount an effort to override.
Simply put, the item veto is a pandora's box, and it should not
be opened. Even were only a majority to be required in order to
override — as some would suggest — let's leave this jinni in the bottle
where it has rested now for over 200 years — undisturbed!
In the recurring debates over the years concerning the item veto,
much has been spoken and written about the so-called "pork" in
appropriations bills. Proponents of the item veto wax eloquent
when they go after "pork barrel" spending. If Voltaire were here,
he would probably say, "If you wish to converse with me, define
your terms." Just what is "pork"? Is it to be defined only by the
beam in the eye of the beholder? If one listens closely to the advo-
cates, it becomes indubitably clear that the working definition of
"pork" is a project that Congress wants and the President does not,
or a project that is in somebody else's district. On the other hand,
the projects the President wants — for example, the superconducting
super collider, which dwarfs — dwarfs — the normal Congressional
items in the pork barrel, to say nothing of the space station — are
not to be stigmatized as "pork."
I chair the Subcommittee on Appropriations for the Department
of the Interior and related agencies, and I annually review the hun-
dreds of requests that I receive from colleagues on both sides of the
aisle who want funds from my subcommittee for programs or
projects affecting their respective States. I, of course, shall not
identify such Senators, but it has caught my attention that there
are a good many Senators who strongly champion the item veto,
yet, who quite unabashedly request funds from my subcommittee
for their own State projects. Those projects would be bait for en-
hanced rescissions or an item veto by the President if he possessed
such powers. This proves that there is, in fact, an exception to the
old saying that you can't have your cake and eat it, too. We can,
indeed, have it both ways!
In any event, just as one man's meat is another man's poison,
one man's "pork" is often another man's job. Much of the vaunted
pork is for rivers, dams, harbors, and water resources projects, or
for highways, mass transit, and other transportation items. Pork or
not, this Nation suffers from an infrastructure deficit, £ind such
projects are important in meeting the transportation, flood preven-
tion, industrial and commercial needs of the Nation. They also pro-
vide construction jobs and strengthen local and regional economies
240
and bring increased revenues into government coffers at Federal,
State, and local levels. Pork? Navigational improvements of our riv-
ers, the deepening of our ports and harbors, and the building of
lighthouses. All these enhance the Nation's shipping of manufac-
tured goods, agricultural products, and raw materials, and they
promote safety. Dams improve water quality, provide recreation,
protect people and towns against floods, provide water for power,
and husband water for release in seasons of drought. Pork? Im-
proved water and rail and motor transportation helps to increase
the productivity of workers, and increased productivity is the key
to growth in the economy. Pork? If all this is pork, then the Nation
needs more of it, for a nation — like a company — that does not in-
vest in its plant and equipment, its people and its future, is bound
to fail in the long run. Moreover, the item veto would only sub-
stitute a President's pork for Congress' pork, and were a President
to possess this power, we would probably end up with greater
spending, rather than less, at the Federal level, as the President
would be telling Congressmen: "If you will vote for what I want in
the bill, I will not cut out what you want." So there would be more
pork than ever. If the Chief Executive were ever to be given this
long handled barbecue fork — the item veto — he would become pre-
eminent in the legislative process — the Chief Legislator, the super
wheeler and dealer!
Moreover, if the President were given item veto or enhanced re-
scission authority, who, in the executive branch, would select the
"items" to be vetoed? It would not be the President. Certainly the
President does not have the time or the expertise to make such de-
terminations involving thousands of discrete items scattered
throughout the vast Federal budget. The fact is that such decisions
would generally be made by bureaucrats in the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget and other executive branch agencies before being
channeled up to the Oval Office. Therefore, the fate of untold num-
bers of appropriations items affecting various and sundry projects
and programs would rest in the hands of anonymous people who
are not elected and who do not have to face the voters. The veto
pen would be wielded by the President's hand, but, for all practical
purposes, the items rescinded or stricken would be determined by
individuals unknown to the Congress, unknown to the people and,
in many instances, unknown even to the Chief Executive himself.
Surely the Congress would think more times than twice before
turning over a share of the purse strings to scores of administrative
functionaries in the executive branch who would thus become de
facto legislators, yet who would be unaccountable to the electorate.
Still, the proponents of the item veto and enhanced rescissions
claim that the President needs such authority in order to put the
brakes on congressional spending. The claim is misleading and
should be seen for what it is: budgetary mythology. The fact is that
Congress, over the years, has spent less than Presidents have re-
quested in their budgets. For example, former President Reagan's
budget requests during his eight years in the White House totaled
$4,587,429,688,727. Congressional appropriations for those years
amounted to $4,571,282,018,726, or $16,147,670,001 less than
President Reagan asked for. If we wish to examine a longer period,
let us look at the 44 years between 1945 and 1988, inclusive. The
241
various administrations, Democratic and Republican, during that
time requested $9,597,329,175,096, while the total of all annual,
supplemental, and deficiency acts, all regular appropriations bills
amounted to $9,409,700,347,968, which was $187,628,827,128, or
.019 percent, under the combined budget requests of Presidents
Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and
Reagan. Thus, while devotees of the item-veto like to picture frugal
Presidents valiantly struggling to keep spendthrift Congresses in
check, the record does not support their case, certainly not with re-
spect to Appropriations Committee actions.
Furthermore, over half of the total Federal budget is outside the
control of the congressional appropriations process and would,
therefore, be beyond the ability of the President to item-veto or re-
scind even if he were to be granted such powers.
What did President Reagan and what does President Bush have
in mind as the target for cuts if given the item veto and enhanced
rescission power? Obviously, not defense or foreign aid. What this
means is that education, water and sewage treatment facilities, en-
vironmental and toxic waste cleanup, scientific research, air safety,
job training, health services, harbor and port improvements, flood
prevention projects, transportation, essential air service to rural
areas, and other national needs would get the item veto knife. Is
this what Senators want? Is this what the Nation's Governors
want?
They want the line-item veto. Watch them scream if the Presi-
dent were ever to be given the line-item veto. The Federal checks
that they like to wait and have their hands out waiting for will not
come. How would they then balance their budgets? Is this what the
people want? These are investments in people, investments in the
Nation's infrastructure, investments in the Nation's future. A com-
pany that does not invest in new plant and equipment and in the
education and training and wellbeing of its employees will fail.
Likewise, a nation that does not invest in its infrastructure, in the
education £ind training and health of its people, and in research
and technology will find itself unable to compete economically, in-
dustrially, scientifically, and culturally with other nations, and its
standard of living will fall. Is this what we want for our country?
This is the part of the overall budget that has taken the brunt of
the cutting knife over the past 10 years. Is this where the budget
will be balanced by further cuts?
Mr. President, the item veto would encourage creation of more
entitlement programs. Because if there existed a danger that the
President would line-item out, or use his enhanced rescissions pow-
ers which this amendment is giving, if he should line-item out the
programs that were popular with Members and with their constitu-
ents, then why would not Members resort to passing of legislation
giving those programs entitlement status so that it would be auto-
matic thereafter? The President could no longer line-item veto
them then.
So what this would mean, as I say, is that to give the President
the line-item veto would encourage creation of more entitlement
programs. Once in place, these would be beyond the reach of the
veto power because such backdoor spending is not subject to the
discriminating control of annual appropriations. Senators should
242
also be aware that, although, the national debate over the item
veto has confined itself to the so-called "pork" in appropriations
bills, such a veto could also be extended to apply to tax-revenue
bills and other authorization bills. Why subject only the appropria-
tions bills to an item-veto power and not revenue-raising bills or
other authorization bills? Legislation to authorize new and costly
social programs, agricultural support programs, defense authoriza-
tion bills, and other authorizing measures such as acid-rain and
environmental bills could also be made subject to the item veto.
That would be the purpose of the amendment which I would offer
as a second-degree amendment to the pending amendment. Let the
legislation that is within the jurisdiction of all of the committees
be subject to the line-item veto as well as appropriations bills. Is
that what we want?
I have an amendment that would provide that across the board
all the committees would have their legislation subject to the item
veto. How would the Armed Services Committee like to have its
legislation sent down to the President and he can line-item out the
items he did not want? The Armed Services Committee might want
those items. The President could line them out.
I do not believe that the chairmen of authorizing committees
want to see that happen. That would be the next step. It might
even be the step here. If the Senate wants to take that action, it
will have the opportunity. And if it should not take it now, on an-
other day at some future time if the line-item veto is ever imposed
on appropriations bills, get ready. The rest of the committees might
as well get ready because it will not be long until the line-item veto
will embrace and swallow them as well.
If we want to give the President a real hold on Government
spending, it can be done by authorizing him to cut "items" out of
legislation that authorizes back-door and other spending programs.
In this way, he can kill the "authorizing" egg before it ever hatches
into the "appropriations" chicken. The appropriations committees
do not operate in a vacuum. Normally, they appropriate funds for
programs that have been previously created by authorizing legisla-
tion enacted into law and signed by the President. Why not, then,
give the President the power to item veto authorization acts passed
by Congress, so that by closing the authorizing valve at the head
of the line he can assure that there will be no appropriations that
will flow through the spigot? Sounds interesting, does it not? How
many members of the Labor and Human Resources, or Agricultural
or Commerce, or Environment and Public Works, or Finance, or
Armed Services or other authorizing committees would welcome
that kind of a shift of power to the President?
How many ranking Members on the other side of the aisle would
like to see their authorizing committees protected from the line-
item veto, or from the enhanced rescissions powers?
Senators on authorizing committees who are eager to shift power
to the Executive by giving him an item veto over appropriations
should be aware that sauce for the goose can also be sauce for the
gander. I submit that if the Senate is going to be forced to vote on
the one, it should be also forced to vote on the other, and I shall
try to see that it does, if that becomes necessary.
243
The Reagan and Bush administrations, in pressing Congress to
grant line-item veto and enhanced rescission powers to the Chief
Executive, have sought to frame the debate around the argument
that such authority is necessary to allow the President to cut Fed-
eral spending, eliminate the deficits, and balance the Federal budg-
et. But the real issue here is much broader than that of balanced
budgets — and, incidentally, neither President Reagan nor President
Bush has ever submitted a balanced budget to the Congress during
their 10 years of running the Grovemment.
The real issue is power. That is the issue. Anyone who doubts
this will find most illuminating the following statement by Mr.
Richard Darman, Director of OMB, during a May 13, 1990 appear-
ance on ABC's "This Week With David Brinkley." I happen to get
along very well with Mr. Darman. I like him. But I think since this
is public information anyhow, I will just use it here.
Mr. George Will, a columnist who likes the line-item veto said:
"The line-item veto was used by Grovemors Reagan, Thompson of
Illinois, Thomburgh of Pennsylvania. . . . It's an interesting man-
agement tool, but no one really thinks that's a way to cut the kind
of deficit we're talking about. Are you suggesting that?
Mr. Darman. No. ... In and of itself, it isn't directly a significant
way to cut the deficit. What it does do is it transfers a degree of
power to the Executive branch and gives the President, in the case
of the Federal Grovemment, a stronger position in negotiations.
That stronger position could be used, for example, to get savings
in other program areas."
So, Mr. President, I repeat that the real issue is power, just as
Mr. Darman said on that occasion. It goes to the very heart of our
constitutional system of checks and balances and separation of
powers. Power. I do not want to see that power in the hands of any
President. I do not want to see it in the hands of a Republican
President. I do not want to see it in the hands of a Democratic
President.
It is not a battle over turf; it is a battle over the division of pow-
ers between the executive and the legislative branches of Grovem-
ment. That division and balancing of powers between these two
branches — setting aside the third branch, the judicial, in the con-
text of this argument — ^is what is fundamentally at stake here, and
the sooner this is understood, the more clearly will appear both the
folly and the danger of the proposals being advanced.
The central mainspring in our constitutional balancing system is
control of the purse. Just as the love of money is, according to the
Scripture, the root of all evil, so is money the milk of politics and
the grease of government. The item-veto debate, when shorn of all
of its fancy trappings, is a debate about power, and control of the
purse is the bone and sinew of power.
I did not put that power here. The constitutional Framers put it
in the legislative branch — ^the power of the purse — and that is
where it ought to stay. That is where it has been these 200 years.
I have already related in an earlier speech how those Framers, who
met in Philadelphia in 1787, knew about the history of England,
about the long struggle of Englishmen to wrest the control of the
purse away from tyrannical monarchs and place it in the hands of
the representatives of the people in Parliament.
244
In the pages of history, we have witnessed the centuries-long
struggle for Anglo-American liberty, and the parallel struggle for
power over the purse — the safeguard of liberty — when that power
remains vested in the legislative branch, the branch of government
that is closest to the people. It is a historical positive that was
clearly stated by William Ewart Gladstone in a speech at Hastings
on March 17, 1891. He said:
"The finance of the country is ultimately associated with the lib-
erties of the country. It is a powerful leverage by which English lib-
erty has been gradually acquired.. . . If the House of Commons by
any possibility lose the power of the control of the grants of public
money, depend on it, your very liberty will be worth very little in
comparison. That powerful leverage has been what is commonly
known as the power of the purse — the control of the House of Com-
mons over public expenditure."
Mr. President, Gladstone was right in associating the "power of
the control of the grants of public money" with one's "very liberty."