commission chaired by my colleagues Senators NuNN and DOMEN-
ICI that a line-item veto is not in itself deficit reduction. But if the
President is willing to use it, it is the appropriate tool to cut a cer-
tain kind of wasteful spending — ^the pork-barrel projects that tend
to appear in appropriations and tax bills. Presidential leadership
can eliminate these projects when Congress, for institutional rea-
sons, usually cannot. Individual Senators and Representatives, who
must represent their own local interests, find it difficult to chal-
lenge their colleagues on behalf of the general interest. Pork-barrel
spending on appropriations and taxes is only one of the types of
spending that drive up the deficit, not the only type, and not the
largest. But until we control these expenditures for the few, we
916
cannot ask for shared sacrifice from the many who benefit from en-
titlements, or the many who pay taxes.
I expect to be asked why I am introducing my own bill, rather
than signing on as a cosponsor to 1 of the 26 existing bills, resolu-
tions, or constitutional amendments to give the President line-item
veto or enhanced recision authority on appropriations. The answer
stems from my experience, as a member of the Finance Committee,
with tax legislation. These bills provide special exceptions from
taxes for special interest that total about $375 billion a year, more
than the entire Federal deficit.
We need to be honest about the fact that as many instances of
outrageous, unnecessary, special-interest pork-barrel as are buried
in appropriations bills can be found in tax bills, although often
camouflaged in coded jargon that makes it impossible to figiire out
who benefits. For every $250,000 for a water tower in Joplin, MO,
earmarked in an appropriations bill, there is a $32 million special
depreciation schedule for rental tuxedos, buried in a tax bill. For
every $900,000 appropriated for a revolving business loan fund in
Elkhart, IN, there is a $6 million special exemption from fuel ex-
cise taxes for crop-dusters. And some tax expenditures even cancel
out spending for the common good: We spend millions of dollars to
clean up lead, asbestos, and uranium, three of the most potent poi-
sons on our planet, but in the Tax Code, there's a $12 million sub-
sidy to produce these minerals.
In singling out these pork-barrel projects, I do not mean to pass
judgment on their merits. Every small businessperson could benefit
from a revolving loan fund. Aviators benefit from the lowest excise
tax on fuel. But these provisions instead single out narrow
subclasses to benefit — ^businesses that happen to be located in Elk-
hart, IN, or people who own crop-dusters. Everyone else pays. A
line-item veto would allow the President to weigh these narrow ex-
penditures against our shared goal of cutting spending and lower
taxes for all. And if Congress concludes that these expenditures
still have merit. Congress will have the power to override the veto.
If the President had the power to excise special interest spend-
ing, but only in appropriations, we would simply find the special
interest lobbyists who work appropriations turning themselves into
tax lobbyists, pushing for the same spending in the Tax Code.
Spending is spending whether it comes in the form of a Govern-
ment check, or in the form of a special exception from the tax rates
that apply to everyone else. Tax spending does not, as some pre-
tend, simply allow people to keep more of what they have earned.
It gives them a special exception from the rules that oblige every-
one to share in the responsibility of our national defense and pro-
tecting the young, the aged, and the infirm. The only way to let ev-
eryone keep more of what they have earned is to minimize these
tax expenditures along with appropriated spending and the burden
of the national debt so that we can bring down tax rates fairly, for
everyone.
For the next President to keep his promise to cut the deficit, he
will need the power to block unnecessary spending for narrow local
interests. For the next President to hold the line on taxes, or even
better, provide some meaningful tax relief for the vast majority of
families who need help, he will need the power to block spending
917
through the Tax Code for narrow interests. And if the next Presi-
dent is to keep his promise to make new investments in education,
job training, and infrastructure, he will need the power to distin-
guish between wasteful, narrow spending generated by congres-
sional special interests and productive investment that will benefit
the general interest.
The bill I will introduce will be modeled on a bill my colleague
Senator Rollings has introduced in several Congresses. I want to
thank and commend Senator HOLLINGS for working so hard to de-
velop a workable line-item veto strategy, one that goes beyond po-
litical demagoguery to the real question of how to limit spending.
My bill will require that each line item in any appropriations bill
and any bill affecting revenues to be enrolled as a separate bill
after it is passed by Congress, so that the President can sign the
full bill or single out individual items to sign and veto. It differs
from other bills in that it avoids obvious constitutional obstacles
and in that it applies to spending through the Tax Code as well as
appropriated spending.
The bill would remain in effect for just 2 years. That period
should constitute a real test of the idea. First, it will provide
enough time for the Federal courts to address any questions about
whether this approach is constitutionally sound, or if a constitu-
tional amendment is necessary. Only courts can answer this ques-
tion, which is in dispute among legal scholars. Second, we should
have a formal process to determine whether the line-item veto
works as intended: Did it contribute to significant deficit reduction?
Did the President use it judiciously to cut special-interest spending,
or, as some worry, did he use it to blackmail Members of Congress
into supporting his own special interest expenditures? Did it alter
the balance of power over spending, either restoring the balance or
shifting it too far in the other direction?
The American people have no more patience for finger-pointing
or excuses. We can no longer tolerate a deficit that saps our eco-
nomic strength which politicians in Washington insist that it's
someone else who really has the power to spend or cut spending.
The President must have no excuses for failing to lead.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that the text of the bill
and a summary be printed in the Record.
Bill Summary
The Tax Expenditure and Legislative Appropriations Act of 1993
introduced by Senators Bradley and Robb would give the President
the authority to veto line items in appropriations bill and to veto
tax expenditures in revenue bills. Expanding upon a bill introduced
by Senator Rollings, it would be a statutory, separate enrollment
line-item veto with a 2-year sunset provision.
The bill would require that each item in an appropriations bill
be enrolled as a separate bill for presentment to the President.
This would be achieved by having the enrolling clerk break the bill
down into its component parts and send each provision to the
President. In addition, the bill would require that each item in a
revenue bill that was scored as a net revenue decrease, e.g. each
tax expenditure be enrolled as a separate bill. As a result, all ap-
918
propriations items and tax expenditures would be subject to the
Presidential veto and the override provisions of the Constitution
would apply. This would effectively give the President the author-
ity to block individual appropriations items or tax expenditures,
subject to the 2/3 override of both houses of Congress.
The bill would sunset in two years. As a result, it would con-
stitute a legitimate test of the workability of the line-item at the
federal level. It would also allow the federal courts enough time to
address any questions as to the constitutionality of the approach.
)
919
PENDING BEFORE THE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
January 21, 1993
n
103d congress
1st Session
S. J. RES. 4
Proposing a constitutional amendment to authorize the President to exercise
a line-item veto over individual items of appropriation.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
January 21 (legislative day, January 5), 1993
Mr. Specter introduced the following joint resolution; which was read t^\^ce
and referred to the Committee on the Judiciar\'
JOINT RESOLUTION
Proposing a constitutional amendment to authorize the Presi-
dent to exercise a line-item veto over individual items
of appropriation.
1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled
3 (two-thirds of each House concuiring therein), That the
4 following article is proposed as an amendment to the Con-
5 stitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all
6 intents and purposes as part of the Constitution if ratified
7 by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States
8 within seven years after its submission for ratification:
920
2
1 "Article —
2 "Section 1. The President may reduce or disapprove
3 any item of appropriation in an Act or joint resolution.
4 If an Act or joint resolution is approved by the President.
5 any item of appropriation contained therein which is not
6 reduced or disapproved shall become law.
7 "Section 2. The President shall return uith his ob-
8 jections any item of appropriation reduced or disapproved
9 to the House in which the Act or joint resolution contain-
10 ing such item originated.
11 "Section 3. The Congress may. in the manner pre-
12 scribed under section 7 of Article I for acts disapproved
13 by the President, reconsider any item reduced or dis-
14 approved under this article, except that only a majority
15 of each House shall be required to approve an item whicii
16 has been disapproved or to restore an item which has been
17 reduced by the President to the original amount contained
18 in the Act or joint resolution.".
SJ 4 IS
921
By Mr. SPECTER:
S.J. Res. 4. A joint resolution proposing a constitutional amend-
ment to authorize the President to exercise a line-item veto over
individual items of appropriation; to the Committee on the Judici-
ary.
LINE-ITEM VETO CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, once again I introduce a proposed
constitutional amendment to authorize the President to veto or re-
duce individual items of appropriation in bills and resolutions. The
line-item veto or reduction authority is a necessary step in helping
to bring the chronic budget deficit under control, and I have long
supported it. This proposed authority of the President to veto or re-
duce specific items of appropriation in large spending bills provides
a realistic opportunity to rein in the deficit from which we suffer.
I believe the President now has the constitutional authority to
exercise the line-item veto, and I co-signed a letter authored by
Senator Dole urging President Bush to exercise the line-item veto,
but President Bush declined on the advice of his counsel. This
amendment would remove all doubt.
The budget process has run amok in recent years. Most recently,
the outgoing administration provided information to indicate that
the deficit will continue to balloon over the next 4 years, contradict-
ing previous information regarding the growth of the deficit. And
some commentators suggested that this recent report understates
the scope of the problem. A line-item veto would provide a valuable
institutional check on unfettered spending and trade-off pork-barrel
projects that serve not the national interest but rather private in-
terests and must therefore be buried in lengthy appropriations
bills, out of sight of all but the concerned interest groups.
Currently, the President cannot realistically control this form of
congressional excess. The choice is a stark one: either the President
vetoes an entire appropriations bill, putting at risk all programs
funded in the bill or he swallows the relatively small percentage of
pork spending in any bill to fund the large number of vital pro-
grams. The line-item veto gives the President a useful tool with
which to counter this type of wasteful spending. Standing alone,
the line-item veto will not solve our deficit problem, but it will help
by allowing the President to stop or reduce funding should he deem
the programs too expensive or unnecessary.
I believe that it is preferable to grant to the President not only
the authority to veto completely individual items of appropriation,
but also to grant him enhanced rescission authority. Studies in
States whose governors exercise line-item veto authority suggest
that while a straight line-item veto, an up or down on a specific
item of appropriation, have little effect on spending and budget
deficits, enhanced rescission authority does have a significant effect
on spending. Therefore, my proposal contains both a veto provision
and a provision to allow the President to reduce individual items
of appropriation.
Many claim that the line-item veto would result in an intolerable
shift of power from the Congress to the Executive and undermine
the carefully crafted balance of power established by the Founding
Fathers. No one is more sensitive than I am to the respective roles
922
of the legislature and the executive and the need to retain a bal-
ance of authority between the two branches. While it is a peculiarly
legislative function to decide how much money to spend on Govern-
ment programs and to allocate these funds, there is no reason for
a line item veto to be considered any more of an infringement on
the separation of powers than the President's ability to veto bills
at all. This veto power serves a crucial function in our system. As
Alexander Hamilton recognized in Federalist 73, the veto pro-
vides —
"An additional security against the enaction of improper laws
* * * to guard the community against the effects of faction
precipitancy, or of any impulse unfriendly to the public good, which
may happen to influence a majority of (the legislative) body."
The purpose for enacting a line-item veto fits squarely within
this reasoning.
Of course, under the Constitution, Congress controls the power
of the purse. The ultimate authority of the Congress to decide how
to allocate and spend the Federal Government's money is protected
by my proposal. Under my proposed constitutional amendment,
Congress could override the President's veto or reduction of any
specific item of appropriation by a simple majority vote. This over-
ride by simple majority, rather than by the two-thirds majority
needed to override a veto of an entire bill, provides adequate pro-
tection for congressional spending authority. Any item of appropria-
tion that cannot command the support of either the President or
a simple majority of the Congress is simply bad policy and should
not be approved at all. By allowing a simple majority vote to over-
ride, the proposal allows Congress to exercise its authority consist-
ent with the general constitutional requirement that a simple ma-
jority is sufficient to enact legislation. Thus, the line-item veto is
not terribly onerous to congressional prerogatives. It merely re-
quires a Congress to take a second look at particular items of
spending. In this regard, it forces the entire institution to look over
spending. Thus, the line-item veto as I propose it will merely re-
duce the power of congressional committees and special-interest
group lobbyists; it will have no significant effect on the authority
of the Congress as an institution.
Mr. President, the issue of the line-item veto has been pending
for several years. In the 101st Congress, the Judiciary Committee
favorably reported two different versions of the line-item veto
amendment, although the full Senate never considered either pro-
posal. In the 102d Congress, no proposal was reported, but pro-
posed statutory enhanced rescission authority was considered and
rejected twice by the Senate. I hope that this year, when the politi-
cal pressure of divided government has been removed, is the year
in which we finally enact this worthwhile idea.
As I have said, I do not believe that, on its own, a line-item veto
will cure the deficit. Together with budget reforms, and greater Ex-
ecutive and congressional discipline, the line-item veto offers hope.
Indeed, it is this hope that induces me to introduce this proposal
again. While President Reagan and President Bush both supported
a line-item veto, there was little realistic chance of its adoption
with a Congress controlled by Democrats. With the accession of
President Clinton, who has enjoyed constitutional authority to em-
923
ploy a line-item veto as Grovernor of Arkansas and strongly sup-
ports the line-item veto in principle, I expect and hope that a Fed-
eral line-item veto can finally become part of our fundamental law
and can be used as a weapon against out-of-control budget deficits.
We must do something to curb these deficits. The American peo-
ple have made it clear that they will not accept government as
usual. We must put the public interest first and the private inter-
ests of the groups that come begging for federal dollars must no
longer enter into our consideration. The best way to thwart the
power of private interests is to shed light on them, and the line-
item veto will enable the President and Congress to do just that.
I ask unanimous consent that the joint resolution be printed in
the Record.
924
[From the Congressional Record Page S622]
n
103d congress
1st Session
S. J. RES. 15
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to allow
the President to veto items of appropriation.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
January 21 (legislative day, January 5), 1993
Mr. Thurmond (for himself and Mr. Simpson) introduced the follo\ving joint
resolution; which was read t\\'ice and referred to the Committee on the
Judiciary
JOINT RESOLUTION
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States to allow the President to veto items of appropriation.
1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled,
3 (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the fol-
4 lowing article is proposed as an amendment to the Con-
5 stitution, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes
6 as part of the Constitution when ratified by the legisla-
7 tures of three-fourths of the several States \vithin seven
8 years after the date of its submission to the States for
9 ratification:
925
2
1 "Article —
2 "The President may disapprove any item of appro-
3 priation in any Act or joint resolution. If an Act or joint
4 resolution is approved by the President, any item of appro-
5 priation contained therein which is not disapproved shall
6 become law. The President shall return with his objections
7 any item of appropriation disapproved to the House in
8 which the Act or joint resolution containing such item
9 originated. The Congress may, in the manner prescribed
10 under section 7 of article I for Acts disapproved by the
11 President, reconsider any item of appropriation dis-
12 approved under this article.".
SJ 15 IS
926
[From the Congressional Record page S2778]
March 11, 1993
By Mr. THURMOND (for himself and Mr. Simpson):
S.J. Res. 15. Joint resolution proposing an amendment to the
Constitution of the United States to allow the President to veto
items of appropriation; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
PROPOSED CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT RELATIVE TO LINE-ITEM
VETO
Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I rise today to introduce a pro-
posed constitutional amendment which would give authority to the
President to disapprove specific items of appropriation on any act
of joint resolution submitted to him. The authority is commonly re-
ferred to as line-item veto.
Too often during debate on the budget, the discussion focuses on
ways to enhance revenues. The Congress must address runaway
spending if we are truly going to establish a sound fiscal policy of
this Nation.
The Federal debt exceeds $4 trillion and payment of interest on
the debt is the second largest item in the budget. The budget defi-
cit for fiscal year 1992 was over $290 billion. The Ofiice of Manage-
ment and Budget projects the deficit for fiscal year 1993 to possibly
reach $341 billion. We must take strong, disciplinary action to en-
sure fiscal responsibility.
The Congress regularly enacts appropriations measures, totaling
billions and billions of dollars. Too often there are items tucked
away in these bills that represent millions of dollars and they
would have very little chance of passing on their own merit. Yet,
the President has no discretion to weed out these unnecessary ex-
penditures and must approve or disapprove the bill in its entirety.
Presidential authority for line-item veto is a badly needed fiscal
tool which would provide a valuable means to reduce and restrain
excessive appropriations.
Forty-three Governors currently have, in one form or another,
the power to reduce or eliminate items or provisions in appropria-
tion measures. Surely, the President should have the same discre-
tionary authority that 43 Grovernors now have to check unbridled
spending.
It is my hope that this Congress will swiftly approve line-item
veto and send a clear message to the American people that we are
making a serious effort to set our Nation's fiscal house in order.
I urge my colleagues to support this proposal and our efforts to
make it part of our Constitution.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that this proposal be
printed in the RECORD following my remarks.
There being no objection, the joint resolution was ordered to be
printed in the RECORD, as follows:
927
II
103d congress
1st Session
S. J. RES. 63
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution authorizing the President to
disapprove or reduce an item of appropriations.
IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES
March 11, (legislative day, March 3), 1993
Mr. SlMOX introduced the following joint resolution; which was read twice and
referred to the Committee on' the Judician-
JOINT RESOLUTION
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution authorizing
the President to disapprove or reduce an item of appro-
priations.
1 Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives
2 of the United States of America in Congress assembled
3 (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the fol-
4 lowing article is proposed as an amendment to the Con-
5 stitution of the United States, which shall be valid to all
6 intents and purposes as part of the Constitution if ratified
7 by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States
8 within seven years after its submission to the States for
9 ratification:
928
2
1 "Article —
2 "The President may reduce or disapprove any item
3 of appropriation in any Act or join resolution, except any
4 item of appropriation for the legislative branch of the Gov-
5 emment. If an Act or joint resolution is approved by the
6 President, any item of appropriation contained therein
7 which is not reduced or disapproved shall become law. The
8 President shall return with his objections any item of ap-
9 propriation reduced or disapproved to the House in which
10 the Act or joint resolution containing such item originated.
11 The Congress may, in the manner prescribed under sec-
12 tion 7 of the article I for Acts disapproved by the Presi-
13 dent, reconsider any item disapproved or reduced under
14 this article, except that only a mggority vote of each House
15 shall be required to approve an item which has been dis-
16 approved or to restore an item which has been reduced
17 by the President to the original amount contained in the
18 Act or joint resolution.".
SJ 83 IS
929
By Mr. SIMON:
S.J. Res. 63. A joint resolution proposing an amendment to the
Constitution authorizing the President to disapprove or reduce an
item of appropriations; to the Committee on the Judiciary.
930
March 24, 1993
[From the Congressional Record pages S375 1-3754]
m
103d congress
2d Session
S. RES. 195
Ebcpressing the sense of the Senate that the President corrently has authority
under the Constitotion to veto individaal items of appropriation and