United States. Dept. of State. Office of Public Co.

Department of State bulletin (Volume v. 41, Jul- Sep1959) online

. (page 42 of 88)
Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 41, Jul- Sep1959) → online text (page 42 of 88)
Font size
QR-code for this ebook

public. That regime has no mandate from its
people. It lacks that true independence which
is a basic attribute of a sovereign state.

Tlie purpose of the Soviets in putting forward
the i^roposjil is all too clearly to perpetuate the
partition of Germany. I repeat, therefore, that
this proposal is not acceptable.

Western Proposal for Continuing Discussions

In rejecting the Soviet proposal for an all-
German committee, however, the Governments of
France, Great Britain, and the United States re-
fuse to abandon their 1-i-year-old effort to achieve
the reunification of Germany in freedom. This
is a responsibility which they share with the
Soviet Union.

The Western peace plan testifies to our con-
tinued search for the means to this end. It also
testifies to our willingness to meet Soviet criti-
cisms of past plans. Unhappily, Mr. Gromyko
rejected the Western peace plan, despite its patent
reasonableness and workability.

We must not flag in our efforts, notwithstand-
ing rebuffs, rejections, and obstructions thrown
up in our path. The German people want reuni-
fication. Justice demands it. Indeed, all those
who have a stake in future peace demand it.

The Foreign Ministers of France, Great Brit-
ain, and the United States, ever since the So^aet
Foreign Minister rejected the Western peace plan,
have been considering how the three of us to-
gether with our So\'iet colleague could best con-
tinue to discharge our responsibility for the
German question as a whole, which includes the
matter of reunification and a peace settlement
with Germany. I say a peace settlement with
Germany, rather than with two parts of Ger-
many, as the So\dets propose, because there can
be no peace settlement unless all of Germany is

•> Jbid., Aug. 1, 1955, p. 176.

represented in its negotiation by the freely chosen
goverimient of a reunified Germany. The Soviet
Union itself recognizes this principle, at least in
form, when it speaks of a peace treaty with
Germany — even though what it goes on to pro-
pose are peace treaties with parts of a divided

The three Western Foreign Ministere have con-
cluded that there is a sensible and businesslike way
of continuing a common search for the road to
reunification and a peace settlement with

Our proposal is as follows :

The Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers, as at
present constitutetl, shall continue in being for the pur-
pose of considering the German problem as a whole. It
should also consider questions relating to the extension
and development of contacts between the two parts of
Germany. For these purposes the conference shall meet
from tune to time at such level and at such place as are
agreed. The conference may also make special arrange-
ments for the consideration of particular questions
arising out of its terms of reference as defined above.

This proposal would enable representatives of
our four Governments to keep under continuing
discussion a problem which is of major impor-
tance to each of us, to the German people, and in-
deed to peoples throughout the world. It will
permit a thorough consideration of the Western
peace plan — the most comprehensive plan yet de-
veloped for solving the problem of a divided

It would enable the Four Powers to utilize
German advisers following the practice adopted
by the present conference.

It would provide, by its terms of reference, for
tliis conference to consider all the subjects which
the Soviet Foreign Minister cataloged in his pro-
posal of June 19. He proposed then that the aU-
German committee

. . . should promote the extension and development of
contacts between the German Democratic Republic and
the Federal Republic of Germany, discuss and work out
concrete measures for the imification of Germany, and
consider questions pertaining to the preparation and
conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany.

The three Western Powers submit tliis proposal,
after careful and serious deliberation, in an effort
to meet the desire of the Soviet Foreign Minister
that we here agree on a method for continuing
discussions looking to German unification — but in
a manner that is consistent with our respective
responsibilities. The U.S.S.R. Foreign Minister

August 10, 1959


has offered to accept any procedure for consider-
ing the problem of divided Germany whicli is ac-
ceptable to the Germans. I am informed that the
procedure here proposed is acceptable to the
Federal Republic of Germany, the legitimate
authority representing 51 million Gennans.

I hope that the Soviet Foreign Minister will
consider this proposal carefully. Thank you.


I would like to speak very briefly, on behalf of
the United States delegation, on one matter. And
that concerns the linkage which the Soviet Union
is seeking to establish between the questions of
German unification and an interim Berlin arrange-
ment. This matter was referred to again by Mr.
Gromyko in the speech he has just concluded.

This attempted linkage illustrates a very real
difference which, I believe, lies at the root of much
of the difficulty we are now having in reaching
agreement at this conference. That difference
arises out of the basic fact that the free world
pursues a strategy of consent in international
affairs, while the Communists pursue a strategy
of duress.

For example, the Soviet Union created this
year's Berlin crisis with a threat that, if the West-
ern Powers did not accept their Bei'lin proposal
by May 27, the Soviets would attempt to extin-
guish Western rights in Berlin. This was an ap-
plication of the traditional Communist strategy
of duress. It did not succeed.

Another Application of Duress

The Soviet Union is now engaged in another
application of this strategy of duress in an effort
to capitalize on the Western Powers' desire to end
the Berlin crisis.

The Soviet Union is saying, in effect, that it will
end the Berlin crisis — for a while — but only at a
price. That price is Western acceptance of the
Soviet proposal that the problem of a divided Ger-
many be put in the hands of a committee of Com-
munist Germans and free Gennans. We are told,
at least implicitly, that if this price is not paid —
if we do not agree to the formation of this com-
mittee — the U.S.S.R. will try to make our position
in Berlin impossible.

If accepted, this Soviet proposal would result
in still a third, and even more dangerous, applica-
tion of the strategy of duress.

The committee of Communist and free Germans
would be given but a short time to solve a difficult
problem with which the Four Powers have wres-
tled unsuccessfully since the war. Failure in its
task would be assured by the basic fact that the
leaders of the Soviet Government and of the so-
called German Democratic Republic have made
ci-ystal clear that they will never agree to reunifi-
cation of Germany under conditions which did not
assure the communization of the Federal Republic.
Such a committee would have no chance of success.

Price of Failure

And what is the price of failure ?
Significantly, the U.S.S.R.'s proposal for a Ber-
lin arrangement includes the termination of the
arrangement at the same time scheduled for the
expiration of the life of the "mixed committee."
The price for the Federal Republic of Germany
and for the Western Powers would thus be another
threat to their West Berlin brothers in freedom.
The price of failure for the East Germans would,
by the same token, be the prospect of another
attempt by their Soviet friends to help East Ger-
many annex West Berlin.

This, then, would be tlie final element of the
three-stage strategy of duress in which the Soviets
are now engaged, if we accepted the Soviet pro-
posals for an all-German committee and for an
interim Berlin arrangement with the same time
In devising these proposals, the Soviet Govern-
ment has constructed an ingenious device whereby
it clearly hopes to apply pressure on the Western
allies eventually to accept changes injurious to
their rights and interests in respect of either Berlin
or Germany — or preferably both.

Mr. Gromyko has made tliis intent quite evident
in tlie present negotiations.

First, he suggests tliat the all-German commit-
tee be given a year and a half in which to com-
plete its labors. If at the end of that time it
fails to agree, then, Mr. Gromyko explains, there
will be no point in its continuing to discuss Ger-
man unity and the Soviet Union will enter into
new negotiations about Berlin and apparently
about a German peace treaty, too, with the
Western Powers.


Deparlmenf of Stafe Bulletin

Mr. Gromyko has given us certain assurances
tliat no unilateral action will be taken during
these subsequent negotiations. He has been care-
ful, however, to say nothing about what will
happen if these negotiations fail — as the Soviet
Union can quickly cause them to do.

He has thus refused to give us any assurance that
the Soviet Union will not, soon after expiration
of the year and a half period which he has pro-
posed, sign a separate peace treaty with the so-
called German Democi-atic Republic — a treaty
which tlio Soviet Union would then claim
extinguished all Western rights in Berlin.

The coincidence of the expiration dates for the
interim agreement on Berlin and on the life of
the all-German committee must thus, according
to Soviet calculation, insure one of two results.

Either the Federal Republic will capitulate in
the all-German committee to any and all demands
of the so-called German Democratic Republic in
an effort to avert unilateral Soviet action in Ber-
lin, or the Soviet Union will use the lack of pi'og-
ress in tlie all-German committee as the pretext
for confronting the three Western Powers with
what the Soviets would expect to be an impossible
situation in West Berlin.

In effect, what the Soviet Union is proposing to
do is to hold for ransom a whole city — 2 million
human beings. And the Soviet Union even sug-
gests tliat we should become its unwitting accom-
plice in this deal by agreeing to the very
arrangements which would make this possible.

This, in brief, is why the Soviet Union pro-
poses that the questions of the all-German com-
mittee and of any interim agreement on Berlin
be inextricably linked.

This, in brief, also is why the Western Powers
reject this linkage.

This conference is seized, as you pointed out
yesterday, Mr. Chairman, with two separate is-
sues: what should be the procedures for future
discussion of the problem of Germany as a whole,
and what should be the terms of an interim
arrangement for Berlin.

Yesterday I indicated why my Government
could not accept the Soviet proposal for linking
these two problems under an arrangement which
would leave the Soviet Union free, after a speci-
fied period, to take unilateral action against Ber-
lin if there were lack of progress toward German

Any interim arrangements which thus permit-
ted the Berlin crisis to be revived after a short
interval would establish, for all practical pur-
poses, exactly the kind of tie between an interim
arrangement for Berlin and the question of Ger-
man unity which could be exploited to apply pres-
sure both on the German people and the three
Western Powers on the two issues.

Since I believe that these two issues — however
important each of them may be — should not thus
be linked in any conference agreement, I also be-
lieve that it would be more orderly for this con-
ference to address them separately. I gather that
this procedure is agreeable in view of Mr. Gro-
myko's statement of yesterday that we should ex-
change views pertaining to an interim solution
on Berlin in order to evaluate "the difficulties
which we have to overcome and to clarify those
possibilities which exist in order to arrive at an
agreement and to realize those possibilities."

If we are to discuss these two questions sepa-
rately, I would like today both to conclude my
previous discussion of the Soviet proposal for a
mixed German committee and to indicate where
I believe tliat this discussion leaves this confer-
ence as far as its future work is concerned.


At the outset let me ask for your indulgence if in
the few remarks that I am about to make I cover
some of the same ground which Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
just covered so clearly and directly in dealing
with the question of the so-called all-German
committee. If some of my remarks appear to be
repetitive, it is, I think, only an indication that
we feel very strongly on the points which have
been brought out during the course of the

Soviet Proposal Unacceptable

I will begin, Mr. Chairman, by summarizing
the principal reasons why the Soviet proposal for
a mixed committee of free and Communist Ger-
mans is unacceptable to the Western Powers.

Mr. Gromyko has tried to give the impression
of surprise at our refusal to agi-ee that such a
committee would, as he put it in his proposal of
June 19, "promote the extension and development
of contacts between the German Democratic Re-
public and the Federal Republic of Germany,

August JO, 1959


discuss and work out concrete measures for the
unification of Germany, and consider questions
pertaining to the preparation and conclusion of a
peace treaty with Germany."

With an air of reasonableness, he told us that
nothing would be more logical than arranging for
the Germans to get together to discuss and agree
on matters vitally affecting their own future. Pie
went on to suggest that it is only blindness, ob-
stinacy, and revanchist-mindedness which stands
in the way of the Four Powers' reaching agree-
ment on his proposal.

When we pointed out that the outcome of any
such confrontation of representatives of the Fed-
eral Republic and of the so-called German Demo-
cratic Republic would be an early and total dead-
lock, Mr. Gromyko asked how we could be sure
of the outcome before we had given the proposal
a trial.

We have explained to Mr. Gromyko tliat we
can be sure of the outcome for the simple reason
that the highest personages of the Soviet Govern-
ment and of the so-called German Democratic
Republic have made crystal clear that they will
never agree to the reunification of Germany imder
conditions which did not guarantee the communi-
zation of the Federal Republic of Germany.

The all-German committee, imder the tenns of
reference proposed by the Soviet Union, is thus
not worth the trial because the outcome of the
experiment is entirely predictable in advance. It
is also not worth the trial for three other reasons :

First, by the device of this proposal, the Soviet
Government very cleverly seeks to have its cake
and eat it, too.

The Soviet Government tells us that reimifica-
tion is none of our affair and that we should turn
this over to the Germans to work out among them-
selves. This is a strange position for the Soviet
Union to take when its own national interests are
so clearly identified with the terms and conditions
under which Germany will be reunified.

How does Mr. Gromyko resolve this problem?
For, despite all its protests to the contrary, I can-
not believe that the Soviet Union is actually will-
ing to renounce its interest in the manner and
terms of German reunification.

The answer is very simple if, as Mr. Selwyn
Lloyd has pointed out, one understands the re-
lationship between the men who head the regime
of the so-called Gennan Democratic Republic and

the Government of the Soviet Union. This re-
lationship is such that it is impossible for repre-
sentatives of the so-called German Democratic
Republic to pursue a policy which is contrax-y to
that which the Soviet Union considers to be in its
own interest.

The negotiation in any all-German committee
would thus not be a free one between two free
governments. It would be a negotiation between
one free government — the Federal Republic of
Germany — and representatives of a regime who
were, in fact, only speaking for the Soviet Union.

Four-Power Responsibility

This leads me to the second of the three reasons
we reject the Soviet proposal.

If that proposal were put into effect, the three
Western Powers would be compelled to abdicate
their responsibility for assuring German reunifi-
cation under conditions which would enable all
Germans freely to determine the form of their
own government. This, again, Mr. Selwyn Lloyd
has developed. Equally important, they would
have to abdicate their common responsibility for
creating a reunited Germany in a framework of
European security which would assure that war
would not erupt again in the center of Europe, as
it has twice in our own lifetime.

These are responsibilities and interests which
the four of us share. They have been confirmed
in past Four Power agreements, the latest of
which was reached on July 23, 1955, when Chair-
man Bulganin subscribed, along with President
Eiseiihower, Sir Anthony Eden, and M. Faure
to a document wliich included the following
words : °

The Heads of Government, recognizing their common
responsibility for the settlement of the German question
and the re-unification of Germany, have agreed that the
settlement of the German question and the re-unification
of Germany by means of free elections shall be carried
out in conformity with tie national interests of the Ger-
man people and the interests of European security.

No one can dispute that tliis language squarely
reserved responsibility for German unification to
the Four Powers. We do not propose here to
enter into an agreement which sets this responsi-
bility to one side.

The Soviet proposal would both maintain the
Soviet Union in a position of responsibility and

> Ibid.


Department of State Bulletin

control in regard to German reunification and ex-
clude tlie Governments of Fi-ance, Great Britain,
and the United States from exercising the role in
this process which their own interests require.

The third reason that we reject the Soviet pro-
posal is because it would amount to our announc-
ing to the world at large tliat we considered the
regime in East Germany to be on a basis of equal-
ity with the freely chosen government of the
Federal Eepublic of Germany. This for obvious
reasons we are not willing to do, and the Soviet
Govcrmnent knew that we were not willing t

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 41, Jul- Sep1959) → online text (page 42 of 88)