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Vol. XLVII, No. 1214 October 1, 1962



by Deputy Under Secretary Johnson 475


by Assistant Secretary Cleveland 482


U.S. FOREIGN POLICY • by Ridmrd iV. Gardner . . 496


STATE • by Assistant Secretary Martin 487




For index see inside back cover


Vol. XLVII, No. 1214 • Publication 7431
October 1,1962


For BBle by tbe Superintendent ot Docnments

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of the Budget (January 19, 1961).

Note: Contents of this publication are not
copyrighted and Items contained herein may
be reprinted. Citation ot the Dbpaetment
o» Stite Bulletin as tbe source will be
appreciated. Tbe Bdlleiin is Indexed In the
Readers' Guide to Periodical Literature.

The Department of State BULLETIN,
a weekly publication issued by the
Office of Media Services, Bureau of
Public Affairs, provides the public
and interested agencies of the
Government icith information on
developments in the field of foreign
relations and on the work of the
Department of State and tlie Foreign
Service. The BULLETIN includes se-
lected press releases on foreign policy,
issued by tlie IThite House and the
Department, and statements and ad-
dresses made by tJve President and by
the Secretary of State and other
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ow To Combat Communist Goals

hy U. Alexis Johnson

Deputy Hinder Secretary for Political Ajf airs ^

I appreciate your courtesy in asking me to join
ith you this evening, for all of us involved in f or-
^ affairs are well aware of the helpful interest
at tlie Junior Chamber of Commerce has taken

the matters exemplified by this Institute, wliile
5o carrying out the constructive work in which
lU have long engaged within this country.
All of us who are in this business realize that
r foreign policy can be no stronger than the
pport that lies behind it in the country as a
liole. With no home and no person in our coun-
y more than 30 minutes away from potential in-
neration, foreign policy is very much the business
' all of us, and the subject on which I was asked

speak this evening, "How To Combat Commu-
st Goals," is indeed veiy well chosen.
I sympathize with persons such as yourselves
ho are properly and of necessity engrossed in
)ur daily business, community, and family af-
lirs and yet want to take an informed interest

this business of foreign affairs. It is a terribly
•mplicated business and becoming more so each
ly; yet the time you are able to devote to it is

cessarily very limited. You read this headline
day and tomorrow you read another, and you
3 not know what or whom to believe. This leads
I confusion and confusion often leads to anger,
et we all know that anger does not produce co-
irent thinking.

When I am away from the daily and hourly flow
I information in Washington and dependent for
y information on headlines, with usually very
cief articles, it has often occurred to me that the

'Address made before the Middle Atlantic Institute of
le Junior Chamber of Commerce at Washington, D.O., on
3pt. 15 (press release 557 dated Sept. 14) .

cfofaer 7, J 962

picture one gets of foreign affairs solely from such
sources must be very like the picture that the
proverbial man from Mars would get of one of our
cities if he were entirely dependent upon the local
press for his information. I say this in no sense
as critical of the press, radio, or television foreign
news coverage but rather to point out that it is
inlierent in the situation. Just as in your cities
it is not the 999 people soberly going about their
accustomed tasks teaching school, constructing a
building, ministering to the ill, manufacturing
useful things, and so on, that ordinarily make the
news, but rather the 1,000th who makes news by
committing a crime or creating trouble of some
kind. We know our own communities well
enough to know that the one is not typical of the
other 999, but we do not have the same background
when it comes to foreign matters and are tlius more
apt to take the headline as typical of the whole.

My point is not that there is not trouble in the
world around us, for there is indeed trouble, but
rather that we need to look not only at the trouble
but also at the tremendous amount of constructive
work going on in order to have a proper picture
of the situation in which we find ourselves.

You can be sure that there are none who better
appreciate that the world we live in is rapidly
changing than those of us in the State Depart-
ment who have seen this transformation take
place. If you will pardon a personal note, when I
joined the Foreign Service in 1935 there was a
total of 665 officers serving in Washington and in
the 61 coimtries with which we maintained diplo-
matic relations. In an average country abroad
there were usually not more than five or six of us,
including the ambassador, and we were usually
the only official Americans in the country. In a


busy month the State Department might handle
something around 2,000 telegrams. Today there
are almost 700,000 official American civilians
abroad, phis about another million military per-
sonnel, and in the State Department alone we
handle more telegrams in a day than we formerly
handled in a month. In just a small way this is
uepresentative of the change that has taken place
in the impact of the woi'ld on these United States
and our impact on the world.

The Development of Nationalism

During this period two other great forces have
had and are having their impact on the world.
One is veiy apparent to all of us— communism.
(I deliberately do not add the adjective "interna-
tional," "Soviet," or "Cliinese" as I want later
to return to this question.) The other great force,
of which we are less aware but which may in the
long run prove to be at least of equal importance,
is the development of nationalism among that more
than half of the world's population that prior to
the Second World War was under various forms
of colonialism. If we are to understand and deal
with the former, it is equally important that we
also understand and deal with the latter.

Few probably realize tliat in the 17 short years
since the end of the Second World War 45 new
free states have been formed and more are still
on the way. These range from the great state of
India, with its more than 450 million people, and
Indonesia, with its almost 100 million, to the
smaller states of Africa. In total population they
far exceed ourselves. Western Europe, and the
Soviet Union combined. Many of these states
have gone through or are going through what we
may at times regard as aberrations. However,
they also present aberrations when looked at from

You will recall that Moscow has pressed might-
ily on this subject of colonialism by others on two
premises. One was that being forced to give up
its colonies would weaken the West, and the sec-
ond was that the former colonies would embrace
communism and thus pass to the control of Mos-
cow. However, this has just not happened. No
single one of these 45 new states has chosen com-
munism for itself. (I do not include in tliis figure
Nortli Viet-Nam and North Korea, which bor-
dered on Communist states and were within the
grip of Communist armies.) At times some of







these 45 states have appeared to liover on the brinl "*
and Moscow has made major investments to brin *"'
them to that brinlc, but fierce national pride hs '"'
asserted itself and they have clambered back ui
the slippery slope

There is a fundamental truth here in which w
can take comfort, although it should not cause i
to relapse into any form of complacency. Th
truth is that our national well-being, in fact tl:
fundamental philosophy at the base of our nation!
life, does not require that foreign countries be oi
satellites or dependencies or be formed in ar
single image of ourselves. Diversity and tole
ance of diversity are a fundamental part of oi
own life and the way we look at the world. As tl
President has stated it,- our goal is:

... a i)eaceful world community of free and Indepen
ent states, free to choose their own future and their ov
system so long as it does not threaten the freedom

Some may choose forms and ways we would not choc
for ourselves, but it is not for us that they are choosii
We can welcome diversity — the Communists cannot. F
we offer a world of choice — they offer the world

We are naturally flattered and pleased wh
someone seeks to pattern his social, political,
economic institutions upon ours, for properly ^
feel that those institutions have served us we
However, we recognize that other peoples with d;
ferent cultural backgrovinds and different natur
environments will probably evolve differing ins!
tutions. To have stability, these political instit
tions must in some form have what our Declar
tion of Independence so aptly termed "the conse
of the governed." The old Chinese term for it w
the "mandate of Heaven." Even with the politic
genius of our ancestors, it took many years and
great Civil War to establish our own pattern. '.
many ways the process is never finished and co
tinues with each session of the Congress and t
Supreme Court.

Understandably, most of these new countries |j
and, for that matter, many older ones — are goi
tlirough the same process, often with much h jy
with which to work and always under the gre
contending forces and pressures of this mode
world. We can sympathize with and understa;
this process. Wliile it is annoying and often fri
trating when these countries do not look at t
world outside of them through the same glasses












' Bulletin of Jan. 29, 19C2, p. 159.

Department of Stale Bulle i


urselves, the thing that is of vital national im-
n ortance to us is that these countries not become
iibservient to a power hostile to ourselves.
ck I lappily, these countries are also seeking to avoid
abservience to anyone, and thus we have a soimd
asis for mutual cooperation based on the sound
rounds of mutual self-interest. We, of course,
ill also always value allies willing to associate
[lemselves with us for common ends.

ationalism and Communism Incompatible

The position of the Soviet Union is vastly dif-

rent. The Soviet Communist system cannot
jlerate material differences of diversity, although
iictically it may appear to do so for temporary
eriods. This demand for conformity, not only
Q a domestic but also an international plane,
rises not just from the personal characteristics
f Soviet leaders but rather more fundamentally
lif« rem the very imperatives of the system itself.

This is not solely a matter of ideology, im-
ortant tliough that is, but arises from the practi-
al requirements of the system. Communism re-
uires a controlled and directed economy down
) its most minute details. In my service in a
Communist country I was increasingly impressed
Tith the fact that production and consumption
aust be regulated and controlled by a central au-
^ hority because there are not built into the system
hose automatic controls with which we are so
amiliar. This central control of the resources
joing into production includes, most importantly,
he human resource — that is, people. To the de-
cree that such control is effective — that is, people
an be made to respond to it — the system can op-
rate. "Wlien people do not respond to it, the
ystem is endangered.

The same is true on the international scale.
fOomfortably to fit into the Soviet scheme of
hings, other states must be responsive and dis-
iplined to Soviet control both in the economic
md political context, for one cannot be divorced
LTom the other. This is increasingly being recog-
lized not only in free countries but also within
he Communist countries themselves. It faces
iommunism with a fundamental challenge for
ivhich it by no means has found an answer. My
)wn conviction is that it cannot find an answer
md remain the communism that we have known.

In part this is demonstrated by the fact that
we can even today no longer speak of a "Com-

Ocfofaer 7, 7962

munist bloc" in the same way as we did 10 years
ago in the sense of a solid group of countries cen-
trally directed and controlled in all things by
Moscow. We need now to differentiate from the
original Soviet Communist model, each in its sep-
arate way, the variants of communism found in
Yugoslavia, Red China, Poland, and Albania.
Thus, even in the orbit of communism, nationalism
is asserting itself. The bitterness of even the pub-
lic debate within the Communist world is witness
to the difEculty that the doctrine is having in try-
ing to adapt itself to the realities of the interna-
tional scene.

I have hastily sketched over some of this back-
ground as I feel that it is important to understand-
ing the world in which we are living. In doing
so, I hope that my remarks will not be interpreted
in any sense as implying that we can be complacent
or that I am attempting to gloss over the prob-
lems we will continue to face, for this is far from
my thought. Rather, what I have attempted to
show is that there are at work in the world many
different forces. While we can, to a degree, hope
to influence some of these forces, we cannot expect
to control them. To seek to do so would be to fall
into the Soviet error. Plowever, what I have tried
to demonstrate is that we need not fear these forces
of nationalism but rather can welcome them as
being compatible with our own tradition and in-
compatible with Communist doctrine. We should
take confidence in this, as it again demonstrates
that our own tradition is still more closely attuned
to the universal aspirations of mankind than any
other system yet devised. It is important that
we remain true to this tradition.

Thus we have in the world today three great
forces: the aggressive forces of communism, the
assertive nationalism of the newly developing
countries, and the great democratic tradition of
this country and Western Europe. "What are we
doing about it, and, specifically, what can you do
about it?

Defeating Communist Insurgency

Only a few brief words on the military aspects.
In the first place it is obvious that all else would
count for little if the Soviet Union were to achieve
a decisive military superiority over us. This it
has not done. Simply let me say that we have
sound grounds for confidence that, no matter what
degree of surprise the Soviets might acliieve in an


attack on the United States, we could still also
inflict crippling devastation on the Soviet Union.
Soviet recognition of this fact is our best deter-
rence against general war. However, this is not
a static situation but rather one that will continue
to call for the best of brains and much of our
treasure. It would be simple and easy to bring
about a situation in which both countries would
be devastated. To use this power wisely and well
so as to promote our interests without bringing
about such a result calls for a high degree of
sophistication and steady nerves. At the same
time we are seeking in the disarmament negotia-
tions to halt and if possible to turn downward this
ever-increasing spiral of terror.

With the standoff in nuclear power and inability
of the Communists to win allegiance by open
means, we will probably continue to face situations
such as that in South Viet-Nam, where the Com-
munists seek to impose their control by insurgency
or guerrilla warfare. This type of warfare is, of
course, nothing new. In 1948 five Communist-led
revolutions were underway in Asia, in addition to
the civil war in China. These were in Indonesia,
Bunna, Malaya, the Philippines, and what was
then called French Indochina. There was also a
major push by the Communist Party in India.
Except in North Viet-Nam, where they were able
to capture the nationalist movement, the Commu-
nists were defeated in all of these efforts, as they
were also defeated in Greece. They were, of
course, successful in China, as subsequently they
were successful in Cuba. I will not attempt this
evening to go into the circumstances that led to
their success in these latter two countries.

My point is that Communist insurgency can be
defeated. It usually has been, and I am confident
it will be defeated in South Viet-Nam. However,
in each rase where it has been defeated it has been
primarily by the forces of nationalism within the
country. We can assist and advise, as we are
doing in South Viet-Nam, but we do not and
should not wage "American wars" against insur-
gent forces. In our concern with the ever-
increasing complexity of general warfare, we had
perhaps neglected our capabilities of assisting
countries facing this type of threat in which
muzzle-loading rifles and even crossbows are more
important than supersonic jet fighters. This type
of warfare calls for a true blend of political, eco-
nomic, and military measures. Quiet organiza-



iion 10

llies »
stead 0'

tional and training steps have been taken by tk flat
administration both in Washington and the fiel liaB
to improve our ability to assist in meeting the! hat of

Terms of the Economic Struggle

There remain the terms of the economic struggl« ,ji,51a
I know that this is a field in which you have
particular interest. Many of you in this room th;
evening will have a direct and personal part t
play in this process. There are several facets t
this matter. First, and most important, is how w
Americans continue to progress in resolving oi
own economic problems such as assuring a decer j[j,.|ijt,
income for the perhaps 10 percent of our populi
tion who have an income below decent subsisten*
standards ; what we are able to do about those (
our working population who are without jobe .„
wl^at we are able to do about the fact that the pe L
centage growth of our gross national product hi
declined. While I full well realize that the dec
sions of government will play an important pa
in this, the ultimate decisions on this will be ma(
by the individual decisions of those sitting in th
room and your business colleagues everywhere :
this country. This is not just a question of pr
senting to the world a picture of a vigorou
healthy economy with the leadership and prestij
this naturally gives but also the very practical ar
immediate jsroblem of our ability to maintain o\
military and economic posture overseas.

Closely related to tliis question of econom
vigor and growth is the type of relationship v
develop with the European Common Market ar
the other industrialized free nations of the wor
such as Japan, Australia, and Canada.

I am sure that I need not argue with this grou
the degree to which the size of the "common ma
ket*' we have enjoyed among our States has co)
tributed to our own economic well-being ar
growth. This is so self-evident that it is no longi
a subject of discussion. Although, as populatic
patterns shift and economic patterns change, har(
ships are inflicted upon individual industries ar
employees, particularly those unable or unwillir
to move with changing times, we recognize this !
an inevitable j^rice to be paid for progi'ess thi
benefits the whole.

I know that you are aware of the formation (
the European Common Market, whicli will prol
ably be joined shortly bj- the United Kingdor

Department of State Bullet



of Ik
tries i








?hat market will comprise a popiilation larger
Ihan our own and, incidentally, also larger than
hat of the Soviet Union. It will comprise an
iconomy that is growing faster than our own and
n some ways is already superior to our own. For
xample, except in a few isolated pockets, un-
mployment is virtually nonexistent in the Com-
^ aon Market area. As Under Secretary Ball stated
" Bst November,^ we are truly on the "threshold of
« new trading world" that will affect every busi-
lessman and manufacturer in this country. The
)rogress of the Trade Expansion Act through the
jongress gives promise that this country will be
ible to enter into a relationship with the Common
*Iarket and the other industrialized free countries
,hat will give entirely new vigor and a new dimen-
iion to the economies of the free world. Inci-
lentally, it is also giving a direct lie to the so-called
icientific theories of Marxism-Leninism on the
iconomic and political development of relations
between capitalist states. Instead of decaying,
hese economies are showing renewed vigor. In-
stead of withering when deprived of their colonial
Dossessions, these countries are showing new
mergy. Instead of fighting among themselves,
:hese coimtries are submerging old rivalries and
nationalisms into a greater good for all.





Aidjto Underdeveloped]Countries

Not less important than the development of our
own economy and that of the other free industrial-
ized comitries is the development of the economy
of the newly independent and underdeveloped
countries. These terms are, of course, not synony-
mous, as there are many long-independent coun-
tries such as those in Latin America that are
imderdeveloped in the sense of providing a decent
standard of life for the greater part of their

"While it is often said that we must assist these
countries in their efforts to develop themselves in
order to prevent their going Communist, in my
own opinion this oversimplifies the matter.
Poverty in itself does not give rise to instability
and disorder — fertile ground in which the Com-
munists can work. As a matter of fact, Cuba had
one of the highest per capita incomes in Latin
America. What does give rise to instability and
disorder is a sense of unjustified inequality as be-

' IMd., Nov. 20, 1961, p. 831.

Ocfober 7, 7962

tween people within the same country and as
between countries.

This question of development is, of course, a
peculiarly difficult one which we by no means have
the time to discuss this evening. "VVliy does one
comitry develop while another does not? It is
clearly not a question of race — witness the devel-
opment of Japan. Wliile climate may have its
influence, vigorous civilizations have flourished in
the tropics. There is clearly much that we do not

However, one thing is clear. There is today no
comitry and no people who are content with the
old patterns and who are not seeking to better
themselves. This desire is, of course, the first step
toward progress. If communism had never
existed, we would still have a big stake in this
process, for it is only as it is achieved in some
degree that we can look forward to that orderly
and stable world which is the goal of our national
policy. From a narrow economic point of view,
we also have a big stake, for we can only sell to
people who can afford to buy. For example, we
sold more to Japan last year than we sold to all
of the continent of Africa. (Incidentally, we also
sold almost twice as much to Japan as we bought
from her.)

"VVliat we can do about this question of develop-
ment is relatively limited, for the thi-ust and re-
sources must come primarily from within the
country itself. What we as a government can
and are seeking to do is to supply the marginal
increment without which the country's own plans
would not be successful. There is also an even
greater role for private investment, for just as we

Online LibraryUnited States. Dept. of State. Office of Public CoDepartment of State bulletin (Volume v. 47, Oct- Dec 1962) → online text (page 1 of 98)