United States. Office of Naval Records and Library.

German submarine activities on the Atlantic coast of the United States and Canada online

. (page 20 of 23)
Font size
QR-code for this ebook

200 feet away. However, it is thought probable that they saw part
of their own wreckage, and that the ship was sunk by a mine. A total
of 85 survivors were later accounted for.

On October 27, 1918, about 10 p. m., the Chaparra, Cuban steam-
ship of 1,505 gross tons, with a cargo of sugar, bound from Cuba to
New York, was blown up by a mine 10^ miles south by east off
Barnegat Light. The crew of 11 men came in the Inlet with the
captain in one of their own boats; the balance of the crew landed on
North Beach, Coast Guard Station 112.

Capt. Jose Vinolas, the captain of the Chiparra, testifies that he
is a native of Barcelona, Spain; that he was the captain of the Chap-
arra, and that she was flying the Cuban flag, her owner being Empresa
Naviera de Cuba, S. A., Habana, Cuba. That they had a full cargo
of sugar consisting of 14,000 bags. That the agents for the ship in
New York were Manuel Caragol & Son. That they sailed from
Cardenas, Cuba, on October 22, 1918, bound for New York. At the
time of the ship's destruction her location was: South 60°, 10 miles
from Barnegat, making 8 miles an hour. That on the night of
October 27, at 10 p. m., they felt a heavy blow just forward of the
bridge on the port side; there was a terrific explosion, and the vessel
was fairly lifted out of the water. At the same time a column of water
was thrown up which covered the bridge. The vessel listed to port
and capsized, sinking within 2^ minutes. They only had time to
launch two boats from the starboard side, and managed to save 23
of the crew of their 29. That he fears that the 6 missing men were
killed. That they made for Barnegat Light, Station 113, and landed
about 8 p. m. on October 28. They were picked up at that place by
a boat which took them to Barnegat. The weather was clear with a
moderate sea. Saw no submarine. There were various other vessels
in the vicinity which were not molested, which leads him to believe
that the ship struck a mine. Ship's papers went dow^n with the ship.

The testimony of Capt. Vinolas is corroborated by the members of
his crew^, all of whom agree that the CTmparra was sunk by a mine.

MINE-SWEEPING SHIPS.

The mine-sweeping operations on the European side of the Atlantic
are dealt with in another paper. For this duty on the Atlantic coast
of the United States the following vessels were employed;



MINE-SWEEPING OPERATIONS ON ATLANTIC COAST. 137

No. 6: Off Chesapeake Bay Buoy 2cB. Number mines

given by message, 6. Not shown on chartlet.
No. 7: Off Wimble Shoal Buoy. Number mines, 9.

5. All of these areas, and all of the areas given in other two reports,
have been carefully swept.

6. Mines have been found as follows:

Area No. 1: Fire Island.

Number.

San Diego — Sunk 19 July 1

20 July— Destroyed 3

5 August — Found on Fire Island 2

5 September — Found on Fire Island 1

8 September — Found on Sandy Ilook 1

Total 8

Area No. 2: Barnegat.

Number. •

7 September — Mine cut loose by U. S. S. South Carolina 1

8 September — Destroyed 14.5 miles NE. Brigantine Shoals Buoy. . 1
4 October— U. S. S. San Saba sunk 1

10 October— Destroyed by U. S. S. Teal 1

12 October— Destroyed by U. S. S. Teal 1

14 October— Destroyed by U. S. S. Teal 1

16 October— Destroyed by U. S. S. Freehold 1

27 October— U. S. S. Chaparra sunk 1

Total 8

German report give nine mines in this field.

Area No. S: South of Fenwick Island Lighthouse.

Number.
29 September — ^U. S. S. Minnesota mined 1

9 November — U. S. S. Seatia sunk 1

9 January — Destroyed by U. S. S. Teal 1

12 January— Destroyed by U. S. S. Teal 1

13 January — Destroyed by U. S. S. Teal 1

14 January — Destroyed by U. S. S. Teal 1

20 January— Destroyed by U. S. S. Teal 1

Total 7

German report gave seven in this area.

Area No. 4: South of Winter Quarter Shoal Lightship.

Number.

23 November— Destroyed by U. S. S. Rail 4

24 November— Destroyed by U. S. S. Rail 3

Total 7

S. S. Inland reported sinking one mine 11 miles SW. Winter Quar-
ter Shoal Lightship 15 January. If this report is correct, it would
make eight mines accounted for in this field. German report gave
eight mines in this field.

Area No. 5: South of Winter Quarter Shoal Lightship.

No mines have been found in this field, although it has been care-
fully swept.



138 GERMAN SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.

Area No. 6: Off Chesapeake Bay Buoy 2CB.



Number.



22 June — Two miles from Virginia Beach Buoy, destroyed. . .

5 July— Lat. 36° 38^ N., 75° 44' W., destroyed

31 July — Found ashore at Gargathy Inlet

18 August— Lat. 36° 08' N., 75° 34' N., destroyed

18 Augiist — Four miles off Cape Henry Buoy 2CB, destroyed.

9 September— Lat. 36° 52' N., long. 75° 44' W., destroyed...

9 September — Found ashore Coast Guard Station No. 168. . .



Total.



None of these mines were swept up. Tliose destroyed were found
floating or ashore. From German reports, six mines were planted in
this area. The mine found at Gargathy Inlet might be credited with
this field or the Overfalls field.

Area No. 7: Wimble Shoal.

Number.

15 August — S. S. Mirlo sunk 1

18 August— Destroyed by U. S. S. Teal 2

25 August— Destroyed by U. S. S. Teal 2

30 August— Destroyed by U. S. S. Teal 2

5 September— Destroyed by U. S. S. Teal 3

Total 10

German reports gave nine mines in this field.

Area No. 8: Off Overfalls Lightship.

This field was not shown on any German chartlet, although one message from
Admiral Sims states "across mouth of Delaware River 2 miles east of Overfalls Light."

Number.

3 June — S. S. Herbert Pratt sunk 1

3 June — Destroyed 2

3 June — Destroyed 1

9 June — Destroyed 1

16 August — Destroyed 5 miles from Five Fathom Bank Lightship.. 1
10 Jime, 1919— Found ashore Coast Guard Light No. 140 1

Total 7

The mines swept up in this area were not across the entrance of
Delaware, but were on a line about S. by E. from Overfalls Light.

7. Besides these reported areas, the following mines have been
reported : ,

Number.

20 September— Cut loose by P. V., not destroyed; lat. 40° 48' N.,

long. 70° 33' W. Reported by S. S. Plassey (doubtful) 1

9 September — Reported by steamship sunk south of Cape Hatteras. 1
8 October — Reported by steamship sunk south of Cape Hatteras,

lat. 33° 20' N., long. 76° 18' W 1

18 September — Sunk by rifle fire off Halifax 1

10 October — Landed at St. Margarets Bay 1

21 October — Washed ashore Sable Island 1

Total 6



VESSELS DESTROYED BY THE SUBMARINES.



139



8. The grand total of all mines found is as follows:

Number.

Outside reported fields 6

Vicinity Overfalls Lightship 7

Vicinity Wimble Shoal 10

Vicinity Chesapeake Bay 7

Vicinity Winter Quarter Shoal Lightship 9

Vicinity Fenwick Island Shoal Lightship 7

Vicinity Barnegat 8

Vicinity Fire Island Lightship 8

Total 62

Of these, three mines were found off Nova Scotia, leaving 57 on
the United States Atlantic coast.

9. Besides these mines which have been sunk, reports of mines
sighted drifting have been received to the number of 29. While
these reports of drifting mines could not be authenticated, only those
that the source was considered reliable have been counted.

10. In view of the above, and the fact that all fields reported have
been carefully swept, and some of them several times, it is believed
that the United States Atlantic coast may be declared clear of mines,
and sweeping discontinued.

Table No. 1. — Vessels destroyed by the submarines acting on the surface, using gunfire
and bombSi in western Atlantic.
»

(Vessels American unless otherwise noted.)



Name.



Class.



Tons.



Gunfire
or bomb.



Date.



Position.



Hattie Dunn

Hauppauge (salved)

Edna

Isabel B. Wiley

Jacob M. Haskell

Edward H.Cole

Winneconne

Texel

Carolina

Samuel C. Mengel

Eidsvold (Norwegian)

Edward R. Baird, jr

Vinland (Norwegian)

Pinar Del Rio

Vindeggen (Norwegian) . . .
Henrik Lund (Norwegian) .

Samoa (Norwegian)

Kringsjaa ( Norwegian)

Chiller (Belgian)

Augvald (Norwegian)

Marosa (Norwegian)

Manx King (Norwegian). .

Perth Amboy

Lansford

Barge No. 403

Barge No. 740

Barge No. 766

Robert and Richard

Porto (Portuguese)



Domfontein (Canadian) .

Muriel

Rob Roy

Sydney B. Atwood

Annie Perry

Nelson A. (Canadian) . , .
O. B. Jennings



Sch....
...do...
...do...
...do...
...do...
...do...

S.S....
...do...
...do...

Sch....

S.S....

Sch....

S.S....
...do...
...do...
...do...

Bk

..do...
S.S....
...do...

Bk

Sch....

Tug....

Bge....
...do...
...do...
...do...

Sch....

Bk

Sch....
...do...
G.S ...
Sch....
..*.do...
..do...
Tanker



435

1,446

325

776

1,778

1,791

1,869

3,210

5,093

915

1,570

279

1,143

2,504

3,179

4,322

1,138

1,750

2,966

3,406

1,987

1,729

435

830

422

680

527

140

1,079

776
120
112
100
116
72
10,289



B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

G

B

G

B

B

G

B

B

G

G

B

G

B

B

O

G

G

O

G

B

fB

[G

Burned -

B

B

B

B

B

G



May 25
...do...
...do...
Jime 2
...do...
...do...
June 2
...do...
...do...
June 3
June 4
...do...
June 5
June 8
June 8-10
June 10
June 14
...do...
June 22
June 23
July 7
July 8
July 21
...do...,
...do...,
...do...,
...do...
July 22

[July 27

Aug. 2
Aug. 3

...do...

...do...

...do...
Aug. 4

...do...



37° 24' N., 75° 05' W.

37° 27' N., 75° 09' W.

37° 30' N., 74° 52' W.

39° 10' N., 73° 07' W.

Barnegat Light, E. by S., 50 miles.

Barnegat Light, 50 miles SE. of.

39° 26' N., 72° 50' W.

38° 58' N., 73° 13' W.

38° 57' N., 73° 06' W.

38° 08' N., 73° 35' W.

37° 12' N., 73° 55' W.

37° 35' N., 74° 00' W.

36° 32' N., 73° 58' W.

36° 16' N., 73° 50' W.

36° 25' N., 73° 20' W.

36° 30' N., 71° 29' W.

37° 30' N., 72° 10' W.

38° 02' N., 71°40' W.

39° 30' N., 53° 40' W.

38° 30' N., 53° 42' W.

40° 00' N., 50° 35' W.

40° 00' N., 52° 00' W.

Coast Guard No. 40 W. (T),3 miles.

3 miles from Orleans, Mass.

Do.

Do.

Do.
Cape Porpoise, 60 miles SE.

38° 25' 36" N., 61° 46' 30" W.

44° 17' N., 67° 00' W. (burned).
Seal Island E. (T), 45 miles.
Seal Island E. (T), 35 miles.
Seal Island E. (T), 30 miles.

Do.
Shelboume, SE. 25 miles.
36° 40' N., 73° 58' W.



140



GERMAN SUBMARINE ACTIVITIES ON ATLANTIC COAST.



Table No. 1. — Vessels destroyed by the submarines acting on the surface, using gunfire
and bombs, in uestern Atlantic — Cortinued.



Name.



Tons.



Gunfire
or bomb.



Position.



Agnes G. Holland (Cana-
dian).

Gladys M. Hollett (Cana-
dian).

Stanley M. Seaman

Merak

Diamond Shoal L. S ,



Sydland (Swedish)...

Katie L. Palmer

Reliance

William H. Starbuck.

Progress

Aleda May

Mary E. Sennett

Earl and Nettie

Cruiser

Old Time



..do....

..do....

S.S

C.G.Ves.



S. S..

G. S..
...do.
...do.
...do.
...do.
...do.
...do.
...do.
...do.



Dorothy B. Barrett ,

Madrugada (Brazilian) . .
San Jose (Norwegian) . . .
Nordhav (Norwegian)...
Triumph (Canadian)



Lucille M. Schnare (Cana-
dian).

Frances J. O'Hara, jr

A. Piatt Andrew

Uda A. Saunders (Cana-
dian).

Pasadena (Canadian)



Sch.

G.S.
S.S.
Bk..
S. T

Sch.



...do.
...do.
...do.

...do.



Sylvania

Diomed (British)

Notre Dame de Lagarde
(French).

Bianca (salved) (Canadian)

E. B. Walters (Canadian). .

C. M. Walters (Canadian). .

Vema D. Adams (Cana-
dian).

J. J. Flaherty

Eric (British)



.do.



S.S.
F. V.

Sch . .
..do.
..do.
..do.



..do.

S. S..



Gloaming (Canadian)...
Rush

Potentate (Canadian)

Elsie Porter (Canadian) .

Gamo (Portuguese)

Constanza (Danish)

Kingfisher

Industrial (British)

Stilinder (Norwegian) . . .



Sch..
S T
Sch.!
...do.
..do.
. .c'o.
S T

s! v.!

Bk...



100



1,060

3,024

590

3,031
31
19
53
34
31
27
24
28
18



1,613

1,586

2,846

239

121

117
141
124



136

7,523

145

408
126
107
132

162
583

130
162
136
136
315
199
353
330
1,746



Aug. 5
..do....



B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

B

fO

IB

Burned

B

B

C



..do...,
Aug. 6
..do...



Aug. 8
Aug. 10
...do...
...do...
...do...
...do...
...do...
...do...
...do...
...do...



^Aug. 14

Aug. 15
Aug. 17
...do...
Aug. 20

..do...

..do...,
..do...,
..do...,

..do....



Aug. 21
..do...
Aug. 22

Aug. 24
Aug. 25
..do...
..do...



..do.
..do....

Aug. 26
...do...
Aug. 30
, . .do...
Aug. 31
Sept. 11
Sept. 20
Oct. 4
Oct. 13



Lehave Banks, 15 miles SE. of.

Do.

34° 59' N., 73° 18' W.
34° 57' N., 75° 40' W.
Near Cape Hatteras, approxi-
mately 35° 05' N., 75° 10' W.
41° 30' N., 65° 22' W.
41° 45' N., 67° 10' W.
41° 45' N., 67° 10' W,
41° 45' N., 67° 10' W.
41° 45' N., 67°10' W.
41° 45' N., 67° 10' W.
41° 45' N.,67°10' W.
41° 45' N., 67° 10' W.
41° 45' N., 67° 10' W.
41° 45' N., 67° 10' W.

38° 54' N., 74° 24' W.

37° 50' N., 74° 55' W.
42° 10' N., 64° 42- W,
35° 42' N., 74° 05' W.
60 miles S. by W. of Cranberry

Island (T) (captured).
Cape Canso, N. i E. (T), 52 miles.

Do.
Do.
44° 31' N., 60° 30' W.

55 miles SSE. from Cape Canso,

Nova Scotia.
Cape Canso, SE. bv E. 90 miles.
40° 43' N., 65° 15' W.
45° 32' N., 58° 57' W. ,

43° 13' N., 61° 05' W.
46° 33' N., 57° 33' W.
46° 33' N., 57° 33' W.
46° 33' N.,57°33' W.

46° 33' N., 57° 33' W.
Gallantry Light, SE. by E. 70
miles.
46° 02' N.,57°35' W.
44° 30- N., 58° 02' W.
50° 30' N., 47° 00' W.
50° 30' N., 47° 00' W.
46° 00' N., 32° 00' W.
62° 30' N., 35° 00' W.
43° 31' N., 61° 5.3' W.
37° 57' N., 66° 41' W.
37° 22' N.. 53° 30- W.



Table No. 2.- — Vessels destroyed by the submarine submerged and firing torpedoes.
(Vessels American unless otherwise noted.)



Name.


Class.


Tons.


Date.


rosition.


Harpathian (British)


S. S.

...do....
...do ...


4,588
8,173
4,175
7,029
4,868
4,139
3,875
7,127
2,550
2,560
3,345
5,130
3,838
6,744


June 5
June 18
June 26
Aug. 1
Aug. 5
Aug. 11
Aug. 12
Aug. 13
Aug. 27
Sept. 2
Sept. 12
Sept. 30
Oct. 3
Oct. 17


36° 30' N., 75° 00' W.


Dwinsk (British)

Tortuguero (British)


38° 30' N.,61°15' W.
55° 50' N., 15° 30' W.


TokuyamaMaru (Japanese)..

Luz Bianca (Canadian)

Pcnnistone (British)

Sommerstadt (Norwegian) . ..
Frederick R. Kellogg


...do....
...do....
...do....
...do....
...do....


39° 12' N., 70° 23' W.
43° 48' N., 63° 40' W.
39° 50' N., 67° 2,5' W.
40° 10' N., 72° 45' W.
12 miles N. of Bamegat I ight.




...do


45° 10' N., 55° 10' W.


Shortind (Norwegian)


...do....


45° 15' N., 30° 00' W.


I. eixops (Portuguese)


...do . .


42° 45' N., 51° 37' W.




U. S. S..

S.S

S.s


43° 05' N., 38° 43' W.


Alberto Treves (Italian)


38° 20' N., 67° W W.
38° 05' N., 50° 50' W.







ANALYSIS OF TABLES — CONCLUSIONS. 141

Table No. 3. — Vessels damaged or destroyed by mines.



Name.



Herbert L. Pratt (salved)

San Diego (salved)

Mirlo (British)

Minnesota (salved)



San Saba

Chaparra (Cuban).
Saetia



Class.



Tanker

u. s. s.

S.S....
U.S. s.

s. s....



.do.
.do.



Tons.



7,145
13,6801

6,978
17, 650 »

2, 458
l,5ai
2,873



Date.



June 3
July 19
Aug. 16
Sept. 29

Oct. 4
Oct. 27
Nov. 9



Position.



Ovarfalls Lightship. N. 45° W. (T), 2\ miles.

40° 30' N., 73° 00' W.

35° 30' N., 75° 18' W.

38° 05' N., 74° 05' W.; made port, Philadel-
phia, Pa.

.39° 40' N., 73°.').V W.

S. 60° E., 10 miles from Barnegat.

E. from Ocean City, Md., about 10 miles
SSE. (magnetic) from Fenwick Island
Lightship.



1 Displacement.

An analysis of the above tables is of considerable interest. Of the
vessels attacked by the submarine on the surface, 62 were sailing
vessels, tugs, barges, and motor boats, and 17 were steamers. Of
the sailing vessels, there will be noted that many of them were very
small, schooners from 100 tons up, besides a number of motor boats
varying between 18 and 117 tons.

It will be noted that the vessels torpedoed were all steamships
from moderate to large size. It is apparent that the submarine
intended to take no chances, and where the vessel appeared large
enough to probably be armed the torpedo was resorted to, whereas
the small helpless craft was openly attacked and ruthlessly destroyed.

Of the vessels destroyed or injured by mines all were large vessels.

The German campaign, by means of submarines on the Atlantic
coast of the United States, so far as concerned the major operations
of the war, was a failure. Every transport and cargo vessel bound
for Europe sailed as if no such campaign was in progress. All coast-
wise shipping sailed as per schedule, a little more care in routing
vessels being observed. There was no interruption to the coast
patrol which, on the contrary, became rather more active. The
small vessels of the submarine chaser and converted yacht types,
armed with very small'guns but provided with depth charges, scoured
the coast regardless of the fact that the enemy submarines were
equipped with ordnance very much heavier than their own. There
was no stampede on the Atlantic coast; no excitement; everything
went on in the usual calm way and, above all, this enemy expedition
of the Atlantic coast did not succeed in retaining on the Atlantic
coast any vessels that had been designed for duty in European waters.



APPENDIX.



Navy Department,

Office of Naval Operations,

Washington, 6 February, 1918.
From: A special board to formulate a plan of defense in home waters.
To: Chief of Naval Operations.

Subject: Defense against submarine attack in home waters.
Reference: (a) Opnav. letter No. of February 1, 1918, convening Board.

1. Pursuant to instructions, reference (a), the Board convened at 10 a. m., Monday,
4 February, 1918, all members present except Lieut. Commander Foy, who was present
beginning with the afternoon session. As a result of its deliberations, the Board
submits the following report:

Basis of Discussion.

2. The Germans have completed a number of cruising submarines of large radius
and large capacity, and these may be used on our coast with a view to divert some of
our military activity away from European waters. The constant increase of anti-
submarine forces abroad may compel an enemy effort to cause such a diversion, and
the comparative openness of American waters offers a good field for submarine activ-
ities. Information is indefinite as to the number of enemy submarines possibly in-
tended for American waters, but an approximation is sufiicient for discussion. The
salient features of the situation are therefore taken to be as follows:

General Situation.

3. A division of four submarine cruisers, each armed with 6-inch guns, 36 mines,
and 16 torpedoes, and capable of at least one month's activity on our coast, may
appear in American waters without warning.

4. Their aim will be to destroy shipping, interrupt the transport of troops and
supplies to Europe, interfere with our coastwise shipping, by these means causing
the recall from abroad of some of our naval force for defense of home waters. Bom-
boardment of coast towns may also be done, with a view to heighten popular demand
for local protection, and thereby embarrass the naval administration.

5. They will employ mines, guns, torpedoes, and bombs. Their principal activities
may be expected to be directed against the main shipping centers — Halifax, New
York, Hampton Roads, and Florida Straits. At the same time, by activ-ity of some
kind in several localities so separated as to suggest the presence of a large force, they
may expect to produce a maximum popular disturbance early in their campaign.

General Policy.

6. The general policy of the United States is to send the maximum possible force
abroad for offensive operations in the active theater of war. This policy the Board
has kept constantly in mind to the end that there might be no weakening of it.

7. With regard to any force still retained or in the future to be held in American
waters which might be suitable abroad, the Board has been governed by the con-
sideration that trans-Atlantic transit, the security of which is the chief task of the

143



;[44 APPENDIX.

naval force based on America, depends for its success upon a sufficient guard in
American as well as in European waters. The force retained in American waters
can not with reasonable military prudence be reduced below the minimum required
for meeting the emergency here being considered. It has devolved upon this Board
to determine what that minimum is; and such determination should be held to
against the repeated urgings, to send all force abroad, of individuals who have not
fully considered the situation as a whole. In the course of our discussions this prin-
ciple had repeatedly to be adverted to and reaffirmed. Emphasis is laid upon it as
the basis of any plan for defense against hostile operations near our coast.

Policy in the Face of Submarines.

8. In the event of actual submarine hostilities on this coast, first disclosed perhaps
by the sinking of a steamer by a mine, what shall be the policy as to shipping? Shall
it continue, with the least possible interruptions, or shall it be held in port until the
enemy submarines shall have been located and destroyed? The latter course would
be to surrender at once to the enemy a large measure of success in his purpose.

9. It is recognized that to keep on sending out shipping may involve the loss of
some vessels soon after departure from our ports; we are, notwithstanding, con\Tnced
that this course should be pursued. To hold vessels in port until all is clear will
encourage the enemy, both near and abroad; it will help prolong his period of acti^dty
on our coast and will demoralize and confuse our arrangements on shore far more
than would the loss of one or two vessels. Abroad the suspension of arrivals for
several weeks would have an effect serious beyond calculation. On the other hand
to continue with our sailings boldly, unshaken in our general offensive policy, would,
hearten our own people while gi^'ing no ground to the enemy submarine. The escort
with our convoys would force the submarines to take a chance for every sinking they
might attempt. From the first disclosure of their presence their accomplishing
anything in our waters should become increasingly difficult, and this can only come
about by our taking the strong line of action.

10. On this point it is therefore the decision of the Board that we should keep on
sending shipping out with the least possible delay, at the same time taking all possible
offensive measures to remove the danger.

11. The measures necessary to put into effect the foregoing policy divide under
two general heads— control of shipping and military offensive.

Control of Shipping.

12. After discussing the several questions involved successively, the Board came
to the following conclusions:

OUTBOUND shipping.

(a) That where mines have appeared, outbound shipping should be routed clear
of them through a swept channel.

(b) That shipping should use swept channels as soon after the sweeping as circum-
tances permit.

(c) That coastwise shipping should proceed at night and independently. (See
change.)

(d) That ocean shipping should proceed in convoys.

(e) That the convoys should be as large as the available escort permit.

(/) That convoys should be preceded to the 50-fathom curve by four submarine
chasers equipped with listening attachment. (See change.)

(g) That air scouts should patrol the convoy's intended course, at least out to the
50-fathom curve, from the convoy's departure until it clears 50 fathoms or dark-ness
comes on. (See change.)



APPENDIX. 145

(h) That convoys should be accompanied by an ocean escort, by an antisubmarine
escort to the 50-fathom curve, and l)y one or more escorting submarines for lookout.
(See change.)

(i) That the ocean escort should be a cruiser, or a concerted merchant vessel in
naval commission, armed with guns of 5-inch or larger calilier.

(_/) That the antisubmarine escort should consist of submarine chasers armed with
depth bombs and guns up to 3-inch caliber. (See change.)

(k) That the antisubmarine escort for a convoy should be the number required by
approved instructions in force at the time.

( /) That the escorting submarines with a convoy should precede it, running awash,


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 20 22 23