sea, an event came to pass in America which essentially
changed the face of things in that quarter of the world.
This event was the defeat of the army under general
Burgoyne. The news of this unexpected disaster, which
arrived in Europe in Nov. 1777, astonished the British
ministers, and must have the more sensibly affected them,
as it overthrew the plan they had laid for the reduction of
the colonies." The observations then suggest that this
great event induced, in the British cabinet, the idea of
conciliation with America, and of a coalition against the
crown of France, in revenge for the supposed aid rendered
by her to the United States ; and to gratify " their most
dear and constant wish — that of humbling France."* " It
was natural for the British ministry, unable to subdue her
colonies, to seek to be reconciled to them, and to engage
them to espouse her resentment. They might so much
the more flatter themselves that they should succeed
herein, as the proceedings of France with regard to Ame-
rican privateers, and especially the dislike the king had at
all times- manifested to any engagement with the Congress,
must have given disgust and dissatisfaction to their depu-
ties, and induce them, notwithstanding their well known
aversion, to seek even in England, the safety of their coun-
try, when they failed to find it in France."
t " The king, well informed of the plan of the court of
London, and of the preparations which were the conse-
quence of it, perceived that no more time was to be lost,
if he would prevent the designs of his enemies : his ma-
jesty determined, therefore, to take into consideration, at
length, the overtures of the Congress."
J " The commissioners [from the United States] pro-
posed to the king a treaty of amity and commerce, and an
alliance offensive and defensive, by which his majesty
should engage not only to acknowledge simply and purely
the independence of the United States, but also to gua-
ranty and defend it by force of arms. The king ordered
an answer to be given, that he could indeed look upon the
independence of the United States as existing ; but that it
did not belong to him to acknowledge it, because he had not
* Ob?, p. 64. t Obs. p. 66. % Obs, p. 67.
I \TE PAPERS. l->5
any riirht to judge of it ; neither could be guaranty it, as
f u did not intend to enter into a war for its support. His
majesty in < onsequence refused an offensive alliance, and
confined himself to the treaty of amity and commerce. But
as it was more than probable that the court of London
had formed the design of attacking France, his majesty
thought he ought to enter into an alliance with the United
States, eventual and purely d . The stipulations
contained in this second treaty aue in substance, that if
France should be attacked by the court of London, before
the cessation of hostilities between that court and its colo-
nies, then the king and the United States should mutually
assist each other against the common enemy: That the
king should guaranty the independence and sovereignty
of the United States ; and that he should not lay down his
arms till it should be acknowledged by Great Britain."
Thus it is manifest that the United States were to be left
still to fight their own battles, unless Great Britain should
choose to increase the number of her enemies by attacking
France, in which it would be as truly the interest of France
as of the United States to make it a common cause.
* " This last treaty remained secret, because it was not
in force at the time of concluding it ; but that of com-
merce was notified at the court of London, March 13,
1778." The first words of the notification are these —
" The United States of North America, who are in full
possession of independence," &c. The whole paragraph
has been already quoted. The notification further ex-
pressed, "that the king being determined to protect
effectually the lawful commerce of his subjects, and to
maintain the dignity of his flag, his majesty has, in conse-
quence, taken eventual measures, in concert with the
United States of North America." The court of London
chose to consider this notification as a declaration of war,
of which they accuse the king as being the author, and
represent him as the violator of laws, divine and human,
&c. &c. " The act, however, which has drawn upon the
king such odious imputations, has, for its foundation, two
incontestable truths ; the first, that at the period of the 6th of '
February, 1778, the Americans had the publick possession of
their independence; the second, that the king had i\w.
*Qhs> p. 69-
160 AMERICAN
right to look upon this independence as existing, with-
out being obliged to examine the legality of it, and that
no law forbade him to form connections with the Ame-
ricans."
The observations then reciting that the fruitless at-
tempts of the colonies to obtain redress from their mother
country, in the mode of supplication, had induced them to
league together to maintain their privileges sword in
hand ; and, soon after to publish the solemn act, whereby
they declared themselves independent, say, * " This act,
which is of the fourth of July, 1776, induced the court of
London to give way to her resentment ; she displayed her
power to chastise the Americans, and to reduce them by
conquest. But what has been the fruit of their efforts ?
Have they not served to demonstrate to America, to all
Europe, and to the court of London herself, her impo-
tence, and the impossibility of her ever hereafter bringing
the Americans again under her yoke /" — That she had
given this demonstration to America, is evident by the
manner in which Congress received the conciliatory bills,
hastily sent from the court of London to America, and
communicated by lord and general Howe. Congress
were then uninformed of the treaties which their commis-
sioners had lately concluded at Paris. Yet confident in
the strength and spirit of their country, and of the ina-
bility of Britain to subdue it, they t resolved unanimously to
reject these overtures for peace and conciliation, and to
hold no conference or treaty with any commissioners on
the part of Great Britain, unless, as a preliminary, they
withdrew their fleets and armies, or in positive terms ac-
knowledged the independence of these states.
Again. — J " It is sufficient, for the justification of his
majesty, that the colonies, which form a nation, conside-
rable as well for the number of their inhabitants, as for
the extent of their dominion, have established their inde-
pendence, not only by a solemn declaration, but also in
fact; and that they have supported it against the efforts
of their mother country. Such was, in eifect, the situation
of the United States, when the king began to negotiate with
them* His majesty had full liberty of considering them as
* OK p. 7.1 t Journals of Congresj, April 22, 1778.,
% Qbg. p. 77,
STATE PAFSitS. 161
independent, or as the subjects of Britain : He chose the
firs! part, because his samst*, the interest of his peo-
Invariable policy, and above all, the secret projects of
the court of London, imperiously laid him under tin >
fify." The secret projects here referred to were those o\
reconciliation, on terms which might satisfy the United
States, and produce a re-union and coalition for the pur-
pose of falling upon Frnnr,\ To avoid the risk of this
combined attack, to avoid greater danger in future, by
preventing the possibility of uniting again the great por-
lions of the British empire, separated in fact, and thus
essentially to diminish its power, were the avowed induce-
ments with the court of France, to consider the United
States as independent. Having stated these things, they
* " ask if there is a sovereign who, in the same situa-
tion with his majesty, would not have imitated his ex-
ample ?"
Again — t " He (the king of France) had the right to
consider as independent the confederate inhabitants of an
immense continent, who presented themselves to him
with this character; especially after their ancient sove-
reign had demonstrated, by efforts as continual as painful,
the impossibility of bringing them back to obedience."
X '' To complete the justification of his majesty, nothing
remains but to examine, whether what are called reasons
of state, could have determined his majesty to connect:
himself with the Americans. To treat this question with
all the clearness of which it is susceptible, the political
interest of France must be viewed under two different re-
lations ; the first respects the other powers of Europe ; the
second respects Great Britain."
" In treating with the Americans, after they became inde-
pendent, the king exercised the right inherent in his sove-
reignty, with no other view than to put an end to the
predominant power, zchich England abused in every quarter
of the globe." The observations then suggest, that by this
conduct the king has essentially watched over the interest
of all the sovereigns of Europe § " by contributing to re-
strain a power which has always carried to excess the
abuse of her resources."
* Obs. p. 78. t Obs. p. 82.
| Obs. p. 88. 5 Obs p. 89,
VOL. II? 21
1.62
AMERICAS
TJie court of London having charged the king of France
with ambition, and the project of demolishing the power
of England, by his engagements with the Americans, the
observations declare, that * < ; nothing more will be dis-
covered in them [his engagements with the United States,]
on the most accurate scrutiny, than a diminution of this
power, a diminution which England has herself provoked,
by a conduct the most unjust and most irregular, and
which the tranquillity and happiness of Europe have for a
long time required*"
t " The most vigilant and consummate prudence could
not devise adequate precautions against the enterprises of
such a power; so that the only means of being secured
from it was to seize the opportunity of diminishing its'*
% " It may then be truly said that on examination of the
conduct of the king — it was not only just and lawful, but
even necessary, as well for the individual interest of France,
as for that of all Europe."
I will trouble you with but one more extract from the
justificatory observations of the court of France.
§ " To deceive the other nations witb regard to the real
motives which have directed the conduct of the king, the
British ministry maintain, that he entered into treaty with
the Americans, not because he feared the secret views of
Great Britain, but because he foresaw that the Americans
defeated, discouraged, without support, and without re-
sources, were about to return to their mother country ; and
that there was not a moment to be lost in reanimating and
confirming them in their opposition. It was without
doubt for the sake of this assertion, that the British minis-
try have thought it beneath the dignity of their sovereign
to search for the period at which France formed connec-
tions with the United States ; it might with greater truth
be said that this research did not coincide with their plan
of defence. The king is willing to spare the British minis-
try a task so disagreeable and embarrassing, by observing
for them, that the conversations which led to the treaties of
the 6th of February, 1 7 78, were considerably posterior to
the capitulation of general Burgoyne. Now it is notorious
that this event elevated the courage and the hopes of the
* Obs. p. 90. t Obs. p. 91.
% Obs p. 0:2. § Obs. p. 95, 96..
ma: i. P IPERS. 1 6 !
Americans, as much as it dejected the British nation, and
principall} the courl of London. If then the king has
listened to the pr position? of Congress, after this period t
so disastrous to the British, it has not been, and could not
. but because ht thought with
the ( hit '.' St ttes, that their independ< nee was thenceforward
ocable."
In these extri cts from the observations of the court of
France, we see an open avowal of her motives for entering
into treaties with the United States during our revolution;
but do such motives affl strong claims to our grati-
tude; she rejoiced al the ] rospect of a final separation of
he thirteen colonies from Croat Britain: — she saw them
erected by their solemn declaration into independent
states : — but during near three years of our contest she
continued waiting for some fortunate event that should
ensure stability and ultimate success to our enterprise.
• -vent took place in the capture of a whole British
army. " Then the king listened to the propositions of
Congress, because he thoughl with the United States that
thi ir independence was irrevocable.â„¢ Tie then treated with
the Americans '• with no other view than to put an end to
the predominant power which England exercised in every
quarter of the globe." " A diminution of thi> power
(says the king) the tranquillity and happiness of Europe
have for a long time required :" " The only means of
being secured from it, was to seize (he opportunity of dimi-
nishing ii ? :" and he did seize it, " because his safety, the
interest of his people, invariable policy, and above all. the
secret projects of the court of London imperiously laid him
under the necessity."
After these repeated declarations on the part of France,
that Iter only view in contracting engagements with the
United States, w r as to diminish the British power, and
thereby promote the safety and interest of her own peo-
ple, and the tranquillity of Europe ; very unexpected
indeed are the modern claims of boundless and perpetual
gratitude. Nevertheless, animated as we always have
been with sincere desires to maintain those useful and
friendly connections with France wdiich had their founda-
tion in our revolution, we should have remained silent on
these claims, had not the frequency and manner in which
'hey have been urged, compelled their discussion. We
j 64 AMERICAN
are not now disposed to question the importance of the
aid we actually derived from France in the war of our
revolution : nor to retract the grateful acknowledgments
that all America has from that time offered to that nation :
we were in the habit of expressing our gratitude to her
for the benefits which we received, although they resulted
from her exertions to advance her own interest and secure
her own safety. But if those benefits had been rendered
from pure benevolence, from disinterested good will to us,
and we had been remiss in acknowledging them, is it the
part of generosity, of magnanimity constantly to upbraid
the receivers of their favours with ingratitude ? Do not
such reproaches cancel the obligation ? But if for fa-
vours apparently generous, substantial returns are de-
manded ; the supposed liberal act degenerates and be-
comes a mercenary bargain.
If such only are the motives for our gratitude towards
France, at the commencement of her political and com-
mercial connexions with us, in the midst of our war with
Great Britain, what more can we discover at the conclu-
sion of that war ? Let us examine.
In 1781, with the assistance of a French army by land
and a powerful fleet by sea, a second British army was
captured.
This event made even the British government despair
of bringing the United States again under her subjection.
The ministry was changed: and the parliament passed
an act to authorize the king to make peace. In the sum-
mer of 1782, an agent on the part of Great Britain, re-
paired to Paris to negotiate with the commissioners of
the. United States. For some time, Doct. Franklin and
Mr. Jay were alone at Paris. The commission to Mr.
Oswald (the British negotiator) authorized him to treat of
aiid conclude a peace or truce with any commissioner or
commissioners, named or to be named by the colonies or
plantations of New Hampshire, cvc. (naming the thirteen)
or with any of them separately, with parts of them, or
with any persons whatsoever. Mr. Jay was not satisfied
with this commission to Mr. Oswald : the independence
of the thirteen states was no where intimated. Agreeably
to their instructions from Congress, to take advice of the
cpurl of France, the commissioners communicated Mr.
Oswald's commission to the prime minister, the count de
TE I APF.RS. 16i»
The rount expressed his opinion that the
ifficient; that it was such : • 1 1 one aa we
hav< exp cted it would be : " That an acknowledg-
ment of our independence, instead of preceding, must, i;i
the natural course of things, be the effect of the treaty."
This opinion the count continued from time to time to
repeat. In short, " it was evident the count did not wish
to see our ind< p< ndence acknowledged by Britain until
they had made all their uses of us." Mr. Ja} still
tinned unmoved. He conferred with Mr. Oswald, and
"urged in the strongest terms, the great impropriety and
consequently the utter impossibility of our ever treating
with Great Britain on any other than an equal footing}
and told him plainly*, that he (Mr. Jay) would have no
concern in any negotiation in which we were not Consid-
ered as an independent people."
It was on this occasion that Mr. Oswald communicated
to Mr. Jay this article of his instructions; — " In case you
find the American commissioners arc not at liberty to
treat on any terms short of independence, you are to
declare to them, that you have our authority to make that
cession; our ardent wish for peace disposing us to pur-
it at the price of acceding to the complete indepen-
dence of the thirteen colonies. "
The British ministry approved of this communication;
but Still were for treating with us as colonies, and making
an acknowledgment of our independence only an article
of the treaty. Mr. Jay's discernment discovered the source
of the backwardness, at this time, in the British court to
admit our independence previous to the negotiating of the
treaty ; and mentioned it with his reasons to Mr. Oswald;
who far from contradicting Mr. Jay's inference, told him
a fact which confirmed his opinion that it originated in
the court of France, and was communicated to that of
London by the British commissioner then in Paris to
treat of peace between France and Great Britain. Mr.
Jay then explained to Mr. Oswald what he supposed to
be the natural policy of the French court, and showed
him, "that it was the interest of Britain to render us as
independent on France, as we were resolved to be on
Britain." Mr. Oswald was convinced. Mr. Jay remind-
ed him of the several resolutions of Congress passed at
different periods, not to treat with British commissioners
166 AMERICAN
on any other footing than that of absolute independence :
and proposed to give to him in writing what he had before
expressed in conversation — his determination not to treat,
hd on the footing of equality, Mr. Oswald preferred
having it in writing. Mr. Jay prepared the draught of a
letter, to be signed by him and Doct. Franklin, expres-
sing their determination not to treat but on terms of equa-
lity, as an independent nation; and exhibiting the reasons
of tnis determination. Doctor Franklin thought the letter
"rather too positive, and, therefore, rather imprudent;
for that in case Britain should remain firm, and future
circumstances should compel us to submit to their mode
of treating, we should do it with an ill grace, after such a
decided and peremptory refusal. Besides, the doctor
seemed much perplexed and fettered by the instructions
from Congress to be guided by the advice, of the French
court. Neither of these considerations affected Mr. Jay.
For as to the first, he could not conceive of any event
which would render it proper, and therefore possible for
America to treat in any other character than as an inde-
pendent nation. And as to the second, he could not be-
lieve that Congress intended they should follow any ad-
vice wkich mightbe repugnafit to their dignity and interest."
Doctor Franklin's doubts prevented this letter being
signed. Mr. Oswald was disappointed ; and desired to
see the draught. He saw it, and requested a copy of it.
After taking time for consideration, Mr. Jay complied
with the request. i; For though unsigned it would convey
to the British ministry the sentiments and opinions he
wished to impress ; and if finally they should not be con-
tent to treat with us as independent, they were not yet
ripe for peace or treaty with us. Besides, he could not
be persuaded that Great Britain, after what the house of
commons had declared, after various other acts of that
government manifesting the intention to acknowledge it,
would persist in refusing to admit our independence, pro-
vided they really believed that we had firmly resolved
not to treat on more humble terms.-'
; - With the copy of this draught Mr. Jay gave Mr.
Gswakl copies of the various resolutions of Congress
which evinced their adherence to their independence.
These papers Mr. Oswald sent by express to London.
STATE 1'AVE.R.x.
:<;;
ir.fl warmly recommended the issuing a new commission*
to remove all further delay*"
Mr. Jay having afterwards ascertained thai the count
de V*>rgennes had sent a confidential agent to London,
hut whose journey was intended to have been a secret,
for purposes evidently hostile to the interests of the Unit-
States, determined immediately to counteract the pro*
ject, by an agent on whom he could rely, to make to the
court of London such repr mentations as he though! the
occasion demanded, H<- su : and in about two
weeks, Mr. Oswald received a new commission in the
form for which Mr. Jay had contended.
Mr. Jay remarked, that agreeably to the declaration of
independence, the United States, as free and independent,
had full power to levy war, conclude peace, contract alli-
ances, &c. That by the act of confederation, the style
of the confederacy was declared to be, The United
States of America, and by that act Congress were
vested with the sole and exclusive right and power of de-
termining on peace and war, and of entering into treaties
and alliances : that being of right and in fact free and
independent States, their representatives in Congress
granted a commission to certain gentlemen, of whom Dr.
Franklin and he were two. in their name to confer, treat
and conclude with ambassadors or commissioners -vested
tvitk equal powers, relating to the re-establishing of peace,
&c. But the first commission to Mr. Oswald was not
equivalent : the United States were not named in it ; nor
their commissioners, who consequently were not the per-
sons with whom Mr. Oswald was authorized to treat.
And if the commissioners had consented to treat with Mr.
Oswald under such a commission, what would have been
the condition of the people of the United States in the
interval between the commencement of the negotiation
and the conclusion of peace ? They would have been not
independent citizens, but by our acknowledgment, British
subjects! Mr. Jay would not consent to this degradation,
after we had maintained our independence six years, after
we had established it in fact, and after Congress had h\
firm and repeated resolutions refused to treat with Great
Britain, unless as a preliminary, she withdrew her fleets
and armies, or else in positive and express terms acknow-
ledged the independence, of tht United Sta$e&. At the sTOne
168 AMERICAN
time Congress manifested their readiness to attend to such
terms of peace as might consist with the honour of inde-
pendent nations : but the honour of an independent nation
forbade their treating in a subordinate capacity. Even
the dignity of France, who four years before treated with
us as an independent nation, required that we should not
degrade ourselves when going to treat with her enemy.
And why then should her ministers desire us to do it ?
Especially when the treaty of defensive alliance declared
the " essential and direct end of it was to maintain effec-
tually the liberty, sovereignty and independence absolute
and unlimited of the United States, as well in matters of
government as of commerce.' 1 There were several rea-
sons. The two parties, France and the United States,
engaged not to lay down their arms until the independence
of the United States should be attained. The explicit
acknowledgment of their independence by Great Britain
would show that for the essential and direct object of the
alliance there was no necessity of continuing the war.
But since making this treaty of alliance with the United
States, France had formed other connections, with whose