not interlocutory so as to require special leave of the
Court of Appeal for appeal beyond twenty-one days (/);
When the demurrer is over-ruled, the demurring party
may still plead on obtaining an order on terms (g) which
is granted "almost of course" (h). Where a plaintiff
(r) 0. XXVIII. r. 2.
(s) Catling v. King, 5 Ch. D. 660.
(t) Noyes v. Crawley, 10 Ch. D. 31.
(u) Dawkins v. Lord Penrhyn, 6 Ch. D. 318.
(v) 0. XXVIII. r. 4.
(to) Powell v. Jewsbury, 9 Ch. D. 34.
(x) O. XXVIII. r. 5.
(i,) Hogg v. DarUy, 47 L. J. Ch. D. 567.
(z) Turner v. Samson, \V. N. 1S76, 163.
(o) 0. XXVIII. r. 2.
(In Do. r. 8.
(c) Duckett v. Gowr, 6 Ch. D. 82.
(d) 0. XXVIII. r. 11.
(e) Johnasson v. Bonhote, 2 Ch. 0. 208.
(/) Trowell v. Shentoiii S Ch. D. 318.
(g) 0. XXVI! I. r. 12.
(A) Bell v. Wilkbuon, W. N. 1878, 3.
42 THE LAW OF PRACTICE.
neglects to pay costs of an unsuccessful demurrer, lie is
liable to have his action dismissed (?').
40. Amendment may be made
A. without leave, (1) of the statement of claim once
before reply or close of time limited therefor, or if no
defence, within lour weeks after the last appearance (j) :
(2) of set-off or counter claim of defendant before reply
or close of time allowed him for pleading to reply, or, if
no reply, within twenty-eight days after defence (k).
And the opposite party may (1) apply within eight days
to have such amendment disallowed or allowed on terms
as to costs (I), including security for costs if a new case
is thereby raised (m), but how far an " entirely new
case " is allowed, qiicere (n) ; (2) apply for leave to plead
or amend his former pleading on terms as to time &c. (o).
Where the defendant neither pleads nor amends, the
amendments will be taken as admitted, and his original
defence will stand as a defence pro tanto (p).
But where the plaintiff has amended his statement of
claim, the defendant should deliver a new defence or
amend, and so on, totles quoties (q).
B. icitJi leave, at any stage of the proceedings, as at the
hearing (r), but in general to be within fourteen days («)
and on application ordinarily to be by summons (t)
of statement of claim, defence, or reply (w). E.g. a de-
fendant may be allowed, on terms, to substitute a separate
and amended defence in lieu of a joint one (v) without
filing any affidavit of grounds, or to introduce particular
ti) White v. Bromige, 38 L. T. 314.
(j) 0. XXVII. r. 2.
(k) Do. r. 3.
(/) Do. r. 4.
{mi Sortluiiujiton Coiil, Iron <£• Woyon Co. v. Midland Wagon Co., 7 Ch.
:
Bee remarks of Jeseel, M. It. (iii headnote to Budding t. Murdoch, 1
Ch. D, l-_\ in Be St. Nazaire Co., 12 Ch. D. 92.
0. XXV1J. r. 5.
(p) Boddy v. Wall, 7 Ch. D. 164.
[q) Durling r. Lawrence, 4<i L. J. Oh D. 808.
[r) Nobel's Explosives Co. v. Jones, Scott, <t- Co., W. N. 1880, 77; Dal-
linger v. St. Albyn, II L. T. 460.
(«) 0. XXVII. r. 7.
[t) Marriott v. Marriott, 26 W. It. 416.
0. XXVII. r. I.
(v) Cargill v. Bower, 4 Ch. I). 78.
AMENDMENT. 43
facts in addition to a general allegation (w). And amend-
ment will generally be allowed, unless (1) the Court or a
Judge is satisfied of the mala fides of the applicant, or (2)
that the blunder has wrought injury to the other side not
to be compensated by costs or otherwise (r). By amend-
ment of the writ and claim an action may be turned into
an information and action without prejudice to a pending
motion (y).
C. by the Court or a Judge (z) ordering to be struck out
or amended matter, including a whole pleading (a), as
scandalous [e.g. irrelevant allegations of fraud (b)],
prejudicial, embarrassing [e.g. statements in nature of
demurrers (c), general statements of title (d)], or delaying
fair trial, or on the ground that amendment is necessary
to determine the real question at issue [e.g. the plaintiff's
state of mind (e)]. A faulty pleading may be struck out,
even though the opposite party has not specified to which
particular portions he objects (/). Allegations will not
necessarily be struck out because they appear inconsis-
tent (g) ; thus, payment into court may be pleaded and
the greater part of the causes of action denied (It). And
a defence may state many facts which, taken together,
constitute an equitable ground of relief (i). The Court
of Appeal will very rarely interfere with the discretion of
the Court or Judge (j), but may do so, even where a
motion to strike out has been dismissed with costs in the
Court below (/c).
(w) King v. Corl-e, 1 Ch. D. 57.
(x) Per Bramwell, L. J., in Tildesley *. Harper, 10 Ch. D. 393.
(y) Caldwell v. Pagham Harbour Reclamation Co., 2 Ch. D. 221.
(z) 0. XXVII. r. 1.
(a) Cashin v. Cradock, 3 Ch. D. 376.
(b) Blake v. Albion Lift- Assurance Co., 45 L. J. C. P. 663.
(o) Stokes v. Grant, 4 C. 1'. D. 25.
(d) Phillips v. Phi/lips, 4 Q. 15. D. 127. Semble, any defence is embar-
rassing which a defendant is not entitled to use. Per Jessel, M. K., mlhuyh
v. Chamber/ah,, W. X. 1877, 128.
(e) Roe v. A/nV.s-, 2 Ch. 1). 729.
(/) Williamson v. London A- North Western Railway Co., 12 Ch. D. 7S7.
(<â– /) Baifot v. Easton (C. A.), 7 Ch. D. 1.
(A) Hawksley v. Bradshaw, S Q, B. D. 302. See also Spurr v. Hall, 2
<l B. D. 615 ; Berdan v. Greenwood, 3 Ex. D. 251.
(i) Heap v. Manis, 2 Q. 15. D. 630.
(j) Qolding v. Wharton Salt Works Co., 1 Q. B. D. 374 ; Waison v.
Rodwell, :\ Ch. D. 380.
{Jc) JJavey v. Garrett, 7 Ch. D. 473.
•U THE LAW OF PRACTICE.
41. Whore tho plaintiff has made default in delivering
a statement of claim, on application by the defendant to
dismiss the action with costs for want of prosecution, an
order may be made accordingly (I), after which a Master
lias no jurisdiction to extend time (ra), but the Court
has (//), and in lieu of an order for dismissal may make
an order on terms for an extension of time (o) or such
other as seems just, and this even though an Order for
security for costs has been made and not abandoned by
the defendant (p). Where the plaintiff has made default
in pleading and then become bankrupt, notice of motion
to dismiss should be served on the trustee in bank-
ruptcy (q).
42. Where the defendant, or one out of several, has
made default in delivering a defence or demurrer to a
claim for
A. a debt or liquidated demand, the plaintiff may enter
final judgment for the amount and costs (r) :
B. detention of goods and damages, or either, he may
enter interlocutory judgment, and have the value and
damages assessed (s) :
C. Similarly, he may deal with A. and B. com-
bined (/) :
D. recovery of land, he may enter judgment that the
person whose title is asserted shall recover possession and
costs, and have the value of mesne profits (if claimed)
assessed (>/) :
E. any other remed}', he may, without notice of setting
down (r), set down the action on motion for judgment (w)
but so as to give two clear days' notice of such motion lor
(I) 0. XXIX. r. ].
(m) Whistler v. Eandeock, 3 Q. B. D. 83 ; Wallis v. Hepburn, 3 Q. B.
B. m d : Kimg v. Davenport, 1 (). B. J>. 402.
(u, Burke <â– . Booney, 4 C. I\ D. 226.
//<-/< inbotham v. Aynsley, 1 Ch. D. 288.
/■! Lagrangt •>. Mc Andrew, i Q. B. I'. 210.
('/) Wright v. Swindon, Marlborough, <ti Audovcr Railway Co., i Ch. D.
(r, O. XXIX. rr. 2, 3.
(â– -â– Da rr. I, 5.
/ Da r. 6.
a ho. rr. 7, 8.
. Qillott .. Kerr, W. N. 187G, 116.
(uj 0. XXIX. r. 10.
DEFAULT OF PLEADING. — DISCONTINUANCE. 45
judgment itself (x). And where one of several defendants
has made default, the action may be set down on motion
for judgment against him either (1) at once, or (2) at the
same time as against any other defendants who have
delivered their defence (//).
43. "Where default is made of any subsequent pleading,
the pleadings shall be deemed to be closed at the expira-
tion of the time limited for delivering such pleading (z),
unless one or more out of several defendants have leave
to extend the time for defence (a). And the statements
of fact in the last previous pleading shall be deemed to be
admitted (z). Where default is made as between one of
the original parties and a third party subsequently ad-
mitted, on application by the opposite party for such
judgment as upon the pleadings he is entitled to, such
judgment may be ordered, or such other order as is
necessary may be made (b). Where default in pleading
has been made by the defendant, the plaintiff must give
at least two clear days' notice, and even then, as a general
rule, the case will only come on in its regular turn, unless
the Court is satisfied that the notice was ample (p).
44. Any judgment by default may be set aside on
terms as to costs or otherwise (d), and right of applica-
tion to set it aside is not barred by lapse of time where
no irreparable wrong would be thereby done to the
plaintiff (e).
45. An action may be (1) wholly discontinued, or (2)
partly withdrawn, by the plaintiff on notice in writing
before receipt of the defence, or afterwards before an)'
other proceedings taken, except interlocutory applica-
tions (/) ; and the plaintiff's discontinuance of the action
discontinues any counter-claim (g), or appeal (h). The
(?) Pardons v. Harris, 6 Ch. D. 694.
(</) 0. XXIX. r. 11.
(z) 0. XXIX. r. 12.
(u) Ambroise v. Evelyn, 11 Ch. D. 759.
(b) 0. XXIX. r. 13.
(c) Soupell v. Parsons, W. N. 1876, 61 ; Hate v. Snelling, do. p. 77 ;
Pearne v. Spickett, do. p. 109.
(,/) O. XXIX. r. 14.
(e) Atwood v. Chichester, 3 Q. B. D. 722.
if) 0. XXIII. r. 1.
(//) Varasseur v. Krupp, W. N. 1880, 11,
(A) Coitybeare v. Lewis, 13 Ch. D. 469.
46 THE LAW OF PRACTICE.
plaintiff shall pay the defendant's taxed costs or costs
occasioned by the part withdrawn (?), and if the plaintiff
gives an undertaking as to damages and then discontinues,
a reference may be directed as to the damages (j). Be-
fore or al or after the hearing or trial, the Court or Judge
may order an action to he discontinued, or part of the
claim to be struck out, upon terms as to costs, as to sub-
sequent action, or otherwise (k) ; but not so where an
arbitrator lias found on a special case substantially for the
defendant {I). Where an action is discontinued or partly
withdrawn, the defendant may sign judgment for costs or
part costs (in).
46. A defendant cannot without leave withdraw his
defence wholly or partly, but may by leave on application,
upon terms in the discretion of the Court or a Judge (n),
as e.g. on payment by the defendant of costs occasioned
by bis defence and by the plaintiff of an adjournment
made into Court (o).
A cause entered for trial may be withdrawn by either
party, on production of consent in writing signed by
both (2?)-
(i) 0. XXIII. r. 1.
\j) Newromen v Conhon, 7 Ch. D. 764.
(jfc) 0. XXIII. r. 1.
(I) Stahlschmidt v. Watford, 4 Q. B. D. 217.
[m) 0. XXIII. r. 2a.
(„i 0. XXIII. r. 1.
(o) Real and Personal Advance Co. v. McCarthy, 14 Ch. D. 188.
(p) 0. XXIII. r. 2.
PART III.
EVIDENCE, &c.
47. Lnterrogatories in writing may be delivered. —
A. without leave, once :
(1) by the plaintiff at any time from delivery of his
statement of claim to the close of the pleadings, both
inclusive (a). But senible, in the Chancery Division a
plaintiff ma}' safely deliver interrogatories before delivery
of a statement of defence ; in the Common Law Divisions
he may even along with his statement of claim, but at
risk of having them struck out in the exercise of the
Judge's discretion (b) ;
(2) by the defendant at any time from delivery of his
statement of defence to the close of the pleadings, both
inclusive. But semble, a defendant cannot generally,
even if he apply for leave, interrogate before delivery
of statement of defence (c) :
B. with leave, (i) a second time within the above
periods ; (ii) at any time, even after delay, as e.fj. after
an action is set down for hearing, in which case the costs
may be made costs in the cause (d). An application for
leave must be supported by an explanation, but not neces-
sarily by affidavit (e). Any opposite party or parties
(a) (». XXXI. r. 1.
(6) Compare Mercier v. Cotton, 1 Q. B. D. 442, and Disney v. Longboume,
2 Ch. D. 704, with Harbord v. Monk, 9 Ch. D. 616, and Hancock v. Guerin,
4 Ex. 1). 3 ; and .see remarks on this last in Union Bank of London v. Manby,
13 Oh. D. 239.
(c) Disney v. Longboume, 2 Ch. D. 704 ; Hauiey v. Reade, W. N. 1876,
64 ; Mercantile Mutual Insurance Co. v. Slutesmith, do.
(d) London <i- Provincial Maritime Insurance Co. v. Davies, 5 Ch. I).
775.
(f) Ellis v. Ambler, 36 L. T. 410.
43 THE LAW OF PRACTICE.
[therefore not including a co-defendant to a counter-
claim ( /')] may be thus examined by interrogatories, a
note at the foot thereof stating which of them each party
is required to answer.
48. If a corporation or unincorporated company or
body is a party, an Order may be obtained at Chambers
tor interrogating some member or officer of such cor-
poration \c (//), who need not be made a party for this
purpose (/<)• The Order will be granted if the Judge
thinks him likely to have the information, apart from
any question as to relevancy thereof (t). A member of
a corporation may refuse to file an answer until the
taxed costs thereof are paid (,/), but an officer cannot
object that his knowledge is derived from privileged com-
munications made to him in his private capacity (/.-).
Semble, an action may be stayed until a foreign sovereign
or corporation has named a proper person to give dis-
covery (/).
49! Interrogatories are exhibited subject to enquiry,
which may be made at the instance of any party, and if
found by the Taxing Master, Court, or Judge to be un-
reasonable, vexatious, or of improper length, the costs
occasioned thereby shall be borne by the party in
fault (in).
50. A. On application at chambers within four days
after service of interrogatories, (1) they may be wholly
Bet aside as unreasonable or vexatious, or (2), particular
ones may be struck out as scandalous. The applicant
must specify to which interrogatories he objects (n). The
( "« ,111-1 of Appeal in its discretion may disallow interroga-
tories which had been allowed by the Court below (0).
W. In the affidavit in answer, particular interrogatories
(/) MoUoy r. Kllby, W. N. 1880, 105.
{a) O. XXXI. r. 4.
h Wilson v. Church, 9 Ch. D. 552 ; and see Costa Rica (Republic of)
v. ErUvnger, 1 Ch. D, 171.
, Berkeley r. Standard Discount Co., 9 Ch. D. 643.
(_;') Berkeley v. Standard Discount Co., 12 Ch. I). 295.
(4) Swansea (Mayor of) t. Quirke, 5 C. P. D. 106.
Co 'â– ' Rica (Republic of) v. Erlanger, 1 Ch. D. 171.
[m C'XXXL r. 2.
,■„ AWatsen r. Labouchere, '■'< Q. B. D. C54.
(o) Bowciiffe v. Leigh, (Jh. D. 256.
INTERROGATORIES. — ANSWER. 4 9
may be objected to as scandalous, irrelevant (}>), not
bond fid', premature (q), or on any other ground (r).
C. Whether a Judge can now order an interrogatory
to be struck out as " objectionable" mero motu and with-
out any application (s), qucere (t).
An interrogatory imputing indictable matter is not
necessarily scandalous, but the party's remedy is not to
answer it (u).
51. An affidavit in answer to interrogatories (in general
to be printed, if exceeding ten folios) is to be filed within
ten days, or further time as allowed by the Court or a
Judge [v), but semble any interrogatory may be left un-
answered by a party who objects to it on a point of law (w).
If not answered, or answered insufficiently, the party in-
terrogating may apply, [in general by summons (x)] for
an Order requiring an answer, or further answer (y), and
in the latter case specifying to which interrogatories, or
parts of which such further answer is required (z), the
answer to be by affidavit or rica voce, as directed. Semble,
where a Judge refuses such an Order at Chambers, an
appeal therefrom cannot open up fresh objections (a).
Subject to the discretion of the Judge, the whole of the
answers to interrogatories is not compelled to be put in
evidence (b).
52. On application ex parte (c) at any time during any
(p) For examples of what is or is not irrelevant, see Mansfield v. Childer-
house, 4 Ch. 1) 82; Rowrlijfe v. Leigh, 6 Ch. D. 256; Allhusen v. Labou-
chere, 3 Q. B. IX 654 ; Sheward v. Lord Lonsdale, 5 C. P. D. 47 ; Bade v.
Jacobs, 3 Ex. D. 335 ; West of England Bank v. Nickolls, 6 Ch. I>. 613 ;
Saunders v. Jan.-;. 7 Ch. D. 435 ; Julius v. Janus, 13 Ch. D. 370 ; Lyon v.
TweddeU, 13 Ch I). 375.
(q) See Saundersv. Jones, 7 Ch. D. 435.
(r) 0. XXXI. r. 5a. (Nov., 1878); and see Gay v. Labouchere, 4 Q. B. I).
206.
(s) Athcrleyy. Harvey, 2 Q. B. D. 524.
(t) Gen. puc original Rule 5 (last part) with amended r. 5a.; and see
remarks of Fry J., in Crackncll v. Janson, 11 Ch. D. 13.
(it) Fisher v. Owen, 8 Ch. D. 645.
(v) 0. XXXI. rr. 6, 7, 8.
(w) ftrnti v. Berg, 36 L. T. 471.
(z) Chesterfield Colliery v. fitodfc, W. X. 1876, 204.
(y) 0. XXXI. r. 10.
(z) Anstey v. .W</* .(• SottfA MWWe/t Subway Co., 11 Ch. D. 439.
(a) G&itrcA v. Perry, 36 L. T. 573.
(A i 0. XXXI. r. 23.
(c) Uenncssy v. Bohmann, Osborne d: Co., W. X. 1S77, 14.
50 THE LAW OF PRACTICE.
action or proceeding, as e.g. generally on application of
the plaintiff before the defendant delivers his defence (d),
an Onlcr may be made for production on oath by any
party [including a third person who has appeared pursuant
to notice {(â– ), or a person who not being a party, has yet
the same or a connected title with one of the parties (/)]
of such documents relating to any matter in question as
the Court <»r a Judge shall think right, to be dealt with
as shall seem just (g). And where the plaintiff disobeys
such an Order, the action may he dismissed by the
Court (h). But an Order will not in general be made in
favour of the plaintiff before delivery of his statement of
claim (/'), especially where the object of the action itself
is delivery or inspection^). Where documents are
required for the purpose of a reference, the Judge, and
not the Referee, is the person to make the Order (k).
An affidavit of documents may be made by the next
friend of a person of unsound mind, or by some other
person acquainted with the facts (I).
53. An order for production cannot be refused unless
(1) semble, the Court or Judge consider it premature (m),
or (2) the documents are privileged, as e.g. documents of
title under certain circumstances (it), communications
from the plaintiff's solicitor or solicitor's agent (o), docu-
ments bond fide intended for instruction of a solicitor in a
ontemplated action (p), letters in answer to inquiries by
i party's solicitor, with a view to anticipated litigation (q),
a doctor's report of an examination at the instance of a
(J) Viuun Bank of f.<„Hl,», v. Mnnby, 13 Ch. T). 230.
(<â– ) McAllister \. Bishop of Rochester, 5 C. P. I). 194.
(/) West of England .(â– <-., /Inn/: v. Canton Insurance Co , 2 Ex. D. 472.
[g) 0. XXXI. r. 11
Republic of Liberia v. Roye, 1 App. Cas. 139.
[i Cashin v. Cradoch, 2 Ch. D: 140.
(j) Republic of Costa Rica v. Strousberg, 11 Ch. D. 323.
ik) Rowcliffe v. Leigh, 4 Ch. D. 661.
(1) Eigginson v. Hall, L0 Ch. I). 235.
„ / ,,:.,,, Bank of London v. Manby, 13 Ch. D. 239. Per James, L.J.
{„, Bustrosv. While, 1 Q. ]'.. I). 423; Owenr. Wynn, 9 Ch. I). 29. As
I , ., plaintiff'* title-deeds, where the pr< sumption of law is in his favour, see
Egremont Burial Board v. Egremont iron Ore. Co., 14 Ch. I). 158.
5 a tro < White, I Q. B. D. 423.
\p) Southwark <(• VavaJtaU Waterworks Co. v. Quick, 3 Q. B. D. 315.
W'Corquodak v. Bell, 1 C. J'. D. 471.
PRODUCTION. DISCOVERY. 51
party's solicitor(r), papers privileged in a former action (.si.
documents privileged on grounds of public policy, though
semble, it should be stated in the affidavit how these la^t
are so privileged (t). Though a defendant is not com-
pelled to produce documents of title to hind of which he
is in possession, he is bound Under Rule 12 to make an
affidavit of them (u).
54. But confidential letters to a party's solicitor, not in-
duced by inquiries (v), correspondence between vendor
and vendee, relative to subject-matter of anticipated
action by a sub-vendee (w), letters (under some circum-
stances) from defendant's unprofessional agent to de-
fendant, relative to the subject matter of an action u),
communications between an officer of the Heralds' College
and his "client" (//), and semble an agreement of com-
promise between the defendant and a third person relative
to the subject-matter of an action (2) are not privileged. No
appeal lies from a Judge's decision as to privilege where
the documents have been by consent submitted to him (a).
55. On application by any, party without affidavit (6),
an Order may be made by a Judge for discover}' on oath
by any other party, of documents relating to a matter in
question, which are, or hare been, in his possession or
power (c). But within what limits discovery can be en-
forced of documents not at the time in the party's posses-
sion or under his control, qucere (d). Proceedings cannot
be stayed by the defendant in an action on a marine
policy until the plaintiff has obtained an affidavit of
documents from a person who is not a party, not under
(r) Friend v. London, Chatham, <£• Dover Railway Co., 2 Ex. D. 437.
(«) Bullock v. Corry, 3 <J B. D. 356 ; Bacon v. Bacon, W. N. 1876, 96.
(t) Kain v. Farrer, W. X. 1877, 266.
(u) New British Mutual Investment Co. v. Peed, 3 C. P. D. 196.
(r) M'Corquodale v. Bell, 1 C. P. D. 471.
(w) English v. Tottie, 1 Q. B. D. 141.
(x) Anderson v. Bank of British Columbia, 2 Ch. I>. 044, explaining Ross
v. Gibbs, L. R. 8 Kq. 522.
o/) Sladev. Tucker, 14 Ch. I). 824.
(z) Hutchins v. Glover, 1 Q. B. D. 138.
(a) Bustros v. White, 1 Q. B. I). 428.
(b) O. XXXI. r, 12. *'an a Judge in his discretion require an affidavit !
See Johnson v. Smith, 36 L. T. 741.
(c) 0. XXXI. r. 12.
(d) See case quoted under (e).
D 2
52 THE LAW OF PRACTICE.
the plaintiff's control, and not within the jurisdiction (e).
An Order for discovery will not in general be made before
delivery of a statement of claim (/). The party against
whom such order is made shall in his affidavit specify suffi-
ciently^) any documents which he objects to produce (h),
and if on the ground of privilege, shall further state and
verify the grounds(j). No affidavit will be admitted in
contradiction, the affidavit of the party answering being
conclusive, unless (1) from such affidavit itself, (2) from
documents referred to therein, or (3) from admission in
pleadings of such party, it appears that other relevant
documents exist. The party seeking discovery, if dis-
satisfied, should exhibit interrogatories (;'). No mere
statement of belief that the other party has other docu-
ments will support an application for a further Order (A:).
Prolix affidavits of documents may be struck off {I).
Semble, the Crown is entitled to discovery, hut not bound
to give it (>n).
56. Without application to the Court or a Judge, any
party may at any time before hearing give notice in
writing to any other party to produce, for inspection and
taking of copies, any document referred to in such other
party's pleadings or affidavits. The party receiving such
notice shall within four days (or two, if he has already
Bel forth such documents in an affidavit as in para. 55)
notify in writing a time within three days for inspection
;it the office of his solicitor, and state which (if any) and
on what grounds he objects to produce (n). Any party
not complying with such notice cannot put such docu-
ment in evidence, unless he s;;1isiics the Court of some
sufficient cause lor non-compliance (o). But semble, it is
(e) Fniyrr v. Burrows, 2 (). B. I). 624. This case as fully reported does
,,,,t go nearlj bo fat as stated by Sir \V. T. ('hurley (3rd Edition, p. ;"81)
who ref( i "i, it. to W. N. l > 7 7 , 7<i.
(j Catkin v. Cradock, '_' <'h l>. 140; Dairies v. Williams, 13 Ch. D.
550, and compare remarks of Bacon V. C. with Union Hank of London v.
Manby C. A.), 13 Ch. D. 239.
Taylor v. Batten, 1 <-l B. 1>. 85 j Foi'trscue v. Fortescue, 34 1. T. 847.
/, o. \XXI. r. 13. (o Gardner v. Irvin, 4 Ex. D. 49.
, Jones-* MtmU Video Qa* Co., W. X. 1880, 87.
L- Welsh Steam Coal Collieries Co. v. Gaskell, 36 L. T. 352.
/ Taylor v. Ketiy, W. X. 1876, 1.".'.'.
tm) Tomline v. The Queen, W. N. 1879, 99.
0. XXXI. r. 1G. {oj Do. r. 13.
PRODUCTION. — ADMISSIONS. oh
generally a sufficient cause for non-compliance of a plain-