Ambassador pointed out, was the first politically
important agreement concluded with' Germany since
the Franco -Prussian War. Whether a certain satis-
faction that the North Sea agreement we proposed
had not been concluded with England 1 alone did



SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS 67

not play some part in this, is a question which may
be asked, but cannot be answered, for lack of
convincing proof.

The objections made by the responsible heads of
our Navy, who thought the agreements would pre-
judice their freedom of action, in case of war, also
very nearly prevented their being concluded. We
succeeded, however, in silencing these objections.
Later on it became generally known that our Navy
was rather inclined to hold political opinions of its
own, and to pursue a policy which did not always
coincide with that pursued by the Ministry for
Foreign Affairs ; in fact, was sometimes directly
opposed to it. True, there could only be one
opinion as to the great fundamental principle that
the Navy, just the same as the Army, should be
a means to great ends, not an object in itself, and
that hence military policy must to a certain extent
depend on the general policy. Nor could there be
any disagreement as to the rate of naval con-
struction, this having been practically fixed for
many years to come by the Navy Bill. On the
other hand, there is no doubt that the way in which
everything relating to the Navy and its growing
strength was publicly discussed in Germany, the
noisy interest shown by wide circles of the people
in the development of our naval power, an interest
aroused and encouraged by active propaganda, and
the spirit which prevailed in the Navy and some-
times led to unfortunate utterances, furnished other
countries with' food for suspicion, intensified the
differences between us and England, and made it
very difficult for those responsible for our foreign
policy to achieve their aims.



68 THE MEMOIRS OF AN AMBASSADOR

If this led to disagreement between the Foreign
Office and the Navy it cannot be a matter of
surprise, for it was only natural. The Navy is,
like the Army, a fighting force, an embodiment
of national strength, seeking satisfaction, not in
rest, but in activity. It is animated by a spirit
essentially different to that of the Foreign Office,
a spirit of undaunted determination, of conscious
strength delighting in great deeds, rather than of
slow and deliberate reflection and action. But the
essential difference of disposition was not an end
of the matter ; the eagerness to accomplish some-
thing great led to the Navy pursuing a policy of
its own, even at the risk of inconvenience to the
foreign political circles. This, however, was not a
state of affairs peculiar to Germany. The relations
between the Navy and the Foreign Office are
apt to be more or less distant, if not strained, 'in
other countries too. The fact that individual
units of the Navy are not infrequently entrusted
with political tasks, even in peace time, and that,
thanks to the strong impression they are able to
make, they solve difficulties more promptly and
thoroughly than can be done by the efforts of
diplomacy, and the further fact that naval officers
have an opportunity of becoming acquainted with
other countries in important matters, and of gain-
ing an insight into the life there, and particularly
into the life of the colonists, by whom they are
hospitably entertained and fe"ted, easily leads them
to feel confidence in their own judgment in
political matters, and produces a tendency, to act
on their own responsibility.

It must be admitted that instances of this have



SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS 69

been more pronounced in Germany than in other
countries. Our Navy was a comparatively new
achievement, born of the spirit of youth and grow-
ing strength, planned and carried out by a master
hand. It was, in an even greater degree than the
Army, the pride of the nation, an organisation
which powerfully appealed to national sentiment.
The military spirit was also far more deeply rooted
in general among us than among other nations,
thanks to historical evolution, thanks to compulsory
military; service, which had long been in force,
and to the German taste for outward show of
strength. It is not to be wondered at that, under
such circumstances, the heads of the Navy were
sometimes tempted to shake off their dependence
on the Foreign Office, and act independently, even
despotically. For instance, on one occasion, the
Admiralty took upon itself to call on the services
of German consular representatives for strictly
confidential matters, without first consulting the
Foreign Office, and ascertaining whether there were
any personal or other objections to this. In the
matter of the new Nationality Law, the Bill was
delayed for a long time by differences of opinion
between the Foreign Office and the Navy, the latter
thinking it knew more about the wishes and needs
of Germans resident abroad than the central office
for foreign affairs, which was relying on the long
experience and opinion of its foreign representa-
tives. The Navy wished to promote the spread
of Germanism by giving them extensive exemption
from patriotic duties, particularly from the obliga-
tion to serve in the Army. They were said to be
sufficiently doing their duty to their country as



70 THE MEMOIRS OF AN AMBASSADOR

pioneers of German commerce. The Foreign Office
was of opinion that the Germans abroad ought to
be given considerable relief in respect of military
service, but not entirely absolved from the obliga-
tion. This would be an injustice to the Germans
at home, and would have the effect of putting a
premium on emigration. Experience taught that it
was a good thing to strengthen, not to relax, the
ties which bound Germans abroad to the mother
country. The position taken up by the Admiralty
was supported with' such vigour, that the Imperial
Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg, who had
already had to deal with the matter as Home
Secretary, was influenced by it. A fresh detailed
enquiry into- the disputed points, with the assistance
of fresh expressions of opinion from our foreign
representatives, was required, before the Chancellor
could be brought round to the Foreign Office view,
and the Bill finally shaped accordingly.

It is obvious that the disagreements between the
Ministries were not calculated to further the
management of foreign policy ; they were, on the
contrary, productive of considerable difficulties and
obstacles. This applied particularly to our relations
with England, which were more and more clouded
by our naval policy, and grew visibly darker.
England, whose insular position and ramification
over the world necessitated her maintaining' a Navy
of such strength as to, be far superior to that of
any other Naval Power, was very much perturbed
by our naval projects, and the sensational way in
which they were being pushed forward. At first
it was probably thought that our programme of
naval construction would not be carried out in full.



SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS 71

When this hope proved delusive, counter measures
were taken, first to assemble a fleet of considerable
strength in the North Sea, thus presenting a front
against us, then to outbid us by constructing new
giant battleships Dreadnoughts and finally efforts
were made to intimidate us. A chorus of noisy
Press voices resounded from the other side of the
North Sea, and here and there an insolent threaten-
ing speech from a responsible quarter. The result
was merely to strengthen our resistance, and thus
intensify the antagonism. The idea now suggested
itself, at first tentatively, then more forcibly, of
trying to settle the matter amicably. English
statesmen advocated a general rapprochement,
and even went so far as to propose an alliance,
but this did not inspire our Government with
the degree of confidence in its stability which
would have been necessary to justify a change
in our policy.

The first serious step taken in the direction of
limiting naval construction, apart from an un-
successful effort made at the second Hague Con-
ference, was on the occasion of a meeting between
the Kaiser and King Edward at Homburg. The
King, however, was cautious enough to leave the
Under -Secretary of State, Sir Charles Hardinge,
who accompanied him, to act as principal in the
negotiations. No discussion of naval questions took
place between the two Monarchs. Hardinge made
suggestions to the Kaiser which practically
amounted to a proposal that we should cut down
our ship-building programme, without anything
more than an indefinite prospect being held out
of England's doing the same. The Kaiser made



72 THE MEMOIRS OF AN AMBASSADOR

it perfectly clear that an understanding on such a
one-sided basis was out of the question, and was
very short with Hardinge when he remarked that
in that case England would be compelled to em-
phasise her superiority more strongly.

The relations soon became strained to such a
degree that public opinion on both sides grew
apprehensive, and efforts to create a more friendly
atmosphere were made, in the form' of reciprocal
visits from Press representatives, mayors, and clergy.
The visits, accompanied by many pretty speeches,
went off very satisfactorily, but the good im-
pression made failed to remove the main causes
of the strained relations.

The future now looked so dark that the Govern-
ment made an effort to relieve the tension. Prince
Billow personally thought it advisable that more
prominence should be given to the defensive
character of German naval armament, possibly
by paying more attention to submarines, coast
defences, and mines, but his wish did not pre-
vail against the advocates of building battleships.
Consequently, there was no course open except
to arrive at an understanding as to the naval pro-
gramme. The possibilities were limited, owing to
our being tied by the Naval Bill. The utmost
that could be done would be to reduce the pace
at which new ships were being laid down, allay
suspicion by giving the English free insight into
what was going on in our dockyards, and consider
the question of abandoning any further increase
in our Navy in the distant future. In return for
such limitation of OUT power, it was hoped that
England would enter into a treaty of neutrality,



SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS 73

an idea with which I did not personally associate
myself, as it seemed to me hopeless.

It was not without difficulty that the consent
of the Admiralty to these plans was secured.
Admiral von Tirpitz obstinately opposed far-reaching
demands made by the Chancellor, and repeatedly
weighed down the scale heavily, by threatening to
resign. Our conferences with the English states-
men, which were at first quite confidential and un-
official, were not unpromising in the beginning, but
they finally ended in smoke, when it became evident
that our proposals did not satisfy the English. We
never got so far as to discuss the idea of neutrality.

The new Chancellor, von Bethmann Hollweg,
who looked on improving our relations to England
as one of his most important and urgent duties,
made a fresh effort to lessen the Anglo -German
differences. It was now mainly a question of an
understanding as to a fixed ratio in the number
and type of big ships, in which we were prepared
from the first to give England an advantage over
us in proportion to her needs. But again, on this
occasion, the Conferences did not reach the point
of starting formal negotiations, owing to the
difficulty in fixing a ratio of ships which would
correspond with the demands made by experts on
both sides. Thus this effort, too, fell through. It
was resumed later on, in conversations with Lord
Haldane, at a time when I was no longer head of
the Foreign Office, but it is well known that these
discussions, in which we again gave prominence
to our wish for a treaty of neutrality, did not lead
to any satisfactory result.

Our Ambassador in London, Count Metternich,



74 THE MEMOIRS OF AN AMBASSADOR

a man of gteat merit, who thoroughly understood
the English mentality, and had the valuable gift
of far sight, had shown himself strongly in favour
of a reasonable understanding with England.
Admiral von Tirpitz was his resolute and pug-
nacious opponent. There were frequent sharp en-
counters between him and the Admiral at the
preliminary Cabinet Councils, which Count Metter-
nich was requested to attend. I always took the
part of the single-minded Ambassador, of whom
the Kaiser also had a very high opinion at first.
Later on, after my time at the Foreign Office, the
antagonism became so pronounced as to prejudice
the position of our representative in London, and
lead to his place being taken by Rreiherr von
Marschall.

There was also a difference of opinion with
regard to Eastern Asiatic policy. Our Kiau-Chow
territory was administered by the Admiralty, which
had done admirable and most promising work
there in a short time, and wanted to do more
in the same direction. Admiral von Tirpitz was
anxious that the German troops which had been
in China since the Boxer expedition should be
transferred to Tsingtau, when they were no longer
needed, in order to make it a first-class fortress.
This scheme was frustrated by the troops being
ordered home at the request of the Eoreign Office,
which urged important political reasons for their
recall. To-day there can be no doubt as to which
side was right.

The work of drawing up a declaration of maritime
law in London, as a result of the second Hague
Conference, was also going on during my early



SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS 75

days of office. Almost all our proposals were
successfully carried through', and a substantial
improvement in , maritime law was consequently
achieved, in the sense of greater safeguards being
provided for commercial freedom and private
property. The English representatives signed the
draft of the Declaration with the others, but al-
though the British Government did not explicitly
refuse to ratify it, they continually delayed the
ratification. Their hands were therefore freer in
this direction in the World War, and they made the
well-known disastrous use of the freedom. The
incident throws a significant light on English states-
manship, which is fond of arraying itself in the
garb of humanity and justice.

My debut in the Reichstag, which of course I
did not look forward to without trepidation, was
not made under very happy auspices. I had been
ill not long before, and still felt very limp, but
as it was a question of the Eoreign Office Budget,
I wanted to be in my place. In addition to this,
there was an unexpected contretemps on the day
itself. The House was well filled, but the
journalists' benches were empty. The press
representatives had taken serious umbrage at
very unparliamentary language a Centrum deputy
had used to them at the previous sitting, and were
on strike. Under these inopportune circumstances,
Prince Biilow avoided speaking, but I could not
back out of the obligation. In the end I got on
better than I expected. My statements, which coni-
cerned Morocco, the Anglo -Russian agreement with
regard to Asia, the Bagdad railway, the Baltic and
North Sea agreements, and a few trifling matters,



76 THE MEMOIRS OF AN AMBASSADOR

were well received. On this first occasion I had
prepared my speech. Later, in the case of questions
which could not be foreseen, this was not feasible.
But I also got on quite well, speaking on the spur
of the moment, and I found that the deputies pre-
ferred this, on account of the speeches being more
spirited, and confined to the main points. If it sc
happened that I had not time to go very deeply
into a matter, or so much was at stake that every
word had to be carefully weighed beforehand, I
got out of the difficulty by reading a statement or
explanation here and there. That always left an
unfavourable impression.

Thanks to the Reichstag being in a good
humour, the Budget debate went off absolutely
without a hitch, so much so that one or 4 two things
the Budget Committee had struck out were re-
inserted by the Plenum. It is true that the
Reichstag withdrew these concessions on the third
reading, solely, as the well-meaning mover of the
proposal informed me in confidence, on the fixed
principle of not giving the Government all it asked.

The incorporation of Bosnia and Herzegovina in
the Habsburg monarchy, proclaimed on October 8,
1908, ushered in, a period full of anxiety aad unrest.
It has often been stated in public that this event
took the German Government completely by sur-
prise. That is quite a fallacy. It was obvious
that the rivalry between Russia and Austria -
Hungary, who were now contending for the
upper hand in the Balkans, instead of pursuing the
policy agreed on at Miirzteg, must lead to the
Balkan question being more or less forcibly solved ;
equally obvious that the first important step would



SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS 77

be taken by the Danube monarchy, which was
eagerly competing for expansion of power under
Baron Aehrenthal's guidance, not from Russia, who
was still disabled.

It is true that it was not clear at first what the
step would be, and when it would be taken* Never-
theless, the constitutional upheaval in Turkey, and
the question it raised whether elections were also
to be held in the provinces of Bosnia and Herze-
govina, which were legally under the jurisdiction
of Austria -Hungary, according to the Berlin Con-
gress, although nominally still under the sovereignty
of the Sultan, foreshadowed some unusual event.
Moreover, a month before the announcement of the
annexation, Baron Aehrenthal had made a point
of acquainting me with his plans, on the occasion of
a visit he paid me at my country place in Bavaria,
where I was spending my leave. The proclamation
was to be made " at the given moment." He could
not yet decide the exact moment, as it still depended
on various circumstances. He did not expect any
very great opposition on the part either of Turkey
or Russia. He proposed to settle the matter satis-
factorily with Turkey by letting her have the
Sanjak, which it would be very difficult to hold
by military force in case of any armed conflict ;
he did not anticipate any serious difficulties with
Russia, all the less as she was incapable of action
for the present. ' The Bear will growl and snarl,
but won't bite or strike out with its claws/' In
reality, none of the European Powers had any good
reason for interfering, for it was not a question
of an actual change in the existing position, merely
of a formal change. Serbia would cry out,



certainly, as a great obstacle would have been
thrown in the way of her fine schemes. " Then she
will just have to put up with the consequences of
her" attitude." This remark threw a light on the
deeper motives which prompted the step. It was
less a question of adding to the lustre of the'Habs-
burg crown, or of evading the difficulty as to the
Turkish elections, than of setting a rocher de bronze
in the way of the Pan-Serbian undermining work,
which was being actively carried on, with Russian
assistance, in the south-eastern portions of the
Monarchy.

In answer to Baron Aehrenthal's question as to
what I thought of his plan, and whether he could
count on our support, I said that I could not
altogether share his view that there would be no
hitch. Comparatively recent experience in the
matter of the Sanjak railway showed that a group
of Powers existed, to whom any excuse for taking
the strongest measures to prevent Austro -Hun-
garian influence from making 1 headway in the
Balkan provinces would be welcome. I agreed that
the " Russian bear would not bite," but it would
certainly do all it could to create difficulties. As
far as the attitude of the German Government was
concerned, I could only say, for the present, that
its fixed principle was to further the interests,
wishes and requirements of its ally in the matter
of the Balkans. But the idea of employing armed
force against Serbia in case of need, seemed to
me very extravagant.

Baron Aehrenthal had already uttered similar
threats against Serbia in an earlier conversation
with me, on the occasion of the Kaiser's visit to



SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS 79

the Emperor Francis Joseph, at Schonbrunn, in the
spring, with the heads of the German Eederal
States, and I had not concealed from him that high-
handed procedure might have far-reaching and
serious consequences^ As to the date of proclaim-
ing the annexation A I imagine that Baron Aehrenthal
wanted first to secure a further means of putting
pressure on Serbia, by drawing Bulgaria into the
orbit of Vienna policy. The declaration of Bul-
garia's independence, which was made at the same
time as the annexation, confirmed this view.

The minor crisis over the Sanjak railway, which
occurred a few months before the Bosnian crisis a
was brought about by Baron Aehrenthal's having
publicly propounded a scheme to carry on the con-
struction of the Bosnian railway in the direction
of Salonica, on the ground of the rights conceded
to the monarchy at the Berlin Congress. Although
Austria-Hungary's right to do this was incon-
testable, and the economic value of the undertaking
obvious, most of the Powers were furious, and a
violent outcry was raised in the Press, led by the
English Press. Not only Russia, Erance, and
England, but also Italy, and particularly Serbia,
protested strongly against the railway project, to
which they imputed political rather than economic
aims. They may have been right in this view, in
so far as the economic expansion of the Danube
Monarchy towards the southern 'Balkans could but
increase its power, and must at the same time have
the effect of sensibly interfering with the Pan-
Serbian schemes of expansion. The Powers named
therefore agreed upon a counter-move, the project
of a railway which should link up the Danube with



80 THE MEMOIRS OF AN AMBASSADOR

the Adriatic. We adopted the standpoint of recog-
nising the cultural and economic importance of the
Sanjak railway undertaking from the first. In
reality, laying railway lines in the disturbed parts
of the Turkish Empire was calculated to do
more than anything else to show the antagon-
istic peoples that there was more to be gained
by opening up the country to profitable economic
activity, than by sanguinary strife and the tutelage
of Powers who forced unsuitable reforms on them.
The question of railway construction was still under
consideration, when it was overtaken by the pro-
clamation of the annexation. It had been, as it
were, the prelude to this event, and had had the
one advantage of showing Austro- Hungarian
diplomacy how strongly attempts to make head-
way in the Balkans would be opposed.

Baron Aehrenthal's bold step was unwelcome to
us, ^n so far as it was Ukely tq lead to complications,
and intensify the existing antagonisms. There was
no reason to suppose, in the first instance, that the
complications would become such as to involve the
serious risk of war, but at the same time we' had
to reckon with 1 this remote possibility. On the other
hand, our own interests, far more than the obliga-
tions of our alliance for this only applied to the
case of a Russian attack demanded that we should
stand by our Ally as a matter of course, and back
her up. strongly in resisting any attempt to under-
mine her' position as a great Eower. Eor it was
only as a great Power that our Ally was of value
to us, both as the guardian of European peace, and
also as a sentinel on the routes to the East, where
a wide field of economic expansion was open to



SECRETARY FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS 81

us. If we left Austria-Hungary to depend on her-
self at a critical moment, which might decide not
only her fate but our own, there was a risk of iher
strength not being equal to the onslaught, and of
her joining our enemies in order to save her own
existence. Our help could, moreover, only be
effective if it made ita influence clearly and distinctly
felt. We therefore not only consented to the step,
but promised our loyal support.

Before the announcement of the annexation it
had already beodfne evident that Russia would make
difficulties. As a matter of fact, M. Isvolsky had
also paid me a visit, shortly after having had a
meeting with Baron Aehrenthal and the Am-
bassador, Count Berchtold, at Buchlau, the resi-
dence of the latter. There he was frankly told of
the proposed annexation, and in return for his