the negotiations, he was in constant communica-
tion with them. How far the later modifications
came from President McKinley, and how far from
Hay or other advisers, I cannot sa}^ ; but there is no
doubt that Hay approved of the terms of settlement



198 JOHN HAY

with Spain, including the retention, by the United
States, of the PhiHppine Islands. The policy of
embarking on colonial possessions aroused a storm
of opposition, which came to be called Anti-Impe-
rialism. Many of its leaders — Carl Schurz, Charles
Eliot Norton, Edward Atkinson, Charles Francis
Adams, Senator G. F. Hoar — had been among the
earliest Republicans, at a time when that party
existed to abolish slavery. To their protests that the
country ought not to go into the business of ruling
Filipinos against their will, and thereby setting up
a form of semi-servitude, Hay and the McKinley
Administration replied that, whether the United
States liked it or not, the Philippine Islands were an
obligation which they could not evade.

On both sides the debate was very bitter — how
bitter can be inferred from the following letter : —

To Whitelaw Reid

Washington, November 29, 1898.

In all the vicissitudes of the last few weeks I have
been delighted to find you always on the side of
square and resolute dealing, and now that I hope the
end is in sight I feel that the country is under great
obligations to you and those of your colleagues who
felt as you have on the subject. There is a wild
and frantic attack now going on in the press against



ENTER HAY SECRETARY OF STATE 199

the whole Philippine transaction. Andrew Carnegie
really seems to be off his head. He writes me frantic
letters signing them "Your Bitterest Opponent."
He threatens the President, not only with the venge-
ance of the voters, but with practical punishment
at the hands of the mob. He sa^^s henceforth the
entire labor vote of America will be cast against us,
and that he will see that it is done. He says the Ad-
ministration will fall in irretrievable ruin the moment
it shoots down one insurgent Filipino. He does not
seem to reflect that the Government is in a some-
what robust condition even after shooting down
several American citizens in his interest at Home-
stead. But all this confusion of tongues will go its
way. The country will applaud the resolution that
has been reached, and you will return in the role of
conquering heroes, with your "brows bound with
oak."

From this letter, not to mention many others
which have preceded it, we observe one of Hay's
most salient traits : having espoused a policy he up-
held it firmly, even fiercely — as if, decision having
been made, debate should cease. He was right: Im-
perialism emerging so suddenly from the hidden
nurseries of fate stood forth in a few months as a
fact that could not be recalled. How far the im-



200 JOHN HAY

perialistic policy might have been modified if Secre-
tary Hay had opposed it, no one can say; but we can
confidently assert that his approval of it greatly
strengthened the Imperialists in the Administration,
in Congress, and throughout the country.

Looking back, we see that the events of a decade
or more had been converging toward the time when
the United States, in dealing with the West Indies
and Central and South America, would be obliged to
depart from their traditional attitude of political
isolation. The loud trumpeting of the transformed
Monroe Doctrine changed all that, for a government
which could utter such a warning could not continue
to be indifferent, much less isolated ; and when it came
to annex, first, the Hawaiian Islands, then Porto Rico,
and then the Philippines, it took on Imperial respon-
sibilities from which no mere protest could absolve
it. Yet the fateful change occurred so casually that
Americans scarcely perceived its far-reaching con-
sequences. The Monroe Doctrine constituted the
United States the warder of both Americas; but
this relation inevitably forced upon the United
States a new position towards Europe, while their
acquisitions in the Pacific, and especially their owner-
ship of the Philippines, threw them into the sphere
of Asiatic development. Whether we would or not,
we were now a World Power and could not evade



ENTER HAY SECRETARY OF STATE 201

the entanglements, ambitions, advantages, or the
dangers implied by that fact.

John Hay was among the few who understood the
significance of the change from the very first mo-
ment; and he accepted it without looking back, or,
so far as appears, without feeling regrets. Seeing its
significance he shaped all his work as Secretary of
State with reference to it. To place this country as
speedily as possible in such relations with the rest of
the world as became its character, was henceforth his
controlling purpose.



CHAPTER XXV

ALASKA: THE FIRST CANAL TREATY

IN the new alignment of world politics which was
measured by continents and not merely by
countries, Hay deemed it to be of the utmost im-
portance that friendship should be cemented be-
tween the United States and the nations of western
Europe; for all these held, or were supposed to hold,
certain ideals of a common civilization. His first
object was to make closer the bonds with Great
Britain, in order that the principles called, for con-
venience' sake, Anglo-Saxon, and professed equally
by Americans and British, should be strengthened
against possible conflict with other rivals in the
political struggle for existence. Not subservience,
not imitation, but the concord of two independent
nations, was his aim.

He had, fortunately, a warm coadjutor in the
British Ambassador, Sir Julian, soon afterward
Lord, Pauncefote, a diplomatist, conciliatory, open-
minded, very sensitive to questions of honor, ready
to assume, until he had proved to the contrary, that
his colleagues' intentions were as honest as his own.
During nearly four years he and Secretary Hay



ALASKA 203

worked together to harmonize the interests of their
respective countries.

Among the larger diplomatic labors which Hay in-
herited from his predecessor was the effort to adjust
with Canada various claims and grievances which
had been a recurrent source of irritation. Twelve
subjects were specified in the protocol; and a Joint
High Commission ^ was appointed ; which, having
met at Quebec, removed to Washington and held
its sessions there during the last months of 1898.

Several of the differences could be easily settled;
one, however, the determination of the Alaska
boundary, proved a stumbling-block. The recent
discovery of gold in the Klondike and the rush
thither of troops of adventurers made it imperative
that the frontier lines should be marked. Since 1867,
when the United States bought Alaska from Russia,
certain inlets, harbors, and channels had been un-
disputedly American ; now, the Canadians laid claim
to them. The Americans believed that the Cana-
dians, knowing that they had no case, insisted on
including the Alaskan contention in the general

^ The Joint High Commission consisted originally of — For the
United States: Senator C. W. Fairbanks, chairman; Senator George
Gray; Congressman Nelson Dingley; ex-Secretary J. W. Foster;
ex-Minister J. A. Kasson; ex-Minister T. J. Coolidge. For Great
Britain and Canada: Lord Herschell, chairman; Sir Wilfrid Lau-
rier, Canadian Premier; Sir R. J. Cartwright; Sir L. H. Davies;
John Charlton, M.P.; Sir J. T. Winter.



204 JOHN HAY

negotiations, in the hope that it might slip through

with the rest.

On December 3, 1898, Hay wrote confidentially to
Mr. Henry White in London: —

To Henry White
I hear from no less than three members of our
Canadian Commission that by far the worst member
of the Commission to deal with is Lord Herschell,
who is more cantankerous than any of the Cana-
dians, raises more petty points, and is harder than
any of the Canadians to get along with. In fact he
is the principal obstacle to a favorable arrangement.
If you could in any discreet way, in conversation
with Balfour or Villiers, or even Lord Salisbury,
should occasion offer, intimate this state of things,
so that they might speak a word which would moder-
ate his excessive lawyer-like zeal to make a case, it
would be a good thing.

On January 3, 1899, the Secretary complains again
to Mr. White: —

" Lord Herschell, with great dexterity and ability,
represents his own side as granting everything and
getting nothing, and yet I think the letter of Fair-
banks shows with perfect clearness and candor that
we are making great concessions and getting no
credit for them.



ALASKA 205

"In the case of Alaska, it is hard to treat with pa-
tience the claim set up by Lord Herschell that vir-
tually the whole coast belongs to England, leaving
us only a few jutting promontories without commu-
nication with each other. Without going into the
historical or legal argument, as a mere matter of
common sense it is impossible that any nation should
ever have conceded, or any other nation have ac-
cepted, the cession of such a ridiculous and preposter-
ous boundary line. We are absolutely driven to the
conclusion that Lord Herschell put forward a claim
that he had no belief or confidence in, for the mere
purpose of trading it off for something substantial.
And yet, the slightest suggestion that his claim is
unfounded throws him into a fury."

Nevertheless, the Lord Chancellor stuck uncom-
promisingly to his demands and the Commission
adjourned on February 20, 1899.

The following letters to various correspondents
throw side-lights on Secretary Hay's work during
these negotiations : —

To Joseph H. Choate

April 28, 1899.

You are by this time probably aware of the great
difficulties that surround the arrangement of any
controversy in which Canada is concerned. The



206 JOHN HAY

Dominion politicians care little for English interests.
Their minds are completely occupied with their own
party and factional disputes, and Sir Wilfrid Laurier
is far more afraid of Sir Charles Tupper than he is of
Lord Salisbury and President McKinley combined;
while the habit of referring everything from the
Foreign Office to the Colonial, followed by a con-
sultation of the Canadian authorities by the Min-
ister of the Colonies, produces interminable friction
and delay.

June 15, 1899.

As to the general subject of the final delimitations
of the frontier, I have still strong hopes that when
Sir Julian returns from the Hague, he may bring us,
after full consultation with you and Lord Salisbury,
some possible basis of agreement. I am so anxious
to have the thing settled that I am willing to run
considerable risk in the Senate with a treaty, either
of delimitation or arbitration, and the President
gives this view his cordial support.

I have been greatly struck, since I came here,
with his coolness and courage in regard to such mat-
ters. Having passed the great part of his life in
Congress, he is, of course, a thorough parliamenta-
rian, with the greatest respect for the Legislative
Department, and a loyal regard and consideration
for its legitimate authority.



ALASKA 207

... To set over their claim on the one place against
our claim on the others may make a neat rhetorical
repartee, but I do not see how a diplomatist or a
man of business can see any justice in such a con-
tention. It is as if a kidnapper, stealing one of
your children, should say that his conduct was more
than fair, it was even generous, because he left you
two.

To Whitelaw Reid

July 27, 1899.

The position in regard to arbitration is not al-
together free from awkwardness. After we had put
forth our entire force and compelled — there is no
other word for it — England to accept arbitration
in the Venezuela matter, we cannot feel entirely easy
in refusing an arbitration in this. It is true the cases
are very different, as I have endeavored to point out
in a long dispatch to Lord Salisbury, in answer to
his proposition for arbitration; but people at large
do not consider these matters in great detail, and it
looks as if we were refusing to England what Eng-
land, at our demand, granted to Venezuela. And
yet if we went into arbitration on the matter, al-
though our claim is as clear as the sun in Heaven, we
know enough of arbitrations to foresee the fatal ten-
dency of all arbitrators to compromise.



2o8 JOHN HAY

Only in the following October was a modus vivendi
agreed to; but not until January, 1903, were negotia-
tions reopened which led to the final settlement of
this fretting dispute. In the mean time, Lord Her-
schell had died, the Boxer uprising and the Boer
War had supervened. President McKinley had been
assassinated, and Theodore Roosevelt was in the
White House.

The convention which Hay then signed with Sir
Michael Herbert, the new British Ambassador, called
for a limited commission, to consist of three Ameri-
cans and three Britishers,^ to treat the Alaskan ques-
tion by itself. It being taken for granted that the
Americans and Canadians would each uphold the
claim of their respective governments, the decision
depended upon Lord Alverstone, whose selection may
not have been fortuitous. For President Roosevelt,
— vigorous, as always, — who thought Hay's atti-
tude indecisive, if not actually timid, took a short
cut to warn the British Cabinet that if this negotia-
tion fell through he would get the consent of Con-
gress to enable him to run the boundary "on his
own hook."

* The Americans appointed by the President were Senator
Lodge, Elihu Root, Secretary of War, and ex-Senator George
Turner, of Washington. The English members were Lord Alver-
stone, Lord Chief Justice of England, and the Canadians, Sir L. A.
Jett6 and A. B. Aylesworth.



ALASKA 209

He said emphatically that he would not arbitrate
the possession of the large sections of Alaska which
the Canadians demanded, but that there were minor
questions, topographical trifles, which they might
discuss. "The claim of the Canadians for access to
deep water along any part of the Alaskan coast is,"
he wrote, "just exactly as indefensible as if they
should now suddenly claim the island of Nantucket."

" I believe that no three men," the President said,
"in the United States could be found who would be
more anxious than our own delegates to do justice
to the British claim on all points where there is even
a color of right on the British side. But the objec-
tion raised by certain Canadian authorities to Lodge,
Root, and Turner, and especially to Lodge and Root,
was that they had committed themselves on the
general proposition. No man in public life in any
position of prominence could have possibly avoided
committing himself on the proposition, any more
than Mr. Chamberlain could avoid committing him-
self on the question of the ownership of the Orkneys
if some Scandinavian country suddenly claimed them.
If this claim embodied other points as to which there
was legitimate doubt, I believe Mr. Chamberlain
would act fairly and squarely in deciding the matter;
but if he appointed a commission to settle up all these
questions, I certainly should not expect him to ap-



210 JOHN HAY

point three men, If he could find them, who believed
that as to the Orkneys the question was an open one.
I wish to make one last effort to bring about an agree-
ment through the Commission," he said in closing,
" which will enable the people of both countries to say
that the result represents the feeling of the represent-
atives of both countries. But if there is a disagree-
ment, I wish it distinctly understood, not only that
there will be no arbitration of the matter, but that
in my message to Congress I shall take a position
which will prevent any possibility of arbitration
hereafter; a position . . . which will render it neces-
sary for Congress to give me the authority to run the
line as we claim it, by our own people, without any
further regard to the attitude of England and Can-
ada. If I paid attention to mere abstract rights, that
is the position I ought to take anyhow. I have not
taken it because I wish to exhaust every effort to
have the affair settled peacefully and with due re-
gard to England's honor."

What passed through the minds of the British
Ministers when they heard, confidentially, the Presi-
dent's decision, is not reported. Possibly, they real-
ized that the claims which the Canadians had pushed
for the past five years were only a bluff; assuredly
they knew that Mr. Roosevelt meant what he said,
and it was no secret that he had already sent troops



ALASKA 211

to Alaska; at all events, they appointed as England's
representative Lord Alverstone, who as it turned out,
supported the American contention.

Whatever demur Secretary Hay may have made
in his consultations with the President, he defended
the American policy stanchly as soon as Mr. Roose-
velt had adopted it.

To a correspondent of the New York Tribune, who
complained that the American Government was too
conciliatory, he wrote (January 30, 1903) : —

To Frederick W. Seward

It seems to me there can be only one objection to
[the treaty], and that is the possibility that the de-
cision of the tribunal may not be final ; the Commis-
sioners may be evenly divided. In that case we are
no worse off than we are now, and the gain we have
made is to separate this question from the other
questions of which it prevented any solution. But I
cannot help thinking . . . that the English are con-
vinced they have no case, and have, therefore, con-
sented to this apparently fair and dignified way of
getting out of an untenable position. It is inconceiv-
able that any American should decide against us,
while if we succeed in convincing one of their men —
and we ought to do it with the case we have — the
troublesome question is settled forever, and the two



212 JOHN HAY

countries can go ahead, delimit the frontier and put
up monuments for all time.

General John W. Foster, ex-Secretary of State and
well versed in the Alaskan controversy, prepared the
American case, which the Administration hoped Mr.
Choate would present before the tribunal. "Your
note of the 22nd of January, 1900," Mr. Hay wrote
to him, "has never been answered, and we regard
it as absolutely unanswerable." Still, Mr. Choate
declined the appointment, and Messrs. Watson and
Dickinson served in his stead. In expressing his re-
grets to Mr. White, Hay said: "A mere legal argu-
ment is not what is required in this unprecedented
case. A sharp, aggressive lawyer will run great risk
of getting Lord Alverstone's back up. Mr. Choate
would have made an argument faultless in tone,
temper, skill, and knowledge of human nature."

Whatever might have been gained from Mr.
Choate's ability as a pleader, we cannot doubt, how-
ever, that he was right in declining the task. For, as
he said, it would be scarcely proper if he, who as
American Ambassador had had frequent conferences
with the British Ministers, should suddenly appear
before the tribunal in the role of an American attor-
ney; it might justify a suspicion that he had been



THE FIRST CANAL TREATY 213

uncandid; it could hardly fail to affect his further
personal and official relations with the British states-
men.

In due season, on October 20, 1903, the tribunal
gave a decision in favor of the chief American claims.
Lord Alverstone voted with the three Americans.
The two Canadian members dissented. Thus, after
long waiting. Secretary Hay saw one of his cherished
measures adopted.

On looking back, the efficacy of the combination
of President Roosevelt's brusqueness with Secretary
Hay's urbanity cannot be disputed.

An even weightier question which pressed for
settlement was that of a canal across the Isthmus of
Panama. A French company under De Lesseps had
collapsed in 1888 after it had accomplished more than
a third of the excavations. Thenceforward the feel-
ing strengthened year by year in the United States
that any Isthmian canal should be built and con-
trolled by the American Government. During the
Spanish War the voyage of the battleship Oregon
round Cape Horn had further emphasized the need
of a shorter route between the Atlantic and the
Pacific States. But the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty,
ratified in 1850 between the United States and Great
Britain, stood in the way: since it pledged each party



214 JOHN HAY

never to "obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive
control over the said ship-canal," or to "assume or
exercise any dominion . . . over any part of Central
America."

As soon as Hay was well established in his depart-
ment he resolved to remove this obstacle. He in-
structed Mr. Henry White, then in charge of the
American Embassy in London, to sound Lord Salis-
bury as to the likelihood of the British Govern-
ment's being disposed to discuss the abrogation of
the treaty. Mr. White acted promptly. It being
Lord Salisbury's habit seldom to visit the Foreign
Office more than once a week, Mr. White wrote to
ask whether he might go down to Hatfield to con-
fer with the Prime Minister on important business.
Lord Salisbury did not like to have foreign ambassa-
dors break in on his country life, but he had long
held Mr. White in friendly esteem and had often
welcomed him as a guest at Hatfield. Accordingly
he sent an invitation for Mr. White to spend a week-
end with him. And one morning late in December,
in the Marquis's library after breakfast, before going
out for a day's shooting together, they talked over
the Isthmian problem. Lord Salisbury assented at
once to the American proposals. The only stipula-
tion he made was that tolls should be levied equally
on ships of all nations that used the Canal. He added



THE FIRST CANAL TREATY 215

that, as Sir Julian Pauncefote was thoroughly con-
versant with the subject, negotiations might be con-
ducted by him at Washington. That evening, after
"a particularly pleasant day's shooting with Lord
Salisbury and his sons," Mr. White cabled to Secre-
tary Hay the happy result of the interview.

So Secretary Hay and Sir Julian conferred on the
terms of the treaty. They found it easy to come to
an agreement on general points; but their progress
was hampered, if not checked, by the Foreign Office,
which was bent on showing to the Canadians its
solicitude for their interests. To make the Canal
treaty a means of securing larger concessions for the
Canadians was too obvious an advantage for a bar-
gainer to throw away.

The following sheaf of letters summarizes most of
the points at issue in the negotiations and has the
further merit of revealing Secretary Hay's manner
of addressing his various correspondents. To Mr.
White in confidence he relieves his pent-up irrita-
tion; to Senator Morgan, to whom the first letter is
addressed, he is dispassionate and polite.

To Senator John T. Morgan

December 27, 1898.

Your letter of the 24th, in regard to the Clayton-
Bulwer Treaty, has been received. It is impossible



2i6 JOHN HAY

at this moment to answer your question as to when
we shall be able to come to an understanding with
the British Government in this matter. I do not
look forward to any protracted negotiation ; we ought
to know before long what we are to expect ; but I can-
not fix a date.

Meanwhile there is, to my mind, no reason why
your work on the Canal Bill should be checked or
retarded in the least, on account of any such nego-
tiation. . . . For my part I shall always be glad of
any suggestions you may feel inclined to make, know-
ing how valuable such suggestions are rendered by
your wisdom and experience.

To Henry White

January 13, 1899.

It is a matter of the utmost importance that if we
are to make such an arrangement, it should be done
at once. In the usual reckless manner of our Senate,
they are discussing the matter with open doors every
day, and are getting themselves so balled up with
their own eloquence that it is greatly to be feared
they will so commit themselves as to consider them-
selves bound to reject any arrangement that may be
made. If you could impress upon our friends in the
Foreign Office that time is very important and that
if they see no serious objection to this draft that



THE FIRST CANAL TREATY 217

they will at once cable Sir Julian to go on with it,
it will relieve the subject of very considerable embar-
rassment.

We desire no advantage, and I am sure we take
none in this arrangement. Our only object is to make
it possible for the Government to take charge and
build the canal without in any way violating our
international obligations to England. The plan, as