that they themselves, of course, "took no stock in
medievalism." The Kaiser went on, however, in-
forming his subjects and the world of the omnipo-
tence of himself and God, and his declaration stead-
ily worked a change in the hearts of the submissive
German people; so that, even when he left God out
of the partnership, the Germans, having the Kaiser,
were not aware of the void.
Thanks to her vigor, efficiency, and enterprise in
material things, Germany prospered. She needed
more territory for her growing population. She lis-
tened to the seductive incitations to world-domin-
ion. Looking at existing conditions, the Germans
concluded that the British Navy alone stood between
them and their ambition. The existence of England
depended upon that navy, therefore if the navy were
destroyed, England would sink. About 1895, the
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THE GERMAN MENACE 277
German Navy League was organized and the build-
ing of a great German fleet was begun. But the
Germans hoped, even before they had finally des-
patched England, to be able to expand by coloniza-
tion, and they coveted especially, as I have before
remarked, Brazil. The reaffirmation of the Monroe
Doctrine by President Cleveland warned them that
they must keep hands off in America. Thence-
forward, for twenty years, they have been watching
an opportunity to humble the United States.
It soon occurred to them that there is more than
one way of colonizing a country. Hundreds of thou-
sands, and even millions, of Germans were scattered
through the world under alien flags. Why should
these Germans be "lost" to the Fatherland? Why
should they not rather in each country form a
veritable German colony, bound by stronger ties to
the Fatherland, using their foreign citizenship for
the benefit of the Fatherland, and preparing for the
happy day, when, through some turn in Fortune's
wheel, they might dominate their adopted countries
in the name of the Kaiser.
The United States held the largest number of
emigrants from Germany. They had come here to
escape military system at home, or to break through
the rigid lines of caste, or simply to better their
fortunes; and they had thriven here. Under the
278 JOHN HAY
pretense of promoting political and commercial
friendship, the German Government began secretly
to organize the German-Americans. Agents of all
kinds were sent out from Germany and the German-
Americans, who had been looked at rather as ab-
sconders by the Imperial Government, were now
flattered, courted, and encouraged in all ways to re-
new their intimacy with the Fatherland and to regard
it as their real home. The time came when those
among them who had achieved wealth or eminence
visited Germany. They were effusively welcomed.
The Emperor condescended to receive them and
permitted even German Jews to penetrate to the
antechambers of the Court. He distributed decora-
tions lavishly. Toward native Americans, also, he
showed great affability. His paid pamphleteers dis-
covered that, in essence, the Prussians and the Yankees
were singularly alike. No form of seduction which
occurred to the Prussic imagination was left untried.
Gradually, the United States were permeated by
the spies, advocates, and surreptitious promoters of
the glory of the Hohenzollern dynasty. Bismarck
had long before taught how to direct a reptile press,
and journalists trained in his teachings came to the
United States.
German teachers in American colleges and uni-
versities did not let slip the advantage which their
THE GERMAN MENACE 279
position gave them for presenting German ideals to
the American pubHc in most alluring forms. In
many institutions they found Germanized faculties
who welcomed them. As the German Government
saw the efficacy of this form of propaganda, it gladly
arranged for an exchange of professors, sending out
some men of distinction who, incidentally, served
the Germanist cause here ; while American professors
went over to tell the Fatherland about this great
country in which the Kaiser was so ostentatiously
interested. The American people, good-natured as
is its wont, suspected nothing.
Now it happened, as I have stated in an earlier
chapter, that when John Hay was in Europe in 1896,
he got wind of the changed purposes of German
Imperialism. Two years later, being Ambassador in
London, he knew of the desperate and undisguised
attempt of both the Germans and the French to
protect Spain from a war with the United States.
He knew of the effort of the German Emperor to
persuade England to join the coalition against us.
He probably heard from Mr. Chamberlain himself
the remark which the Kaiser made to an Englishman,
who reported it to Mr. Chamberlain: "If I had had
a larger fleet I would have taken Uncle Sam by the
scruff of the neck."^ Ambassador Hay knew also
^ Boston Herald, editorial, August 16, 1915.
28o JOHN HAY
that, after the American victory at Manila, an
American official at Berlin, talking quite informally
and without instructions, said in substance, with
regrettable indiscretion, to certain German person-
ages: "We don't want the Philippines; why don't
you take them?" Whether this unguarded remark
led to the appearance, a few weeks later, of a German
squadron in Manila Bay, cannot yet be authenticated
by documents: the fact is undenied that Diederichs
acted as if he intended to seize the islands. Mr. Hay
knew not only of Admiral Dewey's refusal to be
browbeaten, but of the aid rendered by the British
commander Chichester, and of other things which
have not yet been made public. He knew also, as he
wrote in a letter printed above, that England, if
requested, would put her fleet at our service. In
brief, his experience in London revealed to him the
aims of Pan-Germanism.
On his return to Washington, one of Mr. Hay's first
duties as Secretary of State brought him into imme-
diate relation with German diplomacy. For some
time past the United States had exercised a con-
dominium with Great Britain and Germany over
the Samoan Islands. Disputes arose; the friction
between the Germans and the British threatened
to become acute. By common consent, however,
the three Powers agreed, after negotiations in which
THE GERMAN MENACE 281
Hay took a leading part, to give up the condominium.
Germany kept all the islands except Tutuila, and the
English had compensation elsewhere.
The following extracts refer to these negotiations.
The Secretary writes to Mr. Henry White on
September 9, 1899: —
"Our relations with Germany are perfectly civil
and courteous. They are acting badly about our
meats and cannot help bullying and swaggering.
It is their nature. But we get on with them. We
are on the best of terms about Samoa; Sternburg
backed up Tripp in everything, so that, to our amaze-
ment, Germany and we arranged everything har-
moniously. It was rather the English commissioner
who was offish. The Emperor is nervously anxious
to be on good terms with us — on his own terms. Men
entendu."
When England and Germany came to an agree-
ment, Mr. Hay wrote privately to Mr. Choate: —
To Joseph H. Choate
November 13, 1899.
I was kept quite in the dark up to the last moment
as to the arrangement made between Germany and
England. The newspapers have announced, with-
out the least reserve, that England was to keep
Samoa and Germany get the Gilbert and Solomon
282 JOHN HAY
Islands, or, as the boys with a natural reminiscence
of the opera hoiiffe called them, "The Gilbert and
Sullivan." I should have been glad if you had
squandered a little of the public money, letting me
know by telegraph the true state of the case. It is
a satisfaction to me to know that Lord Salisbury
assured you that equal rights as to trade and com-
merce would be reserved for the other Powers in
Samoa, and of this he was informed by your letter
before the German Embassy received the authentic
news that the arrangement had been made. Ger-
many, it is true, has been excessively anxious to
have the matter concluded before the Emperor's visit
to England, and, in the intense anxiety, I am in-
clined to think they have somewhat lost sight of their
material interests in the case. . . .
Our interests in the archipelago were very meager
always excepting our interest in Pago Pago, which
was of the most vital importance. It is the finest
harbor in the Pacific and absolutely indispensable
to us. The general impression in the country was
that we already owned the harbor, but this, as you
know, was not true. . . . Seeing the intense anxiety
of the Emperor that the negotiations should be has-
tened, I sent at his personal request the dispatches
which you have received ; assured that all our inter-
ests would be safeguarded and knowing also that in
THE GERMAN MENACE 283
case the arrangement proposed was not satisfactory
we always had the power of a peremptory veto. . . .
The arrangement seems to have been received
with general satisfaction in the country, though the
New York Sim which is usually very friendly to us,
is greatly displeased by it; while the Tribune, which
has of late been playing the role of "the candid
friend," highly approves. Our Navy Department
has for a long time been very anxious for this con-
summation, and of course, they are delighted with
it. Tutuila, though the smallest of the islands, is
infinitely the most important and the most useful
to us. The argument from size, which the Sun makes
so much of, is hardly worth a moment's considera-
tion. An acre of land at the comer of Broad and
Wall Streets is worth something like a million acres
in Nevada. The proof that size has nothing to do
with the case is that Savii, by far the largest of the
islands, was considered by Germany and by Eng-
land as entirely worthless. My own opinion is that
Germany has the least valuable bargain of the three
and that she was led by her sentimental eagerness
into a bad trade. . . .
The next year, in his labor to save China, Hay had
a still closer view of German methods. What he
thought of them may be summed up in his sentence
284 JOHN HAY
already quoted: "I had almost rather be the dupe
of China than the chum of the Kaiser." After Hay's
discovery that the foreigners at the Legations were
still alive, it was Secretary Root's quick decision to
send General Chaffee with a relief force to Peking,
that saved the day. Incidentally the swiftness of
that movement prevented Count Waldersee from
taking command of the joint expedition as the Kaiser
had planned ; for Chaffee and his associates had put
down the Boxers before Waldersee arrived.
From this time on, as the Isthmian Canal project
came to be a certainty, the Germans redoubled their
efforts to get a foothold in the Western Hemisphere
and if possible within striking distance of the Canal.
In May, 1901, Hay received information that Ger-
man warships had been inspecting the Santa Marga-
rita Islands, off the coast of Venezuela, with a view
to occupying them as a naval base. Later he learned
that the Kaiser was secretly negotiating for the pur-
chase of two harbors "for his own personal use" —
whatever that meant — on the desolate coast of Low-
er California. Both these essays came to nought.
In that same year, 1902, one of the periodic out-
breaks to which Venezuela was addicted gave him
an excuse for putting to the test whether or not the
United States would defend the Monroe Doctrine by
force of arms. The Venezuelans owed the Germans,
THE GERMAN MENACE 285
the English, and the ItaHans large amounts which
they had put off paying until their creditors began
to suspect that they never intended to pay at all.
The Kaiser apparently counted on the resistance of
the Venezuelans to furnish him a pretext for occupy-
ing one or more of their seaboard towns. In order to
disguise the fact that this was a German undertak-
ing he looked about for accomplices who would give
to it an international semblance. It happened just
at that time, that Germany found herself isolated,
as France and Russia had renewed their bond of
friendship. England, too, always suspicious of
Russia, and recently irritated by France, seemed to
be looking for a friend. By offers which cannot yet
be made public, Germany persuaded the Tory
Governm.ent to draw closer to her. The immediate
result of this adventure in international coquetry
was the joint demand of Germany and England
on Venezuela to pay them their dues. Venezuela
procrastinated.
The allies then sent warships and established what
they called a "pacific blockade" on the Venezuelan
ports (December 8, 1901). During the following
year Secretary Hay tried to persuade the blockaders
of the unwisdom of their action. He persistently
called their attention to the fact that a "pacific
blockade" was a contradiction in terms and that its
286 JOHN HAY
enforcement against the rights of neutral nations
could not be tolerated. He also urged arbitration.
Germany deemed that her opportunity had now
come, and on December 8, 1902, she and Great
Britain severed diplomatic relations with Venezuela,
making it plain that the next steps would be the
bombardment of Venezuelan towns and the occupa-
tion of Venezuelan territory.
Here came the test of the Monroe Doctrine, If
the United States permitted foreign nations, under
the pretense of supporting their creditors' claims, to
invade a weak debtor state by naval or military
expedition, and to take possession of its territory,
what would become of the Doctrine? At this point
the direction of the American policy passed from
Secretary Hay to President Roosevelt.
England and Italy were willing to come to an
understanding. Germany refused. She stated that
if she took possession of territory, such possession
would only be "temporary"; but such possessions
easily become permanent; and besides, it is difficult
to trust to guarantees which may be treated as
"scraps of paper."
President Roosevelt did not shirk the test. Al-
though his action has never been officially described,
there is no reason now for not describing it.
One day, when the crisis was at its height, he
THE GERMAN MENACE 287
summoned to the White House Dr. Holleben, the
German Ambassador, and told him that unless Ger-
many consented to arbitrate, the American squad-
ron under Admiral Dewey would be given orders,
by noon ten days later, to proceed to the Venezue-
lan coast and prevent any taking possession of Ven-
ezuelan territory. Dr. Holleben began to protest
that his Imperial master, having once refused to ar-
bitrate, could not change his mind. The President
said that he was not arguing the question, because
arguments had already been gone over until no
useful purpose would be served by repeating them;
he was simply giving information which the Am-
bassador might think it important to transmit to
Berlin. A week passed in silence. Then Dr. Holleben
again called on the President, but said nothing of
the Venezuelan matter. When he rose to go, the
President asked him about it, and when he stated
that he had received nothing from his Government,
the President informed him in substance that, in
view of this fact. Admiral Dewey would be instructed
to sail a day earlier than the day he, the President,
had originally mentioned. Much perturbed, the
Ambassador protested; the President informed him
that not a stroke of a pen had been put on paper;
that if the Emperor would agree to arbitrate, he, the
President, would heartily praise him for such action,
288 JOHN HAY
and would treat it as taken on German initiative;
but that within forty-eight hours there must be an
offer to arbitrate or Dewey would sail with the orders
indicated. Within thirty-six hours Dr. Holleben
returned to the White House and announced to
President Roosevelt that a despatch had just come
from Berlin, saying that the Kaiser would arbitrate.
Neither Admiral Dewey (who with an American
fleet was then manoeuvring in the West Indies) nor
any one else knew of the step that was to be taken ;
the naval authorities were merely required to be in
readiness, but were not told what for.
On the announcement that Germany had con-
sented to arbitrate, the President publicly compli-
mented the Kaiser on being so stanch an advocate
of arbitration.
The humor of this was probably relished more in
the White House than in the Palace at Berlin. The
Kaiser suggested that the President should act as
arbiter, and Mr. Roosevelt was ready to serve; but
Mr. Hay dissuaded him. Mr. Hay had permitted
Mr. Herbert W. Bowen, American Minister to Ven-
ezuela, to act as arbitrator for that country, and
Mr. Bowen regarded it as improper that the United
States, which also had claims against Venezuela,
should sit in judgment on the case. Mr. Hay, desir-
ous of validating the Hague Tribunal, saw a further
THE GERMAN MENACE 289
advantage in referring to it this very important con-
tention. The President acquiesced, therefore, and
Venezuela's claims went to The Hague for arbitra-
ment.
England and Italy, Germany's partners in the
naval expedition, gladly complied. England, we pre-
sume, had never intended that her half -alliance with
Germany should bring her into open rupture with
the United States. Although her pact was kept as
secretly as possible at home, inklings of it leaked out,
and it has since been esteemed, by those who know
the details, one of the least creditable items in Lord
Salisbury's foreign policy. Whether he or Mr. Bal-
four originated it, the friends of neither have cared
to extol it, or indeed to let its details be generally
known.
In a letter to a private correspondent, Secretary
Hay takes a parting shot at the Venezuelan settle-
ment : —
''They [the German Government] are very much
preoccupied in regard to our attitude, and a com-
munique recently appeared in the Berlin papers
indicating that the negotiations would have gone on
better but for our interference. We have not inter-
fered, except in using what good offices we could
dispose of to induce all parties to come to a speedy
and honorable settlement, and in this we have been,
290 JOHN HAY
I think, eminently successful. I think the thing that
rankles most in the German ojfhcial mind is what
Bowen said to Sternburg: ^ "Very well, I will pay
this money "which you demand, because I am not
in position to refuse, but I give you warning that
for every thousand dollars you exact in this way,
you will lose a million in South American trade."
(February i6, 1903.)
In this wise the German Kaiser learned that the
Monroe Doctrine was a fact. But while he was
secretly working for a foothold in America, his
blandishments and protestations of friendliness to
the people of the United States became more and
more marked. As a sign of his hearty favor he sent
over his brother. Prince Henry of Prussia, to bear
his Imperial greetings to the President and to vari-
ous distinguished institutions and representative
bodies. Prince Henry's visit, however, was really
intended to solidify the German-American move-
ment in behalf of the Fatherland. Through his some-
what inept informers. Dr. HoUeben and his satellites,
the Kaiser had been led to believe that a million Ger-
mans were already organized and most eager to bow
down and do homage to a Hohenzollern as their
accepted lord. But it turned out that the German-
Americans were not yet entirely Prussianized. Many
' Freiherr Speck von Sternburg, soon after this appointed Ger-
man Ambassador to succeed Holleben.
THE GERMAN MENACE 291
of them had joined the German societies without
suspecting that these were intended ultimately to sub-
stitute imperial German for democratic American
ideals. Prince Henry's whirlwind passage from city
to city evoked everywhere curiosity, — for Ameri-
cans are always eager to be amused, — but it failed
in some quarters to stimulate the pro-Prussian and
pro-HohenzoUern enthusiasm which had been ex-
pected. From that time forward, however, the paid
agents and organizers pushed on their work secretly,
and they were aided by many enthusiasts, not all of
whom suspected the object for which they were
being used. It is enough to cite the close league be-
tween the Irish and German elements of Tammany
Hall — a league to which Hay has several times re-
ferred — in order to show how "practical" and how
"ideal" was one element of the pro-Hohenzollern
propagandists in this country.
"It is a singular ethnological and political para-
dox," Hay wrote the President, "that the prime
motive of every British subject in America is hos-
tility to England, and the prime motive of every
German-American is hostility to every country in
the world, including America, which is not friendly
to Germany. . . . The Irish of New York are thirst-
ing for my gore. Give it to them, if you think they
need it." (April 23, 1903.)
292 JOHN HAY
Count von Biilow was the Kaiser's chief adviser
during the years of Hay's secretaryship. The Count
promoted, if he did not invent, the policy of recov-
ering the "lost" Germans for the Fatherland. He
encouraged the Kaiser's growing ambition, serving as
the medium between the great industrialists and the
militarists and the Emperor. Outwardly a sleek
man, he made German diplomacy, as Hay remarked,
as brutal as possible. During his ten years' service
the Pan-Germanist propaganda passed from the
stage of dreams to that of an umrestrained im-
pulse. When he was dismissed by a sudden caprice
of the Emperor, he had the satisfaction of knowing
that he had succeeded in leaving Germany without
a friend in the world, — except Austria, which was
really her servant, and Turkey, which was subsi-
dized by her gold. In so short a time to succeed in
alienating the world's sympathy from his country
was a feat of which no other contemporary states-
man could boast.
Von Billow's mouthpiece at Washington, Dr.
Holleben, attempted rather crudely to imitate the
alternating brusqueness and blandishment which the
Kaiser adopted toward this Government according
as its acts pleased or displeased him. When William
was checkmated in Venezuela and England cooled
in her alliance with him, Holleben, working on in-
THE GERMAN MENACE 293
structlons which he must have had from Berhn, —
for no German official acts without instructions, —
strove to irritate our people against England. He
declared that before the outbreak of the Spanish
War, England surpassed the other Powers in hostil-
ity to us, and as a proof of this he recalled the fact
that Pauncefote headed the members of the Diplo-
matic Corps who interviewed President McKinley
to protest against American menace to Spain. Now
every one in Washington knew that Pauncefote went
simply as the dean of the Diplomatic Corps and that
he had consistently worked to strengthen friendship
between England and the United States. That
Holleben had waited until Pauncefote was dead
before uttering this low insinuation against him
caused such general contempt that the Kaiser, per-
ceiving that the little plot had failed, recalled him at
a day's notice. Hay found German diplomacy the
most difficult to deal with. Even trifles assumed a
pompous gravity which might have been excessive
if great matters were at stake. The Germans seemed
to be afraid that they would not be taken at their
own valuation, and so they constantly kept remind-
ing those with whom they had to deal, of their im-
portance. Two or three American warships happened
to be at Villefranche when the French President paid
a casual visit to Marseilles. The Marseilles munici-
294 JOHN HAY
pality, out of common politeness, invited the ships
to visit the port on the day when the President was
there. This they did and the incident, which had no
significance, would have been promptly forgotten had
not the German Foreign Office intimated to our State
Department that the Emperor would feel slighted if
our ships did not pay their respects to him. To such
trifles do the controllers of empires sometimes de-
scend. Another small embarrassment was caused by
William's presentation to the American people of a
statue of Frederick the Great; but here also Hay,
by his urbanity, prevented friction.
I have given in some detail this aspect of Secretary
Hay's work, because in justice to him it should be
known. For during his lifetime some of his critics
attributed to mere prejudice his attitude towards
Germany, and to downright Anglomania his friend-
liness towards England. To those who believe that
the English-speaking peoples all over the world