should not be supplanted by Prussianized Teutons,
Hay's foresight and his choice appear now in their
proper light.
His conduct toward Germany was in fact always
correct; and although he had reason to believe that
the treaty he negotiated with Denmark for the pur-
chase of the Danish West Indies was defeated in the
Danish Parliament by German influence, he never
THE GERMAN MENACE 295
let his suspicion be known. Later, as we shall see,
he worked in harmony with the Kaiser in regard to
the Chinese situation because the Kaiser in this case
was simply bent on enforcing Hay's own policy of
protecting China. In his private letters Hay's refer-
ences to William H are usually amusing. He was
not deceived into mistaking the Emperor's bustle
in politics, art, literature, and religion for greatness.
But although he smiled, he recognized that such a
monarch, working upon such a people as the German,
might become a danger to civilization, and when,
before Hay died, the Kaiser took to "rattling his
scabbard" too frequently, the Statesman of Peace
had no longer any delusions as to the purpose of the
Emperor of War. Only after the German Kaiser had
forced his Atrocious War upon the world in 191 4, did
his agents in the United States proclaim that they
had built up an organization so powerful that it
would compel the American Government to do their
bidding, which was his.
CHAPTER XXIX
THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA
IN an address on "American Diplomacy" which
Secretary Hay delivered at the New York
Chamber of Commerce Dinner on November 19,
1 901, he uttered a sentence which went over the
country.
" If we are not permitted to boast of what we have
done," he said, "we can at least say a word about
what we have tried to do and the principles which
have guided our action. The briefest expression of
our rule of conduct is, perhaps, the Monroe Doctrine
and the Golden Rule. With this simple chart we can
hardly go far wrong."
Mr. Hay had already done much to deserve to be
called "the Statesman of the Golden Rule," and he
was still to do more before he died. The new genera-
tion associates with his memory the qualities which
justify that noble description. While he still lived
men said, "If John Hay did that, it must be right";
and since his death they say, of a given policy, "If
John Hay were alive he would never approve of
this."
I come now to the creation of the Republic of
THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA 297
Panama ā that transaction in his career as Secre-
tary of State about which there has raged the most
vehement debate. Opponents have called it "im-
moral," " piratical," " treacherous" ; some supporters
have defended it on the ground of international ex-
pediency, or on technical legal points; others, while
admitting the ugly appearances, have consoled them-
selves with the thought that, inasmuch as John Hay
gave it his sanction, the affair could not have been
dishonorable.
Mr. Hay used to tell his friends that often Presi-
dent McKinley did not send for him once a month
on business, but that he saw President Roosevelt
every day. That statement illustrates the difference
in initiative between the two Presidents; or, at least,
the ratio of their interest in foreign relations. From
the moment of Mr. Roosevelt's accession, the State
Department felt a new impelling force behind it. The
Secretary still conducted the negotiations, but the
origination and decision of policy came to rest more
and more with the President.
- In no other case was this so true as in that of the
Panama Canal. In the earlier stages Mr. Roosevelt
gave directions which Mr. Hay carried out; before
the end, however, the President took the business
into his own hands ; and has always frankly assumed
entire responsibility for the decisive stroke.
298 JOHN HAY
The abrogation of the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, in
December, 1901, left the field open for the United
States Government to construct, maintain, and con-
trol a canal across the Isthmus of Panama. Two
parties urged their claims ā one, advocating the
route through Nicaragua, the other, the shorter way
through Panama. Each set of promoters put for-
ward the special advantages for its route and pointed
out the drawbacks of its rival. Senator John T.
Morgan, the most zealous champion of a canal, pre-
ferred the Nicaragua plan, and wished to bind the
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations to it. The
Government had appointed a commission of experts,
under Admiral John G. Walker, to study all possible
routes for a canal between the Atlantic and the
Pacific, and this commission reported in favor of
Nicaragua.
Before Congress voted in favor of Nicaragua, how-
ever, the advocates of Panama got a hearing. The
old De Lesseps Company, after its collapse, had
sold its plant, good- will, and excavations to the
New Panama Canal Company. No sooner had the
Walker Commission reported than the President of
the new company, which had previously offered to
sell all its interests for $109,000,000, cabled from
Paris that he would accept $40,000,000 ā the esti-
mate of value made by the Walker Commission.
THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA 299
On January 8, 1902, the House passed, by an over-
whelming majority, the Hepburn Bill, authorizing
the construction of the Nicaragua Canal; but this
measure was fought in the Senate, and only after it
had been amended beyond recognition by Senator
Spooner was it accepted by the Senate, on June 19,
and by the House a week later. President Roosevelt
signed it on June 28, 1902. Briefly, the Spooner
Bill provided for the purchase by the Government,
at forty million dollars, of the New Panama Canal
Company's rights ; for acquiring at a fair price from
the Republic of Colombia a strip of territory six
miles broad from Colon to Panama, together with
as much additional land as the President should
deem necessary; and then for proceeding with the
work of construction.
Such was the tangled skein of the Panama Canal
affair when diplomacy took it up.
The American Government concluded its bargain
with the new company without difficulty, whereas,
from the outset, its negotiations with Colombia
awakened distrust. While Congress was discussing
the Spooner Bill, Secretary Hay had been busy
sounding the Central American republics and Co-
lombia, and he kept Senator Morgan, the zealot of
the Canal project, informed of each move.
300 JOHN HAY
To Senator John T. Morgan
April 22, 1902.
... It is true that the Panama people [New Pan-
ama Canal Company] have at last made their prop-
osition. I have been trying to induce them to make
some changes in it which might render it more ac-
ceptable to the Senate and to our people. When it
is completed I shall give them a note announcing the
readiness of the Government of the United States to
enter into a convention respecting the canal, when
Congress shall have authorized the President to do
so and when the legal officers of the United States
shall have been satisfied of the power of the Panama
Canal Company to transfer all their rights in the
case.
I regret to say that I have not yet been able to
get a firm offer from the Government of Nicaragua.
. . . Let me assure you in strictest confidence that I
was unwilling to send in the Panama proposition un-
til I was able also to send in the Nicaragua proposals.
. . . The principal difficulty in the case is this, that
both in Colombia and in Nicaragua great ignorance
exists as to the attitude of the United States. In
both countries it is believed that their route is the
only one possible or practicable and that the Govern-
ment of the United States in the last resort will
THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA 301
accept any terms they choose to demand. The min-
isters here of both Powers know perfectly well that
this is untrue, and they are doing all they can to
convince their people at home that no unreasonable
proposition will be considered by the Government
of the United States; but it is slow work convincing
them.
April 23, 1902.
... I conceive my duty to be to try to ascertain
the exact purposes and intentions of both the Gov-
ernments [Nicaragua and Costa Rica] and, when I
have done so, to inform your committee of the result
for your information. ... I do not consider myself
justified in advocating either route, as this matter
rests within the discretion of Congress. When Con-
gress has spoken, it will then be the duty of the State
Department to make the best arrangement possible
for whichever route Congress may decide upon.
I cannot but believe that you are approaching the
realization of the great enterprise which has so long
occupied your thoughts and your endeavors, and
certainly when the hour comes no name in the world
can compare with yours in the praise and honor"
which would belong to it for the accomplishment of
this beneficent work which will be for the benefit of
many generations yet unborn.
302 JOHN HAY
But the capacity of the Latin-Americans to post-
pone seemed limitless: witness this note to Senator
Morgan, dated May 12: ā
"It is impossible for you, as it would be for any
one, to appreciate the exasperating difhculties that
have been placed in my way in trying to get a defi-
nite proposition from our Central American friends.
I have finally sent a note to Mr. Corea [Nicaraguan
Minister at Washington], telling him I can wait no
longer upon the convenience of his Government;
that he must, before Tuesday of this week, let me
know what they propose, and that, in case I get no
definite proposition from them by that time, I shall
submit to Congress the proposition made by the
Colombian Government, and also a statement that
it has been impossible to get anything definite from
the Government of Nicaragua.
"In regard to your other question, the President
has no desire for any delay by Congress in the con-
sideration of the Canal matter. He greatly prefers,
as did President McKinley, that the question of the
route should be decided by Congress, but, in case it
should seem best to Congress to leave to him the
decision of the route which the Canal shall take, he
will not evade that labor and responsibility."
The significance of the following extract from a
letter of May 19 needs no comment: ā
THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA 303
"... In our final negotiations we shall insist upon
a provision being inserted which will prevent this
Government from being mulcted in enormous in-
demnities for land which has been recently pur-
chased by speculators with that intention."
As soon as the President signed the Spooner Bill,
Mr. Hay began conferring with General Concha, the
Colombian Minister in Washington, and on July 15
he writes Senator Spooner : ā
" I embodied in a draft of the treaty with Colombia
all the ideas you set forth in our recent conversa-
tions, and think we have got it in very satisfactory
shape. General Concha did not think he had au-
thority to accept these amendments to the draft
which we had formerly agreed upon, and has trans-
mitted them to his Government for their approval
and acceptance. I do not imagine that we shall get
an answer immediately. ..."
Mr. Hay closes his letter with this noteworthy
postscript, written in his own hand : ā
"Gen. Morgan says we ought to acquire Panama
ā the entire State ā from Colombia. I told him I
would consult, as occasion offered, some of the lead-
ing members of the Senate on that subject."
Senator Morgan seems to have already been asking
himself, as were other American public men, whether
the simplest way to assure the political safety of the
304 JOHN HAY
Isthmian Canal would not be to annex the Province
of Panama. On September 27, 1902, in one of his
many urgent notes to Mr. Hay, he sends a copy of a
letter just received from a Virginian friend, who had
spent several years on the Isthmus. "In regard to
the temper of the Isthmus population," this gentle-
man writes, "looking to annexation to the United
States, I think it would be favorable, but Colombia,
in every other section, would be likely to be opposed,
as the Isthmus is looked upon as a financial cow to
be milked for the benefit of the country at large.
This difficulty might be overcome by diplomacy and
money."
This last sentence contains the kernel from which
sprang the violent climax of the Canal negotiations.
The Province of Panama, once independent, had, in
the course of endemic revolutions, been annexed to
the United States of Colombia. Its interests were
quite distinct from Colombia's, and since the con-
struction of the railway across the Isthmus, forty
years before, its revenues had gone mostly into the
pockets of statesmen at Bogota, the Colombian
capitol, distant a fifteen days* journey from Panama.
As soon as the construction of the Canal seemed
probable, those statesmen quickly saw great profit
in it for themselves. The Government, virtually
despotic, was in the hands of President Marroquin,
THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA 305
who had crushed a rebellion of so-called Liberals in
1900.
Making a treaty with such elements was much like
putting a lid on an intermittent geyser. Neverthe-
less, Secretary Hay took up the task with Dr. Tomas
Herran, the Colombian Charge in Washington, and,
after many months* deliberation they agreed that
the United States should pay Colombia ten million
dollars for her consent to the purchase of the New
Panama Company's rights and plant, and for ceding
the required territory, and that, after nine years,
Colombia should receive an annual bonus of two
hundred and fifty thousand dollars. On January
27, 1903, the Hay-Herran Treaty was signed, and
on March 17 the Senate ratified it. Then the instru-
ment went to Bogotd for ratification.
The politicians there at once showed their hand.
Ten million dollars, followed by the annual subsidy,
looked a very small sum to them: why not double
or treble it?
Mr. Hay writes Senator Hanna how matters
stand.
To Senator M. A. Hanna
May 14, 1903.
Walker told me that there was at Colon no accu-
rate source of information, but the air was full of
306 JOHN HAY
rumors, which it was impossible to verify on the
spot. From Bogotd we get occasional very meager
dispatches from Beaupre [American Minister to
Colombia]. He tells us that there Is very great op-
position based on two or three points ā one, the In-
adequacy of the terms; two, the pretended loss of
sovereignty ; and three, the talk of demagogues who
want to get office by denouncing the encroachments
of the Yankees. You know that for some days past
there has been a rumor of the resignation of Marro-
quin and the succession of Reyes. This seems to be
untrue. I never have believed it, and should have
been greatly surprised if It had been confirmed. On
the contrary, the retirement of Fernandes and the
entrance into the Cabinet of Mendoza seems clearly
to me to indicate that Marroquin has the situation
pretty well in hand, and that he would not have
called his Congress together In extra session on the
20th of June unless he had pretty positive assurances
that he will have his way. Still, you know enough
about those countries to know that nothing is certain
until it is done.
The Colombian Congress met on June 20, but the
treaty was not even presented to It for discussion.
Marroquin and his friends thought that, having
committed the United States to accept the Panama
THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA 307
route, they could extort any price they chose, ā an
intelligible attitude for a seller to take. So they de-
clared, unofficially, that the ten millions which Dr.
Herran, their accredited envoy, had agreed to, was
not enough. They planned, therefore, to hold up
the treaty until they should get all they could; and
instead of attacking the United States directly, they
demanded of the New Panama Canal Company
another ten millions for allowing it to sell its rights
to the United States.
That company, whose seat was in Paris, was rep-
resented by its general counsel, Mr. William Nelson
Cromwell, of New York. In 1900 he urged Senator
Hanna to include in the Republican platform a
plank advocating the construction by the United
States of an inter-oceanic canal, preferably by way^
of Panama. Senator Hanna demurred, and only
after Mr. Cromwell had contributed sixty thousand
dollars to the Republican campaign fund was such
a plank, very general in terms, adopted.^
Thenceforward Mr. Hanna took increasing inter-
est in Mr. Cromwell, and supported the upholders of
the Panama route. Mr. Cromwell refused Colombia's
demands, and during the summer of 1903 it was
^ The Story of Panama. Hearings on the Rainey Resolution before
the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives.
Washington, 1912. Statement of Hon. Henry T. Rainey, of Illinois,
p.71.
3o8 JOHN HAY
hinted by the World and other New York papers
that he was busy plotting dire things on the Isthmus.
How far this was true we cannot know until he pub-
lishes his memoirs; but if he had a sense of humor
perhaps he enjoyed the mystery and notoriety and
the suggestion of turpitude which his enemies in the
press whispered about him.
Colombia also intimated that it expected the
United States to raise its payment from ten millions
to fifteen. The Colombian dreams of avarice grew
as rapidly as Jack's beanstalk.
All this while at Washington, Secretary Hay kept
impressing upon Dr. Herran that unless the treaty
went through unmaimed, and within a "reasonable
time," it would be void; and Dr. Herran kept assur-
ing the Secretary that the statesmen at Bogota
would surely ratify it. On July 17 Mr. Hay wrote
President Roosevelt : ā
"I have wired Beaupre to let Colombia under-
stand that their strike for more money would prob-
ably be rejected by the Senate and that any amend-
ment or delay would greatly imperil the treaty."
In July a special committee of the Colombian
Senate took up the treaty and, on August 4, reported
it so amended as to denature it. Only a few days
before Secretary Hay had cabled Mr. Beaupre, the
American Minister at Bogota, to warn the Colom-
/
THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA 309
bians that "No additional payment by the United
States can hope for approval by the United States
Senate, while any amendment whatever requiring
consideration by that body would most certainly im-
peril its consummation."
Despite these warnings the Colombian Senate, on
August 12, unanimously rejected the treaty; but in
order to prevent the United States from losing its
patience, General Reyes, in behalf of the Govern-
ment, said that it had counted on a speedy reaction
in which it would be possible to come to terms. He
asked that a fortnight longer be granted to the
Colombians. To this request Mr. Hay cabled the
reply on August 24: "The President will make no
engagement on the Canal matter, but I regard it as
improbable that any definite action will be taken
within two weeks."
The Colombians, unable to coerce the New
Panama Company into paying the ten million
dollars, hit upon a plan for realizing their dream of
avarice. According to an early agreement their con-
cession to the builders of the Panama Canal would
expire in 1904; but this limit they had subsequently
extended to October 31, 1910. By asserting now that
the first date was the true one, they reckoned that
within a year the rights of the New Canal Company
would revert to Colombia. This would bring her.
310 JOHN HAY
not a paltry ten or even twenty millions, but forty,
besides whatever additional price she could wring
from the next concessionnaire. On September 5 the
Special Committee of the Colombian Senate advised
that the treaty be rejected; on October 14 another
committee reported in favor of regarding 1904 in-
stead of 1 9 10 as the limit of the concession; and on
October 31 the Congress adjourned, without voting
on either of these bills. Why vote, when their acts
spoke so plainly?
To a correspondent in San Francisco who inquired
of Mr. Hay as to the action of this Congress, he
replied: ā
"The extravagant propositions you refer to were
many times presented in various ways to the Bogota
Congress. None of them were passed upon, and no
firm proposition has ever been made by the Govern-
ment of Colombia to the United States. Their aim
was evidently to pursue a dilatory policy until next
year, when they would probably have declared the
French concession forfeited, and have demanded
of us the whole sum agreed upon with the Panama
Company. The only officially ascertained fact in the
case is that they refused to ratify the treaty they had
made with us and offered nothing in its place."
(November 23, 1903.)
News that the Colombian Senate had rejected the
THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA 311
treaty reached Washington on August 16. Some
persons concluded that the Colombian Congress
intended to adjourn, after conferring on Marroquin
full powers to ratify the treaty; others suspected that
the act foreboded a break; others again, familiar
with the state of feeling on the Isthmus, predicted
that Panama would secede, declare its independence,
and offer the Canal route to the United States.
Secretary Hay, on his vacation at Newbury, New
Hampshire, received frequent summaries of the state
of departmental business from the tireless Mr. Adee
in Washington. Some of his brief comments are en-
lightening. The first refers to the proposal from
Rico, Colombian Foreign Secretary, at the moment
when Hay believed the President was not inclined
to say anything more to Bogota. "I can imagine
his reception of Rico's calm proposition to make
some new proposal next August." (September 18,
1903-)
Mr. Adee's own witty summary of the situation
was: " It seems to me that the Colombian cow, hav-
ing kicked over the pail, says: 'See here; if I should
kick over this pail, would. you give me "an extension
of time" to see what I will do with another pailful
to-morrow? ' " (Adee to Hay, September 21, 1903.)
By this time the New Canal Company had become
thoroughly alarmed. Its officers seem to have
312 JOHN HAY
counted on Marroquin's display of dictatorial power
in their favor. Now it was clear that he either would
not or dared not interfere. From the next extract
we infer that Mr. Cromwell had carried their griev-
ances to the State Department. Hay writes: ā
"X must not whimper over the ruin of the treaty
through the greed of the Colombians and the dis-
inclination of the Canal Company to satisfy it. If
they were willing to be bled, why not say so at the
time? It is a thing we could not share in, nor even
decently know." (September 21, 1903.);
ā On September 20 the Secretary remarks : ā
"As to Colombia the President has nothing to say
at present. They have had their fun ā let them
wait the requisite number of days for the consequent
symptoms."
Meanwhile, what of the Panamanians? The terri-
tory to be ceded was theirs ; the persons directly con-
cerned were themselves. Neither love, loyalty, nor
self-interest bound them to Colombia. As early as
June they showed signs of restlessness, and at the
delays of the Colombian Congress they talked more
and more openly of independence, which would en-
able them to make the Canal agreement with the
United States, receive the ten million dollars to be
paid for the concession, and enjoy ever after what-
ever benefits the Canal might bring to the Isthmus.
THE REPUBLIC OF PANAMA 313
Otherwise, the political machine at Bogota would
divide the spoils.
The very critics who were so sensitive over the
wrongs of the Filipinos fighting for their freedom,
had been strangely stony toward the Panamanians,
who also desired their liberty. Granted that the
Panamanians may not have been on a higher moral
plane than the Colombians, ought we to ignore the
fact that their cause was worthy, and that of the
Colombians was odious? Let us at least be consist-
ent. If those who conspire for liberty in Manila are
heroes and martyrs, we must not dismiss those who
conspire for liberty at Colon as outlaws.
The Panamanians were quite competent to initi-
ate any conspiracy themselves. Within the space of
two years ā between October, 1899, and September,
1 90 1 ā they had indulged In four revolutions against
the Colombians. As to a revolution of secession and
offer of annexation to the United States, Mr. Adee,
forwarding to Mr. Hay the daily news of the State
Department, writes on August 18: "Such a scheme
could, of course, have no countenance from us ā
our policy before the world should stand, like Mrs.
Caesar, without suspicion. Neither could we under-
take to recognize and protect Panama as an inde-