that we should be justified in regarding such action as a declaration of war.
428 A NEW AMERICANISM, 1815-1830 [ 505
claimed primacy on this hemisphere; we would protect our
weaker neighbors from European intrusion or molestation ; but
we would leave the Old World without interference from us.
TJie thought of the message was not novel. Part of it is found
in Washington's utterances, and the best of it had been stated
repeatedly by Jefferson ( 446). But the practical application,
in 1823, gave it a new significance. From an "academic"
question, it was suddenly lifted into a question of practical inter
505. The message was thoroughly effective at the moment.
England hailed it as making absolutely secure her own policy
of preventing European intervention in America ; and the Tsar
agreed to move north 250 miles, and to accept the line of 54
40' for the southern boundary of Russian Alaska.
But the "Monroe Doctrine" was not limited to that period.
It had been announced merely as an expression of opinion by
the President. No other branch of the government was asked
even to express approval. But the cordial response of the nation,
on this and all subsequent occasions, has made the Monroe
Doctrine, in truth, the American Doctrine. The only real danger
to its permanence is that we so act as to inspire our weaker
American brethren with fear that we mean to use its high
morality as a shield under cover of which we may ourselves
plunder them at will. If it ever becomes probable that the
sheep dog wards off the wolves that he himself may have a
fuller meal, his function will not long endure.
FOB FURTHER READING. Morse's John Quincy Adams.
NATIONALISM AND REACTION
I. THE RISE OF "PROTECTION"
506. From 1807 to 1815 the embargo and the war shut out
European goods. This afforded an artificial "protection" for
home manufactures. We had to use up our own raw cotton,
wool, and iron, or let them go unused ; and we had to supply
our own clothing, fabrics, tools, and machinery, or do without.
This new demand for building up home manufactures was
met mainly in New England, where much capital and labor,
formerly engaged in shipping, was temporarily unemployed.
In 1807 New England cotton mills had only 8000 spindles in
use ( 435) ; in 1809 the number was 80,000 ; and, by the close
of the war, 500,000, employing 100,000 workers. Woolen and
iron manufactures had not grown quite so rapidly ; but they
also were well under way. The total capital invested had
risen to about a hundred million dollars. Two fifths of this
was in the cotton industry.
507. When peace returned, it was plain that this manufactur
ing industry, developed by unnatural conditions, could not sustain
itself against restored competition. We could let it die, and
permit the capital and labor to find their way back into other
industries ; or we could now "protect " it from foreign compe
tition by law. To do this, we would place high tariffs on
foreign goods like those we manufactured.
If we adopted this policy of " protection," we should pay
more for the articles than if we let them come in, untaxed,
from the Old World, where their cost was lower. But, it
was urged, we should have more diversified industries, larger
city populations, and so more of a home market for our raw
430 NATIONALISM AND REACTION [ 508
materials and for foodstuffs, and, after a time, when we
should come to do the work efficiently, even cheaper manufac
tures, because of the absence of ocean freights.
The question of " protection " was not new. Earlier tariffs
had been framed to carry " incidental protection " ( 374) ; and
in a famous Report on Manufactures Hamilton had argued for
a protective tariff. But all such plans had been for taxation
in order to create manufactures. It was more effective to call
upon Congress to preserve industries into which a national war
had driven our citizens.
Moreover, Calhoun and Clay urged that America must make
itself independent, economically, of Europe. Such economic
independence, they argued eloquently, was essential to real
political independence. They took ground for America like
that which led English statesmen in 1660 to favor the old Navi
gation Acts for the British Empire ( 137). The war had just
given point to the plea.
John Randolph raised his voice in almost solitary protest in
Congress, in behalf of the " consumer" With keen insight, he
warned the agricultural masses that they were to pay the bills,
and that, in the discussion of future rates, they would never be
able to make their needs and opinions felt in Congress as could
the small body of interested and influential capitalists :
"Alert, vigilant, enterprising, active, the manufacturing interests are
collected . . . ready to associate at a moment's notice for any purpose of
general interest to their body. . . . Nay, they are always assembled. They
are always on the Rialto ; and Shylock and Antonio meet every day, as
friends, and compare notes. And they possess, in trick and intelligence,
what, in the goodness of. God to them, the others can never have."
508. The Tariff of 1816 was enacted by a two-thirds vote as an
avowed protective measure. Revenue had become the incident.
Imported cottons and woolens were taxed 25 per cent ; and
manufactured iron, slightly more.
On cheap grades of cloth the rate was really much higher than 25 per
cent, disguised by a '* minimum-price " clause. That is, the bill pro
vided that, for purposes of taxation, no cotton cloth should be valued at
510] PROTECTIVE TARIFFS, 1816-1828 431
less than 25 cents a yard. If the cloth was really worth only 13 cents, the
tariff was still 6| cents, or, in reality, fifty per cent. This effective device
for placing the chief tariff burden upon the poorest classes was much
practiced in later tariffs.
These rates proved too low for their purpose. English ware
houses were heavily overstocked with the accumulations of the
years of European wars, during which the markets of the world
had been closed to them ; and now these goods were dumped
upon America at sacrifice prices.
509. Moreover, in 1819, came the first world-wide industrial de
pression. Senator Thomas H. Benton describes the years 1819-
1820 as "a period of gloom and agony. No money ... no
price for property or produce. No sales but those of the sheriff.
No purchaser but the creditor or some hoarder of money. No
employment for industry." Niles' Register, a paper represent
ing the interests of capital, confessed in August, 1819, that
20,000 men were daily hunting work on the streets of Philadel
phia, more than half the adult male population.
The American causes for this depression of 1819 resembled
those of later " crises." (1) The promise of the tariff itself had
caused overinvestment in factories in the East ; and (2) in
the West there had been reckless overinvestment in public
lands by thousands of poor immigrants who were unduly
allured by the "credit system" of purchase ( 458). A third
cause, which intensified the evil, was the recent multiplication
of " wild-cat " State banks (after the expiration of the first
National Bank in 1811), which had loaned money in extrav
agant amounts, and so had encouraged all sorts of speculation.
When at length these banks found themselves forced to call in
their loans, or to close their doors, they spread panic and con
fusion throughout society.
The manufacturing interests, however, ascribed all the de
pression to insufficient " protection," and clamored for more.
510. The Tariff of 1824 found its leading champion in Clay,
who now glorified the protective policy with the name, the
American System. The chief opposition in debate came from
NATIONALISM AND REACTION [ 510
April 18, 1816
K, ENGRS.. BQSTuN
Webster, who represented a commercial district in Massa
chusetts, and who took his stand upon absolute free-trade
policy. 1 In general, New England was divided, wavering be
tween manufactures and a return to its old shipping interests.
The South had been almost solid for protection in 1816, but
1 Webster followed the teachings of all "the Fathers," except Hamilton.
The Revolution, in no small degree, was fought for the right to trade at will
with the world. For a generation afterward, this fact gave a free-trade bias
to our thought.
PROTECTIVE TARIFFS, 1816-1828
April 22. 1828
now it was solid in opposition, 1 and it loudly denied the consti
tutionality of such laws.
The bill passed by bare majorities, through the union of the
manufacturing Middle States and the agricultural West, which
1 The South found that slavery shut her out from manufacturing industry,
and her agricultural exports could not be sold to advantage unless the United
States enjoyed a large and free commerce with other nations. The tariff
threatened to shut off such trade, besides increasing the cost of manufactured
434 NATIONALISM : REACTION TOWARD 1830 [ 511
hoped to see a home market for its raw materials, and which
believed in " loose construction " because it wanted government
aid for internal improvements. Tariff rates, on an average, rose
to about 33 per cent ; and, under this stimulus, the capital in
vested in manufactures trebled in three years. Clamor con
tinued, however, for still higher protection ; and, four years
later, Congress enacted the third great tariff of this period,
the " Tariff of Abominations."
511. This Tariff of 1828 was engineered largely by men who
planned to make Jackson President. None of the other political
leaders dared oppose it on the eve of a presidential campaign,
but they did make it an atrocious hotch-potch by amendments,
in the vain hope that its authors themselves would refuse to
swallow it. Said John Randolph, " This bill encourages manu
factures of no sort but the manufacture of a President. w Web
ster now changed sides, frankly assigning as his reason that
Massachusetts had accepted protection as a settled national
policy and had invested her capital in manufactures. New
England and the /South had exchanged positions on the tariff since
1816. The law raised the average of duties on taxed articles
to 49 per cent, far the highest point touched until the " war-
tariffs " of the sixties, and gave rise to a new nullification
movement ( 574, 579 ff.).
EXERCISE. Distinguish between free trade and protection. What is
a revenue tariff ? How will the articles taxed in such a tariff differ from
those taxed in a " protective tariff " ? If a large revenue is wanted, will
it be secured more probably from a high tax on luxuries or a low tax on
necessities ? Would people pay willingly a direct tax equivalent to the
indirect tax they pay on their morning coffee ? In a tax ori necessities, do
poor or rich pay most in proportion to their wealth ?
FOR FURTHER READING. Morse's John Qmncy Adams, Schurz's
Clay, Koosevelt's Benton, and Lodge's Webster should be accessible.
II. THE COURTS AND A NEW SECTIONALISM
512. The feeling for nationality upheld the Supreme Court in a
remarkable series of decisions during this period. Perhaps
the most famous case was that of McCulloch v. Maryland in
513] THE FEDERAL COURTS 435
1819. Maryland had imposed a ruinous tax on the Baltimore
branch of the National Bank, to drive it from the State, and had
brought suit in her own courts against McCulloch, an officer of
the Bank, to collect the money. The Maryland court upheld
the tax and denied the constitutionality of the Bank since
the power to charter a bank was not among the " enumerated
powers." McCulloch applied to the Federal Supreme Court for
a " writ of error" That court took jurisdiction and reversed
the State court. The decision was written by John Marshall.
Three points deserve notice :
(1) The title of the case would seem to imply a suit by an
individual against a state such as is forbidden to Federal
Courts by the Eleventh amendment. But the State had begun
the suit originally ; and the Court held that in such a case an
appeal by the individual was not forbidden by the amendment. 1
(2) Following the argument of Hamilton in 1791 ( 381),
Marshall affirmed that Congress had power to charter the bank
under the " necessary and proper " clause of the Constitution.
Those words, he said, meant merely " appropriate."
(3) The State tax law was declared void because in conflict
with this Federal bank laiv. Before this, State laws had been
declared unconstitutional only when in conflict with the Federal
513, Between 1819 and 1828, eleven of the twenty-four States
had one or more laws declared void by the Federal courts. These
decisions, however, did not go without vehement opposition.
Political writers piled up pamphlets of scathing denunciation
against them ; and half the States protested or actually resisted
some decree. 2 Virginia sought strenuously to have Congress
repeal the clause of the Judiciary Act that gave the Supreme
Court its appellate power ( 372). Ohio, by force, took from a
1 This was the express point decided by Marshall in another great case,
Cohens v. Virginia, in 1821. It restored to the Federal judiciary a large part
of the power that the Eleventh amendment had been thought to take away.
2 Details are given in Turner's New West, 299-305, or, more fully, in
McMaster, V, 412 ff .
436 REACTION AGAINST NATIONALISM [ 514
branch of the National Bank a State tax, despite the decision
of the Supreme Court, and held it for six years. 1 Georgia nul
lified a treaty made by the Federal government with the South
ern Indians within her borders : the Supreme Court upheld the
treaty ; but Georgia threatened war if the government should
try to enforce its rights, and carried her point ( 585) :
514. A Summary and a Forecast. The opposition to the Federal
judiciary came from the South and West. This was merely one indica
tion of a new sectionalism.
From 1800 to 1815, every suggestion of interference with commerce
(New England's main economic interest) had called out threats of nulli
fication or secession from that section. The pocket book was stronger
than New England's loyalty.
The war created a new Nationalism. From 1815 to 1820, this force
seemed wholly triumphant. It expressed itself (i) in demands for in
ternal improvements, to bind the parts of the Union together more closely :
(2) in protective tariffs, to make the country independent of Europe eco
nomically ; (3) in a new National Bank, to finance the government ; and
(4) in the victory of " Broad Construction " along various other lines,
especially in a wider Federal control over internal commerce. 2
But by 1820 this Nationalism had to contend with a reaction toward
State sovereignty and sectionalism. From that time to the Civil War,
political history is a struggle between the forces of Union and Disunion.
This time it was the South that felt her pocket book in danger. She
threatened to nullify protective tariffs ( 579), because she thought they
hindered her agricultural prosperity ; and every suggestion of federal
interference with slavery impelled her into disunion movements, because
her leading industry rested on slave labor.
515. One of the first manifestations of the new sectionalism
was the struggle that resulted in the Missouri Compromise of
1820. Until that time a careful balance had been maintained
between slave and free States in admitting new common
wealths. Vermont offset Kentucky ; Ohio, Tennessee ( 384).
Louisiana (1812) made the number of free and slave States just
equal. But the free States grew much faster in population,
and by 1820 (even under the three-fifths rule) they had the
1 McMaster, IV, 498 ff., tells this story in a striking way.
2 American History and Government, 280.
516] THE MISSOURI COMPROMISE 437
larger number of Representatives in the lower House of
Congress by a fourth.
Missouri had been settled mainly through Kentucky, with
many slaveholders among its people. In 1819 a bill for its
admission to the Union came before Congress. Tlie proposed
State lay north of the line of the Ohio, which, with Mason and
Dixon's line, divided free and slave territory east of the
Mississippi. The North roused itself to insist on maintain
ing that same line west of the river ; and mass meetings and
legislative resolutions protested against admission with slav
ery. The South protested quite as vehemently against any
restriction upon the wishes and rights of the Missouri people.
The House of Representatives, by a majority of one vote,
added an amendment to the bill, prohibiting slavery in the
proposed State. The Senate struck out this "Tallmadge
amendment," 1 and the bill failed for that session. No one
yet denied the constitutional power of Congress to forbid or
regulate slavery in the Territories, but many Northerners, even,
denied the right of Congress to impose restrictions upon a new
State- so as to make it less " sovereign " than older States.
At the next session of Congress (1820), the Maine district
of Massachusetts was also an applicant for admission as a
new State. The House passed both bills, restoring the Tall
madge amendment for Missouri. The Senate put the two
bills into one, and substituted for the Tallmadge prohibition of
slavery the Missouri Compromise. Missouri was to be admitted,
with permission to establish slavery, but no other slave State
should be formed out of existing national domain north of the
southern boundary of Missouri (36 30'). The policy of the North
west Ordinance was applied to the greater part of the Louisiana
III. FACTIONS VS. PARTIES
516. For the whole period 1816-1829, true political parties
were lacking. The old Federalists had been galvanized into
1 Introduced by James Tallmadge of New York.
A NEW SECTIONALISM
activity in New England by the Embargo and the war ; but
in 1816 they cast only 35 electoral votes ; and in 1820 none.
The old party lines were wholly gone. Accordingly, his
torians have sometimes miscalled the period " the era of good
feeling." In fact, it was an era of exceeding bad feeling.
The place of parties, with real principles, was taken by factions,
moved only by personal or sectional ambitions.
517. This became plain in the campaign of 1824. Crawford
of Georgia was nominated for the presidency by a Congressional
caucus ( 389), which, however, was attended by less than a third of
ELECTION OF 1824
the members. Legislatures in the New England States nominated
John Quincy Adams ; and in like fashion, Clay was nominated
by Kentucky and Missouri, and Andrew Jackson by Tennessee
RESIDENTIAL ELECTION OF 1825 9
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
Adams Jackson Crawford
Jackson's candidacy was a surprise and an offense to the
other statesmen of the period. He was a "military hero,"
and, to their eyes at that time, nothing more. Never before
had a man been a candidate for that office without long and
distinguished political service behind him.
518. The campaign was marked by bitter personalities.
440 POLITICAL FACTIONS, 1820-1828 [ 519
Adams, whose forbidding manners kept him aloof from the
multitude, was derided as an aristocrat, while Jackson was ap
plauded as a " man of the people." Jackson had 99 votes ;
Adams, 84 ; Crawford, 41 ; Clay, 37. According to the Twelfth
amendment, the House of Representatives chose between the
three highest; and Adams became President, through votes
thrown to him by Clay. Adams afterward appointed Clay his
Secretary of State ; and friends of Jackson complained bitterly
that the " will of the people " had been thwarted by a " corrupt
coalition between Puritan and blackleg." 1
519. Adams was thwarted at every turn throughout his four
years, and the Jackson men began at once the campaign for the
next election. The President's inaugural announced internal
improvements as a leading policy 2 in opposition to the
vetoes of Madison and Monroe, and his first Message urged
Congress to multiply roads, found a National University, and
build an astronomical observatory "a lighthouse of the skies."
But by this time, many States had begun roads and canals of
their own, and had no wish to help pay for competing lines
elsewhere ; so Congress had become lukewarm even on this
520. The President's position, however, helped on the forma
tion of new political parties. Supporters of Adams and Clay,
standing for internal improvements and protection, took the
name of National Republicans, to indicate their belief in a strong
Central government. The Jackson cry had been, "Let the
people rule." To them, the campaign of 1828 was a protest
against the undemocratic " usurpation " of 1824. Accordingly
they took the name Democratic Republicans, 3 or, a little later,
1 It was thought, unjustly, that Adams and Clay had bargained. The quoted
phrase was John Randolph's. Clay challenged Randolph, and a duel was
fought without injury to any one. Honor thus appeased, pleasant social rela
tions were restored between the two.
2 In 1807 Adams had moved the resolution in Congress that called out Galla-
tin's Report (456).
8 To indicate their claim also to be the true successors of Jefferson's "Re
520] THE ELECTION OF 1824 441
merely Democrats. In opposition to the Broad Construction
platform of their opponents, they soon became a " Strict Con
struction " party ; but they won the election of 1828 before this
question came to the front.
Before studying Jackson's administration, we must look at
the New America of 183G.
A NEW DEMOCRACY, 1830-1850
THE AMERICA OF 1830-1850
521. The North Atlantic section was turning to manufacturing.
New England used the water power of her rivers for cotton,
woolen, and paper mills, building up a new line of towns (the
Fall line) at Lowell, Manchester, Lawrence, Holyoke, Fall
River, and so on. Pennsylvania, New Jersey, and New York
got like results by using " stone coal " from the Pennsylvania
mines, which were now accessible cheaply by the Pennsylvania
canal system ( 496).
In 1830 America still had only 32 cities with more -than
8000 people ; but all but four of these were in this manufac
turing region. The population of the new factory towns came
at first from the old farming class, drawn in from the country
by the lure of companionship and cash wages. But in the
thirties these workers began to be replaced by immigrants
fresh from the Old World.
522. The South had become stationary in industry. Slave
labor was unfit for manufactures ; so the water power and
mineral resources of that district went unused for forty years
more. The leading industry remained tobacco and cotton
Southern society, too, remained stratified along the old lines.
(1) At the top were some 6000 families (25,000 or 30,000
people) of large planters, with numerous slaves, sometimes a
thousand to one owner. This aristocracy furnished the South's
523] NORTH, SOUTH, AND WEST 443
representation in the National government and almost all the
higher State officials. (2) A hundred and thirty thousand
families (650,000 people) owned perhaps from one to four slaves
each. These small slaveholders, with about as many more
non-slaveholding but well-to-do farmers, made up the yeomanry
of the South, from whom were to come her famous soldiery.
This class often differed from the aristocracy in political
motives and aims j but it lacked leaders, and it had no organi
zation from State to State. (3) The "poor Whites," without
other property than a miserable cabin and a rough clearing,
outnumbered the yeomanry two to one. 1 This class made the
political following of the rich planters. (4) The 180,000 free
Negroes were hedged in by many vexing laws, and had, of
course, no political rights. They could not serve on juries ;
nor were they allowed to move from place to place at will, or
to receive any education. 2 (5) The 2,000,000 slaves made about
half the whole population.
523. The Mississippi valley gave two more States to the
Union in the decade after 1830 : Arkansas in 1836, and Michigan
in 1837. The West continued to grow more than twice as
fast as the rest of the country (cf. 498). Between 1830
and 1840, Ohio increased 70 per cent ; Indiana and Alabama,
100 per cent ; Illinois and Mississippi trebled their numbers ;
Michigan multiplied her 32,000 by seven.
In 1835 a line of steamboats began to ply regularly between