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is so present." The officer's absence may be for the purpose of procuring
more assistance, and where he has thus left persons behind to guard a house
in which the parties to be arrested were assembled, they can not lawfully,
during his temporary absence, permit them to escape: Ccylee v. Hurting
10 Johns. 85; Comnwnwealth v. Field, 13 Mass. 321. The officer's calling in
assistance must be distinguished from his attempt to act through the agency
of a third person. Thus a constable, having a warrant of arrest, can not effect
an arrest by giving the warrant to his son and having him execute it, while
the father is in sight a quarter of a mile away: Sex v. Patience, 7 Car. & P.
775. A writing must constitute a deputy's authority to do a particular act»
aid the arrest on a bench-warrant directed to the sherifi^ of a person in-
dieted and under recognizance to appear, by one having the sheriff's verbal
authority only, is illegal, and will not discharge the recognizance: People v.
Moore, 2 BougL 1.

Bbxakiho Opbn Doobs to EmoT Abbbst.— 1. In Execution qf CivU
Process. — ^The rule is that every man's house is his castle; and in such cases
his dwelling-house is a protection from arrest not only to the occupant, but
to his children, domestic servants, and permanent lodgers and boiurders, so
long as the outer door or window ia so closed that the officer must forcibly
open the same to gain admittance. Even a common latch will serve to close
the outer door or window, and the officer must not force it open to effect
the arrest of one of them on civil process. This immunity, however, does
not extend to strangers and visitors in the dwelling-house: Oy stead v. Shed,
13 Mass. 520; S. C, 7 Am. Dec. 172; Curtis v. Hubbard, 4 Hill, 437; Cool^s
Case, Cro. Car. 537; Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263; State v. SmUh, 1 N. H. 346;
Snydacler v. Brosse, 51 SI. 360; Semayne's Case, 5 Co. 91 a; Ildey v. NieJiols,
12 Pick. 270; Curtis v. Hubbard, 1 Hill (N. Y.), 336; S. C, 4 Id. 437; sec the
principal case. But the castle-door will not protect the owner against an
officer of the law where the latter has previously touched the defendant by
way of arrest; for he may then break into the house in order to complete the
arrest and carry off his prisoner: Sandon v. Jervis, 4 Jur., N. S., 737; S. C,
6 Id. 860; and in such a case he may also break into the house of another
perscm in which the prisoner has taken refuge, to accomplish the same purpose,
because " the house of any one is not a castle or privilege but for himself,
and sh^ not extend .to protect any person who flies to his house:" Semayne's
Case, 6 Co. 91 a; Johnson v. Ldgli, 6 Taunt. 246; CooU v. BiH, 5 Id. 765|
snt it most be remembered that the officer thus acts at his peril, and is va-



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156 Hawkins u C!ommonwealth. [Kentucky,

■ponaible in damagea for mistake, wantonness, or abuse of aathority, aocord-
ing to the circumstanoes of the case: Johnmm ▼. Leigh^ Id. 246; Morrish v.
Murrey, 13 Mee. & W. 52. This priirilege is confined to the breach of win*
dows and of outer doors, constraoted for the security of the house against
persons from without, who might endeavor to break in; but there is no ob-
jection to an officer's breaking into any building not a dwelling-house or ap*
pur tenant to it to make an arrest: Penton v. Brown^ 1 Keb. 698; Haggerty y.
WUber, 16 Jolms. 288; S. C, 8 Am. Deo. 321 ; FuUerton v. Mack, 2 Aik. 415;
Burton v. WUHnson, 18 Vt. 186. If the officer has obtained entrance into
a dwelling-house through the outer door, he may then, in either oivil or
criminal coses, break open any inner door, closet, chest, or other incloeure,
and arrest any person within the dwelling, without any demand being made
for admittance: Lloyd ▼. Sandilands, 8 Taunt. 250; Bex v. Bird, 2 Show.
87; SmUh ▼. Butler, Comb. 326; Batdiffe ▼. Burton, 3 Bos. & P. 223, 229;
Lee ▼. Oawel, 1 Cowp. 1; 8emayne*8 Case, 5 Ck>. 91 a; Haggerty v. WUber^
16 Johns. 287; S. C, 8 Am. Dec. 321; Hubbard v. Moice, 17 Johns. 127;
State V. Thackam, 1 Bay, 358. As to notice and demand, see " Disclosure of
Purpose and Demand for Admittance,** infra. The cases just cited also show
that a sheriff can not justify breaking even the inner doors of the house of a
stranger merely upon suspicion that a defendant is there, for in this case his
justification depends upon his finding or not finding the defendant; and in the
other case it does not so depend, because defendant's own house is the moel
probable place to find him: Johnson y. Leigh, 6 Taunt. 246; Cooke ▼. Birt, 5
Id. 765.

2. In Execution qf Criminal ProeeM.— The officer may break open the outer
as well as inner doors of a dwelling-house, in the night as well as in the day*
time, after demand of admittance and refusal, to arrest the owner; becaoM
the outer door even is not proof against the "king's kejrs," for an offioer
holding a warrant for any criminal offense, and because no man can have a
castle a^nst the king: 2 Hawk. P. C, c 14, sees. 1-9; SemayneU Case, 5
Co. 91 a; StaU v. SmUh, 1 N. H. 346; BeU v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263; Con^
monweaUJi v. Reynolds, 120 Mass. 190; State v. Shaw, 1 Boot, 134; KeUy v.
Wright, Id. 83; Lee v. Oansel, 1 Cowp. 1; WiUiams v. Spencer, 5 Johns. 352;
Fitch V. Lovdcmd, Eirby, 386; and it is immaterial whether it be the own-
er's house or the house of a stranger, except that in the latter case the offioer
is justified only when he actually finds the party he seeks in the house at
the time: 2 Hale P. C. 117. This right to break doors to effect an arrest
*' extends to every sort of indictable wrong, where the arresting party is
acting under a lawful warrant; and to all lawful arrests for past offenses,
whether by officers or private individuals:" 1 Bish. Cr. Pr., sees. 196, 197.
Bishop also names other instances to which it extends, and cites numerous
autlioriues: Id. And as to the materiality of the warrant, Mr. Bishop deems
it only reasonable that the doctrine applicable to lawful arrests with warrant
should also apply to arrests without warrant; *' for they are made just as
much in behalf of the state and in its cause as are the others — ^the question
of warrant or no warrant pertaining to form, not substance; and the arrest
in ei^Ver case being by authority of law, on behalf of the public:" Id. And
the more reasonable doctrine concerning arrests upon suspicion of felony is
that the doorft may be broken open, with or without warrant, if the paorty,
upon demand, refuse to open them: 1 Hale P. C. 583; 2 Id. 117; 1 Bish. Gr.
Pr., sec. 196, note 6.

3. ExpUmaUon <^ Bredlang Doors — Dwelling'house, — To prevent an en-
trance against the consent of the occupant into a dwelling-house to amal^



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June, 1854.] Hawkins v. C!ommonwealth. 157

Bpon civil process, any person other than a stranger or visitor therein, it Is
f«afficient if the outer door be closed. Merely opening it, then, is in legal
contemplation a breaking. What would be a breaking of the outer door in
bnrglaiy is equally a breaking by the sheriff. Lifting a latch is in law just
as much a brdking as the forcing of a door bolted with iron: BcUeliffe v.
Burton, 3 Bos. & P. 223; Lee v. Oansel, 1 CJowp. 16; Seymour v. Oresham, Cro.
Eliz. 008; Pentan v. Droum^ 1 Keb. 698; CurtU v. Hubbard, 1 Hill (N. Y.),
337; S. C, 4 Id. 437; Biaeop t. WhiU^ Cro. Eliz. 759; Haggerty v. TFttter,
16 Johns. 288; Buetenham v. Drancis, 11 Moore, 40; Walker v. Fox, 2 Dana,
404; Dalton on Sheriff, 350; Bogga v. Van Dyle, 3 Harr. (Del) 288. A sheriff
entering a house in such a way as to cost a burglar his life, to execute civil
process, is a trespasser. Stratagem may sometimes be lawfully employed by
an officer not entitled to break outer doors, to gain admission: Rex v. Back"
kom$e, Lofft, 61 ; but to procure one inside, by some fake pretense, to open the
door, and then, without permission, to rush in with violence, is a breaking on
the part of the person entering: Parke t. Evane, Hob. 62 a; Waterhotue v.
SaltmarsJi, Id. 263 a. For definition of dwelling house, see Bishop on Stat-
utory Crimes, sees. 279-283; Fiteh v. Lovdand, Eirby, 386; WiUiame r.
Spencer, 5 Johns. 352.

4. Diadoawre of Purpot and Demand for AdmiUaneo— Inner and Outer
DooTB. — An officer can not lawfully break either an inner door or an outer
door, where the latter is lawful, until he has disclosed to the inmates of the
house his purpose to arrest some one inside, and demanded admittance.
Otherwise it would be impossible for one to know what the object of the
person breaking open the door might be, and the owner has a right to oon*
elder it an aggression on his private property, which may be resisted to
the utmost: Lannock r. Brown, 2 Bam. & Aid. 592; Waterhouse v. Salt'
marnh. Hob. 263 a; Batel\ffe v. Burton, 3 Bos. & P. 229; Lloyd v. Sandi-
lands, 2 Moore, 207; Semayne's Case, 5 Co. 01 a; Burdett v. AbboU, 14 East,
1, 163; 8taU v. Shaw, 1 Root, 134; KeUy v. WriglU, Id. 83; ComwonweaUh v.
lieynMs, 120 Mass. 190; Bell v. Clapp, 10 Johns. 263; State v. .Stiit^ X N.
H. 346. An entry, authority, or license given by a party will not make the
officer a trespasser: Six Carpenter$* Case^ 8 Co. 146 a; but officers who have
been peaceably admitted into a house have no right to remain there, in case
the prisoner is not found, to await his return; and if they do so tarry for sev-
eral hours for that purpose, they are trespassers ab initio: /Toward v. Ooeaett,
I Car. & M. 380. After notifying the owner of a dwelling-house that he has
a criminal warrant against a person therein, and demanding and being re-
fused admission, the sheriff has the right to enter even the outer door of the
boase by force, for the purpose of serving the warrant, and he can not be
treated as a trespasser merely because he has failed to notify the owner of
the house who the person sought to be arrested is, no inquiry having been
made in relation thereto, even though the person sought for is not in fact
there: Comnumwealik v. Irwin, 1 Allen, 587; Commonwealth v. Reynolds, 120
Mass. 190; Barnard v. BarOeU, 10 Cush. 501. lliis seems to be the better
view, althon^ Chitty sajrs: " It is at the peril of the officer that the party
against whom he has obtained the warrant be found there; for otherwise he
will be a trespasser:*' 1 Ch. Criro. L. 58; citing 2 Hale P. C. 117; 8emayne*s
Case, 6 Co. 91 a; Jcknson t. Leigh, 1 Marsh. 565; S. C, 6 Taunt. 246. This
qoaMcation seems to have also the further American support of the princi-
pal case. If an arrsat has been made, and the person arrested escapes and
takes refoge in his dwelling-house, the officer may break into the house in
|maik of him, withoot making known his business, demanding admissioi^



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158 Hawjons v. CioMMONWEALTH. [Eeutucky,

and leoeiTiiig refusal: AUen v. Martin^ 10 Wend. 300; OyaUad v. Sked^ IS
Masf. 620; S. C, 7 Am. Deo. 172; Cfenner v. Sparkes, 6 Mod. 173; S. C, 1
Salk. 79. And the offender can not find refage in the castle of a third per-
son, for an officer in immediate pursoit of one who has committed a crime in
his presence, or for the purpose of perfecting an arrest, may, after the usual
demand, break open the door: See cases just cited, and 2 Hawk. P. C, c 14,
sec. 8; CommonweaWi v. Reynolda^ 120 Mass. 190; BeU v. Clapp^ 10 Johns^
263; Stale v. Shaw, 1 Root, 134; KeUy v. Wright, Id. 83; StaU v. Smith, 1
N. H. 346. The principal case also supports this doctrine. If, however,
the officer has no reasonable ground for believing the defendant to be secreted
in the house or room which he desires to enter, he should always make a
demand for admittance: RaJtd^fft v. Burton, 3 Bos. & P. 228; Semayne^a Case,
5 Co. 91 a; Lee ▼. Oanael, 1 Cowp. 1; Ilaggerty v. WiUber, 16 Johns. 287;
S. C, 8 Am. Dec 321; Hubbard v. Mace, 17 Johns. 127. In conclusion, it
may be said that whatever doubts there may be in English law as to the
necessity of a demand in case of felony, a previous demand is undoubtedly
necessary in case of a misdemeanor: Lannoek v. Brown, 2 Bam. & Aid. 593;
McLtimon v. Bichardson, 15 Gray, 74 As to what are inner doors, see Lee
V. Oansel, 1 Cowp. 1; WilUame v. Spencer, 5 Johns. 352; I^teh v. Lavekmd,
Eirby, 386. As to what are outward doors or windows, see Foet. 320.

PuBPOSS TO Ar&bst should be Disclosed, not only in trying to effect
an arrest in a dwelling-house, but in all other cases; and this general rule
applies to private persons as well as officers. The object of making an arrest
must be communicated, or at least it must be inferable from the circum-
stances, or otherwise known or suspected: if acJbei2^'« Case, 9 Co. 65 a; StaU
V. Bryant, 65 N. C. 327; Brooke v. Commonwealth, 61 Pa. St. 352. We are
now speaking of the rule as applicable to cases whe^e the party submits to the
arrest, and not where he makes resistance before the officer has time to give
the information. The particulars of authority need not always be given, and
it is sometimes proper to lay hands on a party before a word is spoken; but
either before or at the moment of arrest, the officer ought to say enough to
show a party that he is not dealing with a trespasser, but with a minister of
justice: Bellows v. Shannon, 2 Hill (N. Y.), 86; Countess qfButland's Cast, 6
Co. 55 a; Mackalley*s Case, 9 Id. 69 a; Commonwealth v. Field, 13 Mass. :^1;
Arnold v. Steepes, 10 Wend. 516; Post. 310, 311; Russell on Crimes, 451-
514. The surroundings of the particular case may render plain the purpose
to arrest; and if they do, resistance to the arrest will be as ill^al as if the samr)
were stated in words: Bex v. Davis, 7 Car. & P. 785; Bex v. Howarth^ 1
Moo. C. C. 207; and see Bex v. Payne, Id. 378; Pew's Case, Cro. Gk^. 1?8;
Cook's Case, Id. 537; State v. OarreU, 1 Winst. L. 144; John v. State, 40
Tenn. 127, 147. When the party resists and interrupts the officer before
he can speak all his words, and the officer is mortally wounded by him and
dies, the party can not take advantage of his own wrong, and such a killing
is murder: Mackalley's Case, 9 Co. 69.

Nones OF OiYiciAh Chabacteb. — An officer making an arrest with a
warrant should give some notification of his authority as such officer; and if
he be appointed and qualified, and authorized by a warrant to arrest, he gives
sufficient notice of his authority to do so by reading the warrant of arrest:
State V. Oreen, 66 Mo. 631; wearing the accustomed badge of office is also a
sufficient notice of the official capacity, even in the case of a fresh incum-
bent: YaUs V. People, 32 N. T. 509; and see Commonwealth v. Tobin, 108
Mass. 426; and possibly, if he was elected by the people, that may be
ieemed a sufficient notice: 1 Bish. Cr. Pr., sec. 191. A known offioer is not



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June, 1854.] Hawkins v. C^mmokwealth. 169

andentood to be one known to the party who is to be arrested; but if he be
so oommoiily known, it is sofficient: MaehaUe^a Oa$e^ 9 Co. 69 b. It has
been niled in England that an officer gives sufficient notice of what he is
when he says to the party, " I arrest you in the* king's name; " and in each
a case the party, at his peril, ought to obey him, though he knows him not to
be an officer, and that Uie party is bound to obey, though from the darkness
be can not see the officer: Id. 69; see Russell on Crimes, 839, 840. And
it baa been held that a known officer may, without a warrant, where
he is informed that a felony has just been committed, arrest the person
charged, without disclosing tiie charge to him, and wh^i in reality there was
nothing to justify the arrest: Rex v. Woolmer^ 1 Moo. C. C. 334; see Rex y.
Oordon, 1 East P. C. 315, 352. Where one is committing a felony, he may
be arrested by an officer without being informed of the charge: Wolfv, 8UUe^
19 Ohio St. 248; so where one just having committed a felony is attempting
to escape: People v. Poclt 27 CaL 572. Notice is not necessary in such cases,
because the criminal must know the reason why he is apprehended: Rex ▼•
Paynt^ 1 Moo. C. C 378. Notice may be inferentially shown, and a small
matter will amount to due notification: Rex v. Gordon^ 1 East P. C. 315, 316,
318, 352. In cases of homicide, the law will sometimes presume that the
party killing had due notice of an officer's intention to arrest, especially if it
be in the day-time: ) Hale P. C. 361; Post 311; see 2 Bish. Cr. L., sec 654.

Showino Wabrant upon DsMAiTD. — 1. In Ckue of Private Pertone and
Unknown Officers, — ^AU private persons, and officers not sworn and commonly
known, to whom warrants are directed, must show them, if demanded, in
effecting an arrest. This universal rule is unquestioned: Arnold v. Steeve$t
10 Wend. 515; OammonweaUh v. lUld, 13 Mass. 321; United States v. Jaiier^
2 Abb, 265. 275; State v. VuHis, 1 Hayw. 471; Frost v. Thomas, 24 Wend.
418. And a special deputy is bound, upon demand, to show his warrant,
or the arrest is illegal: Frost v. Thomas, 24 Wend. 418; StaU v. JTtr^,
2Ired. L. 201; Arnold v. Steeves, 10 Wend. 515; Burton v. WUkinson, 18
Vt. 186. As to arrests by private persons without warrant, see extended
note to Eanes v. SteUe, 44 Am. Dec 293.

2. In Case of Sworn and Known Officers, there seems to be some differ-
ence of opinibn. There is no doubt that if such an officer acts out of his own
district, he must show his warrant on demand made: State v. iTir&y, 2 Ired. L.
201; State v. Curtis, 1 Hayw. 471; Commonwealth v. Itdd, 13 Mass. 321. But
where officers are acting within their own precincts, Hawkins laid it down
that they need not show their warrant to the party, notwithstanding a de-
mand for the sight of it; yet he says they ought to acquaint the party with
the substance of their warrants: 2 Hawk. P. C, c. 13, sec 28; see 2 Hale
P. C. 116; Rex v. AUen, 17 L. T., N. S., 222; Rex v. Woolmer, 1 Moo. a
C. 334; Rex v. Cordon, 1 East P. 0. 315, 352. And this doctrine is not with-
out American support: Drennan v. People, 10 Mich. 169; State v. Townsend,
5 Harr. pel.) 487; Arnold v. Steeves, 10 Wend. 514; Woff v. State, 19 Ohio
St. 248; StaU r. Garrett, 1 Winst. L. 144; Commonwealth v. Cooley, 6 Gray,
360; State v. Curtis, 1 Hayw. 471. Lord Kenyon, however, in Hall v. Roche,
8 T. B. 188, observed that if this were established law, it would be a most
dangerous doctrine, because, in case of resistance, the legality of the warrant
would become material in cases of homicide '*! do not think," he says,
** that a perscm is to take it for granted that another who says he has a war-
rant against him, without producing it, npeaks truth. It is very important
that, in all cases where an arrest is made by virtueof a warrant, the warranti
if demanded at least, should be produced." See also 1 Ch. Crim. L. 41.



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160 Hawkins v. C!ommonwealth. [Kentucky^

" This reaaoning/' says Mr. Bishop, " would settle the question, if there had
been any doubt, that a private person, or an officer not known to be snoh^
must prodace his warrant. Bat something oaght to be allowed to official po*
sition; and if one known by me to be an officer tells me he has a warrant to
arrest me, claiming that it is legal and in due form, as he necessarily does by
the very act of attempting the arrest, I ought to yield to him sufficiently to
famish opportunity for celmly looking into the question. Hence, it has
been considered that the arrest, the explanation, and the reading of the war-
rant when demanded ' are obviously successive steps. They can not all occur
at the same instant of time.' And in the case of a known officer, ' the ex-
planation must follow the arrest; and the exhibition and perusal of the war-
rant must oome after the authority of the officer has been acknowledged and
his power over his prisoner acquiesced in.' " 1 Bish. Gr. Pr., sec 191, citing
' CommonweaUh v. CooUy^ 6 Gray, 350, 856, 857. This is supported by the
language of a oourt in Delaware, " that ^dth regard to a known public offioer
of the county, it was not necessary for him either to produce his warrant or
state his chiuracter and authority before making the arrest. The arrest itself
is the laying hands on the defendant; and it might be defeated by the oere>
mony of producing and explaining a paper before the arrest is made. It is
quite time to produce the authority on the demand of the party arrested, and
after the arrest. Every one is bound to know the character of an offioer who
is acting within his proper jurisdiction, and every citizen is bound to submit
peaceably to such officer, until he can demand and investigate the cause of
his arrest. If the offioer have no proper warrant for the arrest, he is liable to
the defenJant who can suffer no wrong from submitting to the law; but if
he resist before such investigation, and the officer have authority, he is in-
dictable for obstructing such offioer in the discharge of his duty:" State r.
Tcwnaendt 5 Harr. (Del.) 487. This, Mr. Bishop is inclined to believe, is the
present American law on the subject, and he refers to the following casest
AmM V. Stuvti, 10 Wend. 514; Kenum v. State^ 11 Ind. 471; Dremum r.
People, 10 Mich. 169; State v. /Veeimm, 8 Iowa, 428; Flatten v. State^ I
Tex. App. 673; StaU v. Garrett, 1 Winst L. 144. It will be observed that
a l^gal arrest under a warrant can not be made by an officer without he*
has it with him. If one has been delivered to him, and he has left it at his
office or elsewhere, yet he can not act; it must be in his immediate possession.
OaUliardy.Laxt<m,2BeBt&S.2&3; S. C, 9 €k>x C. 0. 127; Begina r. Chap-^
man, 12 Id. 4; S. €., 2 Eng. Hep. 160. A due regard to the intereste and
righte of ,the party arrested would undoubtedly indicate that he should be
permitted, by an inspection of the authority of the person who seeks to ar-
rest him, to determine ito validity and the course he should pursue. It is
certainly the more prudent and advisable course for the officer to exhibit the
writ under which he acts, at least when it is demanded. See MaebaUey*$
Gate, 9 Co. 69; ffodgea v. MoHts, Cro. Jao. 485; GommonweaUh v. Held, 13
Mass. 321. As to arrest by officers without warrant, see extended note to
issues V. State, 44 Am. Dec. 292; and note to Boberte v. State, 55 Id. 104.

Tdcb whek Arrxst mat bb Madb. — ^By the conunon law, judicial acta
could not be done on Sunday, but ministerial acts, such as an arrest, might
be lawfully executed on that day: MackaUe^e Gaae, 9 Co. 66 a. This was
changed by the statute of 29 Car. IL, c. 7, sec 6, prohibitmg arresto on Sun-
days; but this statute excepted the cases of treasons, felonies, and b r ea c hes
of the peace, so therefore an arrest in these cases may be made on that
day: LedwUhv, GatehpoU, Cald. 291; King v. Myers, I T. E. 265; Anattf-
MOMS, Willes.'459; Pearee v. Atwood, 13 Mass. 324; Gcmmamoealth y. Eiffn^



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/one, 1854.] Hawkins v, C!ommonw£ALTH. 161

1 Serg. & R. 351; WdU v, Cfumey, 8 Bam. ft Cress. 769; Ooddard v. Harr%$,
5 Moo. & P. 122; S, C, 7 Bing. 320; see Shaw v. Dodge, 5 K. H. 402. Since
the statute, an arrest on Sunday, in cases within the exceptions, has been
treated in England as absolutely Toid, and not cured by any act, neglect, or
waivero/the party interested: WiUonY. Tucker, 1 Salk. 78; Taylory, Philips,
t £a«t, i66; Morgan ▼. Johnson, 1 H. Black. 628; I Bussell on Crimes, 840;
L%fi>rd f. Tyrrel, 1 Anst. 85; WeUs v. Qumey, 8 Bam. & Cress. 771; Atkin-
mm V. JanMon, 5 T. R. 25; & parte Eggtngton, 18 Jur. 224; Parker v. Moor,

2 Sal>. 626; S. C, 2 Ld. Baym. 1028; S. C, 6 Mod. 95; Feaiherfttontliaugh
V. Af Vinson, Bames, 373; Bex v. Myers, 1 T. R. 265; see also Benninghoff v.
Otw^ 37 How. Pr. 235; Cooper v. Adams, 2 Blackf. 294; XeUh v. -TuUle,
28 Me. 326; Main v. McCarty, 15 IlL 441. This is largely a subject of statu-
tory regulation, and it may be said that without the statutory prohibitloDB,
an arrest may be made, with or without warrant, at any time of the day or
nighty or on any day, including Sunday: State v. Smith, 1 N. H. 346; Beil v.
(£tpp, 10 Johns. 263; StaUv. Shaw, 1 Boot, 134; StaU^. Brenan*s Liquors^
25 Coon. 278; 1 Bussell on Crimes, 840; Mackalley's Case, 9 Co. 66 a; 1 Hale
P. a 457; 1 Hawk. P. a, o. 31, sec 62.

UHiTBOBaaABT ViOLBNOB TO BB Atoidsd. — ^Tho amouut of foroe which
may be lawfully used in effecting an arrest is no more than is actually neoee-
sary to secure the arrest and safe custody of the accused: State v. Mfihon^ 3
Hair. (Del) 563f Levyr. Edwards, l^Ctn. & P. 40; Cfiroux v. State, 40 Teat.
97; Shades v. King, 52 Ala. 272. If he uses more force than the occasion



Online LibraryAbraham Clark Freeman John ProffattThe American decisions: cases of general value and authority ..., Volume 61 → online text (page 17 of 117)