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Apostle says (3 Cor. vii. 8) : Although I made you sorrowful
by my epistle, I do not repent, and farther on {verse g), I am
glad; not because you were made sorrowful, but because you
were made sorrowful unto penance. For this reason we should
not show a cheerful face to those who are given to sin, in
order that we may please them, lest we seem to consent to
their sin, and in a way encourage them to sin further.
Hence it is written (Ecclus. vii. 26) : Hast thou daughters ?
Have a care of their body, and show not thy countenance gay
towards them.

Second Article,
whether this kind of friendship is a part of justice ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection 1. It seems that this kind of friendship is not
a part of justice. For justice consists in giving another
man his due. But this virtue does not consist in doing



121 FRIENDLINESS Q. 114. Art. 2

that, but in behaving agreeably towards those among whom
we Hve. Therefore this virtue is not a part of justice.

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 6),
this virtue is concerned about the joys and sorrows of those
who dwell in fellowship. Now it belongs to temperance
to moderate the greatest pleasures, as stated above (I. -II.,
Q. LX., A. 5: Q. LXI., A. 3). Therefore this virtue is a
part of temperance rather than of justice.

Obj. 3. Further, To give equal things to those who are
unequal is contrary to justice, as stated above (Q. LIX.,
AA. I, 2). Now, according to the Philosopher (Ethic, iv. 6),
this virtue treats in like manner known and unknown, com-
panions and strangers. Therefore this virtue rather than
being a part of justice is opposed thereto.

On the contrary, Macrobius (De Somno Scip. i.) accounts
friendship a part of justice.

I answer that. This virtue is a part of justice, being
annexed to it as to a principal virtue. Because in common
with justice it is directed to another person, even as justice
is: yet it falls short of the notion of justice, because it lacks
the full aspect of debt, whereby one man is bound to
another, either by legal debt, which the law binds him to
pay, or by some debt arising out of a favour received.
For it regards merely a certain debt of equity, namely, that
we behave pleasantly to those among whom we dwell, unless
at times, for some reason, it be necessary to displease them
for some good purpose.

Reply Obj. i. As we have said above (Q. CIX., A. 3, ad i),
because man is a social animal he owes his fellow-man, in
equity, the manifestation of truth without which human
society could not last. Now as man could not live in society
without truth, so Hkewise, not without joy, because, as the
Philosopher says (Ethic, viii.), no one could abide a day with
the sad nor with the joyless. Therefore, a certain natural
equity obliges a man to live agreeably with his fellow- men ;
unless some reason should oblige him to sadden them for
their good.

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs to temperance to curb pleasures



Q. 114. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 122

of the senses. But this virtue regards the pleasures of fellow-
ship, which have their origin in the reason, in so far as one
man behaves becomingly towards another. Such pleasures
need not to be curbed as though they were noisome.

Reply Ohj. 3. This saying of the Philosopher does not
mean that one ought to converse and behave in the same
way with acquaintances and strangers, since, as he says
(ibid.), it is not fitting to please or displease acquaintances
and strangers in the same way. The likeness consists in this,
that we ought to behave towards all in a fitting manner.



QUESTION CXV.

OF FLATTERY.

{In Two Articles.)

We must now consider the vices opposed to the aforesaid
virtue: (i) Flattery, and (2) Quarrelling. Concerning flat-
tery there are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether flattery is
a sin ? (2) Whether it is a mortal sin ?

First Article,
whether flattery is a sin ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that flattery is not a sin. For
flattery consists in words of praise offered to another in order
to please him. But it is not a sin to praise a person, accord-
ing to Prov. xxxi. 28, Her children rose up and called her
blessed: her husband, and he praised her. Moreover, there is
no evil in wishing to please others, according to i Cor. x. 33,
/ . . .in all things please all men. Therefore flattery is not
a sin.

. Obj. 2. Further, Evil is contrary to good, and blame to
praise. But it is not a sin to blame evil. Neither, then, is
it a sin to praise good, which seems to belong to flattery.
Therefore flattery is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Detraction is contrary to flattery.
Wherefore Gregory says [Moral, xxii. 5) that detraction is
a remedy against flattery. It must be observed, says he,
that by the wonderful moderation of our Ruler, we are often
allowed to be rent by detractions hut are uplifted by immoderate
praise, so that whom the voice of the flatterer upraises, the

123



Q. 115. Art. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 124

tongue of the detmcter may humble. But detraction is an
evil, as stated above (Q. LXXIII., AA. 2, 3). Therefore
flattery is a good.

On the contrary, A gloss on Ezech. xiii. 18, Woe to them
that sew cushions under every elbow, says, that is to say,
sweet flattery. Therefore flattery is a sin.

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. CXIV., A. i, ^^ 3),
although the friendship of which we have been speaking, or
affability, intends chiefly the pleasure of those among whom
one lives, yet it does not fear to displease when it is a question
of obtaining a certain good, or of avoiding a certain evil.
Accordingly, if a man were to wish always to speak pleasantly
to others, he would exceed the mode of pleasing, and would
therefore sin by excess. If he do this with the mere inten-
tion of pleasing he is said to be complaisant, according to the
Philosopher {Ethic, iv. 6) : whereas if he do it with the intention
of making some gain out of it, he is called a flatterer or
adulator. As a rule, however, the term flattery is wont to
be applied to all who wish to exceed the mode of virtue
in pleasing others by words or deeds in their ordinary
behaviour towards their fellows.

Reply Obj. i. One may praise a person both well and ill,
according as one observes or omits the due circumstances.
For if while observing other due circumstances one were to
wish to please a person by praising him, in order thereby
to console him, or that he may strive to make progress in
good, this will belong to the aforesaid virtue of friendship.
But it would belong to flattery, if one wished to praise a
person for things in which he ought not to be praised; since
perhaps they are evil, according to Ps. ix. 24, The sinner is
praised in the desires of his soul ; or they may be uncertain,
according to Ecclus. xxvii. 8, Praise not a man before he
speaketh, and again (ibid. xi. 2), Praise not a man for his
beauty; or because there may be fear lest human praise
should incite him to vainglory, wherefore it is written,
[ibid. xi. 30), Praise not any man before death. Again, in like
manner it is right to wish to please a man in order to foster
charity, so that he may make spiritual progress therein.



125 FLATTERY Q. 115. Art. 2

But it would be sinful to wish to please men for the sake of
vainglory or gain, or to please them in something evil,
according to Ps. lii. 6, God hath scattered the hones of them that
please men, and according to the words of the Apostle
(Gal. i. 10), /// yet pleased men, I should not he the servant of
Christ.

Reply Ohj. 2. Even to blame evil is sinful, if due circum-
stances be not observed; and so too is it to praise good.

Reply Ohj. 3. Nothing hinders two vices being contrary
to one another. Wherefore even as detraction is evil, so
is flattery, which is contrary thereto as regards what is said,
but not directly as regards the end. Because flattery seeks
to please the person flattered, whereas the detractor seeks
not the displeasure of the person defamed, since at times
he defames him in secret, but seeks rather his defamation.

Second Article,
whether flattery is a mortal sin ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Ohjection i. It seems that flattery is a mortal sin. For,
according to Augustine {Enchirid. xii.), a thing is evilhecause
it is harmful. But flattery is most harmful, according to
Ps. ix. 24, For the sinner is praised in the desires of his soul,
and the unjust man is hlessed. The sinner hath provoked the
Lord. Wherefore Jerome says [Ep. ad Celant.) : Nothing so
easily corrupts the human mind as flattery : and a gloss on
Ps. Ixix. 4, Let them he presently turned away blushing for
shame that say to me : 'Tis well, 'Tis well, says: The tongue of
the flatterer harms more than the sword of the persecutor.
Therefore flattery is a most grievous sin.

Ohj. 2. Further, Whoever does harm by words, harms
himself no less than others: wherefore it is written
(Ps. xxxvi. 15): Let their sword enter into their own hearts.
Now he that flatters another induces him to sin mortally:
hence a gloss on Ps. cxl. 5, Let not the oil of the sinner fatten
7ny head, says: The false praise of the flatterer softens the mind
by depriving it of the rigidity of truth and renders it susceptive



Q. 115. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '* 126

of vice. Much more, therefore, does the flatterer sin in him-
self.

Ohj. 3. Further, It is written in the Decretals (D. XL VI.,
Cap. 3) : The cleric who shall he found to spend his time in
flattery and treachery shall he degraded from his office. Now
such a punishment as this is not inflicted save for mortal
sin. Therefore flattery is a mortal sin.

On the contrary, Augustine in a sermon on Purgatory
(xli., de Sanctis) reckons among slight sins, if one desire
to flatter any person of higher standing, whether of one's own
choice, or out of necessity.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXIL, A. 2), a mortal
sin is one that is contrary to charity. Now flattery is some-
times contrary to charity and sometimes not. It is contrary
to charity in three ways. First, by reason of the very
matter, as when one man praises another's sin: for
this is contrary to the love of God, against Whose justice
he speaks, and contrary to the love of his neighbour, whom
he encourages to sin. Wherefore this is a mortal sin,
according to Isa. v. 20, Woe to you that call evil good.
Secondly, by reason of the intention, as when one man flatters
another, so that by deceiving him he may injure him in
body or in soul; this is also a mortal sin, and of this it is
written (Prov. xxvii. 6) : Better are the wounds of a friend
than the deceitful kisses of an enemy. Thirdly, by way of
occasion, as when the praise of a flatterer, even without his
intending it, becomes to another an occasion of sin. In
this case it is necessary to consider, whether the occasion
were given or taken, and how grievous the consequent
downfall, as may be understood from what has been said
above concerning scandal (Q. XLIII., AA. 3, 4). If, how-
ever, one man flatters another from the mere craving to
please others, or again in order to avoid some evil, or to
acquire something in a case of necessity, this is not contrary
to charity. Consequently it is not a mortal but a venial
sin.

Reply Ohj. 1. The passages quoted speak of the flatterer
who praises another's sin. Flattery of this kind is said to



127 FLATTERY Q. 115. Art. 2

harm more than the sword of the persecutor, since it does
harm to goods that are of greater consequence, namely,
spiritual goods. Yet it does not harm so efficaciously, since
the sword of the persecutor slays effectively, being a sufficient
cause of death; whereas no one by flattering can be a
sufficient cause of another's sinning, as was shown above
(Q. XLIIL, A. 1, ad 3: I.-IL, Q. LXXIIL, A. 8, ^^ 3:
Q. LXXX., A. I).

Reply Ohj. 2. This argument applies to one that flatters
with the intention of doing harm: for such a man harms
himself more than others, since he harms himself, as the
sufficient cause of sinning, whereas he is only the occasional
cause of the harm he does to others.

Reply Ohj. 3. The passage quoted refers to the man
who flatters another treacherously, in order to deceive him.



QUESTION CXVI.

OF QUARRELLING.

{In Two Articles.)

We must now consider quarrelling; concerning which there
are two points of inquiry: (i) Whether it is opposed to the
virtue of friendship ? (2) Of its comparison with flattery.



First Article.

whether quarrelling is opposed to the virtue of
friendship or affability ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that quarrelUng is not opposed to
the virtue of friendship or affability. For quarrelling seems
to pertain to discord, just as contention does. But discord
is opposed to charity, as stated above (Q. XXXVII., A. i).
Therefore quarrelling is also.

Ohj. 2. Further, It is written (Prov. xxvi. 21) : An angry
man stirreth up strife. Now anger is opposed to meekness.
Therefore strife or quarrelling is also.

Ohj, 3. Further, It is written (James iv. i): From
whence are wars and quarrels (Douay, — contentions)
among you ? Are they not hence, from your concupiscences
which war in your members ? Now it would seem contrary
to temperance to follow one's concupiscences. Therefore
it seems that quarrelling is opposed not to friendship but
to temperance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher opposes quarrelling to
friendship {Ethic, iv. 6).

I answer that, Quarrelling consists properly in words,

128



129 QUARRELLING Q.ii6.Art. i

when, namely, one person contradicts another's words.
Now two things may be observed in this contradiction. For
sometimes contradiction arises on account of the person
who speaks, the contradictor refusing to consent with him
from lack of that love which unites minds together, and this
seems to pertain to discord, which is contrary to charity.
Whereas at times contradiction arises by reason of the speaker
being a person to whom someone does not fear to be disagree-
able : whence arises quarrelling, which is opposed to the afore-
said friendship or affability, to which it belongs to behave
agreeably towards those among whom we dwell. Hence
the Philosopher says [Ethic, iv. 6) that those who are opposed
to everything with the intent of being disagreeable, and care
for nobody, are said to be peevish and quarrelsome.

Reply Ob], i. Contention pertains rather to the contra-
diction of discord, while quarrelling belongs to the con-
tradiction which has the intention of displeasing.

Reply Obj. 2. The direct opposition of virtues to vices
depends, not on their causes, since one vice may arise from
many causes, but on the species of their acts. And although
quarrelling arises at times from anger, it may arise from
many other causes, hence it does not follow that it is directly
opposed to meekness.

Reply Obj. 3. James speaks there of concupiscence
considered as a general evil whence all vices arise. Thus,
a gloss on Rom. vii. 7 says : The law is good, since by for-
bidding concupiscence, it forbids all evil.

Second Article.

whether quarrelling is a more grievous sin than

flattery ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —
Objection i. It seems that quarrelling is a less grievous
sin than the contrary vice, viz. adulation or flattery. For
the more harm a sin does the more grievous it seems to
be. Now flattery does more harm than quarrelHng, for
it is written (Isa. iii. 12) : My people, they that call thee
II. ii. 4 9



Q. ii6. Art. 2 THE '' SUMMA THEOLOGICA '' 130

blessed, the same deceive thee, and destroy the way of thy steps.
Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin than quarrelling.

Ohj. 2. Further, There appears to be a certain amount
of deceit in flattery, since the flatterer says one thing, and
thinks another: whereas the quarrelsome man is without
deceit, for he contradicts openly. Now he that sins
deceitfully is a viler man, according to the Philosopher
{Ethic, vii. 6). Therefore flattery is a more grievous sin
than quarrelling.

Ohj. 3. Further, Shame is fear of what is vile, according
to the Philosopher {Ethic, iv. 9). But a man is more ashamed
to be a flatterer than a quarreller. Therefore quarrelling is
a less grievous sin than flattery.

On the contrary, The more a sin is inconsistent with the
spiritual state, the more it appears to be grievous. Now
quarrelling seems to be more inconsistent with the spiritual
state : for it is written (i Tim. iii. 2, 3) that it behoveth a bishop
to be . . . not quarrelsome ; and (2 Tim. ii. 24) : The servant
of the Lord must not wrangle. Therefore quarrelling seems
to be a more grievous sin than flattery.

I answer that, We can speak of each of these sins in two ways.
In one way we may consider the species of either sin, and
thus the more a vice is at variance with the opposite virtue
the more grievous it is. Now the virtue of friendship has
a greater tendency to please than to displease : and so the
quarrelsome man, who exceeds in giving displeasure, sins
more grievously than the adulator or flatterer, who exceeds
in giving pleasure. In another way we may consider them
as regards certain external motives, and thus flattery is
sometimes more grievous, for instance when one intends
by deception to acquire undue honour or gain ; while some-
times quarrelling is more grievous, for instance, when one
intends either to deny the truth, or to hold up the speaker
to contempt.

Reply Obj. i. Just as the flatterer may do harm by
deceiving secretly, so the quarreller may do harm sometimes
by assailing openly. Now, other things being equal, it is
more grievous to harm a person openly, by violence as it



131 QUARRELLING Q.ii6.Art.2

were, than secretly. Wherefore robbery is a more grievous
sin than theft, as stated above (Q. LXVL, A. 9).

Reply Ohj. 2. In human acts, the more grievous is not
always the more vile. For the comeliness of a man has its
source in his reason: wherefore the sins of the flesh, whereby
the flesh enslaves the reason, are viler, although spiritual sins
are more grievous, since they proceed from greater contempt.
In like manner, sins that are committed through deceit
are viler, in so far as they seem to arise from a certain
weakness, and from a certain falseness of the reason, although
sins that are committed openly proceed sometimes from a
greater contempt. Hence flattery, through being accom-
panied by deceit, seems to be a viler sin; while quarrelling,
through proceeding from greater contempt, is apparently
more grievous.

Reply Ohj. 3. As stated in the objection, shame regards
the vileness of a sin: wherefore a man is not always more
ashamed of a more grievous sin, but of a viler sin. Hence
it is that a man is more ashamed of flattery than of quarrel-
ling, although quarrelling is more grievous.



QUESTION CXVII.

OF LIBERALITY.

[In Six Articles.)

We must now consider liberality and the opposite vices,
namely, covetousness and prodigality.

Concerning liberality there are six points of inquiry:
(i) Whether Hberality is a virtue ? (2) What is its matter ?
(3) Of its act : (4) Whether it pertains thereto to give rather
than to take ? (5) Whether Hberality is a part of justice ?
(6) Of its comparison with other virtues.

First Article.

WHETHER liberality IS A VIRTUE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that liberality is not a virtue. For
no virtue is contrary to a natural inclination. Now it is a
natural incHnation for one to provide for oneself more than
for others : and yet it pertains to the liberal man to do the
contrary, since, according to the Philosopher [Ethic, iv. i),
it is the mark of a liberal man not to look to himself, so that he
leaves for himself the lesser things. Therefore liberality is not
a virtue.

Ohj. 2. Further, Man sustains life by means of riches,
and wealth contributes to happiness instrument ally, as
stated in Ethic, i. 8. Since, then, every virtue is directed to
happiness, it seems that the liberal man is not virtuous,
for the Philosopher says of him [Ethic, iv. i) that he is inclined
neither to receive nor to keep money, but to give it away.

Ohj. 3. Further, The virtues are connected with one
another. But liberality does not seem to be connected with

132



133 LIBERALITY Q. 117. Art. i

the other virtues: since many are virtuous who cannot be
Hberal, for they have nothing to give; and many give or
spend Hberally who are not virtuous otherwise. Therefore
HberaHty is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Ambrose says {De Offic. i.)that the Gospel
contains many instances in which a just liberality is incul-
cated. Now in the Gospel nothing is taught that does not
pertain to virtue. Therefore hberahty is a virtue.

/ answer that, As Augustine says {De Lib. Arh. ii. 19), it
belongs to virtue to use well the things that we can use ill. Now
we may use both well and ill, not only the things that are
within us, such as the powers and the passions of the soul,
but also those that are without, such as the things of this
world that are granted us for our livelihood. Wherefore
since it belongs to liberality to use these things well, it
follows that liberality is a virtue.

Reply Obj. i. According to Augustine {Serm. Ixiv. de
Temp.) and Basil (Hom. in Luc. xii. 18) excess of riches is
granted by God to some, in order that they may obtain the
merit of a good stewardship. But it suffices for one man to
have few things. Wherefore the liberal man commendably
spends more on others than on himself. Nevertheless we
are bound to be more provident for ourselves in spiritual
goods, in which each one is able to look after himself in the
first place. And yet it does not belong to the liberal man
even in temporal things to attend so much to others as to
lose sight of himself and those belonging to him. Wherefore
Ambrose says (De Offic. i.) : It is a commendable liberality not
to neglect your relatives if you know them to be in want.

Reply Obj. 2. It does not belong to a liberal man so to
give away his riches that nothing is left for his own support,
nor the wherewithal to perform those acts of virtue whereby
happiness is acquired. Hence the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv.
i) that the liberal man does not neglect his own, wishing thus
to be of help to certain people; and Ambrose says {De Offic. i.)
that Our Lord does not wish a man to pour out his riches all
at once, but to dispense them : unless he do as Eliseus did, who
slew his oxen and fed the poor, that he might not be bound by



Q. 117. Art. I THE ''SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 134

any household cares. For this belongs to the state of perfec-
tion, of which we shall speak farther on (Q. CLXXXIV.,
Q. CLXXXVL, A. 3).

It must be observed, however, that the very act of giving
away one's possessions liberally, in so far as it is an act of
virtue, is directed to happiness.

Reply Ohj. 3. As the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. i), those
who spend much on intemperance are not liberal hut prodigal ;
and likewise whoever spends what he has for the sake of any
other sins. Hence Ambrose says {De Offic. i.) : If you assist
another to rob others of their possessions, your honesty is not
to be commended, nor is your liberality genuine if you give
for the sake of boasting rather than of pity. Wherefore those
who lack other virtues, though they spend much on certain
evil works, are not liberal.

Again, nothing hinders certain people from spending much
on good uses, without having the habit of liberality: even
as men perform works of other virtues, before having the
habit of virtue, though not in the same way as virtuous
people, as stated above (I.-IL, Q. LXV., A. i). In like
manner nothing prevents a virtuous man from being liberal,
although he be poor. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic, iv. i) :
Liberality is proportionate to a mans substance, i.e. his means
for it consists, not in the quantity given, but in the habit of the
giver : and Ambrose says [De Offic. i.) that it is the heart that
makes a gift rich or poor, and gives things their value.

Second Article,
whether liberality is about money ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that liberality is not about money.
For every moral virtue is about operations and passions.
Now it is proper to justice to be about operations, as stated
in Ethic, v. i. Therefore, since liberality is a moral virtue,
it seems that it is about passions and not about money.

Obj. 2. Further, It belongs to a liberal man to make use
of any kind of wealth. Now natural riches are more real



135 LIBERALITY Q. 117. Art. 2


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