American University.

American University Bulletin Catalog Issue: College of Arts and Sciences Announcements (Volume 1941-1942) online

. (page 15 of 26)
Online LibraryAmerican UniversityAmerican University Bulletin Catalog Issue: College of Arts and Sciences Announcements (Volume 1941-1942) → online text (page 15 of 26)
Font size
QR-code for this ebook


ad i). Wherefore in this respect those works are called
servile whereby one man serves another. The third is the
servitude of God; and in this way the work of worship, which
pertains to the service of God, may be called a servile work.
In this sense servile work is not forbidden on the Sabbath
day, because that would be contrary to the end of the
Sabbath observance: since man abstains from other works
on the Sabbath day in order that he may occupy himself
with works connected with God's service. For this reason,
according to John vii. 23, a man'\ receives circumcision on the
Sabbath day, that the law of Moses may not be broken: and for
this reason too we read (Matth. xii. 5), that on the Sabbath
days the priests in the temple break the Sabbath, i.e. do corporal
works on the Sabbath, and are without blame. Accordingly,
the priests in carrying the ark on the Sabbath did not break
the precept of the Sabbath observance. In like manner it
is not contrary to the observance of the Sabbath to exercise
any spiritual act, such as teaching by word or writing.
Wherefore a gloss on Num. xxviii. says that smiths and like
craftsmen rest on the Sabbath day, but the reader or teacher of
the Divine law does not cease from his work. Yet he profanes
not the Sabbath, even as the priests in the temple break the
Sabbath, and are without blame.

On the other hand, those works that are called servile in
the first or second way are contrary to the observance of
the Sabbath, in so far as they hinder man from applying
himself to Divine things. And since man is hindered from
applying himself to Divine things rather by sinful than by

* Vulg., — You shall do no work on that day.
t Vulg., — // a man, etc.



i87 PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q. 122. Art. 4

lawful albeit corporal works, it follows that to sin on a feast
day is more against this precept than to do some other but
lawful bodily work. Hence Augustine says [De decern
chord, iii.): It would he better if the Jew did some useful work
on his farm than spent his time seditiously in the theatre : and
their womenfolk would do better to be making linen on the
Sabbath than to be dancing lewdly all day in their feasts of the
new moon. It is not, however, against this precept to sin
venially on the Sabbath, because venial sin does not destroy
holiness.

Again, corporal works, not pertaining to the spiritual
worship of God, are said to be servile in so far as they belong
properly to servants; while they are not said to be servile,
in so far as they are common to those who serve and those
who are free. Moreover, everyone, be he servant or free, is
bound to provide necessaries both for himself and for his
neighbour, chiefly in respect of things pertaining to the well-
being of the body, according to Prov. xxiv. 11, Deliver them
that are led to death: secondarily as regards avoiding damage
to one's property, according to Deut. xxii. i. Thou shall not
pass by if thou seest thy brother s ox or his sheep go astray, but
thou shall bring them back to thy brother. Hence a corporal
work pertaining to the preservation of one's own bodily
well-being does not profane the Sabbath : for it is not against
the observance of the Sabbath to eat and do such things as
preserve the health of the body. For this reason the
Machabees did not profane the Sabbath when they fought
in self-defence on the Sabbath day (i Machab. ii.), nor Elias
when he fied from the face of Jezabel on the Sabbath. For
this same reason our Lord (Matth. xii. 3) excused His dis-
ciples for plucking the ears of corn on account of the need
which they suffered. In like manner a bodily work that is
directed to the bodily well-being of another is not contrary
to the observance of the Sabbath: wherefore it is written
(John vii. 23) : Are you angry at Me because I have healed the
whole man on the Sabbath day? And again, a bodily work
that is done to avoid an imminent damage to some external
thing does not profane the Sabbath, wherefore our Lord



Q. 122. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 188

says (Matth. xii. 11) : What man shall there he among you,
that hath one sheep, and if the same fall into a pit on the
Sabbath day, will he not take hold on it and lift it up ?

Reply Obj. 4. In the New Law the observance of the Lord's
day took the place of the observance of the Sabbath, not
by virtue of the precept but by the institution of the Church
and the custom of Christian people. For this observance
is not figurative, as was the observance of the Sabbath in
the Old Law. Hence the prohibition to work on the Lord's
day is not so strict as on the Sabbath: and certain works are
permitted on the Lord's day which were forbidden on the
Sabbath, such as the cooking of food and so forth. And
again, in the New Law dispensation is more easily granted
than in the Old, in the matter of certain forbidden works,
on account of their necessity, because the figure pertains to
the protestation of truth, which it is unlawful to omit even
in small things; while works, considered in themselves, are
changeable in point of place and time.

Fifth Article.

WHETHER THE FOURTH PRECEPT, ABOUT HONOURING ONE'S
PARENTS, IS FITTINGLY EXPRESSED ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the fourth precept, about
honouring one's parents, is unfittingly expressed. For this
is the precept pertaining to piety. Now, just as piety is a
part of justice, so are observance, gratitude, and others of
which we have spoken (QQ. CL, CIL, seq.). Therefore it
seems that there should not have been given a special
precept of piety, as none is given regarding the others.

Obj. 2. Further, Piety pays worship not only to one's
parents, but also to one's country, and also to other blood
kindred, and to the well-wishers of our country, as stated
above (Q. CL, AA. i, 2). Therefore it was unfitting for this
precept to mention only the honouring of one's father and
mother.

Ob]. 3. Further, We owe our parents not merely honour



i8g PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q. 122. Art. 5

but also support. Therefore the mere honouring of one's
parents is unfittingly prescribed.

Obj. 4. Further, Sometimes those who honour their
parents die young, and on the contrary those who honour
them not live a long time. Therefore it was unfitting to
supplement this precept with the promise. That thou may est
he long-lived upon earth.

On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, The precepts of the decalogue are directed
to the love of God and of our neighour. Now to our parents,
of all our neighbours, we are under the greatest obligation.
Hence, immediately after the precepts directing us to God,
a place is given to the precept directing us to our parents,
who are the particular principle of our being, just as God is
the universal principle: so that this precept has a certain
affinity to the precepts of the First Table.

Reply Obj. i. As stated above (Q. CI., A. 2), piety directs
us to pay the debt due to our parents, a debt which is common
to all. Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are general
precepts, they ought to contain some reference to piety
rather than to the other parts of justice, which regard some
special debt.

Reply Obj. 2. The debt to one's parents precedes the debt
to one's kindred and country: since it is because we are born
of our parents that our kindred and country belong to us.
Hence, since the precepts of the decalogue are the first
precepts of the Law, they direct man to his parents rather
than to his country and other kindred. Nevertheless this
precept of honouring our parents is understood to command
whatever concerns the payment of debt to any person, as
secondary matter included in the principal matter.

Reply Obj. 3. Reverential honour is due to one's parents
as such, whereas support and so forth are due to them acci-
dentally, for instance, because they are in want, in slavery,
or the like, as stated above (Q. CL, A. 2). And since that
which belongs to a thing by nature precedes that which is
accidental, it follows that among the first precepts of the
Law, which are the precepts of the decalogue, there is a



Q. 122. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 190

special precept of honouring our parents: and this honour,
as a kind of principle, is understood to comprise support and
whatever else is due to our parents.

Reply Ohj. 4. A long life is promised to those who honour
their parents not only as to the life to come, but also as to
the present life, according to the saying of the Apostle
(i Tim. iv. 8) : Piety (Douay, — Godliness) is profitable to all
things, having promise of the life that now is and of that
which is to come. And with reason. Because the man who
is grateful for a favour deserves, with a certain congruity,
that the favour should be continued to him, and he who is
ungrateful for a favour deserves to lose it. Now we owe
the favour of bodily life to our parents after God : wherefore
he that honours his parents deserves the prolongation of
his life, because he is grateful for that favour : while he that
honours not his parents deserves to be deprived of life
because he is ungrateful for the favour. However, present
goods or evils are not the subject of merit or demerit except
in so far as they are directed to a future reward, as stated
above (I.-IL, Q. CXIV., A. 13), wherefore sometimes in
accordance with the hidden design of the Divine judgments,
which regard chiefly the future reward, some, who are dutiful
to their parents, are sooner deprived of life, while others, who
are undutiful to their parents, live longer.

Sixth Article.

whether the other six precepts of the decalogue
are fittingly expressed ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the other six precepts of the
decalogue are unfittingly expressed. For it is not sufficient
for salvation that one refrain from injuring one's neighbour;
but it is required that one pay one's debts, according to
Rom. xiii. 7, Render . . . to all men their dues. Now the last
six precepts merely forbid one to injure one's neighbour.
Therefore these precepts are unfittingly expressed.

Obj. 2. Further, These precepts forbid murder, adultery,



igi PRECEPTS OF JUSTICE Q. 122. Art. 6

stealing and bearing false witness. But many other injuries
can be inflicted on one's neighbour, as appears from those
which have been specified above (QQ. LXXIL, seq.). There-
fore it seems that the aforesaid precepts are unfittingly
expressed.

Ohj, 3. Further, Concupiscence may be taken in two ways.
First as denoting an act of the will, as in Wis. vi. 21, The desire
(concupiscentia) of wisdom bringeth to the everlasting kingdom :
secondly, as denoting an act of the sensuality, as in James
iv. I., From whence are wars and contentions among you?
Are they not . . . from your concupiscences which war in your
members P Now the concupiscence of the sensuality is not
forbidden by a precept of the decalogue, otherwise first
movements would be mortal sins, as they would be against
a precept of the decalogue. Nor is the concupiscence of
the will forbidden, since it is included in every sin. There-
fore it is unfitting for the precepts of the decalogue to include
some that forbid concupiscence,

Obj. 4. Further, Murder is a more grievous sin than
adultery or theft. But there is no precept forbidding the
desire of murder. Therefore neither was it fitting to have
precepts forbidding the desire of theft and of adultery.

On the contrary stands the authority of Scripture.

I answer that, Just as by the parts of justice a man pays
that which is due to certain definite persons, to whom he is
bound for some special reason, so too by justice properly
so called he pays that which is due to all in general. Hence,
after the three precepts pertaining to religion, whereby man
pays what is due to God, and after the fourth precept per-
taining to piety, whereby he pays what is due to his parents
— which duty includes the paying of all that is due for any
special reason — it was necessary in due sequence to give
certain precepts pertaining to justice properly so called,
which pays to all indifferently what is due to them.

Reply Obj. 1. Man is bound towards all persons in general
to inflict injury on no one: hence the negative precepts,
which forbid the doing of those injuries that can be inflicted
on one's neighbour, had to be given a place, as general



Q. 122. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 192

precepts, among the precepts of the decalogue. On the
other hand, the duties we owe to our neighbour are paid in
different ways to different people: hence it did not behove
to include affirmative precepts about these duties among
the precepts of the decalogue.

Reply Ohj. 2. All other injuries that are inflicted on our
neighbour are reducible to those that are forbidden by these
precepts, as taking precedence of others in point of gener-
ality and importance. For all injuries that are inflicted on
the person of our neighbour are understood to be forbidden
under the head of murder as being the principal of all.
Those that are inflicted on a person connected with one's
neighbour, especially by way of lust, are understood to be
forbidden together with adultery: those that come under
the head of damage done to property are understood to be
forbidden together with theft : and those that are comprised
under speech, such as detractions, insults, and so forth, are
understood to be forbidden together with the bearing of
false witness, which is more directly opposed to justice.

Reply Ohj. 3. The precepts forbidding concupiscence do
not include the prohibition of first movements of concupi-
scence, that do not go farther than the bounds of the sen-
suality. The direct object of their prohibition is the consent
of the will, which is directed to deed or pleasure.

Reply Ohj. 4. Murder in itself is an object not of concu-
piscence but of horror, since it has not in itself the aspect
of good. On the other hand, adultery has the aspect of a
certain kind of good, i.e. of something pleasurable, and theft
has an aspect of good, i.e. of something useful: and good of
its very nature has the aspect of something concupiscible.
Hence the concupiscence of theft and adultery had to be
forbidden by special precepts, but not the concupiscence
of murder.



QUESTION CXXIII.

OF FORTITUDE.

{In Twelve Articles.)

After considering justice we must in due sequence consider
fortitude. We must (i) consider the virtue itself of for-
titude; (2) its parts; (3) the gift corresponding thereto;

(4) the precepts that pertain to it.

Concerning fortitude three things have to be considered:
(i) Fortitude itself; (2) its principal act, viz. martyrdom;
(3) the vices opposed to fortitude.

Under the first head there are twelve points of inquiry:
(i) Whether fortitude is a virtue? (2) Whether it is a
special virtue ? (3) Whether fortitude is only about fear
and daring ? (4) Whether it is only about fear of death ?

(5) Whether it is only in warlike matters ? (6) Whether
endurance is its chief act ? (7) Whether its action is
directed to its own good ? (8) Whether it takes pleasure
in its own action ? (9) Whether fortitude deals chiefly
with sudden occurrences ? (10) Whether it makes use
of anger in its action ? (11) Whether it is a cardinal
virtue ? {12) Of its comparison with the other cardinal
virtues.

First Article,
whether fortitude is a virtue ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —
Objection i. It seems that fortitude is not a virtue. For
the Apostle says (2 Cor. xii. 9): Virtue is perfected in
n. ii. 4 T93 13



Q. 123. Art. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" 194

infirmity. But fortitude is contrary to infirmity. There-
fore fortitude is not a virtue.

Ohj. 2. Further, If it is a virtue, it is either theological,
intellectual, or moral. Now fortitude is not contained
among the theological virtues, nor among the intellectual
virtues, as may be gathered from what we have said above
(I.-IL, Q. LVII., A. 2; LXIL, A. 3). Neither, apparently,
is it contained among the moral virtues, since according to
the Philosopher {Ethic, iii. 7, 8): Some seem to he brave
through ignorance; or through experience, as soldiers, both of
which cases seem to pertain to act rather than to moral
virtue, a7id some are called brave on account of certain passions;
for instance, on account of fear of threats, or of dishonour,
or again on account of sorrow, anger, or hope. But moral
virtue does not act from passion but from choice, as stated
above (I.-IL, Q. LV., A. 4). Therefore fortitude is not a
virtue.

Ohj. 3. Further, Human virtue resides chiefly in the soul,
since it is a good quality of the mind, as stated above {loc. cit.).
But fortitude, seemingly, resides in the body, or at least
results from the temperament of the body. Therefore it
seems that fortitude is not a virtue.

On the contrary, Augustine [De Morib. Eccl. xv., xxi., xxii.)
numbers fortitude among the virtues.

/ answer that, According to the Philosopher [Ethic, ii. 6)
virtue is that which makes its subject good, and renders its
work good. Hence human virtue, of which we are speaking
now, is that which makes a man good, and renders his work
good. Now man's good is to be in accordance with reason,
according to Dionysius [Div, Nom. iv. 22). Wherefore it
belongs to human virtue to make man good, to make his
work accord with reason. This happens in three ways:
first, by rectifying reason itself, and this is done by the
intellectual virtues; secondly, by establishing the rectitude
of reason in human affairs, and this belongs to justice;
thirdly, by removing the obstacles to the establishment
of this rectitude in human affairs. Now the human will is
hindered in two ways from following the rectitude of reason.



195 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. i

First, through being drawn by some object of pleasure to
something other than what the rectitude of reason requires ;
and this obstacle is removed by the virtue of temperance.
Secondly, through the will being disinclined to follow that
which is in accordance with reason, on account of some
difficulty that presents itself. In order to remove this
obstacle fortitude of the mind is requisite, whereby to
resist the aforesaid difficulty, even as a man, by fortitude
of body, overcomes and removes bodily obstacles.

Hence it is evident that fortitude is a virtue, in so far as
it conforms man to reason.

Reply Ohj. i. The virtue of the soul is perfected, not in
the infirmity of the soul, but in the infirmity of the body,
of which the Apostle was speaking. Now it belongs to
fortitude of the mind to bear bravely with infirmities of
the flesh, and this belongs to the virtue of patience or
fortitude, as also to acknowledge one's own infirmity, and
this belongs to the perfection that is called humiUty.

Reply Ohj. 2. Sometimes a person performs the exterior
act of a virtue without having the virtue, and from some
other cause than virtue. Hence the Philosopher {Ethic, iii. 8)
mentions five ways in which people are said to be brave by
way of resemblance, through performing acts of fortitude
without having the virtue. This may be done in three
ways. First, because they tend to that which is difficult
as though it were not difiicult: and this again happens in
three ways, for sometimes this is owing to ignorance,
through not perceiving the greatness of the danger; some-
times it is owing to the fact that one is hopeful of overcoming
dangers — when, for instance, one has often experienced
escape from danger ; and sometimes this is owing to a certain
science and art, as in the case of soldiers who, through skill
and practice in the use of arms, think little of the dangers
of battle, as they reckon themselves capable of defending
themselves against them; thus Vegetius says [De Re Milit. i.),
No man fears to do what he is confident of having learnt to
do well. Secondly, a man performs an act of fortitude
without having the virtue, through the impulse of a passion.



Q. 123. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '' 196

whether of sorrow that he wishes to cast off, or again of
anger. Thirdly, through choice, not indeed of a due end,
but of some temporal advantage to be obtained, such as
honour, pleasure, or gain, or of some disadvantage to be
avoided, such as blame, pain, or loss.

Reply Obj. 3. The fortitude of the soul which is reckoned
a virtue, as explained in the Reply to the First Objection,
is so called from its Hkeness to fortitude of the body. Nor
is it inconsistent with the notion of virtue, that a man
should have a natural inclination to virtue by reason of
his natural temperament, as stated above (I. -II., Q. LXIIL,
A. I).

Second Article,
whether fortitude is a special virtue ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that fortitude is not a special virtue.
For it is written (Wis. viii. 7): She teacheth temperance,
and prudence, and justice, and fortitude, where the text
has virtue for fortitude. Since then the term virtue is
common to all virtues, it seems that fortitude is a general
virtue.

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose says {Be Offic. i): Fortitude is
not lacking in courage, for alone she defends the honour of the
virtues and guards their behests. She it is that wages an
inexorable war on all vice, undeterred by toil, brave in face of
dangers, steeled against pleasures, unyielding to lusts, avoiding
covetousness as a deformity that weakens virtue; and he says
the same further on in connexion with other vices. Now
this cannot apply to any special virtue. Therefore fortitude
is not a special virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Fortitude would seem to derive its name
from firmness. But it belongs to every virtue to stand
firm, as stated in Ethic, ii. Therefore fortitude is a general
virtue.

On the contrary, Gregory {Moral, xxii.) numbers it among
the' other virtues.



197 FORTITUDE Q- 123- Art. 2

/ answer that, As stated above (I.-IL, Q. LXI., AA. 3, 4),
the term fortitude can be taken in two ways. First, as
simply denoting a certain firmness of mind, and in this sense
it is a general virtue, or rather a condition of every virtue,
since as the Philosopher states [Ethic, ii), it is requisite
for every virtue to act firmly and immovably. Secondly,
fortitude may be taken to denote firmness only in bearing
and withstanding those things wherein it is most difficult
to be firm, namely in certain grave dangers. Therefore
Tully says [Rhet. ii.), that fortitude is deliberate facing of
dangers and bearing of toils. In this sense fortitude
is reckoned a special virtue, because it has a special
matter.

Reply Obj. 1. According to the Philosopher {De Ccelo
i. 116) the word virtue refers to the extreme limit of a power.
Now a natural power is, in one sense, the power of resisting
corruptions, and in another sense is a principle of action,
as stated in Met. v. 17. And since this latter meaning is
the more common, the term virtue, as denoting the extreme
limit of such a power, is a common term, for virtue taken in a
general sense is nothing else than a habit whereby one acts
well. But as denoting the extreme limit of power in the
first sense, which sense is more specific, it is applied to a
special virtue, namely fortitude, to which it belongs to
stand firm against all kinds of assaults.

Reply Obj. 2. Ambrose takes fortitude in a broad sense,
as denoting firmness of mind in face of assaults of all kinds.
Nevertheless even as a special virtue with a determinate
matter, it helps to resist the assaults of all vices. For he
that can stand firm in things that are most difficult to bear,
is prepared, in consequence, to resist those which are less
difficult.

Reply Obj. 3. This objection takes fortitude in the first
sense.



Q. 123. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 198

Third Article,
whether fortitude is about fear and daring ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article: —

Objection i. It seems that fortitude is not about fear and
daring. For Gregory says {Moral, vii.): The fortitude of the
just man is to overcome the flesh, to withstand self-indulgence,
to quench the lusts of the present life. Therefore fortitude
seems to be about pleasures rather than about fear and
daring.

Ohj. 2. Further, TuUy says (Be Inv. Rhet. ii.), that it
belongs to fortitude to face dangers and to bear toil. But
this seemingly has nothing to do with the passions of fear and
daring, but rather with a man's toilsome deeds and external
dangers. Therefore fortitude is not about fear and daring.

Obj. 3. Further, Not only daring, but also hope, is opposed
to fear, as stated above (I .-II., Q. XLV., A. i, ad 2) in the


1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 15 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26

Online LibraryAmerican UniversityAmerican University Bulletin Catalog Issue: College of Arts and Sciences Announcements (Volume 1941-1942) → online text (page 15 of 26)