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treatise on passions. Therefore fortitude should not be
about daring any more than about hope.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, ii. 7; iii. 9)
that fortitude is about fear and daring.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. i), it belongs to the
virtue of fortitude to remove any obstacle that withdraws
the will from following the reason. Now to be withdrawn
from something difficult belongs to the notion of fear,
which denotes withdrawal from an evil that entails difficulty,
as stated above (L-IL, Q. XLIL, AA. 3, 5) in the treatise on
passions. Hence fortitude is chiefly about fear of difficult
things, which can withdraw the will from following the reason.
And it behoves one not only firmly to bear the assault of
these difficulties by restraining fear, but also moderately
to withstand them, when, to wit, it is necessary to dispel
them altogether in order to free oneself therefrom for the
future, which seems to come under the notion of daring.
Therefore fortitude is about fear and daring, as curbing
fear and moderating daring.

Reply Obj. i. Gregory is speaking then of the fortitude



199 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 3

of the just man, as to its common relation to all virtues.
Hence he first of all mentions matters pertaining to tem-
perance, as in the words quoted, and then adds that which
pertains properly to fortitude as a special virtue, by
saying : To love the trials of this life for the sake of an eternal
reward.

Reply Ohj. 2. Dangers and toils do not withdraw the
will from the course of reason, except in so far as they are
an object of fear. Hence fortitude needs to be immediately
about fear and daring, but mediately about dangers and toils,
these being the objects of those passions.

Reply Ohj. 3. Hope is opposed to fear on the part of the
object, for hope is of good, fear of evil: whereas daring is
about the same object, and is opposed to fear by way of
approach and withdrawal, as stated above (I.-H., Q. XLV.,
A. i). And since fortitude properly regards those temporal
evils that withdraw one from virtue, as appears from TuUy's
definition quoted in the Second Objection, it follows that
fortitude properly is about fear and daring and not about
hope, except in so far as it is connected with daring, as
stated above (I.-H., Q. XLV., A. 2).

Fourth Article,
whether fortitude is only about dangers of

DEATH ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that fortitude is not only about
dangers of death. For Augustine says [De Morih. Eccl. xv.)
that fortitude is love hearing all things readily for the sake
of the object beloved: and [Music, vi.) he says that fortitude
is the love which dreads no hardship, not even death. There-
fore fortitude is not only about danger of death, but also
about other afflictions.

Obj. 2. Further, All the passions of the soul need to be
reduced to a mean by some virtue. Now there is no other
virtue reducing fears to a mean. Therefore fortitude is not
only about fear of death, but also about other fears.



Q. 123. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 200

Obj. 3. Further, No virtue is about extremes. But fear
of death is about an extreme, since it is the greatest of fears,
as stated in Ethic, iii. Therefore the virtue of fortitude is
not about fear of death.

On the contrary, Andronicus says that fortitude is a virtue
of the irascible faculty that is not easily deterred by the fear of
death.

I answer that, As stated above (A. 3), it belongs to the
virtue of fortitude to guard the will against being withdrawn
from the good of reason through fear of bodily evil. Now
it behoves one to hold firmly the good of reason against
every evil whatsoever, since no bodily good is equivalent
to the good of the reason. Hence fortitude of soul must
be that which binds the will firmly to the good of reason
in face of the greatest evils: because he that stands firm
against great things, will in consequence stand firm against
less things, but not conversely. Moreover it belongs to
the notion of virtue that it should regard something extreme :
and the most fearful of all bodily evils is death, since it does
away all bodily goods. Wherefore Augustine says (De
Morib. Eccl. xxii.) that the soul is shaken by its fellow body,
with fear of toil and pain, lest the body be stricken and harassed
with fear of death lest it be done away and destroyed. There-
fore the virtue of fortitude is about the fear of dangers of
death.

Reply Obj. i. Fortitude behaves well in bearing all manner
of adversity: yet a man is not reckoned brave simply
through bearing any kind of adversity, but only through
bearing well even the greatest evils ; while through bearing
others he is said to be brave in a restricted sense.

Reply Obj. 2. Since fear is born of love, any virtue
that moderates the love of certain goods must in consequence
moderate the fear of contrary evils: thus liberahty, which
moderates the love of money, as a consequence, moderates
the fear of losing it, and the same is the case with tem-
perance and other virtues. But to love one's own life is
natural : and hence the necessity of a special virtue modifying
the fear of death.



201 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 5

Reply Ohj. 3. In virtues the extreme consists in exceeding
right reason : wherefore to undergo the greatest dangers in
accordance with reason is not contrary to virtue.



Fifth Article.

whether fortitude is properly about dangers
of death in battle ?

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that fortitude is not properly about
dangers of death in battle. For martyrs above all are
commended for their fortitude. But martyrs are not com-
mended in connexion with battle. Therefore fortitude is
not properly about dangers of death in battle.

Ohj. 2. Further, Ambrose says [De Offic. i.) that fortitude
is applicable both to warlike and to civil matters: and TuU^^
[De Offic. i.), under the heading, * That it pertains to forti-
tude to excel in battle rather than in civil life,' says:
Although not a few think that the business of war is of greater
importance than the affairs of civil life, this opinion must be
qualified: and if we wish to judge the matter truly, there are
many things in civil life that are more important and more
glorious than those connected with war. Now greater forti-
tude is about greater things. Therefore fortitude is not
properly concerned with death in battle.

Obj. 3. Further, War is directed to the preservation of
a country's temporal peace: for Augustine says {De Civ.
Dei xix.) that wars are waged in order to insure peace.
Now it does not seem that one ought to expose oneself to
the danger of death for the temporal peace of one's country,
since this same peace is the occasion of much licence in
morals. Therefore it seems that the virtue of fortitude
is not about the danger of death in battle.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says [Ethic, iii.) that
fortitude is chiefly about death in battle.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 4), fortitude streng-
thens a man's mind against the greatest danger, which is
that of death. Now fortitude is a virtue ; and it is essential



Q. 123. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 202

to virtue ever to tend to good; wherefore it is in order to
pursue some good that man does not fly from the danger
of death. But the dangers of death arising out of sickness,
storms at sea, attacks from robbers, and the hke, do not
seem to come on a man through his pursuing some good.
On the other hand, the dangers of death which occur in
battle come to man directly on account of some good,
because, to wit, he is defending the common good by a just
fight. Now a just fight is of two kinds. First, there is
the general combat, for instance, of those who fight in battle ;
secondly, there is the private combat, as when a judge or
even private individual does not refrain from giving a just
judgement through fear of the impending sword, or any
other danger though it threaten death. Hence it belongs
to fortitude to strengthen the mind against dangers of death,
not only such as arise in a general battle, but also such as
occur in singular combat, which may be called by the
general name of battle. Accordingly it must be granted-
that fortitude is properly about dangers of death occurring
in battle.

Moreover, a brave man behaves well in face of danger
of any other kind of death ; especially since man may be in
danger of any kind of death on account of virtue: thus
may a man not fail to attend on a sick friend through fear
of deadly infection, or not refuse to undertake a journey
with some godly object in view through fear of shipwreck
or robbers.

Reply Ohj. i. Martyrs face the fight that is waged against
their own person, and this for the sake of the sovereign
good which is God ; wherefore their fortitude is praised above
all. Nor is it outside the genus of fortitude that regards
warlike actions, for which reason they are said to have been
valiant in battle. *

Reply Ohj. 2. Personal and civil business is differentiated
from the business of war that regards general wars. How-
ever, personal and civil affairs admit of dangers of death
arising out of certain conflicts which are private wars, and
* Office of Martyrs, ex. Heb. xi. 34.



203 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 6

so with regard to these also there may be fortitude properly
so called.

Reply Obj. 3. The peace of the state is good in itself, nor
does it become evil because certain persons make evil use of
it. For there are many others who make good use of it ; and
many evils prevented by it, such as murders and sacrileges,
are much greater than those which are occasioned by it,
and which belong chiefly to the sins of the flesh.



Sixth Article.

WHETHER ENDURANCE IS THE CHIEF ACT OF
FORTITUDE ?

We proceed thus to the Sixth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that endurance is not the chief act
of fortitude. For virtue is about the difficult and the good
{Ethic, ii. 3). Now it is more difficult to attack than to
endure. Therefore endurance is not the chief act of forti-
tude.

Obj. 2. Further, To be able to act on another seems to
argue greater power than not to be changed by another.
Now to attack is to act on another, and to endure is to
persevere unchangeably. Since then fortitude denotes
perfection of power, it seems that it belongs to fortitude
to attack rather than to endure.

Obj. 3. Further, One contrary is more distant from the
other than its mere negation. Now to endure is merely
not to fear, whereas to attack denotes a movement contrary
to that of fear, since it implies pursuit. Since then fortitude
above all withdraws the mind from fear, it seems that it
regards attack rather than endurance.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 9) that
certain persons are said to be brave chiefly because they
endure affliction.

/ answer that, As stated above (A. 3), and according to the
Philosopher {Ethic, iii. 9), fortitude is more concerned to
allay fear, than to moderate daring. For it is more diflicult
to allay fear than to moderate daring, since the danger



Q. 123. Art. 6 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 204

which is the object of daring and fear, tends by its very
nature to check daring, but to increase fear. Now to attack
belongs to fortitude in so far as the latter moderates daring>
whereas to endure follows the repression of fear. Therefore
the principal act of fortitude is endurance, that is to stand
immovable in the midst of dangers rather than to attack them.

Reply Ohj. i. Endurance is more difficult than aggression,
for three reasons. First, because endurance seemingly
implies that one is being attacked by a stronger person,
whereas aggression denotes that one is attacking as though
one were the stronger party; and it is more difficult to con-
tend with a stronger than with a weaker. Secondly, because
he that endures already feels the presence of danger, whereas
the aggressor looks upon danger as something to come;
and it is more difficult to be unmoved by the present than
by the future. Thirdly, because endurance implies length
of time, whereas aggression is consistent with sudden
movements ; and it is more difficult to remain unmoved for
a long time, than to be moved suddenly to something
arduous. Hence the Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 8.) that
some hurry to meet danger, yet fly when the danger is present;
this is not the behaviour of a brave man.

Reply Obj. 2. Endurance denotes indeed a passion of the
body, but an action of the soul cleaving most resolutely
(fortissime) to good, the result being that it does not yield
to the threatening passion of the body. Now virtue con-
cerns the soul rather than the body.

Reply Obj. 3. He that endures fears not, though he is
confronted with the cause of fear, whereas this cause is not
present to the aggressor.

Seventh Article.

whether the brave man acts for the sake of
the good of his habit ?

We proceed thus to the Seventh Article : —
Objection i. It seems that the brave man does not act
for the sake of the good of his habit. For in matters of



205 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 7

action the end, though first in intention, is last in execution.
Now the act of fortitude, in the order of execution, follows
the habit of fortitude. Therefore it is impossible for
the brave man to act for the sake of the good of his
habit.

Ohj. 2. Further, Augustine says {De Trin. xiii.): We
love virtues for the sake of happiness, and yet some make hold
to counsel us to he virtuous, namely by saying that we should
desire virtue for its own sake, without loving happiness. If
they succeed in their endeavour, we shall surely cease to love
virtue itself, since we shall no longer love that for the sake
of which alone we love virtue. But fortitude is a virtue.
Therefore the act of fortitude is directed not to fortitude
but to happiness.

Ohj. 3. Further, Augustine says {De Morih. Eccl. xv.)
that fortitude is love ready to hear all things for God's sake.
Now God is not the habit of fortitude, but something better,
since the end must needs be better than what is directed
to the end. Therefore the brave man does not act for the
sake of the good of his habit.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 7) that
to the hrave man fortitude itself is a good: and such is an end.

I answer that. An end is twofold : proximate and ultimate.
Now the proximate end of every agent is to introduce a
Hkeness of that agent's form into something else: thus the
end of fire in heating is to introduce the likeness of its heat
into some passive matter: and the end of the builder is to
introduce into matter the likeness of his art. Whatever
good ensues from this, if it be intended, may be called the
remote end of the agent. Now just as in things made
external matter is fashioned by art, so in things done,
human deeds are fashioned by prudence. Accordingly
we must conclude that the brave man intends as his proxi-
mate end to reproduce in action a likeness of his habit, for
he intends to act in accordance with his habit: but his
remote end is happiness or God.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections : for the
First Objection proceeds as though the very essence of a



Q. 123. Art. 8 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 206

habit were its end, instead of the Ukeness of the habit in
act, as stated. The other two objections consider the
ultimate end.

Eighth Article,
whether the brave man delights in his act ?

We proceed thus to the Eighth Article: —

Objection i. It seems that the brave man deHghts in his
act. For delight is the unhindered action of a connatural
habit [Ethic, x. 4, 6, 8). Now the brave deed proceeds from
a habit which acts after the manner of nature. Therefore
the brave man takes pleasure in his act.

Obj. 2. Further, Ambrose, commenting on Gal. v. 22,
But the fruit of the Spirit is charity, joy, peace, says that
deeds of virtue are called fruits because they refresh man's
mind with a holy and pure delight. Now the brave man per-
forms acts of virtue. Therefore he takes pleasure in his act.

Obj. 3. Further, The weaker is overcome by the stronger.
Now the brave man has a stronger love for the good of virtue
than for his own body, which he exposes to the danger of
death. Therefore the delight in the good of virtue banishes
the pain of the body; and consequently the brave man
does all things with pleasure.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says [Ethic, iii. 9) that
the brave man seems to have no delight in his act.

I answer that, As stated above (L-IL, Q. XXXL, AA. 3, 4, 5)
where we were treating of the passions, pleasure is two-
fold; one is bodily, resulting from bodily contact, the other
is spiritual, resulting from an apprehension of the soul.
It is the latter which properly results from deeds of virtue,
since in them we consider the good of reason. Now the
principal act of fortitude is to endure, not only certain
things that are unpleasant as apprehended by the soul — for
instance, the loss of bodily life, which the virtuous man
loves not only as a natural good, but also as being necessary
for acts of virtue, and things connected with them — but also
to endure things unpleasant in respect of bodily contact,
such as wounds and blows. Hence the brave man, on one



207 FORTITUDE Q. 123. Art. 8

side, has something that affords him dehght, namely as
regards spiritual pleasure, in the act itself of virtue and
the end thereof: while, on the other hand, he has cause for
both spiritual sorrow, in the thought of losing his life, and
for bodily pain. Hence we read (2 Machab. vi. 30) that
Eleazar said : / suffer grievous pains in body: hut in soul am
well content to suffer these things because I fear Thee.

Now the sensible pain of the body makes one insensible
to the spiritual delight of virtue, without the copious
assistance of God's grace, which has more strength to raise
the soul to the Divine things in which it delights, than
bodily pains have to afflict it. Thus the Blessed Tiburtius,
while walking barefoot on the burning coal, said that
he felt as though he were walking on roses.

Yet the virtue of fortitude prevents the reason from
being entirely overcome by bodily pain. And the dehght
of virtue overcomes spiritual sorrow, inasmuch as a man
prefers the good of virtue to the life of the body and to
whatever appertains thereto. Hence the Philosopher says
{Ethic, ii. 3 ; iii. 9) that it is not necessary for a brave man to
delight so as to perceive his delight, but it suffices for him not
to be sad.

Reply Obj. i. The vehemence of the action or passion of
one power hinders the action of another power: wherefore
the pain in his senses hinders the mind of the brave man
from feeling delight in its proper operation.

Reply Obj. 2. Deeds of virtue are delightful chiefly on
account of their end; yet they can be painful by their
nature, and this is principally the case with fortitude.
Hence the Philosopher says {Ethic, iii. 9) that to perform
deeds with pleasure does not happen in all virtues, except in
so far as one attains the end.

Reply Obj. 3. In the brave man spiritual sorrow is over-
come by the delight of virtue. Yet since bodily pain is
more sensible, and the sensitive apprehension is more in
evidence to man, it follows that spiritual pleasure in the
end of virtue fades away, so to speak, in the presence of
great bodily pain.



Q. 123. Art. 9 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 208



Ninth Article.

whether fortitude deals chiefly with sudden

occurrences ?

We proceed thus to the Ninth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that fortitude does not deal chiefly
with sudden occurrences. For it would seem that things
occur suddenly when they are unforeseen. But Tully says
[De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that fortitude is the deliberate facing of
danger, and bearing of toil. Therefore fortitude does not
deal chiefly with sudden happenings.

Obj. %. Further, Ambrose says ifle Offic. i.) : The brave
man is not unmindful of what may be likely to happen; he
takes measures beforehand, and looks out as from the conning-
tower of his mind, so as to encounter the future by his fore-
thought, lest he should say afterwards: This befel me because I
did not think it could possibly happen. But it is not possible
to be prepared for the future in the case of sudden occurrences.
Therefore the operation of fortitude is not concerned with
sudden happenings.

Obj. 3. Further, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iii. 8) that
the brave man is of good hope. But hope looks forward to the
future, which is inconsistent with sudden occurrences.
Therefore the operation of fortitude is not concerned with
sudden happenings.

On the contrary. The Philosopher says [Ethic, iii. 8) that
fortitude is chiefly about sudden dangers of death.

I answer that. Two things must be considered in the
operation of fortitude. One is in regard to its choice : and
thus fortitude is not about sudden occurrences : because the
brave man chooses to think beforehand of the dangers that
may arise, in order to be able to withstand them, or to bear
them more easily: since according to Gregory [Hom. xxv.
in Ev.), the blow that is foreseen strikes with less force, and we
are able more easily to bear earthly wrongs, if we are forearmed
with the shield of foreknowledge. The other thing to be con-
sidered in the operation of fortitude regards the display of the



209 FORTITUDE Q. 123.ART. lo

virtuous habit: and in this way fortitude is chiefly about
sudden occurrences, because according to the Philosopher
{Ethic, iii. 8) the habit of fortitude is displayed chiefly in
sudden dangers: since a habit works by way of nature.
Wherefore if a person without forethought does that
which pertains to virtue, when necessity urges on account
of some sudden danger, this is a very strong proof that
habitual fortitude is firmly seated in his mind.

Yet is it possible for a person, even without the habit of
fortitude, to prepare his mind against danger by long fore-
thought : in the same way as a brave man prepares himself
when necessary. This suffices for the Replies to the Objec-
tions.

Tenth Article.

whether the brave man makes use of anger in

his action ?

We proceed thus to the Tenth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the brave man does not use
anger in his action. For no one should employ as an instru-
ment of his action that which he cannot use at will. Now
man cannot use anger at will, so as to take it up and lay
it aside when he will. For, as the Philosopher says [De
Memoria ii.), when a bodily passion is in movement, it does
not rest at once just as one wishes. Therefore a brave man
should not employ anger for his action.

Obj. 2. Further, If a man is competent to do a thing by
himself, he should not seek the assistance of something
weaker and more imperfect. Now the reason is competent
to achieve by itself deeds of fortitude, wherein anger is
impotent: wherefore Seneca says [De Ira i.): Reason by
itself suffices not only to make us prepared for action hut also
to accomplish it. In fact is there greater folly than for reason
to seek help from anger ? the steadfast from the unstaid, the
trusty from the untrustworthy, the healthy from the sick ?
Therefore a brave man should not make use of anger.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as people are more earnest in doing
deeds of fortitude on account of anger, so are they on account

II. ii. 4 14



Q. 123. Art. 10 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 210

of sorrow or desire; wherefore the Philosopher says {Ethic.
iii. 8) that wild beasts are incited to face danger through
sorrow or pain, and adulterous persons dare many things for
the sake of desire. Now fortitude employs neither sorrow
nor desire for its action. Therefore in like manner it should
not employ anger.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says (Ethic, iii. he. cit.)
that anger helps the brave.

I answer that, As stated above (I. -II., Q. XXIV., A. 2),
concerning anger and the other passions there was a difference
of opinion between the Peripatetics and the Stoics. For the
Stoics excluded anger and all other passions of the soul from
the mind of a wise or good man : whereas the Peripatetics,
of whom Aristotle was the chief, ascribed to virtuous men
both anger and the other passions of the soul albeit modified
by reason. And possibly they differed not in reality but in
their way of speaking. For the Peripatetics, as stated above
{loc. cit.), gave the name of passions to all the movements
of the sensitive appetite, however they may comport them-
selves. And since the sensitive appetite is moved by the
command of reason, so that it may co-operate by rendering
action more prompt, they held that virtuous persons should


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