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Job xli. 24, 25: He (Vulg., — who) was made to fear no one,
he beholdeth every high thing : and sometimes it happens
through a defect in the reason; thus the Philosopher says
[Ethic, iii. 7) that the Celts, through lack of intelligence, fear
nothing.'\ It is therefore evident that fearlessness is a vice,
whether it result from lack of love, pride of soul, or dulness
of understanding: yet the latter is excused from sin if it be
invincible.

* Viz., the contrary goods. One would expect se instead of ea.
We should then read: For the reason that he loves himself less
than he ought.

t "A man would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there
were nothing that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at sea,
as is said to be the case with the Celts.'*



237 FEARLESSNESS Q. 126. Art. 2

Reply Ohj. i. The just man is praised for being without
fear that withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether
fearless, for it is written (Ecclus. i. 28) : He that is without
fear cannot he justified.

Reply Ohj. 2. Death and whatever else can be inflicted
by mortal man are not to be feared so that they make us
forsake justice: but they are to be feared as hindering man
in acts of virtue, either as regards himself, or as regards
the progress he may cause in others. Hence it is written
(Prov. xiv. 16) : A wise man feareth and declineth from evil.

Reply Ohj. 3. Temporal goods are to be despised as
hindering us from loving and serving God, and on the same
score they are not to be feared; wherefore it is written
(Ecclus. xxxiv. 16) : He that feareth the Lord shall tremble
at nothing. But temporal goods are not to be despised,
in so far as they are helping us instrument ally to attain
those things that pertain to Divine fear and love.

Second Article,
whether fearlessness is opposed to fortitude ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that fearlessness is not opposed to
fortitude. For we judge of habits by their acts. Now no
act of fortitude is hindered by a man being fearless: since
if fear be removed, one is both brave to endure, and daring
to attack. Therefore fearlessness is not opposed to forti-
tude.

Ohj. 2. Further, Fearlessness is a vice, either through
lack of due love, or on account of pride, or by reason of
folly. Now lack of due love is opposed to charity, pride
is contrary to humility, and folly to prudence or wisdom.
Therefore the vice of fearlessness is not opposed to fortitude.

Ohj. 3. Further, Vices are opposed to virtue and extremes
to the mean. But one mean has only one extreme on the
one side. Since then fortitude has fear opposed to it on
the one side and daring on the other, it seems that fearless-
ness is not opposed thereto.



Q. 126. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 238

On the contrary, The Philosopher [Ethic, iii.) reckons
fearlessness to be opposed to fortitude.

/ answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIIL, A. 3), fortitude
is concerned about fear and daring. Now every moral
virtue observes the rational mean in the matter about which
it is concerned. Hence it belongs to fortitude that man
should moderate his fear according to reason, namely that
he should fear what he ought, and when he ought, and so
forth. Now this mode of reason may be corrupted either
by excess or by deficiency. Wherefore just as timidity is
opposed to fortitude by excess of fear, in so far as a man
fears what he ought not, and as he ought not, so too fear-
lessness is opposed thereto by deficiency of fear, in so far
as a man fears not what he ought to fear.

Reply Ohj. i. The act of fortitude is to endure death
without fear, and to be aggressive, not anyhow, but accord-
ing to reason: this the fearless man does not do.

Reply Ohj. 2. Fearlessness by its specific nature corrupts
the mean of fortitude, wherefore it is opposed to fortitude
directly. But in respect of its causes nothing hinders it
from being opposed to other virtues.

Reply Ohj. 3. The vice of daring is opposed to fortitude
by excess of daring, and fearlessness by deficiency of fear.
Fortitude imposes the mean on each passion. Hence there
is nothing unreasonable in its having different extremes
in different respects.



QUESTION CXXVII.

OF DARING.*

{In Two Articles).

We must now consider daring; and under this head there are
two points of inquiry : (i) Whether daring is a sin ?
(2) Whether it is opposed to fortitude ?

First Article,
whether daring is a sin ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that daring is not a sin. For it is
written (Job. xxxix. 21) concerning the horse, by which
according to Gregory {Moral, xxxi.) the godly preacher is
denoted, that he goeth forth boldly to meet armed men.'\ But
no vice redounds to a man's praise. Therefore it is not a sin
to be daring.

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher {Ethic, vi. 9),
one should take counsel in thought, and do quickly what has
been counselled. But daring helps this quickness in doing-
Therefore daring is not sinful but praiseworthy.

Obj. 3. Further, Daring is a passion caused by hope, as
stated above (I. -II., Q. XLV., A. 2) when we were treating
of the passions. But hope is accounted not a sin but a
virtue. Neither therefore should daring be accounted a
sin.

On the contrary, It is written (Ecclus. viii. 18) : Go not on
the way with a bold man, lest he burden thee with his evils. Now

* Excessive daring or foolhardiness.

t Vulg., — he pyanoeth boldly, he goeth forth to meet armed men,

239



Q. 127. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 240

no man's fellowship is to be avoided save on account of sin.
Therefore daring is a sin.

I answer that, Daring, as stated above (I. -II., Q. XXIII.,
A. i: Q. LV.), is a passion. Now a passion is sometimes
moderated according to reason, and sometimes it lacks
moderation, either by caress or by deficiency, and on this
account the passion is sinful. Again, the names of the
passions are sometimes employed in the sense of excess,
thus we speak of anger meaning not any but excessive
anger, in which case it is sinful, and in the same way daring
as implying excess is accounted a sin.

Reply Ohj. i. The daring spoken of there is that which is
moderated by reason, for in that sense it belongs to the
virtue of fortitude.

Reply Ohj. 2. It is praiseworthy to act quickly after taking
counsel, which is an act of reason. But to wish to act
quickly before taking counsel is not praiseworthy but sinful;
for this would be to act rashly, which is a vice contrary to
prudence, as stated above (Q. LVIII., A. 3). Wherefore
daring which leads one to act quickly is so far praiseworthy
as it is directed by reason.

Reply Ohj. 3. Some vices are unnamed, and so also
are some virtues, as the Philosopher remarks [Ethic, ii. 7;
iv. 4, 5, 6). Hence the names of certain passions have to be
applied to certain vices and virtues : and in order to designate
vices we employ especially the names of those passions the
object of which is an evil, as in the case of hatred, fear, anger
and daring. But hope and love have a good for this object,
and so we use them rather to designate virtues.



Second Article,
whether daring is opposed to fortitude?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Ohjection 1. It seems that daring is not opposed to forti-
tude. For excess of daring seems to result from presump-
tion of mind. But presumption pertains to pride which is



241 DARING Q. 127. Art. 2

opposed to humility. Therefore daring is opposed to
humihty rather than to" fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, Daring does not seem to call for blame,
except in so far as it results in harm either to the daring
person who puts himself in danger inordinately, or to others
whom he attacks with daring, or exposes to danger. But
this seemingly pertains to injustice. Therefore daring, as
designating a sin, is opposed, not to fortitude but to
justice.

Obj. 3. Further, Fortitude is concerned about fear and
daring, as stated above (Q. CXXIIL, A. 3). Now since
timidity is opposed to fortitude in respect of an excess of
fear, there is another vice opposed to timidity in respect of
a lack of fear. If then, daring is opposed to fortitude, in the
point of excessive daring, there will likewise be a vice opposed
to it in the point of deficient daring. But there is no such
vice. Therefore neither should daring be accounted a vice
in opposition to fortitude.

On the contrary, The Philosopher in both the Second and
Third Books of Ethics accounts daring to be opposed to
fortitude.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXVI., A. 2), it belongs
to a moral virtue to observe the rational mean in the matter
about which it is concerned. Wherefore every vice that
denotes lack of moderation in the matter of a moral virtue is
opposed to that virtue, as immoderate to moderate. Now
daring, in so far as it denotes a vice, implies excess of passion,
and this excess goes by the name of daring. Wherefore it is
evident that it is opposed to the virtue of fortitude which is
concerned about fear and daring, as stated above (Q. CXXII.,

A. 3). _

Reply Obj. 1. Opposition between vice and virtue does not
depend chiefly on the cause of the vice but on the vice's
very species. Wherefore it is not necessary that daring
be opposed to the same virtue as presumption which is its
cause.

Reply Obj. 2. Just as the direct opposition of a vice does
not depend on its cause, so neither does it depend on its

II. ii. 4. 16



Q. 127. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '^ 242

effect. Now the harm done by daring is its effect. Where-
fore neither does the opposition of daring depend on this.

Reply Ohj. 3. The movement of daring consists in a man
taking the offensive against that which is in opposition to
him : and nature incHnes him to do this except in so far as
such inchnation is hindered by the fear of receiving harm from
that source. Hence the vice which exceeds in daring has no
contrary deficiency, save only timidity. Yet daring does
not always accompany so great a lack of timidity, for as
the Philosopher says [Ethic, iii. 7), the daring are precipitate
and eager to meet danger, yet fail when the danger is present,
namely through fear.



QUESTION CXXVIII.

OF THE PARTS OF FORTITUDE.

We must now consider the parts of fortitude : first we shall
consider what are the parts of fortitude; and secondly we
shall treat of each part.

Article.

whether the parts of fortitude are suitably

assigned ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that the parts of fortitude are
unsuitably assigned. For Tully {De Inv. Rhet. ii.) assigns
four parts to fortitude, namely magnificence, confidence,
patience, and perseverance. Now magnificence seems to
pertain to liberality; since both are concerned about
money, and a magnificent man must needs he liberal,
as the Philosopher observes {Ethic, iv. 2). But liberality
is a part of justice, as stated above (Q. CXVIL, A. 5). There-
fore magnificence should not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, confidence is apparently the same as
hope. But hope does not seem to pertain to fortitude,
but is rather a virtue by itself. Therefore confidence should
not be reckoned a part of fortitude.

Obj. 3. Further, Fortitude makes a man behave aright
in face of danger. But magnificence and confidence do not
essentially imply any relation to danger. Therefore they
are not suitably reckoned as parts of fortitude.

Obj. 4. Further, According to Tully {loc. cit.) patience
denotes endurance of hardships, and he ascribes the same
to fortitude. Therefore patience is the same as fortitude
and not a part thereof.

243



Q. 128 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 244

Ohj. 5. Further, that which is a requisite to every virtue
should not be reckoned a part of a special virtue. But
perseverance is required in every virtue: for it is written
(Matth. xxiv. 13) : He that shall persevere to the end he
shall he saved. Therefore perseverance should not be
accounted a part of fortitude.

Ohj. 6. Further, Macrobius {De Somn. Scip. i.) reckons
seven parts of fortitude, namely magnanimity, confidence,
security, magnificence, constancy, forbearance, stability.
Andronicus also reckons seven virtues annexed to fortitude,
and these are, coiirage, strength of will, magnanimity, manli-
ness, perseverance, magnificence. Therefore it seems that
Tully's reckoning of the parts of fortitude is incomplete.

Ohj. 7. Further, Aristotle (Ethic, iii.) reckons five parts of
fortitude. The first is civic fortitude, which produces
brave deeds through fear of dishonour or punishment;
the second is military fortitude, which produces brave deeds
as a result of warhke art or experience; the third is the
fortitude which produces brave deeds resulting from passion,
especially anger; the fourth is the fortitude which makes a
man act bravely through being accustomed to overcome;
the fifth is the fortitude which makes a man act bravely
through being unaccustomed to danger. Now these kinds
of fortitude are not comprised under any of the above
enumerations. Therefore these enumerations of the parts
of fortitude are unfitting.

I answer that. As stated above (Q. XLVIIL), a virtue
can have three kinds of parts, subjective, integral, and
potential. But fortitude, taken as a special virtue, cannot
have subjective parts, since it is not divided into several
specifically distinct virtues, for it is about a very special
matter.

However, there are quasi-integral and potential parts
assigned to it: integral parts, with regard to those things
the concurrence of which is requisite for an act of fortitude ;
and potential parts, because what fortitude practises in face
of the greatest hardships, namely dangers of death, certain
other virtues practise in the matter of certain minor hard-



245 PARTS OF FORTITUDE Q. 128

ships and these virtues are annexed to fortitude as secondary
virtues to the principal virtue. As stated above (Q. CXXIIL
AA. 3, 6), the act of fortitude is twofold, aggression and
endurance. Now two things are required for the act of
aggression. The first regards preparation of the mind,
and consists in one's having a mind ready for aggression.
In this respect TuUy mentions confidence, of which he says
{loc. cit.) that with this the mind is much assured and firmly
hopeful in great and honourable undertakings. The second
regards the accomplishment of the deed, and consists in
not failing to accompUsh what one has confidently begun. In
this respect TuUy mentions magnificence, which he describes
as being the discussion and administration, i.e., accomplish-
ment of great and lofty undertakings, with a certain broad
and noble purpose of mind, so as to combine execution with
greatness of purpose. Accordingly if these two be confined
to the proper matter of fortitude, namely to dangers of
death, they will be quasi-integral parts thereof, because
without them there can be no fortitude; whereas if they
be referred to other matters involving less hardship, they
will be virtues specifically distinct from fortitude, but annexed
thereto as secondary virtues to principal: thus magnificence
is referred by the Philosopher {Ethic, iv.) to great expenses,
and magnanimity, which seems to be the same as confidence,
to great honours. Again, two things are requisite for the
other act of fortitude, viz. endurance. The first is that the
mind be not broken by sorrow, and fall away from its great-
ness, by reason of the stress of threatening evil. In this
respect he mentions patience, which he describes as the volun-
tary and prolonged endurance of arduous and difificult things for
the sake of virtue or profit. The other is that by the prolonged
suffering of hardships man be not wearied so as to lose
courage, according to Heb. xii. 3., That you he not wearied,
fainting in your minds. In this respect he mentions per-
severance, which accordingly he describes as the fixed and
continued persistence in a well considered purpose. If these
two be confined to the proper matter of fortitude, they
will be quasi-integral parts thereof; but if they be referred



Q. 128 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 246

to any kind of hardship they will be virtues distinct from
fortitude, yet annexed thereto as secondary to principal.

Reply Ohj. i. Magnificence in the matter of liberality
adds a certain greatness: this is connected with the notion
of difficulty which is the object of the irascible faculty, that
is perfected chiefly by fortitude: and to this virtue, in this
respect, it belongs.

Reply Ohj. 2. Hope whereby one confides in God is
accounted a theological virtue, as stated above (Q. XVII.,
A. 5; I.-IL, Q. LXIL, A. 3). But by confidence which
here is accounted a part of fortitude, man hopes in himself,
yet under God withal.

Reply Ohj. 3. To venture on anything great seems to
involve danger, since to fail in such things is very disastrous.
Wherefore although magnificence and confidence are
referred to the accomplishment of or venturing on any other
great things, they have a certain connexion with fortitude
by reason of the imminent danger.

Reply Ohj. 4. Patience endures not only dangers of
death, with which fortitude is concerned, without excessive
sorrow, but also any other hardships or dangers. In
this respect it is accounted a virtue annexed to fortitude:
but as referred to dangers of death, it is an integral part
thereof.

Reply Ohj. 5. Perseverance as denoting persistence in a
good deed unto the end, may be a circumstance of every
virtue, but it is reckoned a part of fortitude in the sense
stated in the body of the Article.

Reply Ohj. 6. Macrobius reckons the four aforesaid
mentioned by TuUy, namely confidence, magnificence,
forhearance, which he puts in the place of patience, and
firmness, which he substitutes for perseverance. And he
adds three, two of which, namely magnanimity and security,
are comprised by Tully under the head of confidence. But
Macrobius is more specific in his enumeration. Because
confidence denotes a man's hope for great things : and hope
for anything presupposes an appetite stretching forth to
great things by desire, and this belongs to magnanimity.



247 PARTS OF FORTITUDE Q. 128

For it has been stated above (I.-IL, Q. XL., A. 2) that hope
presupposes love and desire of the thing hoped for.

A still better reply is that confidence pertains to the
certitude of hope; while magnanimity refers to the magni-
tude of the thing hoped for. Now hope has no firmness
unless its contrary be removed, for sometimes one, for one's
own part, would hope for something, but hope is avoided on
account of the obstacle of fear, since fear is somewhat
contrary to hope, as stated above (I.-IL, Q. XL., A. 4, ad i).
Hence Macrobius adds security, which banishes fear. He
adds a third, namely constancy, which may be comprised
under magnificence. For in performing deeds of magnifi-
cence one needs to have a constant mind. For this reason
Tully says that magnificence consists not only in accomplish-
ing great things, but also in discussing them generously
in the mind. Constancy may also pertain to perseverance,
so that one may be called persevering through not desisting
on account of delays, and constant through not desisting
on account of any other obstacles.

Those that are mentioned by Andronicus seem to amount
to the same as the above. For with Tully and Macrobius
he mentions perseverance and magnificence, and with Macro-
bius, magnanimity. Strength of will is the same as patience
or forbearance, for he says that strength of will is a habit
that makes one ready to attempt what ought to he attempted,
and to endure what reason says should be endured — i.e. good
courage seems to be the same as assurance, for he defines
it as strength of soul in the accomplishment of its purpose.
Manliness is apparently the same as confidence, for he says
that manliness is a habit of self-sufficiency in matters of
virtue. Besides magnificence he mentions dvSpayadla,
i.e. manly goodness which we may render strenuousness.
For magnificence consists not only in being constant in the
accomplishment of great deeds, which belongs to constancy,
but also in bringing a certain manly prudence and solicitude
to that accomplishment, and this belongs to avSpayaOU,
strenuousness: wherefore he says that avSpayaOla is the
virtue of a man, whereby he thinks out profitable works.



Q. 128 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 248

Accordingly it is evident that all these parts may be
reduced to the four principal parts mentioned by TuUy.

Reply Obj. 7. The five mentioned by Aristotle fall short
of the true notion of virtue, for though they concur in the
act of fortitude, they differ as to motive, as stated above
(Q. CXXIIL, A. I, ad 2); wherefore they are not reckoned
parts but modes of fortitude.



QUESTION CXXIX.

OF MAGNANIMITY.*

[In Eight Articles).

We must now consider each of the parts of fortitude,
including, however, the other parts under those mentioned by
Tully, with the exception of confidence, for which we shall
substitute magnanimity, of which Aristotle treats. Accord-
ingly we shall consider (i) Magnanimity; (2) Magnificence;
(3) Patience; (4) Perseverance. As regards the first we
shall treat (i) of magnanimity; (2) of its contrary vices.

Under the first head there are eight points of inquiry:
(i) Whether magnanimity is about honours ? (2) Whether
magnanimity is only about great honours ? (3) Whether
it is a virtue ? (4) Whether it is a special virtue ? (5) Whether
it is a part of fortitude ? (6) Of its relation to confidence :
(7) Of its relation to assurance : (8) Of its relation to goods
of fortune.

First Article.

whether magnanimity is about honours ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : — •

Objection i. It seems that magnanimity is not about
honours. For magnanimity is in the irascible faculty, as
its very name shows, since magnanimity signifies greatness
of mind, and mind denotes the irascible part, as appears
from De Anima iii. 42, where the Philosopher says that in
the sensitive appetite are desire and mind, i.e. the concupis-
cible and irascible parts. But honour is a concupiscible

* Not in the ordinary restricted sense, but as explained by the
author.

249



Q. 129. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '' 250

good since it is the reward of virtue. Therefore it seems
that magnanimity is not about honours.

Ohj. 2. Further, Since magnanimity is a moral virtue, it
must needs be about either passions or operations. Now
it is not about operations, for then it would be a part of
justice: whence it follows that it is about passions. But
honour is not a passion. Therefore magnanimity is not
about honours.

Ohj. 3. Further, The nature of magnanimity seems to
regard pursuit rather than avoidance, for a man is said to be
magnanimous because he tends to great things. But the
virtuous are praised not for desiring honours, but for shun-
ning them. Therefore magnanimity is not about honours.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 3) that
magnanimity is about honour and dishonour.

I answer that, Magnanimity by its very name denotes
stretching forth of the mind to great things. Now virtue
bears a relationship to two things, first to the matter about
which it is the field of its activity, secondly to its proper act,
which consists in the right use of such matter. And since
a virtuous habit is denominated chiefly from its act, a man
is said to be magnanimous chiefly because he is minded to
do some great act.

Now an act may be called great in two ways : in one way
proportionately, in another absolutely. An act may be
called great proportionately, even if it consist in the use of
some small or ordinary thing, if, for instance, one make a
very good use of it: but an act is simply and absolutely
great when it consists in the best use of the greatest
thing.

The things which come into man's use are external things,
and among these honour is the greatest simply, both because
it is the most akin to virtue, since it is an attestation to a
person's virtue, as stated above (Q. CIIL, AA. i, 2); and
because it is offered to God and to the best; and again
because, in order to obtain honour even as to avoid shame,
men set aside all other things. Now a man is said to be
magnanimous in respect of things that are great absolutely



251 MAGNANIMITY Q. 129. Art. i

and simply, just as a man is said to be brave in respect of
things that are difficult simply. It follows therefore that
magnanimity is about honours.

Reply Ohj. i. Good and evil absolutely considered regard
the concupiscible faculty, but in so far as the aspect of
difficult is added, they belong to the irascible. Thus it is


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