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DIGNITY ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that it does not belong to observance
to pay worship and honour to persons in positions of dignity.
For according to Augustine {De Civ. Dei x.), we are said to
worship those persons whom we hold in honour, so that
worship and honour would seem to be the same. Therefore



13 OBSERVANCE Q. 102. Art. 2

it is unfitting to define observance as paying worship and
honour to persons in positions of dignity.

Ohj. 2. Further, It belongs to justice that we pay what
we owe : wherefore this belongs to observance also, since it
is a part of justice. Now we do not owe worship and honour
to all persons in positions of dignity, but only to those who
are placed over us. Therefore observance is unfittingly
defined as giving worship and honour to all.

Ohj. 3. Further, Not only do we owe honour to persons
of dignity who are placed over us; we owe them also fear
and a certain payment of remuneration, according to
Rom. xiii. 7, Render . . . to all men their dues; tribute to whom
tribute is due ; custom to whom custom ; fear to whom fear ;
honour to whom honour. Moreover, we owe them reverence
and subjection, according to Heb. xiii. 17, Obey your prelates,
and be subject to them. Therefore observance is not fittingly
defined as paying worship and honour.

On the contrary, Tully says {De Inv. Rhet. ii.) that it is by
observance that we pay worship and honour to those who excel
in some kind of dignity.

I answer that, It belongs to persons in positions of dignity
to govern subjects. Now to govern is to move certain ones
to their due end : thus a sailor governs his ship by steering
it to port. But every mover has a certain excellence and
power over that which is moved. Wherefore, a person in a
position of dignity is an object of twofold consideration:
first, in so far as he obtains excellence of position, together
with a certain power over subjects: secondly, as regards the
exercise of his government. In respect of his excellence
there is due to him honour, which is the recognition of some
kind of excellence; and in respect of the exercise of his
government, there is due to him worship, consisting in
rendering him service, by obeying his commands, and by
repaying him, according to one's faculty, for the benefits we
receive from him.

Reply Obj. 1. Worship includes not only honour, but also
whatever other suitable actions are connected with the
relations between man and man.



Q. 102. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 14

Reply Ohj. 2. As stated above (O. LXXX.), debt is two-
fold. One is legal debt, to pay which man is compelled by
law; and thus man owes honour and worship to those persons
in positions of dignity who are placed over him. The other
is moral debt, which is due by reason of a certain honesty:
it is in this way that we owe worship and honour to persons
in positions of dignity even though we be not their subjects.

Reply Ohj. 3. Honour is due to the excellence of persons
in positions of dignity, on account of their higher rank : while
fear is due to them on account of their power to use compul-
sion: and to the exercise of their government there is due
both obedience, whereby subjects are moved at the com-
mand of their superiors, and tributes, which are a repay-
ment of their labour.

Third Article,
whether observance is a greater virtue than piety ?

W^ proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that observance is a greater virtue
than piety. For the prince to whom worship is paid by
observance is compared to a father who is worshipped by
piety, as a universal to a particular governor; because the
household which a father governs is part of the state which
is governed by the prince. Now a universal power is greater,
and inferiors are more subject thereto. Therefore obser-
vance is a greater virtue than piety.

Ohj. 2. Further, Persons in positions of dignity take care
of the common good. Now our kindred pertain to the
private good, which we ought to set aside for the common
good: wherefore it is praiseworthy to expose oneself to the
danger of death for the sake of the common good. There-
fore observance, whereby worship is paid to persons in posi-
tions of dignity, is a greater virtue than piety, which paj^s
worship to one's kindred.

Ohj. 3. Further, Honour and reverence are due to the
virtuous in the first place after God. Now honour and
reverence are paid to the virtuous by the virtue of obser-



15 OBSERVANCE Q. 102. Art. 3

vance, as stated above (A. i, ad 3). Therefore observance
takes the first place after religion.

On the contrary, The precepts of the Law prescribe acts
of virtue. Now, immediately after the precepts of religion,
which belong to the first table, follows the precept of honour-
ing our parents, which refers to piety. Therefore piety
follows immediately after rehgion in the order of excellence.

I answer that, Something may be paid to persons in
positions of dignity in two ways. First, in relation to the
common good, as when one serves them in the administration
of the affairs of the state. This no longer belongs to
observance, but to piety, which pays worship not only to
one's father but also to one's fatherland. Secondly, that
which is paid to persons in positions of dignity refers
specially to their personal usefulness or renown, and this
belongs properly to observance, as distinct from piety.
Therefore in comparing observance with piety we must
needs take into consideration the different relations in which
other persons stand to ourselves, which relations both
virtues regard. Now it is evident that the persons of our
parents and of our kindred are more substantially akin to
us than persons in positions of dignity, since birth and
education, which originate in the father, belong more to one's
substance than external government, the principle of which
is seated in those who are in positions of dignity. For this
reason piety takes precedence of observance, inasmuch
as it pays worship to persons more akin to us, and to whom
we are more strictly bound.

Reply Obj. i. The prince is compared to the father as
a universal to a particular power, as regards external
government, but not as regards the father being a principle
of generation : for in this way the father should be compared
with the divine power from which all things derive their
being.

Reply Obj. 2. In so far as persons in positions of dignity
are related to the common good, their worship does not
pertain to observance, but to piety, as stated above.

Reply Obj. 3. The rendering of honour or worship should



Q. T02. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 16

be proportionate to the person to whom it is paid not only as
considered in himself, but also as compared to those who
pay them. Wherefore, though virtuous persons, considered
in themselves, are more worthy of honour than the persons
of one's parents, yet children are under a greater obligation,
on account of the benefits they have received from their
parents and their natural kinship with them, to pay worship
and honour to their parents than to virtuous persons who
are not of their kindred.



QUESTION cm.

OF DULIA.

{In Four Articles.)

We must now consider the parts of observance. We shall
consider (i) dulia whereby we pay honour and other things
pertaining thereto to those who are in a higher position:
(2) obedience, whereby we obey their commands.

Under the first head there are four points of inquiry:
(i) Whether honour is a spiritual or a corporal thing ?
(2) Whether honour is due to those only who are in a higher
position ? (3) Whether dulia, which pays honour and
worship to those who are above us, is a special virtue,
distinct from latria ? (4) Whether it contains several
species ?

First Article.

whether honour denotes something corporal ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that honour does not denote some-
thing corporal. For honour is showing reverence in ac-
knowledgement of virtue, as may be gathered from the
Philosopher (Ethic, i. 5). Now showing reverence is some-
thing spiritual, since to revere is an act of fear, as stated
above (Q. LXXXI., A. 2, ad i). Therefore honour is some-
thing spiritual.

Obj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher [Ethic, iv. 3),
honour is the reward of virtue. Now, since virtue consists
chiefly of spiritual things, its reward is not something
corporal, for the reward is more excellent than the merit.
Therefore honour does not consist of corporal things.

Obj. 3. Further, Honour is distinct from praise, as also

II. ii. 4 17 2



Q. 103. Art. i THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 18

from glory. Now praise and glory consist of external
things. Therefore honour consists of things internal and
spiritual.

On the contrary, Jerome in his exposition of i Tim. v. 3,
Honour widows that are widows indeed, and {verse 17), let
the priests that rule well he esteemed worthy of double honour
etc., says {Ef. ad Ageruch.): Honour here stands either for
almsgiving or for remuneration. Now both of these pertain
to spiritual things. Therefore honour consists of corporal
things.

/ answer that, Honour denotes a witnessing to a person's
excellence. Therefore men who wish to be honoured seek
a witnessing to their excellence, according to the Philosopher
[Ethic, i. 5, viii. 8). Now witness is borne either before God
or before man. Before God, Who is the searcher of hearts,
the witness of one's conscience suffices; wherefore honour,
so far as God is concerned, may consist of the mere internal
movement of the heart, for instance when a man acknow-
ledges either God's excellence or another man's excellence
before God. But, as regards men, one cannot bear witness,
save by means of signs, either by words, as when one pro-
claims another's excellence by word of mouth, or by deeds,
for instance by bowing, saluting, and so forth, or by external
things, as by offering gifts, erecting statues, and the like.
Accordingly honour consists of signs, external and corporal.

Reply Ohj. i. Reverence is not the same as honour: but
on the one hand it is the primary motive for showing honour,
in so far as one man honours another out of the reverence he
has for him; and on the other hand, it is the end of honour,
in so far as a person is honoured in order that he may be held
in reverence by others.

Reply Ohj. 2. According to the Philosopher (ihid.),
honour is not a sufficient reward of virtue: yet nothing in
human and corporal things can be greater than honour,
since these corporal things themselves are employed as signs
in acknowledgement of excelling virtue. It is, however,
due to the good and the beautiful, that they may be made
known, according to Matth. v. 15, Neither do men light a



19 DULIA Q. 103. Art. i

candle, and put it under a bushel, hut upon a candlestick, that
it may shine to all that are in the house. In this sense honour
is said to be the reward of virtue.

Reply Ohj. 3. Praise is distinguished from honour in
two ways. First, because praise consists only of verbal
signs, whereas honour consists of any external signs, so that
praise is included in honour. Secondly, because by paying
honour to a person we bear witness to a person's excelHng
goodness absolutely, whereas by praising him we bear
witness to his goodness in reference to an end: thus we
praise one that works well for an end. On the other hand,
honour is given even to the best, which is not referred to
an end, but has already arrived at the end, according to the
Philosopher [Ethic, i. 5).

Glory is the effect of honour and praise, since the result
of our bearing witness to a person's goodness is that his
goodness becomes clear to the knowledge of many. The
word glory signifies this, for glory is the same as KXTjpua,
wherefore a gloss of Augustine on Rom. xvi. 27 observes that
glory is clear knowledge together with praise.

Second Article,
whether honour is properly due to those who are

ABOVE US ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that honour is not properly due to
those who are above us. For an angel is above any human
wayfarer, according to Matth. xi. 11, He that is lesser in the
kingdom of heaven is greater than John the Baptist. Yet
an angel forbade John when the latter wished to honour him
(Apoc. xxii. 10). Therefore honour is not due to those who
are above us.

Obj. 2. Further, Honour is due to a person in acknowledge-
ment of his virtue, as stated above (A. i: Q. LXIIL, A. 3).
But sometimes those who are above us are not virtuous.
Therefore honour is not due to them, as neither is it due to the
demons, who nevertheless are above us in the order of nature.



Q. 103. Art. 2 THE '' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 20

Ohj. 3. Further, The Apostle says (Rom. xii. 10) : With
honour preventing one another, and we read (i Pet. ii. 17) :
Honour all men. But this would not be so if honour were
due to those alone who are above us. Therefore honour is not
due properly to those who are above us.

Ohj. 4. Further, It is written (Tob. i. 16) that Tobias had
ten talents of silver of that imth which he had been honoitred by
the king: and we read (Esther vi. 11) that Assuerus honoured
Mardochseus, and ordered it to be proclaimed in his presence :
This honour is he worthy of whom the king hath a mind to
honoiir. Therefore honour is paid to those also who are
beneath us, and it seems, in consequence, that honour is
not due properly to those who are above us.

On the contrary, The Pliilosopher says [Ethic, i. 12) that
honour is due to the best.

I answer that, As stated above (A. i), honour is nothing
but an acknowledgement of a person's excelling goodness.
Now a person's excellence may be considered, not only in
relation to those who honour him, in the point of his being
more excellent than they, but also in itself, or in relation to
other persons, and in this way honour is always due to a
person, on account of some excellence or superiority. For the
person honoured has no need to be more excellent than those
who honour him ; it may suffice for him to be more excellent
than some others, or again he may be more excellent than
those who honour him in some respect and not simply.

Reply Obj. i. The angel forbade John to pay him, not
any kind of honour, but the honour of adoration and
latria, which is due to God. Or again, he forbade him to
pay the honour of dulia, in order to indicate the dignity of
John himself, for which Christ equalled him to the angels
according to the hope of glory of the children of God: wherefore
he refused to be honoured by him as though he were superior
to him.

Reply Obj. 2. A wicked superior is honoured for the
excellence, not of his virtue but of his dignity, as being
God's minister, and because the honour paid to him is paid
to the whole community over which he presides. As for



21 DULIA Q. 103. Art. 3

the demons, they are wicked beyond recall, and should be
looked upon as enemies, rather than treated with honour.

Reply Ohj. 3. In every man is to be found something that
makes it possible to deem him better than ourselves, accord-
ing to Philip, ii. 3, In humility, let each esteem others better
than themselves, and thus, too, we should all be on the alert
to do honour to one another.

Reply Ohj. 4. Private individuals are sometimes honoured
by kings, not that they are above them in the order of dignity
but on account of some excellence of their virtue : and in this
way Tobias and Mardochaeus were honoured by kings.

Third Article,
whether dulia is a special virtue distinct from

LATRIA ?

We proceed thus to the Third ArticU : —

Objection i. It seems that dulia is not a special virtue
distinct from latria. For a gloss on Ps. vii. i, Lord my God,
in Thee have I put my trust, says : Lord of all by His power, to
Whom dulia is due ; God by creation, to Whom we owe latria.
Now the virtue directed to God as Lord is not distinct from
that which is directed to Him as God. Therefore dulia is
not a distinct virtue from latria.

Ohj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher {Ethic, viii. 8),
to he loved is like being honoured. Now the charity with which
we love God is the same as that whereby we love our neigh-
bour. Therefore duUa whereby we honour our neighbour
is not a distinct virtue from latria with which we honour God.

Ohj. 3. Further, The movement whereby one is moved
towards an image is the same as the movement whereby
one is moved towards the thing represented by the image.
Now by dulia we honour a man as being made to the image
of God. For it is written of the wicked (Wis. ii. 22, 23) that
they esteemed not the honour of holy soids, for God created man
incorruptible, and to the image of His own likeness He made him.
Therefore dulia is not a distinct virtue from latria whereby
God is honoured.



Q. 103. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 22

On the contrary, Augustine says {De Civ. Dei x.) that the
homage due to man, of which the Apostle spoke when he com-
manded servants to obey their masters, and which in Greek is
called dulia, is distinct from latria, which denotes the homage
that consists in the worship of God.

I answer that. According to what has been stated above
(Q. CL, A. 3), where there are different aspects of that which
is due, there must needs be different virtues to render those
dues. Now servitude is due to God and to man under different
aspects: even as lordship is competent to God and to man
under different aspects. For God has absolute and paramount
lordship over the creature wholly and singly, which is entirely
subject to His power: whereas man partakes of a certain
likeness to the divine lordship, forasmuch as he exercises
a particular power over some man or creature. Wherefore
duha, which pays due service to a human lord, is a distinct
virtue from latria, which pays due service to the lordship of
God. It is, moreover, a species of observance, because by
observance we honour all those who excel in dignity, while
dulia properly speaking is the reverence of servants for their
master, dulia being the Greek for servitude.

Reply Ohj. i. Just as religion is called piety by way of
excellence, inasmuch as God is our Father by way of ex-
cellence, so again latria is called dulia by way of excellence,
inasmuch as God is our Lord by way of excellence. Now
the creature does not partake of the power to create by
reason of which latria is due to God : and so this gloss drew
a distinction, by ascribing latria to God in respect of
creation, which is not communicated to a creature, but
dulia in respect of lordship, which is communicated to a
creature.

Reply Ohj. 2. The reason why we love our neighbour is
God, since that which we love in our neighbour through
charity is God alone. Wherefore the charity with which
we love God is the same as that with which we love our
neighbour. Yet there are other friendships distinct from
charity, in respect of the other reasons for which a man is
loved. In like manner, since there is one reason for serving



23 DULIA Q. 103. Art. 4

God and another for serving man, and for honouring the one
or the other, latria and duha are not the same virtue.

Reply Ohj. 3. Movement towards an image as such is
referred to the thing represented by the image : yet not every
movement towards an image is referred to the image as such,
and consequently sometimes the movement to the image
differs specifically from the movement to the thing. Accor-
dingly we must reply that the honour or subjection of dulia
regards some dignity of a man absolutely. For though, in
respect of that dignity, man is made to the image or likeness
of God, yet in showing reverence to a person, one does not
always refer this to God actually.

Or we may reply that the movement towards an image
is, after a fashion, towards the thing, yet the movement
towards the thing need not be towards its image. Where-
fore reverence paid to a person as the image of God redounds
somewhat to God: and yet this differs from the reverence
that is paid to God Himself, for this in no way refers to His
image.

Fourth Article,
whether dulia has various species ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that duHa has various species. For
by dulia we show honour to our neighbour. Now different
neighbours are honoured under different aspects, for instance
king, father and master, as the Philosopher states {Ethic, ix. 2).
Since this difference of aspect in the object differentiates
the species of virtue, it seems that dulia is divided into
specifically different virtues.

Obj. 2. Further, The mean differs specifically from the
extremes, as pale differs from white and black. Now hyper-
dulia is apparently a mean between latria and dulia: for
it is shown towards creatures having a special affinity to
God, for instance to the Blessed Virgin as being the mother
of God. Therefore it seems that there are different species
of dulia, one being simply dulia, the other hyperdulia.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as in the rational creature we find



Q. 103. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 24

the image of God, for which reason it is honoured, so too in
the irrational creature we find the trace of God. Now the
aspect of Hkeness denoted by an image differs from the
aspect conveyed by a trace. Therefore we must distinguish
a corresponding difference of dulia: and all the more since
honour is shown to certain irrational creatures, as, for in-
stance, to the wood of the Holy Cross.

On the contrary, Dulia is condivided with latria. But latria
is not divided into different species. Neither therefore is
dulia.

I answer that, Dulia may be taken in two ways. In one
way it may be taken in a wide sense as denoting reverence
paid to anyone on account of any kind of excellence, and
thus it comprises piety and observance, and any similar
virtue whereby reverence is shown towards a man. Taken
in this sense it will have parts differing specifically from one
another. In another way it may be taken in a strict sense
as denoting the reverence of a servant for his lord, for dulia
signifies servitude, as stated above (A. 3). Taken in this
sense it is not divided into different species, but is one of the
species of observance, mentioned by TuUy [De Inv. Rhet. ii.),
for the reason that a servant reveres his lord under one
aspect, a soldier his commanding officer under another, the
disciple his master under another, and so on in similar cases.

Reply Ohj. i. This argument takes duHa in a wide sense.

Reply Ohj. 2. Hyper dulia is the highest species of dulia
taken in a wide sense, since the greatest reverence is that
which is due to a man by reason of his having an affinity to
God.

Reply Ohj. 3. Man owes neither subjection nor honour to
an irrational creature considered in itself, indeed all such
creatures are naturally subject to man. As to the Cross
of Christ, the honour we pay to it is the same as that
which we pay to Christ, just as the king's robe receives the
same honour as the king himself, according to Damascene
[De Fide Orthod. iv.).



QUESTION CIV.

OF OBEDIENCE.

{In Six Articles.)

We must now consider obedience, under which head there
are six points of inquiry: (i) Whether one man is bound to
obey another ? (2) Whether obedience is a special virtue ?
(3) Of its comparison with other virtues: (4) Whether God
must be obeyed in all things ? (5) Whether subjects are
bound to obey their superiors in all things ? (6) Whether
the faithful are bound to obey the secular power ?

First Article,
whether one man is bound to obey another ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that one man is not bound to obey
another. For nothing should be done contrary to the divine
ordinance. Now God has so ordered that man is ruled by
his own counsel, according to Ecclus. xv. 14, God made man
from the beginning, and left him in the hand of his own counsel.
Therefore one man is not bound to obey another.

Obj. 2. Further, If one man were bound to obey another,
he would have to look upon the will of the person command-
ing him, as being his rule of conduct. Now God's will alone,
which is always right, is a rule of human conduct. There-
fore man is bound to obey none but God.

Obj. 3. Further, The more gratuitous the service the more
is it acceptable. Now what a man does out of duty is not
gratuitous. Therefore if a man were bound in duty to obey
others in doing good deeds, for this very reason his good
deeds would be rendered less acceptable through being done

25



Q. 104. Art. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 26

out of obedience. Therefore one man is not bound to obey



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