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distinct vice from the others.

On the contrary, The Philosopher [Ethic, ii.) accounts
meanness a special vice opposed to magnificence.

7 answer that, As stated above (I.-IL, Q. I., A. 3:

* Parvificentia, or doing mean things, just as magnificentia is
doing great things.

302



303 MEANNESS Q. 135 Art. i

Q. XVIII., A. 6), moral acts take their species from their
end, wherefore in many cases they are denominated from
that end. Accordingly a man is said to be mean (parvificus)
because he intends to do something little (parvum). Now
according to the Philosopher {Prcedic. Cap. Ad aliquid) great
and little are relative terms : and when we say that a mean
man intends to do something httle, this must be understood
in relation to the kind of work he does. This may be little
or great in two ways : in one way as regards the work itself
to be done, in another as regards the expense. Accordingly
the magnificent man intends principally the greatness of
his work, and secondarily he intends the greatness of the
expense, which he does not shirk, so that he may produce
a great work. Wherefore the Philosopher says [Ethic, iv. 4)
that the magnificent man with equal expenditure will produce
a more magnificent result. On the other hand, the mean man
intends principally to spend little, wherefore the Philosopher
says {Ethic, iv. 2) that he seeks how he may spend least. As
a result of this he intends to produce a little work, that is,
he does not shrink from producing a little work, so long as
he spends little. Wherefore the Philosopher says that the
mean man after going to great expense forfeits the good of the
magnificent work, for the trifle that he is unwilling to spend.
Therefore it is evident that the mean man fails to observe
the proportion that reason demands between expenditure
and work. Now the essence of vice is that it consists in
failing to do what is in accordance with reason. Hence it
is manifest that meanness is a vice.

Reply Obj. i. Virtue moderates little things, according
to the rule of reason : from which rule the mean man declines,
as stated in the Article. For he is called mean, not for
moderating httle things, but for declining from the rule of
reason in moderating great or little things : hence meanness
is a vice.

Reply Obj. 2. As the Philosopher says [Rhet. ii. 5), fear
makes us take counsel: wherefore a mean man is careful in
his reckonings, because he has an inordinate fear of spending
his goods, even in things of the least account. Hence this



Q. 135. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 304

is not praiseworthy, but sinful and reprehensible, because
then a man does not regulate his affections according to
reason, but, on the contrary, makes use of his reason in
pursuance of his inordinate affections.

Reply Ohj. 3. Just as the magnificent man has this in
common with the hberal man, that he spends his money
readily and with pleasure, so too the mean man in common
with the illiberal or covetous man is loth and slow to spend.
Yet they differ in this, that illiberality regards ordinary
expenditure, while meanness regards great expenditure,
which is a more difficult accomplishment : wherefore mean-
ness is less sinful than illiberality. Hence the Philosopher
says [Ethic, iv. 2) that although meanness and its contrary
vice are sinful, they do not bring shame on a man, since neither
do they harm one's neighbour, nor are they very disgraceful.

Second Article,
whether there is a vice opposed to meanness ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that there is no vice opposed to
meanness. For great is opposed to httle. Now, magni-
ficence is not a vice, but a virtue. Therefore no vice is
opposed to meanness.

Obj. 2. Further, Since meanness is a vice by deficiency,
as stated above (A. i), it seems that if any vice is opposed
to meanness, it would merely consist in excessive spending.
But those who spend much, where they ought to spend
little, spend little where they ought to spend much, according
to Ethic, iv. 2, and thus they have something of meanness.
Therefore there is not a vice opposed to meanness.

Obj. 3. Further, Moral acts take their species from their
end, as stated above (A. i). Now those who spend exces-
sively, do so in order to make a show of their wealth, as
stated in Ethic, iv., loc. cit. But this belongs to vainglory,
which is opposed to magnanimity, as stated above
(Q. CXXXI., A. 2). Therefore no vice is opposed to mean-
ness.



305 MEANNESS Q. 135. Art. 2

On the contrary stands the authority of the Philosopher
who {Ethic, ii. 8; iv. 2) places magnificence as a mean be-
tween two opposite vices.

I answer that, Great is opposed to little. Also little and
great are relative terms, as stated above (A. i). Now just
as expenditure may be little in comparison with the work,
so may it be great in comparison with the work in that it
exceeds the proportion which reason requires to exist be-
tween expenditure and work. Hence it is manifest that
the vice of meanness, whereby a man intends to spend less
than his work is worth, and thus fails to observe due pro-
portion between his expenditure and his work, has a vice
opposed to it, whereby a man exceeds this same proportion,
by spending more than is proportionate to his work. This
vice is called in Greek ^avavG-La, so called from ^avvo^,
because, like the fire in the furnace, it consumes everything.
It is also called aTrvporcakia, i.e. lacking good fire, since
like fire it consumes all, but not for a good purpose. Hence
in Latin it may be called consumptio {waste).

Reply Ohj. i. Magnificence is so called from the great
work done, but not from the expenditure being in excess
of the work: for this belongs to the vice which is opposed
to meanness.

Reply Ohj. 2. To the one same vice there is opposed the
virtue which observes the mean, and a contrary vice.
Accordingly, then, the vice of waste is opposed to mean-
ness in that it exceeds in expenditure the value of the work,
by spending much where it behoved to spend little. But
it is opposed to magnificence on the part of the great work,
which the magnificent man intends principally, in so far
as when it behoves to spend much, it spends little or nothing.

Reply Ohj. 3. Wastefulness is opposed to meanness by
the very species of its act, since it exceeds the rule of reason,
whereas meanness falls short of it. Yet nothing hinders
this from being directed to the end of another vice, such as
vainglory or any other.



n. ii. 4 30



QUESTION CXXXVI.

OF PATIENCE.

{In Five Articles.)

We must now consider patience. Under this head there
are five points of inquiry : (i) Whether patience is a virtue ?
(2) Whether it is the greatest of the virtues ? (3) Whether
it can be had without grace ? (4) Whether it is a part of
fortitude ? (5) Whether it is the same as longanimity ?

First Article.

WHETHER patience IS A VIRTUE ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that patience is not a virtue. For
the virtues are most perfect in heaven, as Augustine says
(De Trin. xiv.). Yet patience is not there, since no evils
have to be borne there, according to Isa. xlix. 10 and
Apoc. vii. 16, They shall not hunger nor thirst, neither shall the
heat nor the sun strike them. Therefore patience is not a virtue.

Ohj. 2. Further, No virtue can be found in the wicked,
since virtue it is that makes its subject good. Yet patience
is sometimes found in wicked men; for instance, in the
covetous, who bear many evils patiently that they may
amass money, according to Eccles. v. 16, All the days of his
life he eateth in darkness, and in many cares, and in misery
and in sorrow. Therefore patience is not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, The fruits differ from the virtues, as
stated above (L-IL, Q. LXX., A. i, ad 3). But patience
is reckoned among the fruits (Gal. v. 22). Therefore patience
is not a virtue.

306



307 PATIENCE Q. 136. Art. i

On the contrary, Augustine says [De Patientia i.): The
virtue of the soul that is called patience, is so great a gift of
God, that we even preach the patience of Him who bestows it
upon us.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CXXIIL, A. i), the
moral virtues are directed to the good, inasmuch as they
safeguard the good of reason against the impulse of the
passions. Now among the passions sorrow is strong to
hinder the good of reason, according to 2 Cor. vii. 10, The
sorrow of the world worketh death, and Ecclus. xxx. 25,
Sadness hath killed many, and there is no profit in it. Hence
the necessity for a virtue to safeguard the good of reason
against sorrow, lest reason give way to sorrow: and this
patience does. Wherefore Augustine says {De Patientia ii.) :
A man's patience it is whereby he bears evil with an equal
mind, i.e. without being disturbed by sorrow, lest he abandon
with an unequal mind the goods whereby he may advance to
better things. It is therefore evident that patience is a
virtue.

Reply Obj. i. The moral virtues do not remain in heaven
as regards the same act that they have on the way, in rela-
tion, namely, to the goods of the present life, which will not
remain in heaven: but they will remain in their relation to
the end, which will be in heaven. Thus justice will not be
in heaven in relation to buying and selling and other matters
pertaining to the present life, but it will remain in the point
of being subject to God. In like manner the act of patience,
in heaven, will not consist in bearing things, but in enjoying
the goods to which we had aspired by suffering. Hence
Augustine says {De Civ. Dei xiv.) that patience itself will
not be in heaven, since there is no need for it except where evils
have to be borne: yet that which we shall obtain by patience
will be eternal.

Reply Obj. 2. As Augustine says {De Patientia ii: v.)
properly speaking those are patient who would rather bear
evils without inflicting them, than inflict them without bearing
them. A s for those who bear evils that they may inflict evil,
their patience is neither marvellous nor praiseworthy, for it



Q. 136. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 308

is no patience at all : we may marvel at their hardness of
heart, hut we must refuse to call them patient.

Reply Ohj. 3. As stated above (I.-IL, Q. XI., A. i), the
very notion of fruit denotes pleasure. And works of virtue
afford pleasure in themselves, as stated in Ethic, i. 8. Now
the names of the virtues are wont to be applied to their acts.
Wherefore patience as a habit is a virtue; but as to the
pleasure which its act affords, it is reckoned a fruit, especially
in this, that patience safeguards the mind from being
overcome by sorrow.

Second Article,
whether patience is the greatest of the virtues ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : — -

Objection i. It seems that patience is the greatest of the
virtues. For in every genus that which is perfect is the
greatest. Now patience hath a perfect work (James i. 4).
Therefore patience is the greatest of the virtues.

Ohj. 2. Further, All the virtues are directed to the good
of the soul. Now this seems to belong chiefly to patience ;
for it is written (Luke xxi. 19) : In your patience you shall
possess your souls. Therefore patience is the greatest of
the virtues.

Ohj. 3. Further, Seemingly that which is the safeguard
and cause of other things is greater than they are. But
according to Gregory (Horn. xxxv. in Ev.) patience is the
root and safeguard of all the virtues. Therefore patience is
the greatest of the virtues.

On the contrary, It is not reckoned among the four virtues
which Gregory [Moral, xxii.) and Augustine [De Morih.
Eccl. XV.) call principal.

I answer that, Virtues by their very nature are directed
to good. For it is virtue that makes its suhject good, and
renders the tatter's work good [Ethic, ii. 6). Hence it follows
that a virtue's superiority and preponderance over other
virtues is the greater according as it inclines man to good
more effectively and directly. Now those virtues which



309 PATIENCE Q. 136. Art. 2

are effective of good, incline man more directly to good than
those which are a check on the things which lead man away
from good: and just as among those that are effective of
good, the greater is that which establishes man in a greater
good (thus faith, hope, and charity are greater than pru-
dence and justice); so too among those that are a check on
things that withdraw man from good, the greater virtue is
the one which is a check on a greater obstacle to good.
But dangers of death, about which is fortitude, and pleasures
of touch, with which temperance is concerned, withdraw
man from good more than any kind of hardship, which is
the object of patience. Therefore patience is not the greatest
of the virtues, but falls short, not only of the theological
virtues, and of prudence and justice which directly establish
man in good, but also of fortitude and temperance which
withdraw him from greater obstacles to good.

Reply Obj. i. Patience is said to have a perfect work in
bearing hardships : for these give rise first to sorrow, which
is moderated by patience; secondly, to anger, which is
moderated by meekness ; thirdly, to hatred, which charity
removes; fourthly, to unjust injury, which justice for-
bids. Now that which removes the principle is the most
perfect.

Yet it does not follow, if patience be more perfect in this
respect, that it is more perfect simply.

Reply Obj. 2. Possession denotes undisturbed ownership;
wherefore man is said to possess his soul by patience, in so
far as it removes by the root the passions that are evoked
by hardships and disturb the soul.

Reply Obj. 3. Patience is said to be the root and safe-
guard of all the virtues, not as though it caused and
preserved them directly, but merely because it removes their
obstacles.



Q. 136. Art. 3 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '' 310



Third Article,
whether it is possible to have patience without

GRACE ?

We proceed thus to the Third Article : —

Objection i. It seems that it is possible to have patience
without grace. For the more his reason incHnes to a thing,
the more is it possible for the rational creature to accom-
plish it. Now it is more reasonable to suffer evil for the sake
of good than for the sake of evil. Yet some suffer evil for
evil's sake, by their own virtue and without the help of
grace; for Augustine says [De Patientia iii.) that men endure
many toils and sorrows for the sake of the things they love sin-
fully. Much more, therefore, is it possible for man, without
the help of grace, to bear evil for the sake of good, and this
is to be truly patient.

Ohj. 2. Further, Some who are not in a state of grace
have more abhorrence for sinful evils than for bodily evils:
hence some heathens are related to have endured many
hardships rather than betray their country or commit some
other misdeed. Now this is to be truly patient. Therefore
it seems that it is possible to have patience without the help
of grace.

Ohj. 3. Further, It is quite evident that some go through
much trouble and pain in order to regain health of the body.
Now the health of the soul is not less desirable than bodily
health. Therefore in like manner one may, without the
help of grace, endure many evils for the health of the soul,
and this is to be truly patient.

On the contrary, It is written (Ps. Ixi. 6) : From Him, i.e.
from God, is my patience.

I answer that, As Augustine says (De Patientia iv.), the
strength of desire helps a man to hear toil and pain: and no one
willingly undertakes to hear what is painful, save for the sake
of that which gives pleasure. The reason of this is because
sorrow and pain are of themselves displeasing to the soul,
wherefore it would never choose to suffer them for their



311 PATIENCE Q. 136. Art. 3

own sake, but only for the sake of an end. Hence it follows
that the good for the sake of which one is willing to endure
evils, is more desired and loved than the good the privation
of which causes the sorrow that we bear patiently. Now
the fact that a man prefers the good of grace to all natural
goods, the loss of which may cause sorrow, is to be referred
to charity, which loves God above all things. Hence it is
evident that patience, as a virtue, is caused by charity,
according to i Cor. xiii. 4, Chanty is patient.

But it is manifest that it is impossible to have charity
save through grace, according to Rom. v. 5, The chanty of
God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Ghost Who is
given to us. Therefore it is clearly impossible to have
patience without the help of grace.

Reply Obj. i. The inclination of reason would prevail in
human nature in the state of integrity. But in corrupt
nature the inclination of concupiscence prevails, because it
is dominant in man. Hence man is more prone to bear evils
for the sake of goods in which the concupiscence delights
here and now, than to endure evils for the sake of goods to
come, which are desired in accordance with reason: and
yet it is this that pertains to true patience.

Reply Obj. 2. The good of a social virtue* is commensurate
with human nature; and consequently the human will can
tend thereto without the help of sanctifying grace, yet not
without the help of God's grace, f On the other hand, the
good of grace is supernatural, wherefore man cannot tend
thereto by a natural virtue. Hence the comparison fails.

Reply Obj. 3. Even the endurance of those evils which a
man bears for the sake of his body's health, proceeds from
the love a man naturally has for his own flesh. Hence
there is no comparison between this endurance and patience
which proceeds from a supernatural love.

* Of. I.-II., Q. LXL. A. 5. t Cf. I.-II., Q. CIX., A. 2.



Q. 136. Art. 4 THE '' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 312

Fourth Article,
whether patience is a part of fortitude ?

We proceed thus to the Fourth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that patience is not a part of forti-
tude. For a thing is not part of itself. Now patience is
apparently the same as fortitude: because, as stated above
(Q. CXXIIL, A. 6), the proper act of fortitude is to endure;
and this belongs also to patience. For it is stated in the
Liher Sententiarum Prosperi^ that patience consists in en-
during evils inflicted by others. Therefore patience is not a
part of fortitude.

Obj. 2. Further, Fortitude is about fear and daring, as
stated above (Q. CXXIII., A. 3), and thus it is in the iras-
cible. But patience seems to be about sorrow, and conse-
quently would seem to be in the concupiscible. Therefore
patience is not a part of fortitude but of temperance.

Obj. 3. Further, The whole cannot be without its part.
Therefore if patience is a part of fortitude, there can be no
fortitude without patience. Yet sometimes a brave man
does not endure evils patiently, but even attacks the person
who inflicts the evil. Therefore patience is not a part of
fortitude.

On the contrary, Tully {De Inv. Rhet. ii.) reckons it a part
of fortitude.

/ answer that, Patience is a quasi-potential part of forti-
tude, because it is annexed thereto as secondary to principal
virtue. For it belongs to patience to suffer with an equal
mind the evils inflicted by others, as Gregory says in a homily
(xxxv. in Ev.). Now of those evils that are inflicted by
others, foremost and most difficult to endure are those that
are connected with the danger of death, and about these
evils fortitude is concerned. Hence it is clear that in this
matter fortitude has the principal place, and that it lays
claim to that which is principal in this matter. Wherefore
patience is annexed to fortitude as secondary to principal

* The quotation is from S. Gregory {Horn. xxxv. in Ev.).



313 PATIENCE Q. 136. Art. 4

virtue, for which reason Prosper calls patience brave
(Sent 811).

Reply Obj. i. It belongs to fortitude to endure, not any-
thing indeed, but that which is most difficult to endure,
namely dangers of death : whereas it may pertain to patience
to endure any kind of evil.

Reply Obj. 2. The act of fortitude consists not only in
holding fast to good against the fear of future dangers, but
also in not failing through sorrow or pain occasioned by
things present ; and it is in the latter respect that patience
is akin to fortitude. Yet fortitude is chiefly about fear,
which of itself evokes flight which fortitude avoids; while
patience is chiefly about sorrow, for a man is said to be
patient, not because he does not fly, but because he behaves
in a praiseworthy manner by suffering (patiendo) things
which hurt him here and now, in such a way as not to be
inordinately saddened by them. Hence fortitude is properly
in the irascible, while patience is in the concupiscible
faculty.

Nor does this hinder patience from being a part of forti-
tude, because the annexing of virtue to virtue does not
regard the subject, but the matter or the form. Neverthe-
less patience is not to be reckoned a part of temperance,
although both are in the concupiscible, because temperance
is only about those sorrows that are opposed to pleasures
of touch, such as arise through abstinence from pleasures
of food and sex: whereas patience is chiefly about sorrows
inflicted by other persons. Moreover it belongs to tem-
perance to control these sorrows besides their contrary
pleasures : whereas it belongs to patience that a man forsake
not the good of virtue on account of suchlike sorrows,
however great they be.

Reply Obj. 3. It may be granted that patience in a certain
respect is an integral part of justice, if we consider the fact
that a man may patiently endure evils pertaining to dangers
of death; and it is from this point of view that the objection
argues. Nor is it inconsistent with patience that a man
should, when necessary, rise up against the man who inflicts



Q. 136. Art. 5 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '* 314

evils on him; for Chrysostom* says on Matth. iv. 10, Begone
Satan, that it is praiseworthy to be patient under our own
wrongs, hut to endure God's wrongs patiently is most wicked :
and Augustine says in a letter to Marcellinus {Ep. cxxxviii.)
that the precepts of patience are not opposed to the good of the
commonwealth, since in order to ensure that good we fight
against our enemies. But in so far as patience regards all
kinds of evils, it is annexed to fortitude as secondary to
principal virtue.

Fifth Article,
whether patience is the same as longanimity ? t

We proceed thus to the Fifth Article : —

Objection i. It seems that patience is the same as longa-
nimity. For Augustine says {De Patientia i.) that we speak
of patience in God, not as though any evil made Him suffer,
hut because He awaits the wicked, that they may be converted.
Wherefore it is written (Ecclus. v. 4) : The Most High is a
patient rewarder. Therefore it seems that patience is the
same as longanimity.

Obj. 2. Further, The same thing is not contrary to two
things. But impatience is contrary to longanimity, whereby
one awaits a delay : for one is said to be impatient of delay,
as of other evils. Therefore it seems that patience is the
same as longanimity.

Obj. 3. Further, Just as time is a circumstance of wrongs
endured, so is place. But no virtue is distinct from patience
on the score of place. Therefore in like manner longanimity
which takes count of time, in so far as a person waits for a
long time, is not distinct from patience.

Obj. 4. On the contrary, a gloss} on Rom. ii. 4, Or despisest
thou the riches of His goodness, and patience, and longsuffer-
ing ? says : It seems that longanimity differs from patience,

* Homily v. in the Opus Imperfectum, falsely ascribed to S. John
Chrysostom.

t Longs uffering. It is necessary to preserve the Latin word, on
account of the comparison with magnanimity.

J Origen, Comment in Ep. ad Rom. ii.



315 PATIENCE Q, 136. Art. 5

because those who offend from weakness rather than of set purpose
are said to be borne with longanimity: while those who take a
deliberate delight in their crimes are said to be borne patiently.

I answer that, Just as by magnanimity a man has a mind
to tend to great things, so by longanimity a man has a mind
to tend to something a long way off. Wherefore as magna-
nimity regards hope, which tends to good, rather than daring,
fear, or sorrow, which have evil as their object, so also does
longanimity. Hence longanimity has more in common
with magnanimity than with patience.

Nevertheless it may have something in common with
patience, for two reasons. First, because patience, like
fortitude, endures certain evils for the sake of good, and if
this good is awaited shortly, endurance is easier: whereas


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