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no justice, hut a twofold sin: and again a gloss on Lament, iv. 6,
The iniquity . . . of My people is made greater than the sin of
Sodom, says : He deplores the sins of the soul that falls into
hypocrisy, which is a greater iniquity than the sin of Sodom.
Now the sins of Sodom are mortal sin. Therefore hypocrisy
is always a mortal sin.

Ohj. 2. Further, Gregory says {Moral, xxxi. 8) that hypo-
crites sin out of malice. But this is most grievous, for it
pertains to the sin against the Holy Ghost. Therefore a
hypocrite always sins mortally.

* S. Augustine, on Ps. Ixiii. 7.



107 HYPOCRISY Q. m- Art. 4

Obj. 3. Further, No one deserves the anger of God and
exclusion from seeing God, save on account of mortal sin.
Now the anger of God is deserved through hypocrisy accord-
ing to Job XXX vi. 13, Dissemblers and crafty men prove the
wrath of God : and the hypocrite is excluded from seeing
God, according to Job xiii. 16, No hypocrite shall come
before His presence. Therefore hypocrisy is always a
mortal sin.

On the contrary, Hypocrisy is lying by deed since it is a
kind of dissimulation. But it is not always a mortal sin to
lie by deed. Neither therefore is all hypocrisy a mortal sin.

Further, The intention of a hypocrite is to appear to
be good. But this is not contrary to charity. Therefore
hypocrisy is not of itself a mortal sin.

Further, Hypocrisy is born of vainglory, as Gregory says
{Moral xxxi. 17). But vainglory is not always a mortal
sin. Neither therefore is hypocrisy.

/ answer that, There are two things in hypocrisy, lack of
hohness, and simulation thereof. Accordingly if by a
hypocrite we mean a person whose intention is directed to
both the above, one, namely, who cares not to be holy but
only to appear so, in which sense Sacred Scripture is wont
to use the term, it is evident that h5^ocrisy is a mortal sin :
for no one is entirely deprived of hohness save through
mortal sin. But if by a hypocrite we mean one who intends
to simulate holiness, which he lacks through mortal sin,
then, although he is in mortal sin, whereby he is deprived
of hohness, yet, in his case, the dissimulation itself is not
always a mortal sin, but sometimes a venial sin. This will
depend on the end in view; for if this be contrary to the love
of God or of his neighbour, it will be a mortal sin : for instance
if he were to simulate hohness in order to disseminate false
doctrine, or that he may obtain ecclesiastical preferment,
though unworthy, or that he may obtain any temporal good
in which he fixes his end. If, however, the end intended be
not contrary to charity, it will be a venial sin, as for instance
when a man takes pleasure in the pretence itself: of such
a man it is said in Ethic, iv. 7 that he would seem to be



Q. III. Art. 4 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 108

vain rather than evil; for the same applies to simulation as
to a lie.

It happens also sometimes that a man simulates the
perfection of holiness which is not necessary for spiritual
welfare. Simulation of this kind is neither a mortal sin
always, nor is it always associated with mortal sin.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.



QUESTION CXII.

OF BOASTING.

{In Two Articles.)

We must now consider boasting and irony, which are parts
of lying according to the Philosopher {Ethic, iv. 7). Under
the first head, namely, boasting, there are two points of
inquiry: (i) To which virtue is it opposed ? (2) Whether
it is a mortal sin ?

First Article,
whether boasting is opposed to the virtue of

TRUTH ?

We proceed thus to the First A rticle : —

Objection i. It seems that boasting is not opposed to
the virtue of truth. For lying is opposed to truth. But
it is possible to boast even without lying, as when a man
makes a show of his own excellence. Thus it is written
(Esther i. 3, 4) that Assuerus made a great feast . . . that he
might show the riches of the glory and of his kingdom, and the
greatness and boasting of his power. Therefore boasting is
not opposed to the virtue of truth.

Obj. 2. Further, Boasting is reckoned by Gregory [Moral.
xxiii. 4) to be one of the four species of pride, when, to wit,
a man boasts of having what he has not. Hence it is written
(Jerem. xlviii. 29, 30) : We have heard the pride of Moab, he
is exceeding proud: his haughtiness, and his arrogancy, and
his pride, and the loftiness of his heart. I know, saith the
Lord, his boasting, and that the strength thereof is not according
to it. Moreover, Gregory says [Moral, xxxi. 7) that boasting
arises from vainglory. Now pride and vainglory are

109



Q. 112. Art. I THE *' SUMMA THEOLOGICA " no

opposed to the virtue of humility. Therefore boasting is
opposed, not to truth, but to humiUty.

Ohj. 3. Further, Boasting seems to be occasioned by
riches; wherefore it is written (Wis. v. 8): What hath pride
profited us ? or what advantage hath the boasting of riches
brought us ? Now excess of riches seems to belong to the sin
of covetousness, which is opposed to justice or liberality.
Therefore boasting is not opposed to truth.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says {Ethic, ii. 7, iv. 7),
that boasting is opposed to truth.

/ answer that, Jactantia (boasting) seems properly to
denote the uplifting of self by words : since if a man wishes
to throw (jactare) a thing far away, he lifts it up high. And
to uplift oneself, properly speaking, is to talk of oneself
above oneself.* This happens in two ways. For some-
times a man speaks of himself, not above what he is in him-
self, but above that which he is esteemed by men to be:
and this the Apostle declines to do when he says (2 Cor. xii. 6) :
/ forbear, lest any man should think of me above that which
he seeth in me, or anything he heareth of me. In another way
a man uplifts himself in words, by speaking of himself above
that which he is in reality. And since we should judge of
things as they are in themselves, rather than as others deem
them to be, it follows that boasting denotes more properly
the uplifting of self above what one is in oneself, than the
uplifting of self above what others think of one : although in
either case it may be called boasting. Hence boasting
properly so called is opposed to truth by way of excess.

Reply Obj. i. This argument takes boasting as exceeding
men's opinion.

Reply Obj. 2. The sin of boasting may be considered in
two ways. First, with regard to the species of the act, and
thus it is opposed to truth, as stated (in the body of the
article and Q. CX., A. 2). Secondly, with regard to its
cause, from which more frequently though not always it
arises : and thus it proceeds from pride as its inwardly moving
and impelling cause. For when a man is uplifted inwardly
* Or tall-talking, as we should say in English.



Ill BOASTING Q. 112. Art. i

by arrogance, it often results that outwardly he boasts of
great things about himself; though sometimes a man takes
to boasting, not from arrogance, but from some kind of
vanity, and delights therein, because he is a boaster by habit.
Hence arrogance, which is an uplifting of self above oneself,
is a kind of pride ; yet it is not the same as boasting, but is
very often its cause. For this reason Gregory reckons
boasting among the species of pride. Moreover, the boaster
frequently aims at obtaining glory through his boasting,
and so, according to Gregory, it arises from vainglory con-
sidered as its end.

Reply Obj. 3. Wealth also causes boasting, in two ways.
First, as an occasional cause, inasmuch as a man prides him-
self on his riches. Hence (Prov. viii. 18) riches are signifi-
cantly described as proud (Douay, — glorious). Secondly,
as being the end of boasting, since according to Ethic, iv. 7
some boast, not only for the sake of glory, but also for the
sake of gain. Such people invent stories about themselves,
so as to make profit thereby ; for instance, they pretend to
be skilled in medicine, wisdom, or divination.

Second Article,
whether boasting is a mortal sin ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that boasting is a mortal sin. For
it is written (Prov. xxviii. 25) : He that boasteth, and puffeth
himself, stirreth up quarrels. Now it is a mortal sin to stir
up quarrels, since God hates those that sow discord, accord-
ing to Prov. vi. 19. Therefore boasting is a mortal sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Whatever is forbidden in God's law is a
mortal sin. Now a gloss on Ecclus. vi. 2, Extol not thyself
in the thoughts of thy soul, says: This is a prohibition of boast-
ing and pride. Therefore boasting is a mortal sin.

Obj. 3. Further, Boasting is a kind of lie. But it is neither
an officious nor a jocose lie. This is evident from the end
of lying; for according to the Philosopher {Ethic, iv. 7), the
boaster pretends to something greater than he is, sometimes for



Q. 112. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA " 112

no further purpose, sometimes for the sake of glory or honour,
sometimes for the sake of money. Thus it is evident that it
is neither an officious nor a jocose lie, and consequently it
must be a mischievous lie. Therefore seemingly it is always
a mortal sin.

On the contrary. Boasting arises from vainglory, according
to Gregory {Moral, xxxi. 17). Now vainglory is not always
a mortal sin, but is sometimes a venial sin which only the
very perfect avoid. For Gregory says [Moral, viii. 30) that
it belongs to the very perfect, hy outward deeds so to seek the
glory of their author, that they are not inwardly uplifted hy the
praise awarded them. Therefore boasting is not always a

mortal sin.

I answer that. As stated above (Q. CX., A. 4), a mortal sin
is one that is contrary to charity. Accordingly boasting
may be considered in two ways. First, in itself, as a He,
and thus it is sometimes a mortal, and sometimes a venial,
sin. It will be a mortal sin when a man boasts of that which
is contrary to God's glory — thus it is said in the person of the
king of Tyre (Ezech. xxviii. 2) : Thy heart is lifted up, and
thou hast said : I am God — or contrary to the love of our
neighbour, as when a man while boasting of himself breaks
out into invectives against others, as told of the Pharisee
who said (Luke xviii. 11) : / am not as the rest of men, extor-
tioners, unjust, adulterers, as also is this publican. Some-
times it is a venial sin, when, to wit, a man boasts of things
that are against neither God nor his neighbour.

Secondly, it may be considered with regard to its cause,
namely, pride, or the desire of gain or of vainglory: and then
if it proceeds from pride or from such vainglory as is a
mortal sin, then the boasting will also be a mortal sin: other-
wise it will be a venial sin. Sometimes, however, a man
breaks out into boasting through desire of gain, and for this
very reason he would seem to be aiming at the deception and
injury of his neighbour: wherefore boasting of this kind is
more likely to be a mortal sin. Hence the Philosopher says
{Ethic, iv. 7) that a man who boasts for the sake of gain, is viler
than one who boasts for the sake of glory or honour. Yet it is



113 BOASTING Q. 112. Art. 2

not always a mortal sin because the gain may be such as not
to injure another man.

Reply Ohj. i. To boast in order to stir up quarrels is a
mortal sin. But it happens sometimes that boasts are the
cause of quarrels, not intentionally but accidentally: and
consequently boasting will not be a mortal sin on that
account.

Reply Ohj. 2. This gloss speaks of boasting as arising
from pride that is a mortal sin.

Reply Ohj. 3. Boasting does not always involve a mis-
chievous He, but only where it is contrary to the love of
God or our neighbour, either in itself or in its cause. That
a man boast, through mere pleasure in boasting, is an
inane thing to do, as the Philosopher remarks {Ethic, iv. 7) :
wherefore it amounts to a jocose lie. Unless perchance he
were to prefer this to the love of God, so as to contemn
God's commandments for the sake of boasting: for then it
would be against the charity of God, in Whom alone ought
our mind to rest as in its last end.

To boast for the sake of glory or gain seems to involve
an officious He : provided it be done without injury to others,
for then it would at once become a mischievous lie.



II. 11. 4



QUESTION CXIIL

OF IRONY*

{In Two Articles.)

We must now consider irony, under which head there are
two points of inquiry : (i) Whether irony is a sin ? (2) Of
its comparison with boasting.

First Article,
whether irony is a sin ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that irony, which consists in be-
Htthng oneself, is not a sin. For no sin arises from one's
being strengthened by God : and yet this leads one to belittle
oneself, according to Prov. xxx. i, 2, The vision which the
man spoke, with whom is God, and who being strengthened by
God, abiding with him, said, I am the most foolish of men.
Also it is written (Amos vii. 14) : Amos answered . , . I am
not a prophet. Therefore irony, whereby a man belittles
himself in words, is not a sin.

Obj. 2. Further, Gregory says in a letter to Augustine,
bishop of the English [Regist. xii.) : It is the mark of a well-
disposed mind to acknowledge one's fault when one is not
guilty. But all sin is inconsistent with a well-disposed
mind. Therefore irony is not a sin.

Obj. 3. Further, It is not a sin to shun pride. But some
belittle themselves in words, so as to avoid pride, according to
the Philosopher [Ethic, iv. 7). Therefore irony is not a sin.

On the contrary, Augustine says [De Verb. Apost., Serm.

* Irony here must be given the signification of the Greek elpavia,
whence it is derived : — dissimulation of one's own good points.

114



115 IRONY Q. 113. Art. I

xxix.) : If thou liest on account of humility y if thou wert not
a sinner before lying, thou hast become one by lying.

I answer that. To speak so as to belittle oneself may occur
in two ways. First so as to safeguard truth, as when a
man conceals the greater things in himself, but discovers
and asserts lesser things of himself the presence of which
in himself he perceives. To belittle oneself in this way does
not belong to irony, nor is it a sin in respect of its genus,
except through corruption of one of its circumstances.
Secondly, a person behttles himself by forsaking the truth,
for instance by ascribing to himself something mean the
existence of which in himself he does not perceive, or by
denying something great of himself, which nevertheless he
perceives himself to possess: this pertains to irony, and is
always a sin.

Reply Obj. i. There is a twofold wisdom and a twofold
folly. For there is a wisdom according to God, which has
human or worldly folly annexed to it, according to i Cor.
iii. 18, // any man among you seem to be wise in this world, let
him become a fool that he may be wise. But there is another
wisdom that is worldly, which as the same text goes on to
say, is foolishness with God. Accordingly, he that is streng-
thened by God acknowledges himself to be most foolish in
the estimation of men, because, to wit, he despises human
things, which human wisdom seeks. Hence the text quoted
continues, and the wisdom of men is not with me, and farther
on, and"^ I have known the science of the saints.

It may also be replied that the wisdom of men is that which
is acquired by human reason, while the wisdom of the saints
is that which is received by divine inspiration.

Amos denied that he was a prophet by birth, sinc:e, to wit,
he was not of the race of prophets : hence the text goes on,
nor am I the son of a prophet.

Reply Obj. 2. It belongs to a well-disposed mind that a

man tend to perfect righteousness, and consequently deem

himself guilty, not only if he fall short of common

righteousness, which is truly a sin, but also if he fall short of

* Vulg., — and I have not known the science of the saints.



Q. 113. Art. 2 THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA" ii6

perfect righteousness, which sometimes is not a sin. But
he does not call sinful that which he does not acknowledge
to be sinful : which would be a lie of irony.

Refly Ohj. 3. A man should not commit one sin in order
to avoid another : and so he ought not to lie in any way at all
in order to avoid pride. Hence Augustine says [Tract, xliii.
in Joan.) : Shun not arrogance so as to forsake truth : and
Gregory says {Moral, xxvi. 3) that it is a reckless humility
that entangles itself with lies.

Second Article,
whether irony is a less grievous sin than boasting ?

We proceed thus to the Second Article : —

Objection i. It seems that irony is not a less grievous sin
than boasting. For each of them is a sin through forsaking
truth, which is a kind of equality. But one does not forsake
truth by exceeding it any more than by diminishing it.
Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting.

Ohj. 2. Further, According to the Philosopher [Ethic, iv. 7),
irony sometimes is boasting. But boasting is not irony.
Therefore irony is not a less grievous sin than boasting.

Ohj. 3. Further, It is written (Prov. xxvi. 25) : When
he shall speak low, trust him not : hecause there are seven mis-
chiefs in his heart. Now it belongs to irony to speak low.
Therefore it contains a manifold wickedness.

On the contrary, The Philosopher says [Ethic, iv. 7) : Those
who speak with irony and helittle themselves are more gracious,
seemingly, in their manners.

I answer that. As stated above (Q. CX., AA. 2, 4), one lie
is more grievous than another, sometimes on account of the
matter which it is about — thus a lie about a matter of religious
doctrine is most grievous — and sometimes on account of the
motive for sinning; thus a mischievous lie is more grievous
than an ofhcious or jocose lie. Now irony and boasting lie
about the same matter, either by words, or by any other
outward signs, namely, about matters affecting the person :
so that in this respect they are equal.



117 IRONY Q. 113. Art. 2

But for the most part boasting proceeds from a viler motive,
namely, the desire of gain or honour: whereas irony arises
from a man's averseness, albeit inordinate, to be disagreeable
to others by uplifting himself: and in this respect the Philo-
sopher says [loc. cit.) that boasting is a more grievous sin than
i rony.

Sometimes, however, it happens that a man belittles him-
self for some other motive, for instance that he may deceive
cunningly : and then irony is more grievous.

Reply Ohj. i. This argument applies to irony and boast-
ing, according as a lie is considered to be grievous in itself or
on account of its matter : for it has been said that in this way
they are equal.

Reply Ohj. 2. Excellence is twofold: one is in temporal,
the other in spiritual things. Now it happens at times that
a person, by outward words or signs, pretends to be lacking
in external things, for instance by wearing shabby clothes,
or by doing something of the kind, and that he intends by so
doing to make a show of some spiritual excellence. Thus
Our Lord said of certain men (Matth. vi. 16) that they dis-
figure their faces that they may appear unto men to fast.
Wherefore such persons are guilty of both vices, irony and
boasting, although in different respects, and for this reason
they sin more grievously. Hence the Philosopher says
{Ethic, iv. 7) that it is the practice of boasters both to make
overmuch of themselves, and to make very little of themselves :
and for the same reason it is related of Augustine that he
was unwilling to possess clothes that were either too costly
or too shabby, because by both do men seek glory.

Reply Obj. 3. According to the words of Ecclus. xix. 23,
There is one that humbleth himself wickedly, and his interior
is full of deceit, and it is in this sense that Solomon speaks
of the man who, through deceitful humility, speaks low
wickedly.



QUESTION CXIV.

OF THE FRIENDLINESS WHICH IS CALLED AFFABILITY.

{In Two Articles.)

We must now consider the friendliness which is called affa-
bility, and the opposite vices which are flattery and quarrel-
ling. Concerning friendliness or affability, there are two
points of inquiry: (i) Whether it is a special virtue ?
(2) Whether it is a part of justice ?

First Article,
whether friendliness is a special virtue ?

We proceed thus to the First Article : —

Objection i. It seems that friendliness is not a special
virtue. For the Philosopher says {Ethic, viii. 3) that the
perfect friendship is that which is on account of virtue. Now
any virtue is the cause of friendship : since the good is lovable
to all, as Dionysius states {Div. Nom. iv.). Therefore
friendliness is not a special virtue, but a consequence of
every virtue,

Obj. 2. Further, The Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 6) of
this kind of friend that he takes everything in a right manner
from those he loves not and are not his friends. Now it seems
to pertain to simulation that a person should show signs of
friendship to those whom he loves not, and this is incom-
patible with virtue. Therefore this kind of friendliness is
not a virtue.

Obj. 3. Further, Virtue observes the mean, according as
a wise man decides {Ethic, ii. 6). Now it is written (Eccles.
vii. 5) : The heart of the wise is where there is mourning, and

118



119 FRIENDLINESS Q. 114. Art. i

the heart of fools where there is mirth: wherefore it belongs
to a virtuous man to he most wary of 'pleasure {Ethic, ii. 9).
Now this kind of friendship, according to the Philosopher
{Ethic, iv. 6), is essentially desirous of sharing pleasures, hut
fears to give pain. Therefore this kind of friendHness is not
a virtue.

On the contrary, The precepts of the law are about acts
of virtue. Now it is written (Ecclus. iv. 7) : Make thyself
affahle to the congregation of the poor. Therefore affabihty,
which is what we mean by friendship, is a special virtue.

I answer that, As stated above (Q. CIX., A. 2: I. -XL,
Q. LV., A. 3), since virtue is directed to good, wherever there
is a special kind of good, there must needs be a special kind
of virtue. Now good consists in order, as stated above
(Q. CIX., A. 2). And it behoves man to be maintained in a
becoming order towards other men as regards their mutual
relations with one another, in point of both deeds and words,
so that they behave towards one another in a becoming
manner. Hence the need of a special virtue that maintains
the becomingness of this order: and this virtue is called
friendliness.

Reply Ohj. i. The Philosopher speaks of a twofold
friendship in his Ethics. One consists chiefly in the affec-
tion whereby one man loves another and may result from
any virtue. We have stated above, in treating of charity
(Q. XXIIL,A.i,A.3,a^i: QQ. XXV., XX VL), what things
belong to this kind of friendship. But he mentions another
friendliness, which consists merely in outward words or deeds;
this has not the perfect nature of friendship, but bears a
certain likeness thereto, in so far as a man behaves in a
becoming manner towards those with whom he is in
contact.

Reply Ohj. 2. Every man is naturally every man's
friend by a certain general love ; even so it is written (Ecclus.
xiii. 19) that every heast loveth its like. This love is signified
by signs of friendship, which we show outwardly by words
or deeds, even to those who are strangers or unknown to us.
Hence there is no dissimulation in this: because we do not



Q. 114. Art. I THE " SUMMA THEOLOGICA '* 120

show them signs of perfect friendship, for we do not treat
strangers with the same intimacy as those who are united
to us by special friendship.

Reply Ohj. 3. When it is said that the heart of the wise
is where there is mourning it is not that he may bring sorrow
to his neighbour, for the Apostle says (Rom. xiv. 15): //,
because of thy meat, thy brother be grieved, thou walkest not
now according to charity : but that he may bring consolation
to the sorrowful, according to Ecclus. vii. 38, Be not wanting
in comforting them that weep, and walk with them that mourn.
Again, the heart of fools is where there is mirth, not that they
may gladden others, but that they may enjoy others' gladness.
Accordingly, it belongs to the wise man to share his pleasures
with those among whom he dwells, not lustful pleasures,
which virtue shuns, but honest pleasures, according to
Ps. cxxxii. I, Behold how good and how pleasant it is for
brethren to dwell together in unity.

Nevertheless, as the Philosopher says {Ethic, iv. 6), for the
sake of some good that will result, or in order to avoid
some evil, the virtuous man will sometimes not shrink from
bringing sorrow to those among whom he lives. Hence the



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