The principles of the interpretation of wills and settlements online

writ<'r>. to lia\e strained the rtilf to the ntmo-t extent.

In /// r< \\'/i(inro(>((, < h/lr v. /.on/ S/trrhor/ic ( ISST ), Teor.
:;i ( li. 1). I li".. a testator beipieathed "to Lord Sherborne
and lii^ Iwir- niv < )|i\ cr ( 'roinwi-ll c^p |irc-<'nl<'il to our
<'omnion ancestress, lor an lieirloom. At ilic date ol th(i
will tlier<- was a |)ersoii who bore tin- liih' ol Lord Sher-
borni'. iiid who died bcforf the tr-l;itor. L\idi'iicc was
given that tlie te^lalof. wlini lie niadi' tin- la-t coilicil to
hi- will. \\a- awai-c tliai tlii- Lor«l Sln-iboriK' \\a- llien
deail, and that In- n<- veit li'li - diil not alt.r in any way



7<> r.M;-!' II. — l)KsCl!ir'l'IoN OF |)nNKi:s.

Art. 10. till' l)('(ni('st. ( >ii tlic (Icatli of the Lord Sli(M-l)onic in
(luostioii. the title (l('<ccnilcil to liis son : — IhhL tliat tlio
son wlio was Lord .Shcrlxiriic at the testator's deatli, eoiild
not take under the heiniest. "It is said," CoTTON. L.d.,
observes in d('li\ crinti- jiid;^ineiit. " that the lonii ol' the
^"it't • to Lord >^herhorne and his heirs as a heirh)oiu " is
sutticient to show that it was tho testator's intention that
the j)orson wlio ininht he Lord Shcrl»orne at the time of
the testator's deatli should take the leoaey. T do not think
there is any force in the argument. It comes to this,
that if j)ro|)erly advised he would have drawn his will
differently."

Kldestsoii. Again, "eldest son," where there is nothinn- in the

context or circumstances to rebut the presumption, means
the son who at the date of the instrument was " the eldest
son " then living. Thus, in j\Jereditli v. Vreffrii (lylU),
12 ('h. D. 170, a testator devised his land to A, for life^
then to A.'s eldest son for life, and after the eldest son's
deatli to tile eldest son's eldest son in fee tail, and if A.'s
eldest son died without issue, then A.'s second and other
sons successively in tail. A. had at the date of the will an
eldest son living, who, however, di<'d liefore the testator,
and without issue. On the testator's death the question
arose whether the second sou of A. — who was now A.'s
eldest surviving son — took a life estate iindei- the will as
A.'s eldest son or a fee tail as A.'s secoml son : — Hcldy
that he took a fee tail.

The decision in Mcveditli v. Treffi'ij, sapni. has. in
Anniot V. Dwai'ris, [1904] A. ('. 2Gii, been affirmed and
followed by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,,
while Re ilarris Trust (1«54), 2 V\ . \i. G«l», which was
in conflict with that case, was oveiruled.

Though, in delivering judgment in Mtrrdhli v. 'rrefrij^
siiprtty Hall, V.-C. laid >ome weight u[)on the fact that
A. had an eldest son living at the date of the will, it is
doubtful whether, if A. had then been childless, the-



Chap. I. — Individuals. 71

interitretation of the words " eldest son "' would have been Art. 10.
different. •' Eldest son " differs from such descriptions as
'â–  wife " in this point, that strictly speakinor, it can, in the
nature of thini;;s, apply properly only to one person — the
first born {Bathurst y.Errington (1877), 2 App. Cas. tJyS).
At the same time a small indication of such an intention
is sutHcient to induce the court to interpret the phrase in
the sense of ''eldest son for the time being " or " eldest
surviving- son " {il>/d.).

The rule that the person answering a general description Rebuttal of
at the date of the settlement is the only person who can
take under a gift to the person answering that description,
is easily rebutted by a context suggesting that the person
answering it at the death of the testator, or at any other
time, was intended. And even where there is no such
context the oljject of the instrmncnt may be sufficient to
rebut it.

Thus, in Jh n- Drew, Drew v. Brew, [1899] 1 Ch. :VM, Ulustiatinus

1 i 1 111 1 • /• , , "f ri'liuttiils :

the testator l)ef|ueatned the annual income ot property to "Wiff."
his sou 15. 11. 1). tor life, and at'tci- his decease "unto the
wife of my said son for and (hiring" her natural life for her
separate inaiienaljle use, and from and after her decease,
upon trust to pay such interest dividends and income to
the lawful child or cluldren of my said son V>. II. 1>. who
.siiall Ije living at his decease, and wiu> shall Vi\r to attain
the age of 21 years,*' and if there were no such ehildren.
tlien over. I>. 11. 1). was m:ini<d at the date of the will
as was known to i\u'. testator. Siiliscipiciif Iv, however,
his wife die<l. .-md be marriecl ;i -icond wii't- wlioiii In- |in'-
deceased. Tin- coiirt lidd that tin- word- ot' lln' lMM|iif-t
were wide enoiigli to coser aiiv wife of H. II. I ). who
.•^iirviveil bim, on tlie groiiml tbat tbe context sliowcd that
all tlie cliiMi-t II ot' 15. 11. 1).. wlietber bv lii- then or any
sub*e(pienl wife, w lio weri- living at bis death, w<'re t<» be
jirovided for. and it woidd b«' e\f raordin.-iry if the wife
then living were not the wit'e intemled to be pr(i\id<Ml lor



r2 r.MM' II. — l^KscRirnoN of Donkks.

Art. 10. too (wliicli, li(i\vc\ri-, i^ inconsistent with the judi^uicnt ot"
KoMKK. L.-l., in /ii re Cole//, \k ('>1 . sujirti) : and (Ui lln'
t'lirtlicr ii;roiiiul tliat tlic context |)ro\i(l('(| that in case
1). 11. D. attempted to alienate the income diirini: liis lil'e.
it was to determine, and tlie trustees of tlie settlement were
to lioM it on a discretionary trust tor the benefit ol" him
"and his t'amilv "" during" his life, which would inelu<le
anv wil'e for the time Kein;^;. And see Loiniirnrl h v.
Bellamy/ (1871), iO L. .1. ( 'h. .^)i;',).

In In re Droione's I'olicij, liroicnc v. /)roinn\ [I'JOiJ]

1 ( 'h. 188, the presumption that by ** wife" is meant the
actual wife at the date of the execution of the instrument
referrino; to her, was held to be rebutted in the case of an
insurance policy taken out under s. 11 of the ^larried
AVomen's Pro})erty Act, 1882, Ijy a husl)an(l '' I'or the
benefit of his wife and children/' This was held to enure
for the benefit of a subsecjuent wife. Scd <j>iare and see In
re Griffith's J'oJin/, [liK)3] 1 (1i. 7;'>:». where the words
were " for the benefit of his w^ife. or if she l)e dead between
his children in equal proportions."

Rebuttal of Again, in Bathurst v. Errington (1877), 2 App. ('as. G98,
presumption : , ^ t •< i i • i i ^ ii i i- \ l

'' Eldest sou." '^ testator limited Ins lands to tiie second son ot a hai-oiiet

in tail, and his third and other sons in succession, subject
to the condition that on the second or any other son of the
baronet " becomino; the eldest son " of his father, his
interest in the lands devised was to cease, and the interest
following to come into possession. Here it was h(dd on
the wording of the condition, and on the geneial object of
the testator, which was to exclude the son of the baronet,
who, as heir, would be provided for, from enjoyment of the
devised lands, that " becoming eldest son "' meant becom-
ing the eldest surviving son during his father's lifetime,
and as such, entitled to the estates settled to accompany
the title.

A similar case is that of Crofts v. Beamish, [190.5]

2 I. K. iUD. There a testator left certain ])ortions of his
real estate to each of seven sous with a o-ift over of each



CHAr. I, — Individuals. 7:^

portion should tlic son entitled thereto die lietbre attainin-i Art. 10.
the age of thirty years, to "•his next eldest brother * :
— ITeJd. that by '• next eldest brother "' was meant not
next elder, but next youno;er.

It is to be renieniberedjutwever. that the rule a|([>lies to
ordinary shifting- elaiise>. nidess there is something in the
context or object of the settlement to show that "eldivst
son"' means heir or heir apparent of his father. See
Meredith \. lyejf'n/, sttpni. p. 7(i.

The only cases where, without the assistance of a context Where court
,. " 1 . . , . -n 1 1 1 xi X ^^ill hold that

snggestnig such an interpretation, the court will hold that .'^.l(lest son"

" elilest child " or '" eldest son "' means the person who "'wins heir.

succeeds to the family e<iati'. is where a settlement is made

by a jiarent or a jtersoii in lorn jnwciitis for the purpose

of providing portions for the younger children. Here,

"eldest son"" will mean the jierson, who. at the ])eriod

of distribntion of the fund jiroviding the portions (see

r. 18), is entitled to the family estate, and he will be

excluded from the class of younger ehildren. whether, as a

matter of fact, he is the eldest child or a younger i-liild

who has succeeded to the estate owing to an elder child's

<leath without issue (CoUliujwnod. v. Stanhope (\>^C)*i)),

ni. L. .■>(> : Ellison V. I'linnuis (18(J2). 1 I». .1. A- S. ■>')).



Ai'/r. 11. — Person ''horn" or '' lirlii;/."

For the purpose of taking under, or I'uHilling tlu'
condition of a gift, or satisfying th(; rule as to
perpetuities, a cliild tn rnitrc s(( nti re will conic
within sucli words as child or issue "living" or
" boni " at a certain time.

Ill //- /v li,irr,>,rs. ('Ir.iliorn V. liii mors. I 1 Sil.'t ] 2 Cli. IlluHtnitm,,
r.l7, ill"- fe^tatiir di-MM-d In- re-idn.irv i<:ihy ami |iei-<iii:ilt y
to hi- wife Wtv lil'i-. and ilieii in hi- dannhtrr ( '. '• r(M- Ikt
ab-olutc u-e and benelil in e.i-.' -he li:i- i - <iii- livin;: at iIk-



74 Taki' 11. 1 )i>(i;inh)N di' HoNKKs.

Art. 11. death of m\ wile." luit it' >lie Inul no issue, llieii to her lof
life, ami allerwai'ds o\'er to his son. At the death ol
the te>tatoi"s wile, ( '. was eiic/ciitc, and ;^;i\e liirth to a
liviiiU' child on the toilowiiie- day: — llcUL that >he had
'• issue livin;j, "" at the death of the testatof's wil'e.
('llIl'l'^. d.. in deli\('rin;j; jiidoinent >aid : " It is said that
the word ■ i>^iie ' imports more than tiie woi^l • child,
and that it means that there must he a child horn at the
period when the mother is to taki; ; hut it tippears to me
tliat the distinction hetween the two words is too reHiied.
Then it is said that the rule is that tlie child en rcntvc sa
mere is not deemed to he livino-, except where there is a
benoiit passin;; tlireetly to the cliild ; and as tlie mother
and not the child in this case takes the henelit, the eift
over takes effect. J>ut tlie question is covered hy authority."
And his lordship cited th(^ jud^inents of Lord Eldon and
Macdonalu, C.B., in 'riii'Uiissiin V. Woodford (1805),
11 Ves. 112, and the remark of Eyrk, (J.d.. in Doe v.
Clarke (1795), 2 IT. VA. IVJU, ut p. 401, that -The two
classes of cases in e(|uity proceed on a distinction which
has alwavs ap[)eared to me extremelv unsatist'actorx' and
nnfit to he the o-roinid of any decision whatever." As to
Blas.^oi, V. Bhis^oa flSO-l), 2 D. J. & S. (WkI. ins lordship
was of oj);nit>n that the coiu't there cam*' to the conclusion
that the testator intended to draw a distinction hetween horn
and unhorn children, and that it was on that around th;it the
court held that '"hoi-nand livine" children fthewoi-d> ii-i'd
hy the testator) did not include a child en ventre .va mere.

The matter came once more hefore the court for con-
sideration, in connection with the ride tii/ainst perj)etuities,
in /// rr Wihners I'rnsts, Moore \ . Wimifield, [IDO;}] lM 'h.
411, when it was held that, so far from a cin'ld m ventre
sa mere hein"" ree;ar(led as "horn" or •• li\ini: " onlv when
it would, hy heine- so re<:ar(|e(l. olitaiii a lienelit. the rule
a{)plied even where it resulted in a disadvantai^e to the
child. There a testatrix left realty in trust to j)av the
income to A. for life, then in tru-t for her second and
everv voun<a'r son horn or to he horn .successivelv. with



Chap. I. — Individuals. 75

reinaiiuler at'tor tlic deatli of oach sueli son upon trust Art. 11.
for his first and other sons successively in tail male.
On the testatrix's death A. was preonant with a younocr
son : — ITilil. that this son must be reffiirded as a livinir
jterson and that the limitation over to his eldest son in tail
was not l)ad as within the rule of perpetuities. The
younger son, therefore, took merely a life estate and not
an estate tail by the cij jyrh doctrine.

In Villar v. (TiUter)^ [I'JO;")] 2 ('h. ."iOl. while expressing
approval of the rule as laid down in the above article (see
p. ^504:), the court held, that apart from the case of fulfilling
the condition of a gift and the rule as to perpetuities, the
court should interpret words such as "born in my lifetime"
in a strict sense as meaning not en ventre sa mire, but
actually born. This decision, however, has been reversed
by the Court of Appeal ( (1906), 75 L. J. Ch. 308), which
held, that for purposes of devolution of property under
wills or intestacies prima facie, '' children born " include
children en ventre sa mere.

As to land, the old common law rule (which, however. Old tonunon
was a rule of law and not of construction) seems to have '"
been that a child fn ventre sa mere was to be regarded as
living for the ]iurpose of taking by descent, but ndt by |piir-
cha.se (J^ei^ve v. Lorn/ (lGli4j, 1 Salk. 227 : and s.-e Butler's
note, Co. Lift. 2[}H a). Accordingly, a limitation, at any
rat<* bv de<'(l, directlvto a child <// vi'utre sit mi rv wa- batl.
and it' it was bv wav of remainder it failed if the child
wa< not born until after the pariii-ular estate determined.
The law. however, as to thi-, \va> allei-c.l bv l(i\ II Will.:!.
c. Itj, and a chilil /// rmfn' sa mi rr can take by purchase
a- well a- bv inheritance. The connnon law rule never
applied to limitations by way of ii>e or executory de\ i-e
(/.una V. lilarl.all (I7il7j, 7 T. I{. !<>()).

A> to the meaning of " willntiil being marrieil," " willi-
ont b-:i\iiiy children.*' etc.. see mlra, (ih)>-ar\.



( 7(; )



CHAPTER II.

RELATIONSHIP.

Akt. 1"A(;k

12. — Reldtloiisliiji iii'Ktis jni/it<iillii hlood ii'I'il ioiishiji - - 7<»
13. — Reldtidnsliij} nie((ns primKriljiletjitimdte liloixl rtdul ionshiji 7^S
14. — Where ^^ issve" is to be read ^^ children" - - - 89



Art. 12. — Belatiunship means primarihj bloud
relationship.

Where persons are described by terms expressive
of their relationship to some other person the de-
scription will be held to include only those related
to such by the whole or half blood ; and where the
degree of relationship is stated only those so related
in that degree. But the term may be extended by
necessary implication from the condition of things
in reference to w^hich the instrument was made or
by the context to include also persons related only
by affinity or related in a different degree.

Authority. *" There is not ;mv li;n-(l ami l'a~t rule that a gilt to

nieces does not include a great-niece, where in another
part of the same will a great-niece is dcscrihed as a niece ;
nor, on the other hand, is tliere any hard and last rule
that, wlicnever a o-reat-niece has once been referred to in
a \vill as a niece, the expression "niece" must in all
other parts of the will be taken to include! great-nieces.
The true rule is to determine by the language and
context of each will, including the consideration of the
whole instrument and any evidence })roperly admissible,



Chap. H. — IxELATioNSHir. 77

the meanino- of the rxi)ressions oontaiiieil in it. ami the A.rt. 12.
persons who are entitled to shai'e in the heiietits thereby
conferred " ipf*' Swixfen-Eady, J., in In re Co:<'ns,
Miles V. Wilson, [li>03] 1 Cli. 138, at p. 14:V).

As will Ite seen. tlii> rule is nierelv a particular and
verv oontinon application of the o(>neral rule in Art. 2.
para. 2, supra, p. 31. A verv sliort illu>t ration of it will
therefore be sufficient.

In the tirst jilaee, then, where the ^ift is simply to a
person's "relations '' ^r/m^/ facie, the husband or wife of
the prepositus is not included ((jrreen v. Howard (1771*).
1 Bro. (/. ('. 31). To prevent such a oift failing; for un-
certainty, it has been con-triKil. in wills, at any rate, as
eipiivalent to next-of-kin according" to the JStatutes of
Distributions, even when the oift is a devise {/hte d.
Thwaites v. Over (1«08), 1 Taunt. 2r.3).

Ill the next place, "'relations'" .-imply, or relations of a
certain detrree, such as l)rothers, etc., includes ecpially
persons related by the whole and pei'sons related by the
half blood (Grieves v. Baidei/ (1852), 10 Hare, (;3 ; In rr
Heed (l>iS>i), 3(; W. 1{. r,H2).

In the thir<l place, when the term u-imI is descriptive of
a certain de<;ree of relafion-liip to the pr<'ji(»situs, jirlind
fufie onlv those person > act iialK of t hat decree m-c includcil
under it. And before tlii- nieanin;^ i- d^paricd i'rom. tlu'
court, in the word- of d.vMKs. |j..l., in /// n lilnii-cr .<
Trusts (T.'>71 ), (i < 'li. ooi. at p. '.\'>'.\. ■•iiiu-t be n-a.-oiiably
>ure." it i- fojlowiii;^' the intention of the te-talor.

Thus, in /// re Cozens, Mihs v. W'Hsn,,. \\\n\:\\ 1 ( 'ji.
13M, a testatrix Hrst n;av(' certain properly to b.' divided
anion;r certain persons named. ne|ihews and iiie( o oi hi-r
late hii-b;ind. niid "niN' niece- lOmiiiu Mooic .iml S;iiali
Metc.'dt'"" Kmm.i .Moore wa> in la<M the daii;.iliier oi
William .Moore. ;i nephew of the testatrix, and Sarali

Meteidf \\a- llie ille"ilim.lte -on ol' ;i -i-lcr of te-|;itri\.



78 l*Ai;r II. — Dksi'iui'I'ion' of Donkks.

Art. 12. Xt'Xt the ti'>t;itri\ ;4;iV(' ;i l(';4:ir\' to AVilliaiii .Mooic niid
l(';:;:icios to ciu-li ot" ]u< I'liildrcii cxccj)! lOniiiia, wlioiu she
ri<fhtly descrilx'tl ;is (l:iu;j;lit('r ot" licr iiopluMv. Tlicn slic
l(>ft. a hotel to trustees upon ti'iist (inter alin) to ji:iv ;iii
animity " to my uophow, Alexander Duncan." Alexander
Duncan was in tact the nephew of the testatrix's late hns-
liand. Then she left one moiety of the ])roceeds of her
rc^i(hiarv estate in trust for Alexandci- |)uiu-an for life,
then for his wife for life, and on the deatli of the sur\ivor
n])on trust " to pay and divide the said moiety nnto and
anion<i" all my own n('j)hews and nieces with the exception
of i\Iary Ann, the sister of William Moore, share and
share alike " : — Held, that the expression " my own ne})hcws
and nieces " restricted the class to persons who were the
lawful nephews or nieces of the testatrix, of the whole or
half blood, to the exclusion of great-nephews or great-
nieces of the testatrix, nephews or nieces of her husband,
a daughter of an illegitimate son of a sister of testatrix,
and all other persons, though some of them might have
been inaccurately referred to in some other part of the will
as " my n(^])hew " or " my niece."

As examples of cases where the jirimary meaning has
been rebutted, see Seale-Hayne v. Jodrell, [1891] A. C.
304 ; In re Gue, [1892] W. N. 132, and the next article.



Art. 13.- — Belationship means prinuirihj Legitimate
Blood Belationsliip.

(1) Where persons are described by terms expres-
sive of their relationship to some other person, the
description will be held to include those only who are
so related in legitimate kinship, and not those reputed
to be so related in natural kinship, unless it is neces-
sarily implied from the condition of things with



('hap. II, — UKLATlONSHir. 79

reference to which the instrument was made, or it Art. 13.
appears from the words of the instrument itseh', that
persons reputed to be so related in natural kinship were
intended to be included.

(*2) The condition of things with reference to which
the instrument was made is never where the relation-
ship is through the father, though it may be where the
relationship is through the mother, sufficient in itself
to raise a necessary implication that natural relations
born after the execution of the instrument were
intended to be included under terms expressive of their
relationship.

Paragraph (1).

"It is. of course, not o[)en to dispute that the won! Authorities.
' relatives.' according to its natural inter|iretatiou if there
were nothing to show that auotiiei* nu'aning was to be
attributed to it, would not include those who were what
may l)e tcruicij natural Mood relations, liut wliose jiarents
or grandparents were nut born in wedlock, and who,
therefore, were not in the eye of the law relateil to the
testiitor. l>ut it i- not disputed that if the testator has in
the j)rovisions of his will indicated whom he considers to
be ' relative^ ' in the sense in which he i> s|ieaking of
relatives, or uicnihers ot' his faniiiv, you arc entitled
to look sit those other provisions in order to iiii(i|)i<'t th'-
word 'relatives' as nse(l in this jiart of his will"" ( yrr
Lor.l Ili:it-cm:i,i.. in Sr,il,-I l,ui„r v. ./,>,/,■( I/, [l«yi]

A. (J. ;ioi. ai p. ;')(i:)).

"TIk- rules of |;i\v :ind ol" eon^triiclion a|iplii-al)l<' to
this <-a>e are — lir-t, that a gift to children uieau> a ;;ilt
to tin- lawful <-hildren of a lawful niarria;:e, Mnle-.s (which
is the -econd ride) there lie xiuieihing whieh. in express



80 Takt ir. — Dksckii'tion of Donees.

Art. 13, terms or liv what ha- liccii caUcd 'necessary im|iHeati()n
shows that the tiil't is to ilh'uitiiiiato cliiMreii exclusivoly,
or to illegitimate i-hihlreii to ho included in a class with,
or to a i'las> ot' illegitimate children who ai-e to take
conjointly with, another cla>s of legitimate children. It is
a<:r(M'al)lc to ns to tind so clear a rule laid down as to
what is meant hv 'nocossarv im|ilication ' as that which we
lind in Lord 1']i,im)N''s judoinciit in the case of W ///.///.•mn x.
A(/it»i ( ISi;; ). 1 V. e^- P,. 4:^2 : that is, that necessary ini|)li-
cation means, not natural necessity, hut so strong' a
prohahilitv of intention that a contrai-y intention cannot he
sui)posed " (per James, Jj.J., in ('ri»>/: v. ///// (1^71),
L. H. C Ch. ;U1. at p. 1515).

"What appears to ho the [irinciple which may i'airly Ijc
extractod from tho cases upon this subject is this — the
term 'children' in a will /D-imd facie means legitimate
children, and if there is nothinfj; more in the will tho
circumstance that the person wliose children are i-eterri'd to
has illeoitiuiate t-hildren will not entitle those illegitimate
children to take. Put there are two classes of cases
in which that prnmi fucie interpretation is departed
from. One class of cases is where it is impossible,
from the circumstances of the parties, that any legitimate
children could take under the bequest. . . . The
other class of cases is of this kind. Where there is,
upon the face of the will its(df and upon a just and
proper construction and inter[)retation of the words used
in it, an expression of the intention of the testator to use
the term ' children " not merely according to its />riii>a
facie meaning of legitimate children, but according to a
meaning which will ajjply to. and which will include,
illegitimate children"' (per Lord ("aiijns, in ///// v. Croo/,-
(187:1). L. H. (â– > H. L. 2(J5. at ].. 2.s;',).

Meaning of By legitimate relationship is meant, not merely relation-

rXt'ionship. ^l^ip ^^hich is legitimate by the common law of England,

but also relationship which would not be legitimate by tho



Chap, 11, — Relationship. 81

ocuninon law hut is Icoitiinate by the law of the doinicilc of Art. 13,
the persons so relateil. In the words of Kay, J,. '• Tiie
law, as T understand it, is that a bequest of personalty in
an En*ilish will to the children of a forei<iner means to his
legitimate children, and that by international law us
recognised in this country, those children are legitimate
whose legitimacy is established by the law of the father's
domicili'. Thus, anlt^ nati, whose father was domiciled in
(Tuernsey at their birth, and subsecjuently married the
mother so as to make the ante nati legitiuiate l)v the law
of (Tuernsey. are recognised as legitimate l)v the law of this
coimtry, and can take under such a gift "' i^ln re Aiidros,
A ml ):>.â– < V. A>i</i'<>.< (1.S83), 24 Ch, 1). (537, at p, G â– ]{)).
Ami this rule applies to gifts of realty a^ well as to gifts of
personalty (/;/ re Greys Trusts, Grei/ v. Stam/oi'd, [1892]
3 Ch. 88), the rule of Doe v. Vardill (1835), 2 Cl. & F.
o71 : (18-40), 7 Cl, & F, 8'J5, that the son of a deceased
jXTson to be /le/r at late must be legitimate according to
tlie common law, being confined strictly to inhauimice ^i â– 
of realty (In re Goodmans Trusts (1881), 17 Oh. D.