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estates should go together to the same jierson, but not



Chap. I. — I^irected by Wills. 3(!1

that the liiiiitations of the two shoukl lie identical. . . . Art. 66.
The word • eon-espoml ' does not mean that the limitations j,.^ ..^ ,.^<
are to be exactly the same, but that thev are to !)»>
adapted to each otlier so as to carry out the testatrix's
intention that the estate and title >lundd ^o toticther. . . .
It' the settlement were IVanuHl with a limitation in the
words of the letters patent. Lord Bnckhurst wt)uld be
iible to defeat the intention, and. l)y convertin<i; his estate
tail into a fee simple, to separate the estate and rhe title
tor ever."



( -M-d )



CHAPTER II.

COVENANTS TO SETTLE OTHER OR AFTER-
ACQUIRED PROPERTY.

AKT. PAGE

f)7. Hinr f(( I- the wife is hound bij such cocaiani.^ - - - .Sfi2
(>S. PrupeHy which is p^^imA facie excluded from <i covenant

tv settle other or after -acquired property - - - 'MS\^
Hit. What is comprised in a (jeneral covenant to settle

property to irhich the wife is presently entitled - - 873

70. What is comprised in a covenant to settle after-

acquired property if the vife, or if llo' Imslnnid in

her right - - ..... 374

71. Covenants to settle a definite interest in j^roperty - - .380

72. Covenants to settle property exceeding a certain ndne - ,382



Akt. (57. — Huir far the M'ifr is hoioul hij siic/i
Covenants.

(1) AVhether a wife is bound l)y a covenant con-
tained in a marriage settlement, to which she is a
party, to settle her other or her after-acquired
property, or whether such a covenant only binds the
husband to settle whatever he may acquire jure mariti,
depends on the words used, in accordance with the
following principles :

(a) If the words consist of an agreement or declara-

tion, or even a covenant by the husband
alone, that the wife's property " shall be
settled," both spouses are bound.

(b) A mere covenant by the husband alone that lie

{or, semhle, that he and all other necessary



( HAP. II. — CoVKXANTS TO SkTTLK PPiOrKKTY. 363

parties (a)] will settle, does not bind the wife, Art. 67.
unless the property referred to is specific.
But a covenant by him alone that he, ami
his irife, will settle, binds her even althoucjh
the property be not specific.

(2) Even where the wife is not bound, s. 19 of the
MaiTied Women's Property Act, 1882, preserves the
effect of a covenant entered into by the husband only,
to settle after-acquired property of the wife ; and
accordingly prevents such after-acquired property vest-
iujj; in the lady as her separate estate under ss. 2, 5,
whether the marriage took place before or since
December 31st, 1882.

[H) If the covenant would be binding on the wife
but for her infancy, it will be voidable only and not
void ; and if she wishes to repudiate it, she must do
so promptly.

I'AKAiiKAl'H (1 ).

-V marriagf .<('ttl('nu*nt contaiiicil tii'- t'olJowin;^ claii-cs : l'r<>\is<.or

" Ir i< hereby jirovided (|c<'larc(| ami a;^itril liv :iiid ,|„i, j,,.,,.

betuccM the -aid iiarli"- to tln-c pic-i-nt- and tlu' said P''''^^' ",'"'"
' .. Ill lie .sotlloii.

\_/iu.shu/td] lor hiiii>elt. etc., "dulii hereby covenaiil
proinis*' and grant to and with the [ti-Ksln'K]" that in
ca.-e till- niarria;.'<' .-liouiil \:i\«- i'tVi'<t. and ilir wile or the
hii-band in her ri^lil ^iiould at any time during the Hie
ol thf lui-liand beeonu' jujsses.-ieil ot or interoird in »»r
entitled to anv |M-r-onal estate, etc., in posse.ssion, n'\<-i-
»ion, rcjniainder, or exjteetaney, the lin>band and wile
Hhuuld and would truublcr and assi-n tie- >ain.' i.. tin-



la) .S» he-Ill l»y HviiNK, .1., ill mi iiiiii|mi tnl i iino <>( Ji' Siinl/i,
Jl(J,HOn V, Ti'Uy, Miirtli IStli, IWUl.



^5()-i- Part VII. — Executory Settlements.

Art. 67. trustees : — Held, that the wife was hound ( Toinishi nd V.
I'ani. (1). //(irroirhi/ (18.>b), 27 L. .). ( "h. ."),").■{).

Covenant by The hi.st ilhistl'atiou is a >iiii|>h' case, and is. imh-ed,
the husbami , . , ... ... n i ,■ i

alone tluit what afises under all ni.strunieiits which are well dratted.

the wife shall ]>,,|. ^\^^, point IS not so sini|)lc where there is not a i.ioviso
settle, binds ' , , ' . , . . ,

the wife. and dcchiration (which, of course, jn-imd fdc/r hinds all

partie.s to the deed), hut a covenant hy the Inishand alone.
In such cases it a])])ears i'roni the modern authorities, that
the wit'c is hound where the coNcnant is that the pniperiy
"shall he settled," or that "he and the wife" will settle,
on the nround that the wife is an assenting party to the
covenant, and cannot afterwai-ds ohstruct its performance.
Thus, in the ca.se of Ihitrher v. Bntrlwr (1851), 14 Beav.
'22'1, the form of the hushand's covenant was, that in case
any personal estate should at any time thereafter, <luring
the coverture, come to or vest in the wife, or the husband
in her right, the same should be paid, assigned, or trans-
ferred hy all iwoper jtartie.s .-—Jleld, that a reversionary
interest in certain property, to which the wife became
entitled during the coverture foi- her separate use. was
bound by the covenant.

A similar decision was given bv Kayk, J., in Be De
y/o.v' Trust, Ilardicicke v. Wilmot (H^So). iil Ch. D. 81,
where there was a covenant by the husband only, in general
terms, but the acts which were to be done in pursuance of
the covenant were expressly to be done by the irife as loell
as the hiishand.

Covenant by Qn the other hand, in Dawes v. Tredicell (1881),
the husl)ancl ,,, /,i i\ o-i i ii i • -i i.

alone that he ^^ ^ "• ^- ^'^^j where the words were very sunilar, except

will settle, is that the settlement was not to be " by all proper parties,"

not binding j 7 7 7 j ? ? •

on the wife, but the acts were only to he done hy the husband, it was

held that the property which came to the wife for her

separate use, was not bound by tlie covenant.

.4/iVt>- where I,i ]^^.^. y f^^f, (l87(;j, 4 ( "ll. D. 17.5, however, the late

is^s^dfic Sir G. Jessel, M.R., decided that the wife is bound even



Chap. II. — ('ovhn'ants to Settle Propektv. iU>5

when the hushamrs covonant ilocs nor cxjiressly state that Art. 67

she is to do any act or that the iiroperty is to he settled. /// piTrTh

cases where the j>roj>erfi/ aimed at l>>/ the eoreiiaiit Is sj>eriflr jj,j^i t|,^> ^^.jf^.

aud not <feneral. In that case, an antenuittial setthnnent i'^'"f " ^^^^'

... . . <l«'t'<l-

was si^nieil hy all parties, ineliidin^' the intended wife. and.

hy it. her parents ao;reed that they wonld apj)oint to her
a share of certain reversionary j)roperty over whieh they
had a power of appointment. The hushand then a^ireed
that he would settle such share as the wife ini<iht take /'//
the jiropert)/ in question, either hv appointment, or in
default of appointment. It was ludd hy the Master of
THE Rolls, that althoui^h there was no express covenant
by the wife, nevertheless the property was bound. He
said : " Then the husi»and proceeds to settle, or agrees to
settle, what does not l)elong to him, as. indeed, appears i)y
the instrument itself. Uncpiestionably the property was
not his to settle : it was his wife's, and he could not settle
it hini-i'lt". because during the lives of the wife's father
ami mother he could have no interest whatever, therefore,
his covenant or agreement to settle was a covenant or
agreement" to settle not his own estate, but someltody
else*<. But his wife was an assenting party tt) this agree-
ment. It was, therefore, simply an agreement l)y A.,
with B.'s assent to .settle B.'s estate, and in sinh a case
it i< clear that B. is bound. So that, even if it is treated
a> a covenant by the husband alone, yet it is for \alu-
able consideration, and with the assent of the wile, ami

-he i- therefore bolUld."

In the more recent case of He / laden, ('nlina \. //aden, (■«>vi'iiiiiit >\v
r ,,-,,,, . . , '. 1 tlic IivihIniiuI

[lJ5.*><j 2 ( h. 22n, a marriage settlement coiitaine<l a <"ove- ,j,„„. ,i„^,

nant bv tlie husband alone, that .ill the ri-al and pei'xinal •''^" I""' ,,

iiiM t y hIuiU
estate above a certain value which >h(»idd at any time during Im- m'ttK-d.

the coverture bv anv means be accpiired by the wile or

the hunband in her ri;^ht should forthirilh he seltleil upon

the trusts of the settlement. The wife was a party to and

executed the deed. |)uring the coverture -he became

entitled, umJer the will of her father, to certain r<al estate.



*i(!t) Pai;t VIT.— Executoky Rf/i'tlemexts.

Art. 67. It \v;i'^ licld liv Si'iia.lNi;. .).. tli;il llic in-opcrt v in (|ii('>ti(»n
PirTTh ^^'"^^ l»oun(l. After coininentin^i; on the cases above cited,
lie s;ii(l : "In the j)resent ease the covenant is 1)\' the
hushanil alone, thiit the iiroperty shall he settled, not sav-
intji; by whom. The wife was a party to and executed the
settlement. It contains no recitals : so I oain no ;i->ist-
ance from that source. It seems to me. 1. eonfe>> with
some hesitation, that the only wav in whi<di I can deal
with such a covenant is to look and see if it has a plain
meanino-, and, if so, to give effect to it. Looking- at it
from that point of view, and ivadin;^ the material words,
it is a covenant that all the real and jx-rsonal estate
which shall at any time be ae(juir<'d by the wife or the
husband in her rieht, shall be settled, (an I faiily limit
the subject matter of the covenant to the interest of the
husl)and in the real estate ? It seems to me that 1 can-
not. The words ar(>, in mv opinion, intended to include
more than the mere; interest of the husband. It is an
agreement that all the real ])roperty of the wife >hall
be settled, and a ]»erson assenting to such a co\enant
must be taken to mean that the covenant shall take ettect
accordingly."

Pakagkai'H (2).
Ett'ect of On the assumption that a covenant to settle after-

Women's acquired property is not binding on the wife, it follows

Property Act that property which has been given to her for her separate

on covenants . •, " i ^ /> n • i • i i i )»

binding tlie use ui equity, does not tall witlnn tiie husljancfs covenant.

hnshandonly, Jt mio'lit be thought that the same result would follow

to settle » . . , • , ,

property of where the wife becomes entitled to separate })ro})erry not

the w lie. under any gift ex})ressly conferring it upon her for her

separate use, but under the general provisions of the Married

Women's Property Act, 1882. This is not so, however,

owing to the effect of s. lU of that Act, by which it is

enacted that *' Nothing in this Act contained shall interfere

WMth or ajf'ed any settlement or agreement for a settlement

made or to be made, whether before or after marriage,



CHAr. II. — Covenants to Settle Propeutv. 3G7

respecting the pro})t'rrv ot" anv married woman."" But tor Art. 67.
the Act, the right? which a hushaml formerly took in his j..^^..^ ,.,
wife's property wouKl have l)een l)0und by his covenant :
and it was held in llawock v. Ilanrork (18<Sy). 38 I'h. D.
78. that the effect of tlie section above (juoted was to
preserve to persons claiming inuler marriage settlements
jirecisely tlie same rights under such covenants as they
would have had if the Act had never been passed. In
short, the effect of s. lit seems to be to take away the
character of separate property from all jiroperty which
would, but for the Act, have been l)ound Vty a husband's
covenant to settle it.

In the case now under consideration, North. J., after
deciding that the wife was not bound by th<' covenant,
said: "If the fund in question is bountl at ail, it is
bound by the covenant of the husband. How does the
Act affect that ? Sections ."> and 10, taken together,
prevent the wife from saying that the separate use which
is given to her by s. "> standing alone, excludes tlu- opera-
tion of the covenant in the settlement. The fund having,
as it is admittcil, arisen solely from jjcrsonal estate of the
testatri.K, is Ixjund bv the ri)\('iiant. and iiin-r be trans-
ferred to the trustees of the scttlcuK nt. One [toint
.-tronglv urged on l)eiialf of the petitioner wa^ this —that
the will of the testatrix wa< maile afti-r the Act i-ame into
operation, and that it does not contain any direetitm that
the int<'rests given by it to females shall be f.ir their
separate use, b<*cause the testatrix knew ami relie.j upon
the law as establisheil by s. .'». I'ut the answer t<i this
argument is obvious. The fimd doe- ii(»t belong to the
wife for her s(;parate u-e unle>> the Act makes it lni-
-epurate property. It -. •"> stood alone, that wouM be the
effect of the Act ; but by the combined operation (tf »>. ."i
and 11', it i< not so. The ie»t;»tor"> kmtwledge mii-t be
taken to extend to the wlmle .\et, ami not to ha\e been

limited \i) one -eeti(Hl (inl v.



:\c^



I'akt VII. -ExKcrroKV Sktti.kmkxts.



Art. 67.

I'ara. (2).



Sucli

covenants
exclmle the
operation of
the Married
Women's
Property
Act, even
although
entered into
since 1882.



This ilcc'ision of X(')KTll, .1., was sul)S(>(|U(Mitlv artinncil
by the Court of Appeal, Cotton, L.-I., saying-: '"Un-
doubtedly tliere was a scttlemiMit Ikm'o, and it was re-
sjiec'tino; the })r()perty of ihis hidv, and if we K)ok at the
natural meaning; of the words of the section, we cannot
hel[t sayino- that it excepts from the Act everything which
would interfere with the settlement, and would prevent the
covenants contained in it from havin;^ operation. The
oth section does interfere with the settlement." See also
Ji'c Wlutaker, Christian v. \\'/ut<(f.rr (18.S7), ;U Ch. D»
227.

The above cited case (^flaticor/: v. I ItuicocL-) was sub-
sequentlv extended by Chittv, d., in >Steren,'i v. Trecor-
(rai-rirl; [1.S93] 2 Ch. :i07. There an infant, being
entitled to a sum of i'l.t )()(), joined with her husband in
April, 1(S9(), iu executing a marriage settlement by which
he and she purported to assign it to trustees upon the
usual trusts. In October, 181)1, she attained twenty-one,
and forthwith disaffirmed the settlenu'ut, and claimed the
£!,()( )() absolutely. It was argued that, as the marriage
took place, and the settlement was executed after the
Act (and not, as in Hancock v. Ihoicock, before it came
into operation), s. ID did not apply. Chitty, J., how-
ever, held that the reasoning in Jlancork v. Hancock was
(•([ually applicable, whether the marriage took place
before or after the Married Women's Property Act, 1882,
and consequently that the £1,000 was bound. See also
linrkland V. Bu'rLhuul [11)00] 2 Oil. .o34.



PAU.\GnAI'H (.'')).

The statement in j)aragraph (3) is not a rule of iiiteri)re-
tation, but of law, and it is only mentioned for the sake of
convenience. Assuming that a woman, who is an infant,
purports to covenant to settle her after-acquired property,
and subsequently becomes entitled to property for her sepa-
rate use (but not tinder the Married Women's Property
Act, 1882), is she l)Ound ? The answer is, yes, unless she



Chap. II. — Coven ants to Settle Property'. 'M\\)

has, after attaininor her niajorirv, and heeoiuiii;^" aware of Art. 67.
her ricrht to ropiuliato, promptly ilisaffirmed her liaKility. panTT-S)
See Viil/t: v. 0'IIa;/an, [IDOO] 2 Ch. i>l ; Wilder v.
Pf'ffott (1882), 22 Ch. D. 20a : irveenhlll v. X)/7//
British, etc. Co., [18i»3] i) Ch. 474 : and i^f JIodMin,
Williams V. AX'//'^ [189-4] 2 C"h. 421.



Art, 68. — Property which is prim^'i facie excluded
from a covenant to Settle other or after-acquired
Property.

Prima facie, covenants to settle other or after-
acquired property (not definitely described) do not
comprise :

(1) Income, or (semble) capitalizations of income.

(2) Corpus which a married woman is restrained

from anticipatint^, unless she is simply re-
strained until it falls into possession.

(3) Property over which the covenantor has merely

a general power of appointment, with a gift
over in default of appointment, or which she has
a statutory power of making lu-r own, unless
she exercises such powers in iier ow n favour.

(4) Gifts made to her hy her husband.

l'AKA«il!Al'll ( 1 ).

A .«»ett lenient was inadi* hv a hii»l»and (»f .ill hi- p.-r-onal <'i<liiwuy

. •■•ivi'imiit

esitate to whi<'li In- wa- iIhmi or nn;^lit ihfirali.-r "'••••unit' i.iii.lx '-..i/.-m
entitN'<l. in trn>t for hini-<-ir lor lil'r with rcn»aind<'r- ovt-r : ',"'|^j'„','"J,'n.
— ////</. not to comprix' hi> intcrr-t in a luml hripicitht'il
to hitn lor life {St. Aiihi/n v. Jhitnj'/ini/ (laritl). 22 I5.m\.

W. - II



iJ70 Fart VII. — Executory Settlements.

Art. 68. 175, and see also Toicnslwnd v. //(irroich// (IJ558),
ParaTTn '^^ L.J. Ch. .553, :ind Lewis v. ^fad(lo(^k•s (1810), 17 Yes.
48). The same principle applies to an annuity bequeathed
to a wife {He Doicdiiu/, Gregorjj v. DowduKj, [1004]
1 I'h. 441). But of course life interest may be caught
by such covenants where it is plainly intended that they
shall be {Scholjield v. Spooner (1884), '1\:> Ch. D. 04 ;
explained in Re Dowding^ Gregory v. Doicding, svpra).

Questionable Whether, liowever, a wife who has covenanted to settle
wvena^nts"^ after-acquired property, is liable to settle property which
bind property <;he has purchased out of the savings of income, is not
out of the settled. In Re Bendij, Wallis \. Beady, [1895] 1 Ch.
savings of i()()^ Kekewich, J., held that she was. On the other
hand, KoMER, J., dissented from that view in the subse-
quent case of Finlay v. Darling, [1897] 1 (-h. 719,
saying : " If income which the lady receives from the
settled funds and property, is not bound by the covenant
(and it is clear the income is not), it appears to me, on
principle, not right to hold that, merely because the lady
does not choose at once to spend that income, but accumu-
lates it either in her ])urse or at her l)ankers, she renders
that liable to be bound by the covenant which was not
bound before. If one half-yearly income she received was
not bound, I fail to see why, after several years' receipts
of half-yearly income, when the money she had not spent
of that income remained in her hands and exceeded £200,
I should hold that that accumulated income passed from
her and went to the trustees of the settlement. In my
opinion that is not the meaning or intent of the covenant
here ; and, on princij)le, 1 think that the covenant ought
not to be extended to that. If the accumulations in licr
hands or at her bankers are not held to be bound Ijy the
covenant, I fail to see on principle why I should hold the
money bound when it becomes invested by her in some
investment, such as consols or the like." This was
followed by Buckley, J.,' in Re CbiUerJmrk, Jilo.vam v.
Clutterhuck (1904), 73 L. J. Ch. 698 ; and it is humbly



Chat. 11. — Covkkant^ to Skttle Propekty. ;''71

conceived that the reasoning is eorrcet, uuil that a wonian Art. 68.
who covenants to settle atter-ac(iuired pro]ierty contein- p.^^..^ j,j
phites merely the settlement of property which may come
to her by ^iit't or bequest, and not property which she may
acquire out of the savings of her income.

This view is strengthenetl by the case of (litin-hUl v.
Diiinif (1875), '10 Eq. olU. There, a naval otiicer had
covenanted to settle any property which he might there-
after acquire. Some years afterwards, he conniuitcd his
half-pav for a capital sum which was then claimed
1)V the trustees. It was, however, held that it was not
liable.

PAKAGHArH (2).

Projtertv coming to a ladv with restraint on antieipa- IVdirtiv

' . . Ill ii tliviMi t<i wife

tion or alienation, is not bound hy a covenant to settle ^viiliout

unless she is merelv restrained while her interest remains pow^T of

alienation is
reversionary (^Re Baakex, liei/nolds v. Klhs, [1902] 2 ( ii. not suhjett

333; Re Clarke's Truds (1882), 21 ( 'h. D. 74.S : A'<' ;.;;;^|;;;^^^^

Parkin, JJill v. Sclncarz, [18112] 3 Ch. .>1U). Such

covenants only refer to property which a wife can assign,

and a restraint on antieipation elfectually prevent > her

doing so during coverture (/iV Curre//, (jihson v. II ity

(1881)), 32 Ch. D. 301 : AV JUumUU. [lUOl] 2 Ch. 221).

It is conceived, that although ihe restraint can imw be

removed by a judge, under s. (12 of the Conveyancing

and Law of I'roperty Act, 1881. a lady is under no

obligation to seek that removal at the nque'^t (»f tlu^

trustees (see illustration to paragraph (3j, infra), nor

will the court remove the re>iraint in such a case unless

it is ch'urly for her benefit (Re BlundtU, suj>ra).

PAUA<iltAriI (i)).

In 7'i>n'ng/t,ii(l v. Ilnrron-hi/ ( l^<.')^), 27 L. d. ( "li. .')r(3. ('..v.ii.intH to
,..,,..,. " 1 • I "fltlc uftor-

the wite had joined in a covenant t<t srttl.- a!i<r-aeqinre»l n,,|,„,,.,|

property. She sub>e<iuently became the don.e of ;i g( neial pi"'|"">

2 H i



372 PAiii" VII. — Executory Settlements.

Art. 68. power of apjiointiin'iit over sonic jn-ojicrt y ; liiit it was

raraT.S) ''*'^'^ ^^^^^' ^^^^ covenant did not aji|ily to it so as to ol)li<2;o

do not oblige ^^^^' to exercise the power in favour of lierself or the

aduneeof" trustees of the settlement. Kinderslkv. V.-C. said:

a gl'lRTuI

power of "It was very important to uphold the l)road distinction
Wppoillt"'^ between property and i)ower, and he (the Vice-Chancellor)
tlu' property had always endeavoured to do so. It was true that power
to lu'rself. • 1 , ' I • ; 1.1 • 1- -i •!• 1

mioht result m jiroj)erty, and tlie exercise ot it. it ocneral,

mioht affect property in an iiulirect manner ; hut so lon^
as it was unexercised it was distinct from property. In
one sense it was interest in property, because if there was
a power it could not be said that there was not some
interest. Technically, however, in the eye of a court of
law or equity, a power was not an interest, and an interest
was not a power. This covenant was clearly not intended
to apply to a mere power." See also Ercart v. Eivart (1^53),
11 Ha."'27G, and Boicev v. Smith (1«71), l\) W. 11. 399.

lUit where ])roi)erty was oivcii for such pui-poses as A.
should appoint, and /// </r/'(iu/f of (ij<j>(>//ihit(jil to her
ahsoluteli/, it was held that she could not defeat a covenant
to settle after acquired ])roperty exceedino- £200, coniing
to her at any one time, and having one source, by appoint-
ing it to herself by a succession of appointments of £199
each. The decision is based on the gift in default of
appointment being to the lady herself, so that any appoint-
ment would have been a taking away of })roperty which
she had already bound herself to settle (Re O^Connell,
Mau'le v. Jagoe, [1903] 2 Ch. 574, following Steward v.
Poppleton (1877), W .N. 29, and distinguished Townshend v.
Harvoxchij, supra, and see also Bower v. Smith (1<S71),
19 W. R. 399, as ex[)lained in Steward v. Poppleton and
7.\' Lord Gerard, Oliphant v. Gerard (1888), 58 L. T. 800,
observed on In re OH^onnell, Mawle v. Jagoe, supra).

Xot bound to So. in Ililhers v. Parkinson (1883), 25 Ch. D. 200, it

property. "^^'^'^ \w\i\ that the covenant did not oblige a wife, upon

w^hom an estate tail had devolved, to exercise her statutory

power of disentailing the jtroperty and conveying it to the



( "uAr. II. — Covenants to Settle Property. '.'u'.\

trustees in tee simple. (Approved and lollowed by the Art. 68.
Court ot" Ap[)eal in J\\' lJunsant/\' Settlement, Nott v. p^^^.^^ ,.^.
Jjunsan'i. [lilOt)] 1 Ch. 578).

Paragkaph (4).

In Colts V. Coles. [UHU] 1 Ch. 711. rhen- was an
assignment of all the wile's property, present and future : —
Held, by Joyce. •!.. that assuinin»i; that it was effective as
to after acquinnl pro])ertv. it did not extend to presents
made by the husbanil to the wife. The leanu'd judge
i-aid, •' I decide this case upon the grounds stated by
Malins, V.-C, in his judgment in D'ifk'ntson v. I Hlhryn,
(j^'o^^), 8 Eq. 551, where he says, 'on the broad grounds
of intention, I am of opinion that the words of that covenant
never could have been intended to ap})ly to property which
the wife should acquire from her husband.' What 1 mean
is this : that in my own mind, rightly or wrongly, I have
no doubt that if I were to make this assignment extend to
this sum of money, I should be doing what the parties



Online LibraryArthur UnderhillThe principles of the interpretation of wills and settlements → online text (page 36 of 42)