Arthur Underhill.

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n<*v<T intended or for a moment thought of. 1 therefore
hold that this sum of money is not bound by the settle-
ment.'" This case was followed in Klmjan v. Matter,
[1905] 1 Ir. K. -J 7 2.

Again, an indemnity given by a Scottish husband to his
wife against an act {e.'j., change of domicile) which would
<leprive lier of her jus rilirtu under the law ol" Scotland,
does not bring the Juk iwlntu within a covenant to settle
atter accjuired propertv ( /w- Shnpson, Sfm/'soit v. Snii/>sini,
[llM)4j 1 <'h. 1).

Art. (j*i. H'hat is cui/ijjriscd in a General Cuvinant
to settle Property to which the wife is presently

Where the covenant is to Hcttlc property t<> wbicb
the wife " is now entitled," or words to that effect, all


Art. 69. property to which she then has any title, whether it be
in possession, reversion, or contingency, is bound.

Covenants t.. In /,',- .A/r/.^o//'.'^ Will (l.STD), l."'. Cli. I ). 1S'.>. tlic ruvt'imiit

pioixTtv '^ ^^''^ '" *^^^"^ '^ '^^ ^^'*' time of tlio solciniiiziition of the intended

lompnsi- niarrium' the wife shall be ; or if at anv time thereafter,

whiili tlif and dnrnig the joint lives or the liusband and wite she or

\v\h- l>;v^ a 1,^.,. Imshand in her ri<>ht shall become beneficially entitled

title, whetlier ^^

1 possession, to anv real or jiersonal property estate or effects for any
inm.!,'r.'v estate or interest whatsoever, then and in every such
case " it should be settled : — //</(/, that a reversionary
interest in personalty which was vested in the wife at the
date of the marriage, but was liable to be divested by the
exercise oi" a ])ower of appointment, was included in
the covenant, although it did not fall into possession until
after the husbands death. See also i^^^ Mackenzie f: Settle-
ment (1867), 2 Ch. App. 345 ; Agar v. Georrje (1876),
2 Oh. D. 706 ; Cornmell v. Kehh (1876), 3 V\\. D. 7(;7 ; and
Siceetapple v. Jlorlock (1879), H C!h. D. 745.

ii'version, or

Art. 70. — What is comprised in a CovencDit to settle
after-acquired Property of the Wife, or of the
Husband in her right.

(1) A covenant to settle after-acquired property of
the wife is limited, prima facie, to property acquired
during effective coverture.

(2) A covenant to settle property to which " the wife
or the husband in her right shall become entitled,"
prima facie binds, not only future property of the wife,
but also property to which she is entitled at the date of
the marriage {sed qucere, when the marriage took place
since 1882).

Chap. II. — Coven'axts to Settle Property. 875

(3) A covenant to settle property to which the wife Art. 70.
shall become entitled binds —

(a) property to which she is then entitled in rever-

sion, remainder, or contingency ; provided
that it falls into possession during the period
covered by the covenant ; and

(b) property to which she has no title at the date of

the marriage, but in which she acquires a
reversionary or contingent interest during the
period covered bj'' the covenant, even although
it may not fall into possession during that

Paragraph (1).

"The primary object of a covenant to settle the future Prhmi j'ncif
property ot a wite is to prevent its tailing under the sole tosettleaftcr-
control of the liushancl. and it therefore, ni-iina facit\ is to aeijuiiLHi

, , 1 • I 1 1 ' 1 property is

be supposed not to Ik- intended to apply to jirojierty the (,, i,,. ii,„jti.(i
wife's title to which does not accrue until after the ^" P"'I»^"''i.v


husband's death. We have consulted the Lord ("hanci'llor thuing
[Selborne] on the case, and he agrees with us in the ji^vorturo
opinion that, in th<^ absence of any (JXjiression showing
tliat u covenant of this nature was intended to have a more
extended operation, it is to be constru<'d as if tin- usual
words 'during the said intendeci coverture' IkuI l.fcu
inserted. It appears to his lonlshiji, as well as to us. that
the rule laid dcjwn in /f/rlinnoii v. /f/lhiyn (18(J'J), i*' K(|.
r>4(i, and Ctrtrr v. ('<irl,r (lS(;'.t). //,;,/.. .'»:)!, i^ fo l.r
followed, and not the rule which was acted upon in
Stevens V. I '/// S'linrst {\H'u\), 17 Beav. .'5(>.')" (/'«'/•
Ja.mks, L..I.. /.'. /.;/,ra/7/.v (I.S7;;). '.' Ch. App.. at |.. Kxt,
and .see al-o !{>■ ^ uiiij>/:-ir.-< l',>liii,s (|.h77). •'. < "h. I >. tlJStl ;

Jif Coff/ilai,, linni„l,t„n V. llnni.ihhMi. (iM'.tJ] W Cji. 7t;).
Tlii- rule h.i- lati'lv liccn carrii-.| to its lo^ic-d conilu-.ion,

wife's death.

'MC) Paht VII. — ExECUTOuv Settlements.

Art 70. the 0(,)urt holding; that it aiiplicd where the i-overtuiH' has
PanTTl) 'jt't'ii ilcterniincd oithor l)y divorce or judioial separation

{Jkii-enport v. MarxhalL [lit02] 1 Ch. &1 ; Be >'Shnj>son,

Simpson v. Simpson (UtO-A). 1 ( 'h. 1).

* )ii -iinihir grounds it has heeii recently hehl that llie
jus relirtd' of a Scottish \vit'e is not bound by such a
covenant, even where coupled with a covenant by the
husband in damages it" she shouhi be (Hsa}){)ointed of it
{Re Simpson, Simpson v. Siinj'son, si(j>ra).

But where The rule, as stated in Re Edwards, supra, was appa-

survh-e'!Tt' ^<^"^ly expressed somewhat too broadly by the late Lord

hinds him Justice James; for a general covenant to settle a wife's

property future property will not be restricted to ])roperty falling in

acquired during the coverture if the Imshand survives, though it
jure inariti • i i i • • • x f ;

after the will be SO restricted when the wiie survives. In risher v.

Shirleij (1889), 43 Ch. D. 290, the wife was entitled to a
vested reversionary interest in personal estate, which fell
into possession after her death, and was claimed Ijy her
husband pire mariti. Stirling, J., however, held that it
was bound by the husband's covenant to settle the wife's
after-acqnired property. The learned judge, commenting
upon Lord Justice James' judgment in Re Julwards,
sxipra, said : " No doubt the concluding words of the lord
justice in that judgment at first sight su})})ort the contention
on behalf of the husband. But when the literal construc-
tion of a covenant is departed from, one ought to look at
the reason for so doing, and the reason assigned is, that
the object of the covenant is to ])rotect the property, the
subject of the covenant, from the husband's marital right,
and preserve it for the benefit of the wife and children.
There is no need to protect property against the husband's
marital right where the wife does not become entitled
until after the husband's death: but there is need of such
])rotection where the husband is the survivor and the
projierty falls in after the wife's death. If effect were
given to the husband's claim, his marital right would be

Chap. II. — Covenants to Settle PKorEra'y. 377

enforced in-read of the wife's property bein;^- pi-oTeetcd Art. 70.
against it. and the very object of the covenant woidil lie I'm-^^ (n.
defeated. The words of the covenant in the jn-esent case
are quite general, and the reason assigned for limiting
them does not appear to apjily, and in my opinion, they
cannot, in the present case, be limited as siiggestetl.' It
is difficult to reconcile this case with Pearce v. (rra/tani
(1803), 32 L. J. Ch. o')i». where the wife's father gave
her a legacy, which (:i< >li(' dicil in the father's lifetime)
l)ecame payable to the husband as her administrator by
virtue of the Wills Act, and was held not to be bound by
the covenant. This case does not seem to have been ritcd
in Fisher v. Shirlei/, sujira.

AVhether the distinction made by Stirling, d.. would V""'.
apply where the pro})erty is separate estate ot the wile, imshand's
otherwise than under the Municd Wouhmi'^ Property Act, L'jvi-naiii

. , would nm<l

is not clear. (_)n the one hand, if she died intestate her si-purato jiro-
husbaud would take it, and it would therefore- fall within ;;7,v\.;l-'ng
the mischief aimecl at by Stirling, J. On the oili. r band, in liim as her
if she made a will l)equ<'athing a vested remainder, the j,..^,„.'
mi;><:hief in question wouM seem not to arise. Possibly
the difficulty might be solved it tin- rule wen- still more
elaborated, and sucii covenants were held binding on the
(vife with regard to projierty falling into possession thiring
the coverture only, and (»n the hu-band as t<i |ir(ijierty
coming to him jure nmriti. whether thu'ing the cove'rtun'
or afterwanls. But this is a (juestion for future decision.

pAHAi.KAI'il ( 2).

The cases in relation t<i what word- do. and what dti n<tl CuvimuuiIs

1 • I 1 . 1 " I'iili iipimr-

inthcate un intention to settle pn»|.i'rty aeqnire.l alter the ^.,,j,^, ,.,„„.

marriage, are verv coiiHietin'f, and iirobablv each case l""*<' '»»»/"''•

must be jn<lged on the actual words used. I>ill m |,n,|Mily cmly

w'iiiMm.H "v. .iA-/-'vo- (l^;^h, i<> .\|.p. <'as. 1, it was I >'di I ;;';;>'.;;;;';;;,

that in the absence of any ex|ilanatory re<-itals, a eovenant in.H.nt pro

1 • "l I ' I' ' , I I I I ■ I |»'ll\ IIH \\<-ll.

to -ettle property to which •'the wife or tlu lunihaml m Ik r


Part VTI. — Execi'tory Settlements.

Art. 70.
Para. (2).

On the
that tlie
onh- relates
to future
arises what
future pro-
perty is

proving that
tliere must
be a new
or a change
in the old

ri(//if s/i((ll l)ecome entitled iluriii^ the coverture" com-
prised property to which .vAc was entitled at the moment
of the marriage, inasmuch as hy the tact of" the nKirriao(^
the husband became entitled /?/r<^ marki.

W'licther the jMairicd Women's Property Act, 1882, has
altered this, would seem to be a nice question, having regard
to the decision in Hancock- v. Hancock (1888), 38 ( 'h. D.
78, p. vU)7, supra. It is, however, conceived that it has ;
as it would be a /u'f/f/o /irhir/p/l to assume tliat s. lit of
the Act a})plied when the very oi)ject of the eiupiiry is
whether a settlement of tlu^ property in question was in

However this may be, it seems clear, that where the
covenant is merely to settle property to which the ivi/e
shall become entitled, then the covenant will not embrace
present property of the wife's. And the rather thin and
scholastic construction adopted in Williams v. Mercicr,
siij'va, will readily yield to anything in the context, show-
ing that property to which the wit'e was f/ir/i entitled was
not intended to be included ; c.^/., a recital. See J^c
Garnett, liohinson v. Ganil>/ (1886), :VP> C'h. D. ;500, and
see also Re Vianfs Settlement Ttnists (1874), 18 E(j. \'M').

Paragkaph (o).

Assuming tliat the covenant is restricted to future
property of the wife, the (juestion then arises, what con-
stitutes future property. I'aragraph (3) is believed to
enunciate correctly the principles which regulate that

That this is so, is, it is submitted, apparent from the
following considerations : A covenant to settle future-
ac(|uired property (without more) is suf^cieutly wide to
embrace (1) that which may be hereafter acquired in
possession, although it has already been acquired in title,
and (2) that which may be acquired in title only, although
possession may never be obtained during the coverture ;

Chap. II. — ("ovkxaxts to Settle Property. 'Md

but it cannor possibly (Mubrafc that to which a tit If has Art. 70.

already been aciiuired. which tirU' is not t'ollowt'd (hn-ino- ,, 7.,,

the coverture by the actual ri^ht to possession. In short. Q^^^.^ ^^^ \,^.■^^^g

such a covenant is aimed at some future chanije of owner- property

snip, wlucli may bo either a chan^^e ot title or a change ot covenant to

the actual right to eniov : and where neither one or other ^^"''^' *""^"'"*'
^ . .' . j)n)j)eity.

occurs, there is nothing on which the words of the
covenant can act.

Thus, where a vesteil remaiiidfr to which the wit'f i^ A remainder
entitled at the date of the settlement does not fall in during ,',|^!iJ,^jJ ?J ,*ot
the coverture or the life of the husband (if he be survivor), 1'ouikI unless
it will not be bound by the covenant to settle future- ^uvuv^ the
acquired property ; for the wife, e.r Ji)/pothe.<is. has ac(piired lui^^ljiUKl's
no new right in it since the settlement. See 7iV ./oucs's
Will (ISTC). 2 C:h. D. 302 ; Be Pcdders Settlenwnf
(l^Td). lOEq. 5^5 ; Re Clhitons Trust (ISTl^. l!'. E-i. in*.').
See also Bt' MirhelCs Trusts (1«S7^), i> ( "h. D. .'), where the
wife's interest was contingent at the date of the sc^ttlement.
became vested during the coverture, but did imt fall into
[tossession until after the coverture determined, ami it was
held to fall within the covenant.

But when such a vested remainder doo fall in during the Aiii>r if it
coverture (or where the period for whieh the covenant is to '

be operative is not named, if it falls in during the life of the
husband {Flslwr v. ."^Iiirlei/ {\.m\)), 43 ( "h. I >. 2!M») ). then
it is bound : for the wife lias ac(iuired a new right since
the .settlement, viz., the right to the present enjoyment of
the property (/y/y/ A*' V. (Imunllr (1.S42), 13 Sim. 1 '.»() ;
Sj>rin<i V. I'ridf (1^»J1). I I »e (;..l.,t S. 'M't ; lit Clinton's
Trust (1872), 13 Eip 21l'»). The same rule applio with
increased force to an interest contingent at the date of the
marriage which falls into |i(»-^-e>«-ion iluring the < tiveiture
{Archer V. AV% (l»tJ()), 1 I >r. ^ Sm. /.(Ml; /.'/..,./> n.

h'rii/, (iMr.i), i/.i,i., 4r,2).

,1 /o/7/(»/-/ will the property be b(»imd where t hi- wile had A K-inaintliT

w liuli IN nut

no title wliat<'ver to it at the date ol the marriage, if she ^/^"^

',)^0 PAiiT VII. — Exi:cLT(»KY 8ettlkmkni\s.

Art. 70. aftjuircs a title, although it lie only in rcinaiiKK'r or

Para. (3). I'evi'i'J^iou, during the period wliicli the covenant covers.

at date of i-^ov it is clearly an entirely new proprietary ri<iht. and

inanmge is ^^^j ^.^^ j^^ ^j^^^ j.^^^ casc) merely the chaiii-e ol' a ri;'lit in

bituiid, even ... .

although it reversion to a ri;j;ht in ])ossession {//hi/Iks \. )'tiiiii<i (1<S()3),

in (hirin' the "^^ ^^' '^ • ^^^- ^^^ '■> D'u'kinson \. DiUwi/n (lydl*), '"> 1*^<J-

husbaiurs 54G ; Cow per- Smith v. Anstetj, AV. N. (1877), 2<S).

Art. 71. — Covenants to settle a definite Interest
in Property.

Where the covenant is to settle a definite estate or
interest in property, if that interest subsequently
becomes enlarged, the covenant does not bind the
enlarged interest ; and if the definite interest fails, but
the covenantor acquires the property under another
title, it will not be bound.

Property not lu Sli'eetapple V. llorloiL (1^579), 11 C\\. D. 745 (cor-
bound if it rg^^tpj jj^ j^^ Jack-soil s Will (1879), 13 Ch. D. 189), the

comes to the _ .

covenantor intended wife being entitled to a reversionary interest

way to that under her parent's settlement liable to be defeated by the

contemplated exercise by her father of a power of appointment,

settlement, covenanted to settle all ]troperty which she was " then

seised of or interested in or entitled to." The father

subsequently exercised his power, and a})pointed to her

exactly the same proportion of the property which sh<'

would have taken in default of ajujointment. On these

facts, Jessel, M.K., held that the wife's covenant (hd not

comprise the appointed share, although it would have done

so if the share had come to her in default of appointment,

.saying : "A conveyance by a person by innocent assurance,

of an interest expressed as being subject to be defeated by

the exercise of a power does not convey an interest which

that person might take under the power. This is not like

a settlement of all property which might come to the wife

Chap. II. — I'ovexaxts to Skttle Property. ;^.s1

in any evont, hut only of that which was tlion vested in ov Art. 71.
belonging to her."

So, in Smith v. (K<I>ornt' (ISoS), t! H. L. C'as. 'M'k it
was laid down, that where a man in his marriage scttlr-
nient deseriltes hiniselt" as entitled to an ex|)eetant cstati' in
remainder in two pieces of laud, and eovcnaiits that wlu'U
■■ such reuuiinder " shall become vested in possession, he
will convey it to the uses of his settlement ; if he l)ecoines
possessed of either of these pieces of land liv a title
ditl'ercnt from that described in the covenant, the covenant
will not bind him. As Lord AVen^leydale put it, the
point resolved itself into this : " Is this a covenant tct
convey the townlands of Stonehouse to the trustees
absolutely, whenever the covenantor was entitled to them
in [lossession ? Oris it a bargain only with respect to thc^
contingent interest, or .yes smression/'s, or more correctlv,
a bargain to convey the estates conditionally, if they
should vest in possession in ]Mr. Boyse Osborne, the
covenantor under the will id' the grandfathi-r. Tliouias
('arr ? " His lordship then pointed out that in the
words of the covenant, it was onlv to take effect if the
estate became A'esteil in the (•()\('naiit()r under the will ot'
his grandfather, ami that, as a matter of I'aet, it ln-eame
ve>te<I in him in defiance of that will, by gift from a tenant
in tail luidii' that will, who had iji-entaili-.l. lb- further
remarked (in relerence to an arguiiu-nt df the tru>tee'>
couns(d that there was an (d)viuus intention to >e(tle the
estates themselves^ that that was "toapjily a wrong ride
.f construction. It is to interpret the eovenant, not
according to the meaning ot" the words ixr^vd but according
to what the parties may be reasonably supposed ( iud;^in;;
iVoiM th<' circumstances in which they were pi:n'<-d) to
have been likejv to intend to do wIh-h they entered into
the eontraet . . . The onlv -ale rule of eon-truelion
is to ascertain the meaiiiug of the wonis used, and in this
case I think it is ttxt clear to admit of aiiv doul»t. "

'^i>'2 Part VII. — Executory Settlements.

Art. 72.
Akt. 72. — Covenants to settle Fropertij cxcaduu/

a certain Value.

Where the covenant is to settle property exceeding
a certain value :

(1) That value is the actual net value of the property

itself after deducting duties, and not the
actuarial value of the wife's interest in it ;

(2) That value is prima facie construed to mean the

value of funds derived from the same source.
But two legacies from one testator are so

Pakagraph (1).

Where the In Be .}fackenzie's Settlement (18G7), 2 ("li. A]. p. lUf), a

covenant is to . . , . • i . ,i . •,• i -i-

settle pro- marriage settlement contamed a covenant that, it tlic wite

perty which fJien was, or should, at anv time durino- the coverture.

IS worth . 1 , I ' 1 • 1 1

more tlian a become entitled to any real or personal estate of the value

minimum ^- £^^,^ j^ ^^^ . Jj^t^^i.^,^. {j- should i)e settled,

sum, the pro- ' J '

perty itself, At the date of the settlement, she was entitled (uii(l<'r
value of the '^ prior settlement) in remainder, expectant on her

covenantor's mother's death, to (a) a share of a sum of stock in her own

interest in it, i i p i i . i

governs the right, and (b) a further share oi the same stock as one ol

(luestion. ^1^^ next-of-kin of a deceased brother. The value of the

two shares taken together was above £400 but the

actuarial value of the wife's reversionary interest in them,

at the date of the settlement, was considerably less than

£400 : — Held, that both shares were included in the

settlement, the true interpretation of the covenant being

that it referred to the value of the property itself, and not

to the value of the wife's reversionary interest in it. In

giving judgment, Cairns, L.J., said : " It is admitted that

the share payable to her out of the fund, on her bi-ut Iter's


death, woulil exceed £400 nfter all (leJucTions : hut it is Art. 72.
said that the value of this share iu the year 1M'»1 [the i>a7a7~(l).
date of the marriage] was under £400. The covenant,
however, iu my opinion, does not refer to the value of her
interest in the fund, hut to the value of the fund in which
she has an interest ; just as we should say that a man was
entitled to an estate of the value of £100,000 on the death
of his father, merely to describe the value of the estate,
and not t\\o interi'-^r in the estate.''

The value is. however, the net value and not tlie gross The value to
, 1 • ,• ■ 1 1 • I 1 1 • • beasc-erlainod

value ; so that it atter deductnig ileatn tluties, cost, etc., it j^ ^]^^. „ei

falls below the stipulated amount it will escape the ^''l"*'

covenant {L\- /\i/v.v, [10(11] 1 ( 'h. 708).

1*AKA(;UA1'H (2).

It will Ijc s«'cn that, in the case last cited, the aggregate Impliid lemi
of the two funds was held to he hound, although se,'.'ii„.,iViilue
singlv the\' were of insuthcient amount. But although >i<t""-^ t"

1 ' I 111 1 -1 1 IIIDIHTtV

they accrued to the lady under two titles, they were ,ii.,.iv,.,f f,
derived from the same source, viz.. the original settlement, t'"^' '^"'oi'

_ , _ SMiini-.

<"are must, however, l)e taken to distinguish between
covenants where nothing is said iijion this point and those
in which the (juestion is distinctly deah with. l"'or
instance, in the case last cited it ajipear- tiiat there were
two distinct funds, neither of which taken alone would
liave fallen under the covenant, tiut whieh. taken t«»getlier,
exceeded the value mentioned in the covenant. It also
appears that although they came to the lady under
dirterent titles, they were hehl to I.e IxMrnd hy the
covenant. N<'Vertliele>s. it a|)|ie:irs to he well >etlled
that in -ueh ea-es the fund will not be Imuinl unle-s all its
parts are derived from t/ir siiim- .sourri- ( /u llonji, r (iSd.'i),
i;; \V. K. THi; //,„„/ V. rraiiklln (l^Tli), if", i;.|. \\U\).
The same -ource, however, d(jes not necessarily mean umler
the same title. In the ea>-<' now being considered ( /i'»
.MaikenzieaUdtlfiniiit) both fnnd> were d<Mi\ed Ironi the

384 1\miT V[I. — EXKCITOKY Sf.ttlkments.

Art. 72. sMinc souivc (vi/.., the prioi- si'ttlnnciit) .-illliDUuli ]);irt was
Wv\ (•') 'l«'|■'^<''l ilifi'i'tlv imd [kii'I ;i-> the ucxr-ot'-kiii ot' a ln'othcr.
And in tlu' saiiu' way it lias iiHirc rcceiitlv liccii liclil. that
two separate legacies derived tVoiii the same testator are
derived from the .same soui'ce and at the same time ( AV
Fares, [11>01] 1 Cli. 70,s).

Cases where (.'are must be taken to distinguish between covenants

limitTthr"^ such as those in Be Hooper and Hood v. Franklin (svpra)

fund to be where nothing is said upon the point, and those in which

funds the fund to be settled is expressly declared to be a uiinimum

acquired "at g^jj^ derived from one and the same source, and "'at one

one time. .„,,., • 71 0-7

and the same tnne. ror instance, in noicer v. bmitli

(1871), 19 W. R. 399 (the report in 11 Eq. 279 is mis-
leading and incorrect, — see Steward v. Foppleton (1877),
W. N. p. 29), the covenant was to settle property exceed-
ing £500 in value which the wife should acquire " at any
one time."" She afterwards became the donee of a general
power of a])}iointmeiit ovei- a I'uiid of i;5,199 19.v. Id.
This power she exercised by eleven successive appoint-
ments in favour of herself for sums under £.500 each. On
these facts it was held that the appointed funds were not
bound, for although they were all derived from the same
source, they were not acquired at the same time, i.e., at
the same moment.

Hums already \Vhere the fund originally exceeds the mininnim named

advanced to ^^^ ^|^^ covenant, but bv reason of advances made to the

of a fund. lady while it was still reversionary the fund has been

reduced below that minimum, the amount so advanced

must be iiu-luded for the purpose of determining whether

tlu> fund is large enough to be brought into settlement.


Of Words and Plimses most freipientli/ orcun't'iu/ in
Wills and Settlements.

Absolute gift.— See supra, p. 169.

Absolute power. — Does not make life tenant <ii. - puuishable for
\\a<te : I'ardoe v. Pardoe (1900), 82 L. T. 547. And see ]\ 177.

Actual possession. — See supra, p. 219.

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