The principles of the interpretation of wills and settlements online

tliat i.s to be ascertained, nut frcjin a context ol word- more

or less dissimilar in some other ^i-ttlcmi'iit. but liom tin-

whole contents of tliL*; settleiiicni . I am ol' opinion llial

the words are cajiablr of >ii«'h a >ens<'. I do iinl -ax that

they beiir it so clearly that they ndiilit not be rc|ie||cd b\

a context, or even bv exfritisic circmnstances |(»oked at in

c<»micction wiili th<- context which wnuM tend tu lejiel it ;



12 TaKT I. — (JkNKKAL l*ltlNCIl'LKS.

Art. 2. l,|it wf li;i\c Id (•(•nsitlcr wliiit we lunc lici'c Lookin^i ;it
Pan* (l)(ft). 'I"' in>"><''li!il'' i"<>n'«'Xl oiilv. ;i< r;ir:i< 1 ciiii tonii :m ()|)iiii()ii
I think that there ini;ihl lie xtiiiethiii;^' to lie siiid on lioth
■«i(|e-, Imi cei-lainh' the con-ti-iiet ion is not re|)elle(l l)\- ;in\'
piirtieuhir word- which wonhl (V\ehi(h' those nrtieh's. And
we tind hiler on. in the -anie inst i-uinent, \voi-d< which
:i|i|ie:ii- to nie most |ihiiid\' and exju'esslv to .-how that
it was meant to inchi(h> these t'hin<i;s words which must
he rejected it" thc-c lliin^i's are not incliiih'(l '" ( Will'/dni.'f v.
Meiri,')' (liSM ). I<» App. ('as. 1, at [.. .S).

Pauaghaph (1) fh).

/'rhnd/ach "In all oast'.s the oljject is to see what is the intention

im-anuig expressed by the \vor(l> used, lint tVoin tlie imi)ertection

.surniiiiuUng ot" laiiguacre, it is ini|to-sil)le To know what that intention is
stances. without in([uirinn tart her, and seein;; what the circum-

stances were with reterence to which the words were used,
and what was the ohject, a})})earine; from those ciicuni-
stances, wiiich the person usino- them had in Aiew ; for the
meauine; of words varies accordine- to the circumstances
with res|iecr to which they were used. I do not know that
1 can make my meanino- plainer, than hy referrine- to the
old rides of pleadine- a- fo iniiuendos in cases of defama-
tion. Those rules, thoui^h hi^-hly technical, were \-erv
lo^neal. Xo innuendo could enlarge the sense of the words
heyond that which they prima facie bore, unless it was
supported by an inducement or preliminary averment of
facts, and an averment that the libel was published, or the
words spoken, of and concerning the j)laintiff as connected
with those facts. If those j)reliminary averments were
proved, words which jn-ima facie bore a veiy innocent
meaning might be shown to convey a very injurious one,
and it was for the court to say whether, when used of and
concerning the inducement, they boi-e the meaning imputed
by the innuendo. . . . In construing written instru-
ments I think the same princii)le ap})lies. In the cases of
will-, the testator is speaking of and concerning all his



Meaxixg Affected by SruRorxpiNo Circumstances. 1[\



Para. (l)(b).



affairs ; and tlioretbre evidence is admissihlt" to s1k)\v all Art. 2.
that he knew, and then the court has to say what is the
intention indicated by the words when used with reicrence
to these extrinsic facts ; for the same words used in two
wills may express one intention when used with reference
to the state of one testator's affairs and family, and quite
a different one when used witii reference to the state of
the other testators affairs and family, in the case of a
contract, the two ])arties are sj)eakin<i of certain things
only, and therefore the admissible evidence is limiteil to
those circumstances of and concerning which they used
tliose words (see (yrares v. Le<i<i (185-1), i* Exch. 709).
In neither case does the court make a will or a contract
such as it tiiiiiksthe testator or the [larties wisjied to make.
but declares what the intention indicated by the words
used under such circumstances I'eally is " ( per Lord
Bl.\CKBUKX, in River Wear Commissioners v. Aduntson
(1S77). 2 \\>\K ('as. 14::). at j». TlVA).

" You must Ijring in facts where tiie words require
explanation ; that is to say, you must l)ri ng in those facts
which enable you to stand in the testators shoes, or, as it
is sometimes phrased, to sit in his eliaii-. ami see the
objects which the will affects"* ( j'cr Kekkwich. J.: Jx'r
Jlnrrison, Harrison v. JIi<jsou, [1891] 1 < 'h. 5(jl, at
p. ."iCl).

"The court has a right to ascertain all the I'aet- which
were kn<jwn to the testator at the time lie made bis will,
and tbn> to jilace itself in the te>tator"s positi(tii in order
to ascertain tlie bearing and ap|)lication of the language
he M'^e- '" ( i<rr Lord <'.\lUNs: C/mrlcr v. C/tarIrr ()874),

L. II. 7 11. L. :;•;!. ai p. ;'.77).

The (■(iiiditioii ol tbiii<'« to be taken into consideration 'I'lie sm
bv tlie court in construnig wili> and deed.- is tlie londitntn ..j,,.,,,,,.
of things in reference U) which the will or deed was made, '^'"•"(ts nm^i

,,,, . Ml I I- • 1- I • 1 '"■ **'"■'' "•*

Ibat Is not necessarily the actual condition ol tliiii;is when ih,. loHiaiui-

tb.- will or de.-d wa- made. .\ will or d.-d mav !..• made w;i"t-..Kni/.ii,t



14 TaKT I. (JkNKUAI, PUINCII'I.KS.



i'arn. (l)(b).



Art. 2. uitli rt'lVrcMcc ft) ;iii :i>siiiiic(l coiidilioii of iliiii;j^^-i wliicli
in liU't is not the actual I'oiitlif ion <>!' ihiii<>;.s. in sudi a
case, it" the will or drcil sots out tlctiiiitcly the assiinic(l
condition ot" tliin;j;s in rctcrcncc to wliicli it was made.
no extrinsic evidence will he adniissihle to prove the actual
>-tate of thin/^js. Thus a will contained an erroneous recital
to the effect that the testator hail niad(> certain advances
to certain ol' his children durin<;- his lifetime, and on that
a^uiniition the will ]iroceeded to direct that these advances
-hotilil l>e Itroueht into hotchpot : — Held, that evidence
that such advances were never made or were smaller in
amount than slated in the will, was not admissilde {In re
Mnl's K<tate. Af'rd v. Quirk (187;)), 12 Ch. D. 2H1 ;
/» rr W.uhL \V<ird v. Wood (18i:!G), 32 Ch. 1). :.17 : and
see III n- JJiOjot, Puton v. Ornwrod, [18lt3] :* Ch. J-^l.N).

The decision in In re ^Urd's Estate, supra, was reviewed
hy SwiNFEX Eady, J., in the case of In re Kelseij,
W'oollei/ v. Woollei/, [11)05] 2 Ch. 465. There a testator
after erroneously recitino; that a let>atee owed him ,£5,000,
for<rave him £2,000. and directed liim tobrinf; tlie balance
of ^3.000, or "so much thereof as mieht remain unpaid "
at the distribution of assets into hotchpot. His lordshij),
atter dividine; erroneous recitals into two classes, one in
which the recital shows a clear intention of chare;iiifr ;i
legatee with a definite >um. and the other in wliicli tlioii^h
a detinite sum is stated, yet the testator shows an intention
to charge the legatee only with the sum actually due. h(dd
that this case came within the second class. He was al>o
of opinion that /// re Aird's Estate, supra, also came within
class two, anil on the authority of In re Taylor, Tondin v.
['nderha// (1882), 22 Ch. D. 495, 500, refused to follow it.

In the same way, the recital of a particular fact in a deed,
estoj)S all parties to the deed if it is clearly intended to be
a declaration of all the parties to the deed, and estops the
party who makes it where it is intended to be the declara-
tion of that party only, from denying the truth of it (per



Meaning Affectkd by Strrounding Circumstances. 15

Patteson, J., in StronrfhiU v. JJiok (1^50). U (,^. B. Art. 2.

781. at p. 787). i> ~7[,,.

^ -^ iara. (1) (b).

It is to be reineiuborod tliar what is here said applies
merely to the (juestion ot" construction. A will or deed in
which the assumed condition of thinijs is very differeut
from the actual condition of things may be oi)en to attack
on the ground of fraud, mistake, or mental incapacity on
the part of the testator or party. We are here speaking
merely of the interpretation, not of the validity, of the
instrument (see infra, p. 42).

The stiite of a testators family is of importance to show State of a
who are incluiled under a general description. Thus if the fl^l^^^/.^or
gift be to " my children,"" the fact that one of his ri^puted piupurty.
children is illegitimate, would oi'dinarilv be held to >liow
that it was not intended to include him or her in the
description (see infra, Part II., Chaj)ter 11.). Again,
in a gift to " my nephews antl nieces," the fact that the
testator had not at the date of his will any nephews or
nieces of his own, and that all his brothers and sisters
were then dead, would be relevant to show that the words
nephews and nieces referred to the testators wife's nejihews
and nieces (Sherrattw. Momitford ^1873). S ( 'h. [)26 ; and
see Crost/iicaite v. Dean (18G8), ") Etj. 21.") : /a re Imjlex
Trusts (1871), 11 l><i. .-178).

The state of a te>tator*s jumjici'I \- i< ol' iinporlancc to
.siiow what is included umler a general or even a specific
gift. Thus, under the old law. a gilt of ''all my lands in
S. shire'' [jassed the testat()r'> freeholds onl\. if he had lioih
freeliolds and leasehoI<ls in S. -liire. but |i;isse(l his lea>e-
li<dds if he had no freehnlds. Ami in a -peeifie de\ i>(»
under the present l:i\\ .-i te>tatrix li-l't "all that and iIkoc
messuage ar len<ini nt. liou-e, buildings, farm, and lands
called II. . . . -iiuate in the juirish (if L.. e<mt;iiiiiMg
eightv aerr-s more or |c>-« . . . now in ilie nrciiiiiition ol
< '. I).."" to ( '. I ).. hi- liejr- and a>~igns. ( »n |iroof i]i;il ihc



H; Www 1. (il.NKKAI. I'kINCII'LKS.

Art. 2. t'anii ciilli'il 1 1, coiilaiiird 1 7.") ,i<'ic>. llinl ;ill of it \v:is in

,, ... ,, . tln' t)fi-ii|i:iti(jii (il ( '. I ).. ;iii(l tliiit of the 17.") acres altoiit
Para. (I) (li). '

ciulil v-iiiiic wi'ir iVri-liold ill the parish of L.. ahoiit sixty-
live were c'o|i\li()M ill llie |iai-i-li ol' L.. and tlie rest were
eo|)vliold in the ailjoinin;^' paii-li, it was held that this
eviih'iiee >h(i\vrd that the testatrix meant not to devise tlie
whole ot' II. farm to < '. I >.. lnil merel\' thi' eighty-nine
acre- ot" it which were freeiiold and within the parish ot' L.

(W'/i/t/lrlil V. Liuiihhtli' {1.S7:)), 1 eh. I>. (il ).

At the same time the conih'tion of a testator's estate
inii-t not he u()iic into tor the purpose of aherine- the
nii'anint:' ot' lannuajj;e itself |iei-fectlv clear and ])erfectlv
applicahle to deriiiite ohjects in the condition of things to
which the will refers. Tlins \n Hl<i(ii ns \. I ki>r.«)n. []!)(l:i]
,. A. < '. 1. a te-tator. when he made his will, owed two mort-
e;a;i-e dehts which toi;('tliei- constituted his whole personal
estate. P)y his will, after directing the payment of his
dehi- and t'liiieral and lestamentarv expen.ses, he hccpieathed
certain le;;acies. and ;^a\-e to thi-<'e jiersons '• all the residue
and remainder" of the two niortnaoe dehts after pay-
ment of hi- dehts and funei-al and testamentary expen.se.s
t- (not adding •■ and legacie.s '"). The two mortgage debts^
were ju.st sufficient to pay the debts, funeral and testa-
mentary expen.ses and legacies. But before his death the
testator acquired other personal estate. There was no
general residuary clause in the will: — Held, that ''all
the re-ii|iie and remainder "" ret'crred only to the rest of
till' mortgage debts after ]ia\"ment of dehts and funeral
expenses, and were not e(iuivaliMit to a gift of the whole
roidne of his jiersonal estate.

Tcstator".s The state of a te-tator's knowledge or ac(|uaintance is

kniiwleflgc , . i • i . , . . ,

oracc|uaiiu- ''"' "'^'.'^ '"' important. It a lte(pie>t is left snnplv to .John

Smith, proof that the testator was accjuainted with one

• lolin Smith would tend to show that he was the John

.Smith referred to. In the words of Lord Cairns, L.C,

in ('raven (tud J/eri'e'/-/>((f/iiir.-'f v. /-'rriiH/ton and Others



mice.



Meaxing Altered by Surrouxding Circumstances. 17

(1877), 37 L. T. ^oS. at p. 339, -'In construing the will Art. 2.
o£ the testator . . . wo should put ourselves as tar p.^^..^ ^^ i,
as we can in the position of the testator and inter[)ret his
expressions as to persons and things with reterenee to
that degree of knowledge of those persons and things
which, so far as we can discover, the testator possessed."
And see In re Vauahan (1901). 17 T. L. 11. 278.

On the same principle, evidence is admissible to show
the testator's knowledge that a certain person has pre-
deceased him (Be Whoricood, Ogle v. SJierhorne (1887),
34 Ch. D. -I-IG), or that at the date of the wdll a certain
person was dead, leaving only illegitimate children (AV
Herbert's Trusts (1860), 1 Jo. & H. 121), or that he
entertained certain religious ojnnions {Bunbury v. Doran
(187-1;, Ir. K. ^ (". L. 51(1), to aid the court in ascertain-
ing the meaning of the words of the will. And see /// tlit^
Goods ofChappell [189-1] P. 98.

The admission of extrinsic evidence of surrounding cir- Identitication
cumstances has been carried very lar in tlie matter ot ticiaries
identifying beneficiaries and others referred to in wills.
As we have seen, where the words refer to the thing given
if there is something in existence which adequately answers
the words of the will, the court will not admit extrinsic
evidence to show that something else or something mori'
was intendcci (Jlhjijins \. Dawson, supra). But that |iiiii-
ciple seems to have Ijeen dej)art('d from where ihc woiil-
refer not to a thing but to a jicrson. Tim- in Charter v.
Charter (1874). 7 U. L. 3()4, a testator, called Forster
Charter, had hail iliicc sons, Forster, William Forster
— alwuvs known a«. W'illiiini and < 'Iiarl<>. Tlie tii>f
died before the testat(jr made his will, the second li\rd
at a great di-itanee Iroin the te-(ator, and was not on
good terms with liini. and tin- third li\i'd with the trsiator.
his wile and hi- daughter IJarbara, whom the l< >tator in
his will called "• I'arbara For>ter.*' The will :i|.|iointed
" my .son, For.Hter (.'barter," executor, left him the house



18 1'aKT I. — GeNEUAI, 1*1;INCI1-LHS.

Art. 2. and I'anu i)(\'ii|iit'<l li\- tlic icslaldi' al his ilcalli. madr |>ro-
I'ura (l)(b) Vision lor Forstcr ('liartcr ami llic tcstiitor's wile and
daughter ccasiiit;' to li\(' t(i;^ctlicr, and directed " my
oxceutor Forstcr ( 'liai-tcr " to pay " Jiaidiara l'\)i-sl('i- " an
aiinuitv. I'rohatc havin^;; been granted to William Forstcr
( 'iiai'tcr, on a citation to recall ])rol)at(^ : — Ih'ld, \hi\i dii-ect
evidence of declaration- liy I lie testator was not. Imt the
e\id('nec ot" the state, circuinstanccs and hahits oi' the tes-
tator and his family was, admissible to show that by
•' Forstcr Charter" the testator meant Charles Charter.

Here it may be said that the context of the will raiseij
a ipresnmption that by " Forster Charter" the testator
really meant Charles ( 'barter. This can liardly l)e said.
however, as to the caseot' IIendin:to7iY. Henderson. [l*J();j]
1 I. R. 353. There a testator left property in trust for
his "grandsons Robert William Henderson and John
Barnett Henderson, or the survivor of them, in case tlu'y
or he shall attain twenty-one years." The testator had, at
the date of the will, three grandsons — one calb'd IJoliert
AVilliam. the son of Oliver, who was living, and two otiiers
called William Uol)ert and John Barnett respectively, the
sons of a deceased son of the testator, calleil jjobert Wil-
liam Marshall Henderson. There was a recital in the will
as follows : " As I have recently given to my son, Oliver
Henderson, the sum of £1,023, which I consider an ample
provision for him, I do not leave; him anything by this my
will " : — Held, that evidence of surrounding circumstances
was admissible to show that by " my grandson, Robert
William Henderson," the testator meant not his grandson
Robert William, but his grandson William Robert.

The only recital which could be said to raise a presumj)-
tion that '• liobert AVilliam Henderson " was not used by
the testator to describe the grandson l)earing that name
was that as to the advancement of his father Oliver. If
this raised any presumption at all it was a very weak
one. The decision undoubtedly carries the rule farther



Meaxini; Affected by Surrounding Circumstances. 19

than any of the previous decisions. See, further, Re Art, 2.

Hooper, Hooper v. Warner (1903), 88 L. T. IGO, and Re p.^j..^ (i)(b).

ChenoicetK Ward v. Dxcellen (1901), 17 T. L. R. alo ; '
In re Blake s Trusts, [1904] 1 I. R. 98.

The prineijile apjiliealilc to deeds is the same as that Evidence of
applying to wills, with this dilierence (as ])oiiit(Hl out by circum- °
Lord Blackburn, in Rh-er Wear Commissioners v. Adam- stances in

, ,1 •nil -ill < ,-,• • relation to

son, supra), that, as a will deals with the testator s aftairs the interpre-

generallv. therefore the state of his affairs oeuerally is t'^^i"^'" ^'if
'' ' « J deeds.

releAant. while as a deed refers usually only to a particular
transaction, matters connected with that transaction alone
are relevant. Thus in the case of the grant of a lease, the
condition of the property leased at the date of the grant is
a relevant fact, of which the court will admit evidence to
assist it to construe a covenant to repair in the lease
(Lister v. La7ie, [1893] 2 Q. B. 212). A dictum of
RiGBY, L.J., in Broomjieldx. Williams, [1897] 1 Ch. G02,
at p. GIG, goes even further. It is to the elfect that the
condition of land at the time an agreement to convey it is
entered into may be taken into consideration in construing
the subsequent conveyance, though in the meantime the
condition of the land has changed. And see l^ri/or v.
Petre, [1894] 2 ( "h. 11 ; and. ////'m, Part III.. Cliap'. 1.

Where the instrument to be construed is aneient, and Ancient
therefore tlie surrounding facts of a ]iublic nature are m^t 'l^'^'"»>*-'"ts.
witliin the cognizance of the court, ihccouit ma v ascer-
tain those facts by rel'erring to the writings of historians,
to contemporary documents, and to all other sources of
evidence such a- .-i hi.-torian in\estigating the ]teriod would
resort to (Ridsdale\. Cli/lon (1877), 2 P. I >. 27(1 : /',ad \.

Iiish.>i, nf I/n,rnin, [1X92] A. T. Gllj.

I'aRAi.RAI'II ( 1 ) ((•).
"As words and |ihra-es ol" Sjteeeh :ire to be expninided I.ooaI,

and construe(l as they are gen^-rally imderstood, soil is jn^i ,'|!,i<ij, '
likewise in particuhir places ; and tlierefore, if 1 covenant "»"''•'>««•



•JO I'.VKT I. OkNKUAL PlUNCirLKS.

Art. 2. to fonvcv to anolln'r :iii acre ol' laml in ( 'oniwall. iIh' coiii-
Para (IMc) inoii acfcptatioii of the word ' acre ' tlicre ainoniits to as
iiuu'li as a liuiidrtMl of other counties, so a ' jieri'li ' in
Stafford-hire is as nnieli as twenty ])erclies in sonic oth<'i-
phieos, theri'fore such words must be ^overneil liv the
common and known acceptation of tlie peoph' " ( jicr
curiam. \n I uirksdale v. Morgan (16i)3), 4 Mod. 185).

Attain, in /// re Steel, Wappett \. I'oliinson, [It'OI-i]
1 ( 'h. ].".'), a testatrix devised to X. lier "freeliold land
and hereditaments at IM." in Westmorehmd. She had
l»oth "freeholds" and " customary freeholds '" at ]\I. It
was shown that l)v local usage at M. customary freeholds
were called freeholds simidy. and that the testatrix was
unaware of the distinction in tenure -.—Held, that both
the freeholds and the customary freeholds passed to X.
And see Briiner v. Moore, [1904] 1 ( 'h. 30"), where on
evidence of business usage " month " was held to mean
not a lunar Init a calendar month. And see In re Rapier,
Rai/ner v. Rayner, [1904] 1 Ch. 176, at p. 188, where in
considering whether " securities " could be held equivalent
to " investments " the court dwelt on the necessity of
admitting, where necessary, evidence of the use of such
phrases by persons accustomed to deal in stocks and
shares.

Customary Whether a certain word or })hi\ise has. when used in

meaning' ii . • ^- ^ • -i-ix . ,

1 ufstion i)t' ii certain eunneetion. a eu>toniai-v meanuig ditterent irom

ti^ct. its natural or usual meaning is always a (juestion of fact :

but it sometimes is a question of fact which the court will

itself decide, without calling for extrinsic evidence to

support the customary meaning. When this is the case,

the custom which gives the word its customary meaning

is said to be judicially recognised — that is, the courts

have had the fact, that under certain circumstances the

word has a customary meaning, so often brought to their

attention, that they have at length taken judicial cognizance

of the fact. Until the custom becomes a judicially recog-



Meaning Affected by Custom. 21

nised custom, extrinsic evidence of the custom is necessary Art. 2.
to prove to the court that there is a special custom which p.^ ,j, ,^.
gives the words in ijuestion the customary meanino- aUeged
(pev Channell, J. : Moult v. Hallidai/ (1898), 77 L. T.
7itl. at p. 7i)6).

So tar as wills are concerned, custom seldom goes Customary
further than to modifv the sense in which words or "ip;^"i"oS m

^ wills.

phrases are presumed to be used ; but in the case of
deeds, as we .shall shortly see, special custom not infre-
quently introduces provisions altogether unexpressed in
the instrument.

Paragraph (1) (d).

This rule is akin to that stated in paragraph (1) (c). Words

It has, however, one important point of ditference. The ^l^y^J |J^ ^j^^

rule as to customarv meaninii' prevails even though the testator

, . , . ,. ' .' , , Tii- 1 inaccuratolj'.

words m tJieir ordniarv meanmg would create noditticulty

in ap[)lying the instrument to the facts. This is clear

from the instances given in BarhsdaJi^ v, Moryan, supni.

The rule now stated, however, onlv prevails when the

words of the instrument taken in their ordinary sense do

not jiroperly ap])ly to the facts. If the words taken

in their ordinary meaning apply properly and without

ditHculty to the facts, the court will not admit evidence

to siiow that the testator or parties used them habitually

in a different sense. Thus, in I^oe v. O.renden (1810),

."> Tamit. 117, a testator devised his "estate at Ashtou"

to U, It was held that his estate situate at Ashton only,

passed to 0., and tiiat evi<lene(' was not ;i(lmissil)le to show

that the te.stiltoi" hal/it ii:dl\- included land >ituatc d.-cwhrre

in tiie term ''Ashton e.-tate." And the fact that such a

(•on>trucf ion will cause incuii\ciiiencc, is no ground to

induce the court to depart Inuii it. Tim-, in /// /v Seal,

Seal V. '/'aijlnr, [l^'.'l] I < 'li. illil, the t<-tator devised

*' my residence calleil Stoneleigh House and the premises

thereto as the same are now occupied l>y me" to his wire.



22 Pakt T. (Jknkkal PuiNcirLKs.

Art 2. At the (late of his will, and up lo lii< di-atli. the licld
Para (\)Uh '"^U"''^'"rl Stonidci^fli House, the lowci- |»ai-t ol' the ont-
lu)iisi>s (wliic'li was ajipidai-lu'd I'roin a private r()ad)l)Ut
not tlie upper room (wliieli i-oiild he ap])roaelieil only
thniiiLih Sl(»n(deiL;h lIou>e) and the wasldioiise ami otHees
in the yard i>l' Stoneleinh House Avei'e oeeuj)ie(l hy the
testator's sons I'or the purpose of their husiness. It was
C'ontcniled on hehaU' of the wife that, as it would Ix;
extreiiudv ineoincnient to have part of the outhouses and
the ottiees and wasldiouse in the yard severed i'roin the
rest ot" the house, the Avords ''as the same are now
oeeujiied hy me" shouhl be rejected as fal.sa demonstratio
(see infra, p. 5t5) on the ground that there was proi)erty
of the testator which answered precisely to the description
in the will, and when that was the case the court could
not alter the natural construction of the words merely
because the result of construino- them naturally would
lie ineonvenient to some of the l)eneficiaries. And see
///'/;//■/(,-• v. Dawson, [H)02j A, V. 1, supra, p. IG.

Hahitual The same rule applies where the words in question

tion u/"'' I'^'ft'i* "ot to the e-ift but to the objects of the gift. H" they
I)er.«r>iis where app]v aiitlv to a certain iierson, or class of persons, evidence
answering ^^lU nut he admissible to show that the testator or parties
descH)tion li:i'''tii:ilb- ap[»lied the words improperly to other persons
exist. or classes of ])ersons. Thus, in the case of In re Parker,

Benthani v. Wilson (1881), 17 Ch. D. 262, a testator gave
one third of his property to his first cousins, and two-
thirds to his second cousins. At his death lie left first