The principles of the interpretation of wills and settlements online

cousins, second cousins, and children and uraiidcliildren
of first cousins. The court, though the point wa< not
actually decided, intimated that evidence thit the testator
was in the habit of descril)ing th<' children of his Wr^t
cousins as second cousins would lujt be admissible. On
the other hand, in In re Jeans, L'jiton v. Jeans, W. N.
(18i>5) 98, the testator left his property to his " children."
He had no children, and therefore the description diil not



)ns
ings
m



Meaning Affected by Rule of Ejusdem Generis. 23

aptly apply to any persons. Evidence was admitted to Art. 2.
show that he was in the habit of callino- his wife's children p^ra (i)(d)
by a previous husband, his children, and that they were
intended to take under the gift. And see In re Deakin,
Starke'/ v. Et/res, [1894] 3 Ch. 565 ; Flood v. Flood,
[1902] 1 I. R. 538 ; and British Home for Ineurahles v.
Royal Hospital for Incurables (1904), 90 L. T. GOl.

Paragraph (1) (e).

This rule must be read subject to Article 1 and Para- Restriction
graph 2 of this Article. By the first of these, general words, ^vl)r(ls follow-
like other words, are in-imd facie to be taken in their usual ing particular

,..,.' . 4111 persons or

nieanmg — that is, in their general nieannig. And h\ tlie things, to

latter, when the intention of the parties or the testator is 1'^''?;''
clearly ascertained, the meaning to be given to general tjimh
words, like other words, is governed by that intention. All ^^"'^' *''â– 
that the present paragraph means is that the fact that general
words are preceded by specific words all indicating a
certain class of persons or kind of things, suggests that
the general words were used not in their general sense
but in a sense restricted to othei' persons or things included
in that class or kind, l)ut not covered by the s^jccific words.
See /.>^r Pollock, (".!>.. in Liindon v. Standbridge (1857),
2 H. A: X. 45, at [i. 51 : "It is a general rule of con-
struction that, where a particular class is s))oken of, and
general wortls follow, tin- class first iiiciitidiicd is to be
taken as the most c(jm])rc]i('nsive, and the general words
treated as rcffrriiig to matters c/iisdrin oiiui-is with such
class.'-

The iciidfiicy (tf the flcci-joiis of late iiKirr fspecialiy .M.mI.th

in tin- case of wills, has been rather t(j disre<^ird or restrict »'■'"''""''>/"

'^ disregard

tlii« doetrine tA' cjiisdinn gc/wr/s (svi' Hodgsnu \. .A,/- ( 187(1), ijiiMihm
'1 ( li. I ». 122j ; and if the dicta of some of tli<' jmlges •'"""''"

.•ire to be ae'-epleij, piaetieallv it llUS ceuseii to e\i>t. For
example, Lord IO-ili;i:. .M.K.. in Andtrsmi \. Andrrsn/i,



24 P.MtT 1, — General Principles.

Art. 2. [LSD')] I {.). 15. 7 lit. :ii p. ">:\) states tlic rule thus :
Para (Du-i " ^''■''""' ./<""'<' ;^»'n('ral words are to he taken in their
hir;:('r sense, iinh'ss Vdii can Hntl that in the |(artieiilar
case the true eoii-triici idii nl the iii^l riiinciit re(|iiires von
t(» eoiiehnh' that they ar(^ iiiteiuh'd to l)C used in a sense
limited to things ejusdcvi omeris witli those whicl) have
heen specifically mentioned hefore." Stated thus, the
rule is merely an a|)j)lieation of the l)roadcr rule that the
I intention when ascertained is to iiovern the meanins; of
I the words used. It is submitted, however, that in the
cases where such dicta are used the decisions do not go
so far. Nearly all of them might have been decided on
the ground that the rule of ejusdem r/eneris did not apply,
for the simple reason that there was no <ii'ni/.-<. The
persons or tilings specifically mentioned did not all belong
to any definite class or kind. In this very case of Ander-
son V. Anderson, supra, i\n' things s])ecifically mentioned
included furniture, plate, linen, glass, tenant's fixtures,
pictures, statuary, works of art and consumable goods.
The general w'ords following these were, " and other goods
"â– battels and effects in or belonging to *' the settlor's house.
Surely if the things here specifically mentioned belonged
to any kind or class of things in particular, it was ])re-
cisely the class described by the general words, and no
other. At any rate the context here — which included
a devise, to the same person, of the house itself — clearly
showed that the words were to be taken in their widest
meaning.

Of late there has been some reaction against this
tendency to disregard the doctrine of ejusdem <jeneris. In
In re Stockport Ragged Industrial and J\e/ormator// Schools,
[1808] 2 C'h. 687, is an examjde. There the words under
consideration were " any cathedral, collegiate, chapter, or
other schools " contained in s. CO of the Charitable Trusts
Act. 18r)3, and the question was whether "other schools "
meant all other schools or only other schools more or less



Meaning Affected by TUle of Ejusdem Generis. '2')

like cathedral, oolle;;iate. ami chapter school. The court Art. 2.
adopted the latter interpretation, and Lindley, M.R. (at Para. (l)(e).
p. 69(3), referrino; to Aiuhrson v. Anderson, supra, treated
the judgment of Lord Esher. M.R., as not overruling the
doctrine of ejuscleni (^^/ener/s, hut nicrclv as a protest against
its heing jiushed too tar.

In the case of wills, the inclination of the court is to Cases where
disregard the rule where the effect of ren;ardinu; it would ^!"^ :n'pl}t<\-
be to cause a partial intestacy. Thus, the interpretation (loctiine of
of general words following specific words, all describing 'n"^,'r;T\vo\x\d
things belontiin<r to one class, deiiends very largely on cause partial

1 fi ^ .1 • 1 . • 1 ? / 1 intestacy.

whether or not they occur in what was intended to be

a residuary clause. If they do, they are taken in the
larger meaning (Parker \. Marchant (1842), 1 Y. (k, C. 0.
290). If they do not, and taking them in the larger
sense would make the clause residuary, they are read
ejusdem f/eneris (Smith v. Davis (1806), 1-1 W. R. 912 ;
CamphM V. McGrain (1875), I. R. 9 Eq. 397).

So far as individuals are concerneil, this rule seldom Doctrine
finds any application in wills or deeds. It is, however, )^^„*^,"v,' "'
often a])plied in construing statutes. Thus, in the Lord's applied to

7. 4 / >r> / . . _s . . ^ ^ ^\ 1. .L j^ ^ individuals.

Day Act f29 < ar. 2, c. /) it is enacted that "no trades-
man artificer workman labourer or other person what-
soever shall do or exercise any worldly labour l)usiness
or work of their ordinary callings upon the Lord's Day " :
— I/eld, that "other jierson whatsoever" here means only
other persons following callings similar to those specifically
described, and therefori' <l()<'< not iii'linlc a farmer (A', v.
Cleworth (1H61), 1 1'. iV S. ".'27 ) or a coach |irt)prietor
(Sandiman v. Jin-ar/i (I^!27). 7 15. \ < '. ;•(■.).

As to the subject matter of gifts, sec //' Mill< r. l>ani,J\. Applied t<>
]>aniel nHS9), 61 L. T. 'M\'k There :, i.-tator, :ifter l!','.!;!?^;'^;^,,
giving the following Icgacic-. to I*. i!l(><l.. to A. the books <iit ilnwn
and wine at Ins residence, to J . ;ill tlw plate :it In-, ri'>iileMce, ,i,„,',f ,1^.
made tlie-e luMpie-t- : ".All the |-. - t ol tin- liiniil iin- and ''"'■"' •



26 IV\i;t I. ( Jknf.i; \i. 1'i;in(II'I,1'>



Para. (l)(cl.



Art. 2. ctVrcts"' :i! his roidciicc in I >. alorc-aiil. ;mil •"llic rest
residue iiiul ri'iiiaimlcr "' ol' his "estate ami ctVcets what-
soever :iinl w hci-c-ocxcr "" lo T. atoresaiil. ( )ii the testator's
death ihi-rc uci-e rmintl al his i-i'si(hMK'e .^2,7U^ in hank
notes, a jiost Kill, a (hx idcml warrant, and certain certificates
for shares: — //eld, tliat ••ett'ects*" nin-i lie construed
tjiisdi'm (ji'ui'vis with l)Ooks, wine, plate and I'liiniture, and
therefore not to inehide the hank notes, po.st hill, dividend
warrant and certiticates (and see Re Parrolt (1^85),
:uy L. 'L\ IL' : /.ami.ouni y. .]/rLellan, [lUO*}] 2 Ch. 2(',ii,
an.l .\/nr/>lni;i V. rhilUi>.<. [I'JOl] 1 I. K. 155).

"Here- I'l CroDipfon v. Jarratt (1885), 30 Ch. D. 298, a

(litaments" g^ttlor by deed of settlement conveyed ''all and sineuhir
.similarly '' . . ,

cut doWn. the manors messuages farm hinds hereditaments and

premises comprised and described in the Schedule here-
under written and all other the freehold liereditaments of
him the said (settlor) situate in the several })arishes of
Doncaster AVarmworth and Cantley in the county of York
together with their appurtenances."' The Schedule
enumerated all the settlor's lands and other cor})oreal
liereditaments in these parishes, but did not refer to an
advowson in trross which belono-ed to him. and which
concerned a church and glebe in one of the parishes
mentioned in the settlement : — Held, that though, if
there was nothing else to satisfy the words of the settle-
ment, then the advowson miglit ])ass under them, yet as
there were hereditaments situate in these jjarishes which
aptly fitted the words, an advowson which properly
speaking could not be said to he "situate" anywhere
would not })ass. In delivering judgment, Cotton, L.J.,
said (at p. 316), "Although it is true . . . that
words of general description like this ai-e used in order to
carry into the assurance anything which l)y accident has
been omitted, yet. in my opinion, they must, p7'imd facie,
be held to include oidy things that are of the same class
and nature as those which have been s[)ecitieally described



Meaning Affected by Rlle of Ejusde^i GEXEras. 27

and eniiinerateJ." Sue this ease distinguislied in Re Art. 2.
Hodgson, Tai/lor x. Jlodgson, [1898] 2 Ch. 545. Pj^^.^^ (i)(e).

Aoain in In re CastIehou\ Lamonln/ v. Carter, [1903] " Public
-1 /.I ^ - . . ii'^ii -i companv.

1 Lh. 3oz, a testatrix empowered ner trustees to nivest

the trust funds in any of the public funds, or in Govern-
ment or real or leasehold securities, or upon the stock,
shares or securities of any railway or other " public
company *' : — Held, that raking the words "• public com-
pany â– ' along with those preceding them, public company
must be held to apply only to public ci)nijianie> in the
United Kingdom. (/. In re Stanley, Tennaitt v. Stanley
(1905), 75 L. J. Ch. 50.

For an a[>plicaliun of the doctrine of (jusdent generis to
the interpretation of powers of attorney, see Jacobs v.
Morris, [1902] 1 Ch. 8lt.'.,

The proviso to the rule may best be stated in the words Proviso to
of WiLLES, J., in Fenwick v. Schmalz (1868), 3 C. P. 313, „J,^,^^/' ,.1,1^.
at p. 315 : "That case (R. v. Payne (18GG), 1 C. C. 27) '
falls within the rule that if the particular words exhaust
the whole genus, the general wui'd must refer to some
larger genus, '^

Pauaokaph (1) (f).

Generallv siteakin^i' the interitretation put uiion a deed Uhsemo
• ' '^. '. Ill- words III

(jr will by persons acting im<ler it, as shown by their acts, ancient

i- not relevant to thr h-ual int<Tiir<'talion of ihi' deed''',"""!'",""'"

or will (Clyde Sarigatimi Trust ns \. /.ii/rd ( l.S<S3), Lion aiu-<l

8 App. ('as. 658). An exception, how cNcr. to this I'lde j,,.,j,.„i„,.

occur- in the case of aneit-nt in-tnnnrnt- which an-, or -*"-'â– 

iiave bv time, become and»igu(jus in (jieir terms (see I^ord

Hastings v. Nnrl/t Kastrrn /uiiliruy, [IS'.HI] I ( "h. ('n')!'.. at

p. G63; atfirnicil [1900] A. ( '. 2t;0). With regard to

tliese, the coini will |»"rmit evidence of tin- aci> done by

persons acting under their pro\i-ions to -olvc ainliiguities.

In tin* words of SlUUEN, < '.. in Atl.-titn. \. I hnnnnoml



28



I'.MIT I. — Gf.NKKAL PlUNCirLKS.



Art. 2.
Pftni. (l)(f).



Evidence
of ancient
usrtge.



Usage must
have been
unifnnn.



Illustration
of evidence
of ancient
usage.



(1S4:2), 1 \h\ \ W'av. .):>:), at ji. ;5(;.S, "Onc of the most
settled rule.s ot" law toi- the con.stniction ot" ;mil)i<!;uities in
an ancient instrument is, that you may resort to eontem-
]i(»raneotis ii-a^c to ascertain the meanin^j; of the deed ;
tell lue what von ha\t' (h)nc niider such a deed, and
1 will tell you what the dvvd means." Thus tlie mode in
which the ori<j;inal donor of trust funds acted in administer-
ini: them, was held to he evidence to aid the court in
construing the trust ileed {Att .-Gen. v. Brazenose ColUu/e
(Us;Uj, 2 CI. it F. 2115, at p. 32t]).

This evidence is what is called evidence of ancient usage.
But uncontradicted evidence of modern usage is also
eviilence to aid the court in construing amliiguities or
obscurities in ancient instruments (per Pauke, B., in
Beaufort v. Swansea {Mayor of) (1849), 3 Ex. 413,
at ].. 42')). Thus in J/eah/ v. 71iorne (1870), Ir. M.
4 ( ". L. 4'.l.5, evidence of usage during the eighty years
preceding Avas admitted to aid in construing a grant by
King James I.

The usage proved, must be the uniform usage, though
a temporary lapse from it will not make evidence of it
ina.lmissible (T/ie Queen v. Archdall (1838), 8 Ad. & El.
281, at p. 2SS) ; and the evidence is only admissible when
the terms of the instrument are ambiguous or obscure.
It will not be admitted to contradict what is clear and
express (ifar/fZ^ la Warr v. Miles (1881), 17 Ch. D. 535).
" It is not to be disputed that, where the necessity of the
case requires it, evidence of more recent usage and custom
may be adduced for the purpose of explaining old or
obsolete or even imperfect expressions to be found in
ancient documents. But the necessity must be apparent,
the ambiguity must be fouiul to l)e existing" (pei'
Bacon, V.-C il>/(l., at p. 573).

A testator, in 1(541, left certain lands to Sidney Sussex
College, (.'ambridge, and Trinity ( "ollege, Oxford, " for
the only use. education in pietie and learninge of foure of



Meaning Affected by Ancient Usage. '2d

the descendants of the brothers and sisters of my second Art. 2.
wife or in default of such to their next poor kindred for ParjTn") if\
the first, by the Cither's side for the second, by the
mother's side and the lease of the said ' lands ' to be at
one tliird parte under the value to my said wire's kindred
ever viz. brothers and sisters there and at Harrowe."' The
two colle<Tes accepted the gift, and each had always
required that those persons who clainicd th(> benefit thereof
should become members of the college and be educated
there, and when there were no claimants, each college
had appropriated a moiety of the rents to their own pur-
poses. It was contended that this inter})retation of the
will was wrong ; that the will constituted a trust of the
lands for the purpose of educating certain of the testator's
kindred, subject to the regulation and direction of the
court : — Held, that the intention of the testator was that
the education given was to be that provided bv the
colleges to which he had left the lands, and that, tliere-
fore, the colleges were carrying it out when they insisted
on the claimants becoming members, and that the colleges
were entitled to appropriate the income when no elaimants
appeared. In delivering judgment. Lord Hathekley,
L.(J.. said, *' I thiidc th<' appellants are entitled to aj)plv
that princijile (if the court, which says, that if thert' be
any ambiguity, the course of construction and action u]ioii
the bequest may be calh'cl in aiil. as inferring llial the
persons who are concerned in thr ti-ii-i lia\c not Keen
committing a breach of trust from the (dininenceiueiit
downwards to the present time "" {All.-d'i/i. \. S/'il/n'i/
Susse.r Colleen' (IStJO), 4 ( 'h. 722).

In St'imiiwr.s v. /h'.r,„i (\S{)(]), 7 Kast. 2<Mi. tb<'re was
an ancient adnii->ion to eop\liold in thc^i- icini- "'tre.i
acrax jirati, " an<l the (jnestion in di>pitte was whether the
a(lmissi«jn cfjiiveyed the whole interest in the land, or a
right to enter- ii|ion th<- land and take the tui-eerop.
Hvideiiee showed that I'iDin linie iinnienioiial. the beiietii



30 Pakt 1. ( JKNr;i!Ai. Pkincii'lks.

Art. 2. of tlir tell;. Ill iimlrr I lie lirniit had liccii i-(mliii('(l to the

,, 77., c. taking: tin- rorccrop, ami that every other l)eiieiit ol the
I am. ( 1 ) (t). â–  '

laud had liem enjoyed hy the ij;raiitor.s, h)ril,s ot" the manor.
It was lield that the f>rant coiivoyod only the iiicor})oreal
hereilitainenr. In deliverinii; jnd<i,inent, the eoui't said
(|i. iKIT). "We must then eonstiMie the ri<>hts ot" the
parties, however deriveil iVom ancient erant.s, consi.stently
with the j)ossession. and there will then exist a coiivliold
interest in the jD'/iua (o/i.-mrd, I'oi- tlie dd'endant, and ever\'
other freehold interest in the land forihc plaintitV. lint
this, it is said, is inconsistent with the enti-ies on the eoui-t
rolls, which erant an interest in tlie soil to the tenant, and
wore evitlence for the jury to show in what i-inht the
defendant claimeiland took the forecrops. The admissions
are to tres acras prati ; but can it be said that the woid
prati is not open to receive any construction which will
carry a less interest than the whole right to the soil ? The
judge thought, that if the usage in fact were tliat the
defendant and those under whom he claimed had never
enjoyed any other benefit of the land than the forecrop,
and that those undei- whom the plaintiff claimed had
enjoyed every other benelit of it, that word might receive
a construction conformable to the actual enjoyment, and I
think he was right in that opinion,*'

The rule applies ('([ually to the interpretation of Acts of
Parliament. Thus in Covporatimi <»/' Ihihliu v. l^naiti/
Collefje (1903), «8 L. T. ;')(».■). the (piestion was whether
Trinity College was or ever had been liable to '"grand
jury cess.'' The answer di'|iendei| on the interpretation of
various old Irish Acts. l']videnee wa>u;i\('n thai no ^raiid
jury cess had ever been levied. T'he court had held that this
was to be taken into consideration in deciding what was the
meaning of the ambiguous ex])ressions in the Irish Acts.
Lord Halsbury, L.C, in moving the dismissal of the
appeal from this decision, said. " The learned comisel hare
insisted that if the plain words of an Act of Parliament



Meaning Affected by Ancient Usage. 31

impose a tax. no amount of omission to charoc that tax ov Art. 2.
to insist upon it 1)y the proper executive officer couhl p^i-a (i)(f).
control, or cut down, or override tlie force of the Act of
Parliament itself. "With that observation I entirely agree.
I do not think that any amount of user would be enough
to contradict the projter efficiency of an Act of Parlia-
ment : but the proposition must be that the language of
the Act of Parliament is incapable of exposition otherwise
than in the mode in which it nnist hit this or that subject
of taxation. But . . . when you are dealing with
the question what is the meaning of an Act of Parliament,
or of certain words used in it, the question how these
words were understood at the time when the Act was
passed, or what was the sense in which at that time people
would generally have understood them, is a very different
question. To my mind, where there has been a user for
some centuries in which a particular meaning has been
attached to particular words it may well l)e that the true
understanding of those words is exhibited by the con-
tinuous ])ractice of those centuries. ... It will not
control it "" (the meaning of the Act) '" Init in order to
interpret the meaning when it is not plain, the user at the
time or at a subsequent time, may well be brought
in aid.*'

Paragraph (2).

'"It is now, 1 Itcbcvr, uiiivrr.-ally ailiuiiti'il, that in Striking out
construing a will, thi- rule is to read it in the ordinary vu.nis whort

grammatical sense of the words, uiilos >om(' ()1)\ ious il'^^' yi^'i'^'ral

... . . • 1 1 '^••lifmu of lliu

absurdity, or some repugnanci* or inconsistcncv wiili Hie (lutuinent

declared intentions of tiic writer, to be extractt-d iVoni ilu' •i<i""i'« >t ;

whoh* instrument, should follow IVfjin so readiug it. Thm

tlie sense may be modified, extcnde(I, or aliridged. >(> ;iv iti

avoid tljose consefjiu'uces, but no further. . . (Jiiiie

consistently with thi> inle. \\or<U and nniitaii(in> may be

»upplieil or rejerte(l when warranted lt\ I lie innnediate



32 I'aim' I. - Gkni:i;al PinNcii'LEs.

Art. 2. I'oiitfxt or the ;^t'ii('r;il st'liciuc of the will, luii not iiicrcly
P)ira~7'') **" "' C()iij('iMin;il liy|»othosis of the testator's intontiou,
li()W('\('r r(':i^()ii;il)l(', in ()])]i()siti()n to tlio ])lain and obvious
st'iisc of ilir instrumcni "' ( jh r Lord AVkn'slkydat.k, in
Ahhott V. Mi.liUcto), (l.S;l.s), 7 H. L. (Jas. (J8, at \k " '•
And SCO jx'f Stiuling, I^.d.. in /// /v Uli/'lmorc, W'n/trrs v.
//<nwvVv)», [1JM)2] -2 Cli. ili;. ;it |,. 70).

" \\ hell till- main jiurposc and intention of the testator
are asecrtaincd to the satisfaction of the court, if particuhir
oxpressioiis arc found in the will which are inconsistent
witli snt'h intention, though not sufficient to control it, or
which indicate an intention wdiich the law will not permit
to take effect, such expressions must be discarded or
modified. And, on the other hand, if the will shows that
the testator must necessarily liave intended an interest to
be given, the court is to supply the defect by iinj)lie;ition,
and thus to mould the lan^uaoe of the testator, so as to
carry into eff^ect. as far as ])ossible, the intention which
it is of o|iiiiion that the testator has on tlic whole will
suffieiently declared "" { j>er Jjord KlXGSDOWN, in 'J'oicns v.
U'rnfirnri/, (1.S58). U l\Ioo. l\ C. C. 520).

•• It is (piite true, 1 am not to conjecture or guess at
what might have been the intention of the parties ; but I
am to consider the whole instrument, and if there appear
a plain intention to give interest, then, though there
should be no express words to that eff'cct, and this is the
case of a deed, yet I am bound to give it that construc-
tion " (per Lord St. Leonakds : Clayton v. Glengall
(IS 11). 1 Dr. ct W. 1, atp. 14).

I'.ui iIr- ^>o indication of intention is, however, sufficient to induce

rntenti<.n ^^^^ court to hold that a certain bequest has been made,
must ho unless, as a matter of fact, the bequest is made either

clearlv •, , . ,. . . , .i, . ,

exnreksed in expressly or by necessary nnplication ni the will itself.

order that fhe court Cannot make a will for the testator. The only
the rule may .,,,... -^

Ihj applied. intentions of his which it can carrv out are the intentions



Meaning Affected by General Intention. :Ki

either explicitly or iiinilicilly expressed in the will. In Art. 2.
the words of Lord Halsbiky, L.C, iu Scah' v. Hmclins, p.^^..^ .,>
[1892] A. C. 342. at p. :U3. "the difficulty which I have
here is uot in specula t in <;• upon what poradvonture may, at
some time or other, have hecn in the testator's mind ; but
I must tind words which are absolute and express. I
might be })ertectly satistied that he intended that this lady
should have an estate of inheritance in this property. 1
mioht be satisfied that that was his intention otherwise
than by the words of the will ; but I should be compelled
to come to the same conclusion as I do now, namely, that
that intention is not sufficiently expressed. . . . The
thing has not been done : and I am not aware of any
authority which would lead vour lordships to come to the
conclusion that, because the testator had, at some time or
other, the intention in his mind to give this property to the
person in question, you are justilied in saying that he has
done so by the instrument which he has executed." And
see In re Bagot, Fatoii v. Unnennl, [1893] 3 C'h. 3-48 ;
Murdoch v. Brasa (190.")), (J F. 841, hfra, p. 59 ; and
Art. 8, infra.

Necessary implication has been defin(Ml liv Lord Kldon, M.eaning of
in WiUiamKoa v. Adam (1812), 1 V. k, V>. 422, as meaning, i„ipliiatii>i'i.'"
not natural necessity, but so strong a })0ssibilit3^ of inten-
tion, that a contraiv intrntion cannot Ijc supposed. This
definition has been adopted by .Ia.MKs, L..I.. in Crooh v.
Hill (I871j. <; Ch. 311, who siinplitio it thus: -'The
question, then, resolves itself into thi> : whether, having
regard to the language of this will, guarding ourstdves
.scruj)ulously against indulging in conjecture, <»r in an
attemjit to <lo wliat we think the; testator would have done
if he had been better infurmeij or better advised, but
taking into consideraticMi the wlnde ol' the will, and the