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applied it to the case where a switchman was injured
through the negligence of an engineer. • • • • •
The counsel for the respondent has argued with much
ingenuity that the general rule of law as it has been
heretofore understood has been so modified by the
decision of the court in the case of Railroad Co. v.
Ross, 112 U. S. 877, 5 S. C. Rep. 184, as permits a re-
covery by the plaintiff in this suit. We do not think
that Uie decision in that case supports plalnUfPs posi-
UoB. It modifies and limits to some degree the extent
to which the rule is applicable, and holds, substan-
tially, that an employee of a railroad company may,
under some circumstances, and as to some persons,
become a representative of his employer to such an
extent as to render his principal liable for his negligent
acts; and that a conductor of a raUroad train, having
a right to command its movement and control the
other persons employed upon it, as to such persons
may cease to be a fellow-servant, while he remains in
charge of such train, and may, under some circum-
stances, during such time, become a representative of
the company. This decision modifies the rule as laid
down in Sherman v. Railroad Co., 17 N. Y. 153, and
other like cases. But we do not understand it over-
rules the general rule of law that where several per-
sons are employed in the same general service, by a
common employer, and one is injured by the negli-
gence of the other, the employer is not responsible.
And see Naylor v. Railroad Co., 88 Fed. Rep. 801,
where it was held that an engineer and switchman
were fellow-servants.

The Texas court after reviewing the same
authorities says :

We confess that the reasoning upon which the rule
has been adopted is not very satisfactory. It is said
that when the servant accepts the employment of the
master he impliedly assumes the risk of the negligence
of his fellow -servants. The argument seems illogical.
It amounts to saying that the law is that he cannot
recover because he takes the risk, and that he takes
the risk because the law is so. By a parity of reason-
Ing, we might assume that he takes the rbk of his
master's own personal negligence, and that, therefore,
the master would not be liable to a servant for such
negligence. A more reasonable ground is that of pub-
lic policy. It is freouently asserted as the true basis
of the doctrine, and is founded upon the theory that
it is calculated to make servants in a common employ-
ment watchful of each other, and thereby to promote



No. IT

earefalness in the performaiice of their duties. If
this is to be taken as the true ground, the rule should
be confined to those servants whose duties bring them
into such juxtaposition that one would be enabled to
observe the negligence of his fellows. But, however
unsatisfactory may be the reasons for the doctrine, it
is too well established, and its limits, in so far as the
question before us is concerned, are too well defined,
to permit us to intrench upon it. We feel constrained,
both by the former opinions of this oourtand the great
weight of authority elsewhere, to hold that the em-
ployees who were operating the train which caused
the injury in this case were the fellow-servants of the
plaintiff. If we could hold it an open question, our
ruling might be otherwise; but we consider the doc-
trine too firmly established to be changed, except by
the action of the legislature.

The Rhode Island court, hold that the
overseer of the slashing room in a cotton
mill is a fellow-servant with the second fore-
man of tdie machine shop, and after quoting

Farwell v. Railroad Co., 4 Mete. 49, says:

The reasons here sot forth are a strong answer to the
position taken in the Illinois cases. Railroad Co. v.
Moranda, 98 HI. 802. They show an obvious impracti-
cability in trying to gauge the liability of an employee,
in a complex business, by the independence of its dif-
ferent branches, or by the intercommunication of
those employed. Not only would it be almost impos-
sible, in many cases, to separate the work into distinct
departments, and to discern their dividing lines, but
Incidental duties, changing the relations of workmen
to each other, would vary also the master's liability.
He would thus be liable for the negllgenceof a servant
at one time or place, and not at another. Without a
personal supervision of all his help in all their work, he
could not know when he was responsible and when he
was not. Moreover, such a rule would govern the
liability of a master when the ground w<Mrk upon which
the rule is founded did not exist. For, if the test of
liability be that of the separate and independent duties
of the servants, they may nevertheless be so near each
other as to be able to exert a mutual influence to
caution; or, if it be that of association, they may still
be in the same department, but unable from their
duties or position, to exert such influence. But, aside
from these considerations, we do not think the rule is
correct in principle. The principle upon which the
determination of Farwell v. Ballroad Co. proceeded
is the same that has been generally followed in England
and in this country, namely, that the risrhts and liabil-
ities of both master and servant are those which grow
out of their contract relation. The master impliedly
agrees to use due care for the safety of his servant, in
providing suitable places and appliances for work;
and, as is universally conceded, the servant agrees to
assume the ordinary risks of his employment. The
most common risks of service spring from the negli-
gence of fellow-servants. When one works with
others, he knows that his safety depends on the exer-
cise of care by those around him, as their safety de-
pends also upon his own caution. No man can enter
into an employment without a thought of this. Neg-
ligence, therefore, among workmen, is a breach of the
duty which each owes to the others, and not a breach
of the master's duty, if he has exercised the care that
is required of him.

The question, upon which there are few
authorities, whether, in an action for malicious

prosecution, the plaintiff, to prove the want
of probable cause can show that he was, ta
the knowledge of def endaQt, of good reputa-
tion, was decided in the affirmative by the
Supreme Court of Massachusetts in, Mclntire
V. Levering, 20 N. E. Rep. 101. The court

There is some conflict of authority as to the com-
petency of evidence of the reputation of the plaintUT
in a trial of an action for malicious prosecution.
There are many cases in which it is held that in ac-
tions of this kind, as in actions of slander, the general
bad reputation of the plaintiff may be shown in miti-
gation of damages. There are also decisions that in
suits for malicious prosecution such reputation may
be shown to meet the allegation of want of probable
cause. Bacon v. Towne, 4 Gush: 241; Pullen v. Glid-
den, 68 Me. 509; Barron v. Mason, 81 Yt. 189; Bodri-
quez V. Tadmire, 2 Bsp. 721; Gregory v. Thomas, 2
Bibb. 286; Bostick v. Butheford, 4 Hawks, 88; Greg-
ory V. Chambers, 78 Mo. 294; Eosenkrans v. Barker^
116 m. 881. But the cases do not go so far as to per-
mit proof of particular instances of bad conduct. In
determining whether there is probable cause for a.
prosecution for the commission of a crime, the known
character or general reputation of the person sus-
pected is always an element of some importance. In
a suit of this kind, where the prosecution complained
of was for an offense implying moral turpitude, the
plaintiff's general reputation at the time of the prose-
cution, if the delendant was where he would be likely
to know it, is always involved in the issue, and the
defendant may properly be permitted to show that it
was bad. We see no good reason why the plalntifT
should not be permitted, on the other hand, to show
aflirmatively that it was good. It is true that every
one is presumed to be of good character until the
contrary appears, and this presumption ordinarily
saves the necessity of proof. Indeed, in civil oases, a»
a general rule, evidence of reputation is not competent
upon a question as to liability for a partieular act.
But whenever character is in issue the rule is differ-
ent. One charged with a crime Is not obliged to rest
upon a presumption of good character. In favoren^
Ubertatis he may prove the fact, if he can, by a weight
of evidence far more effective than any mere presump-
tion. A plaintiff in a suit for a malicious prosecution
upon a criminal charge has the burden of proving^
that the prosecution was without probable cause.
In defending against the prosecution he would have
had the right to show his good reputation, although
his character Was not attacked otherwise than incident-
ally by the prosecution itself. The same incidental
attack upon his character necessarily appears in the
suit for the malicious prosecution. To prove that the
attack was originally made vdthout probable cause,
we think he should be permitted to show his good
reputation, known to the defendant when the prose-
cution was commenced. In several of the States there
are adjudications to this effect: Woodworth v. Mills, 61
Wis. 44; Blizzard v. Hays, 46 Ind. 166; Israel v.
Brooks, 28 111. 675; Miller v. Brown, 8 Mo. 127; Scott
V. Fletcher, 1 Overt. 488.

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Vol. 28.




1. Object. •

9, Qipadty td Contract— Personal Status.
8. Asslgttn&eDt for the Benefit of Creditors.

4. Contract by Master of Vessel.

5. Personal Property.

6. Character Determiaed by Domicile of Owner.

7. Pledged Property— Wh«re to be Redeemed.

8. Wills of Personal Property.

9. Harried Women.

1. Object. — The design of the present
article is not to treat of the whole law of
domicile, bat simply to give a sammary of the
law of domicile as affecting contracts, deter-
mining the character, descent and diatribu-
tion of property, and the like. It is a general •
and well established rule, that the law of the
place where a contract is made is to govern
as to its nature, the obligation and interpre-
tation of it ;^ unless the contract is to be
performed in another country, in which ease
it is to be governed by the law of the place
of performance.'

2. Capacity to Contract — Personal Status.
The ability of a party to contract depends
upon the law of tdie domicile when the ques-
tion is one of personal ability or disability.'-
Thus, the capacity of a person to execute an
instrument, affecting his personal property in
another jurisdiction, is to be determined by
the law of the domicile.^ And where a hus-
band and wife residing in Mississippi, made,
in that State, a contract transferring lands,
in Louisiana, from the husband to the wife,
it was held, that her capacity to take lands

1 City of Bnuilford, 29 Fed. Bep. 878; Brooks v. New
York, etc. B. Co. (Pa.)rl Cent. Bep. 125; Boach v. St.
Louis Type Foundry (Mo. App.), 18 West. Bep. 186;
Nat. Bank of Tenant v. Tenant (Pa.), 1 Cent. Bep.
506; Marvin Safe Co. y. Norton (N. J.), 5 Cent. Bep.
843; Peabody y. Maguire, 79 Me. 572; 12 Atl. Bep. 680;
5N. Eng. Bep. 604; Matthews y. Paine, 47 Ark. 55;
Sparrow v. Kohn (Pa.), 1 Cent. Bep. 852; Brown y.
Browning (B. I.), 8 N. Eng. Bep. 584.

spittsburg & St. Louis B. Co. y. Bothschild, (Pa.)
4 Cent. Bep. 109; Shoe & L. Nat. Bank v. Wood,
(Mass.)> 8 N. Eng. Bep. 119; Maryin Safe Co. y. Nor-
ton (N. J.), 5 Cent. Bep. 841; Nat. Bank of America y.
Indiana Banking Co. (111.), 1 Wett. Bep. 854; Dixon y.
Blondin (Vt.), 2 N. Eng. Bep. 777.

3 See Yaity. Brown, 42 Hun (N. T.), 394; Matthews
y. Murchison, 17 Fed. Bep. 760; United States v. Gar-
linghouse, 4 Ben. (U. S.) D. C. 194; 11 Int. Bey. Bee.
11; Petrle y. Yoorhees, 8C. E. Gr. (N.J. Ch.) 285.
Bucgundus declares that in all matters of contract, the
lex domicilii must preyail: Burgondus, 8 Tr. Ck>ns.
Cour. Floan. 9 48. See Story Confl. L. $ 481 ; Whrrton
Confl. L. 9 92.

^Eohnes Estate, 1 Pars. (Pa.) 899. See Volt v.
Brown, 42 Htm (N. T. ) 894.

from tlie husband must be determined by the
law of Mississippi ; but the effect of tdie con-
tract on the lands must be determined by
the law of Louisiana.^ But it has been held
by a federal court that the capacities and
incapacities of an individual are to be de-
termined by the law of the place where the
person is and not by that of his domicile.^

3. Assignment for the Benefit of Creditors.
— ^The statutory title of foreign assignees in
bankruptcy or insolvency can have no recog-
nition solely by virtue of the foreign statute^
but the comity of nations allows effect to
such title when they can be enforced without
prejudice to the rights of creditors, and when
the foreign statutes are not in conflict
with the laws or its public policy
of the State where the title is
sought to be enforced.^ The validity of an
assignment for the benefit of creditors, is to
be tested by the law of tdie assignor's dom-
icile.® But a receiver appointed in another
State has no extraterritorial power. The
principles of comity do not apply to such a
case.^ In Maine, a general assignment for

« Kelly V. Davis, 28 La. An. T78. See Laronden's
Succession, 89 La. An. 962; 8 South. Bep. 216; Tillot-
son y. Prlchard (Yt.), 12 Atl. Bep. 802; 6 N. Eng. Bep.
518; Otis T. Gregory, 111 Ind. 504; 18 N. E. Bep. 89; 10
West. Bep. 791; Swanp v. Hufnagle, 111 Ind. 462; 9
West. Bep. 629.

•Polydore v. Prince, 1 Ware (U. S.), D. C. 402,
citing and reviewing Medway v. Needham, 16 Mass.
167; 8 Am. Dec. 181; West Cambridge t. Lexington, 1
Pick. (Mass.) 506; 11 Am. Deo. 281; Putnam y.Putnam,
8 Pick. (Mass.) 488; Commonwealth v. Green, 17 Mass.
615; Saul v. His Creditors, 17 Mart. (La.) 696; Case of
Francesco, 9 Am. Jar. 490; Butler y. Hopper, 1 Wash.
C. C. 499; Ex parte Simmons, 4 Wash. C. C. 396;
Lunsford v. Coquillon, 14 Mart. (La.) 40; Bankin v.
Lydia, 2 A. E. Marsh. (Ey.) 470; The Slave Grace, 2
Hagfi:. Adm. 105-114; Scrimshire v. Scrimshlre, 2 Hagg.
Consist. 407; Ck>mpton v. Bearcroft, Buller's N.P. 114;
Stewart v. Somersett, 1 Black. Com. 426n,* Somerset v.
Stewart, Loft's Bep. 1; Stewart v. Somerset, 11 State '
Trials, 840; 20 How. St. Trials, 1; Forbes v. Coch-
rane, 2 Bam. & Cress. 448; Williams v. Brown, 8 Bos»
& Pull. 69; Shanley v. Harvey, 2 Eden, 127, quoted in
2 Hagg. Adm. 116.

T See In re Wait's Accounting (N. Y.), 1 Cent. Bep^
14; Harvey v. Watson (N. H), 1 N. Eng. Bep. 482;
Glenn v. Dodge (D. C), 8 (3ent. Bep. 288; Van Winkle
V. Armstrong (N. J.), 4 C^nt. Bep. 58; Eimball v. Lee
(19. J.), 4 Cent. Bep. 882; Moore v. Church, 70 Iowa,.
208; Welder v. Moddoz, 66 Tex. 872.

8 Livermore v. Jenches, 21 How. (62 U. S.) 126; bk.
16, L. ed. 702; Wickham v. Dillon, 2 West. L. Mo.
511; Caskle v. Webster, 2 WaU. Jr. C. C. 131; D'lver-
nois V. Leavltt,28 Barb. (N. Y.), 63; Ockerman v.
Cross, 54 N. Y. 29; 40 Barb. (N. Y.) 465; Moore v. Wil-
lett, 85 Barb. (N. Y.) 663; Smith's Appeal, 104 Pa. St.

• Day y. Postal Tel. Co. (Md.), 6 CenUB^. 44L

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No. 17

the benefit of creditors, by a debtor domiciled
in another jurisdiction, will not protect his
property, found in that State, from the at-
tachment of a resident creditor. ^^ But this
rule only applies to such property as is found
within the jurisdiction of the State at the
time of the assignment.^^

4. Contract by Master of Vessel. — A con-
tract made by the master of a vessel in a
foreign country is governed by the law of the
owner's domicile, so far as respects the lia-
bility.^ Thus, it has been held that the lia-
bility of an English vessel on which goods
are shipped in England on an ordinary bill
of lading, is to be determined according to
the law of the flag.^^ And a contract of af-
freightment, made in a foreign port by the
master of a vessel owned in Massachusetts,
for the delivery of the cargo in Pennsylvania,
is governed by the law of the former State. ^*

5. Pe^'sonal Property, — ^Personal property
has no locality ; the law of the owner's dom-
icile is to determine the right to its posses-
sion,^^ as well as the validity of its transfer
or alienation, unless there be some positive or
customary law of the country where it is
found to the contrary.** The fiction of law,
that the domicile of the owner draws to it his
personal estate, wherever it may happen to
be, must yield whenever, for the purpose of
justice, the actual situs of the property ought
to be examined.*^ Thus, by the laws of Illi-
nois, an attachment of personal property

' there will take precedence of an unrecorded
mortgage, executed in another State, where
record is not necessary, though the owner,
the attaching creditor, and the mortgagee,
be all residents of such other State; and
effect must be given in the latter, to the
judgment in the attachment suit.^^ A title

w The Watchman, 1 Ware (U. S.), 282.

11 The Watchman^ supra.

w Pope V. NIckerson, 3 Story C. C. 465.

i« The Titania, 19 Fed. Rep. 101.

1* Pope V. Nickerson, 8 Story C. C. 485.

w See Smith's Appeal, 117 Pa. St. 80; 11 Atl. Rep.
804; 20 W. N. C. 192; 9 Cent. Rep. 695; Blane v. Drum-
mond, 1 Brock. C. C. 62.

i« Speed V. May, 17 Pa. St. 91; 55 Am. Dec. 540;
Black V. Zacharie, 8 How. (U. S.) 483; Oakey v. Ben-
nett, 11 How. (U. S.) 83; Harvey v. Richards, 1 Mason
C. C. 881.

17 Green v. Van Buskirk, 7 Wall. (74 U. S.) 189; bk.
19 L. ed. 109, reversing? s. c, 2 Keyes (N. Y.) 119; 84
Barb. (N. Y.) 467.

1^ Green v. Van Buskirk, supra* As to foreign at-
tachments and the law governing them, see Steell v.
Goodwin (Pa.), 4 Cent. Rep. 659; May v. First Nat.

to personal property acquired under the laws
of the domicile,is available in any other State.^
And a deed of personal property, valid by
the law of the place where the parties re-
sided, and there duly recorded, protects
their title when they afterwards remove into
another State to reside.^

6. Character Determined by Domicile of
Oumer, — ^The law appertaining to the domicile
of the owner determines the character of
personal property.*^ Thus a transfer of stock
is governed by the lex fori as to the form of
the transfer, but the rights of the parties
under it are determined by the lex domicilii.'^
It has been held that a transfer of the stock
of a bank located in another State, if good
by the law of the owner's domicile, passes the
equitable title to it, unless the law of the
State where the corporation is located pro-
hibit such transfer.^ Contracts respecting
public funds or stock, bank stock, and other
property of that incorporeal nature, which
owes its existence to and is regulated by pe-
culiar and local laws, must be made and car-
ried into execution according to those laws.^
. 7. Pledged Property — Where to be Re-
deemed. — Where property is pledged as
security for a debt, the domicile of the creditor
is the place at which a redemption must be
made.^ And if a pledge or trust of personal
property be valid by the law of the domicile,
it will be protected, on a subsequent removal
of the parties, into another State.^

8. Wills of Personal Property.'^ — ^It is now
the universal rule recognized by the common
law that the succession of personal property
is governed exclusively by the law of the

Bank (111.), 7 West. Rep. 681; Faulkner v. Hymber
(Mass.), 2 N. Eng. Rep. 181.

w Shelby v. Guy, 11 Wheat. (U. S.) 861.

» Bank of the United States v. Lee, 18 Pet. (U.S.)
107;5CranchC. C.819.

21 The Kosciusko, 11 N. Y. Leg. Obs. 88.

«2 Burr V. Sherwood, 8 Bradf. (N. Y.) 85.

28 Black V. Zacharie, 3 How. (U. S.) 483.

2< Dow V. Gould, etc. Co., 81 Cal. 629.

« Stoker v. Cogswell, 25 How. (N. Y.) Pr. 267.

« Reid V. Gray, 87 Pa. St. 508.

^ Those interested in history of the question of suc-
cession to property and testamentary disposition
thereof, can consult with profit Bentham's Chapter on
"Succession." See 1 Bentham's Works, 334, and
Maine's chapters on "The Early History of Testa-
mentary Succession," and "Ancient and Modem
Ideas Respecting Wills and Successions." See Maine's
Ancient Law, chs. VI, VII, pp. 166-287. And Morgan's
"Three Rules of Inheritance.*' See Morgan's Ancient
Society, 525-554.

» See Emery v. Union Soc, 79 Me. 884; 9 Atl.

/lyiLi^cjvj kjy

9 AU. Itep.

\roL. 28.



place where the testator was domiciled ^ at
the time of his death.^ And the validity of
a beqnest of personal property depends upon
the lex domicilii.^ But the succession to
personal property is governed by the law of
the actual domicile of the intestate at the time
of his death, no matter what was the country
of his birth or his former domicile, or the
actual situs of the property at the time of his

A will of personal property must
be executed according to the law of the
testator's domicile, at the time of his death, or
it will not pass personal property in a foreign
country, though executed with all the for-
malities required by the laws of that coun-

891; 4 N. Eng. Rep. 462; Hutton v. Hutton (N. J.). 2
Cent. Rep. 216; Richardson v. Lewis (Mo. App.), 4
West. Rep. 267; Williams v. Nlchol, 47 Ark. 254. By
the law of domidl, as applied to succession, is meant,
not the general law, but the law which the country of
the domlcil applies to the particular case: Duprey v.
Wurtz, 63 N. Y. 656.

^Rkduurdson v. Lewis (Mo. App.), 4 West. Rep.
267. See Lawrence v. Kltteridge, 21 Conn. 677; 66
Am. Dec. 885; Holeomb v. Phelps, 16 Onn. 127;
Thomas Saccession, 86 La. An. 19; Olivier v. Townes,
14 Mart. (La.) 99; Saarez v. Mayor, etc. of New York,
2 Sandf. Ch. (N. Y.) 178; Holmes v. Remsen, 4 Johns.
Ch. (N. Y.) 460; 8 Am. Dec. 681; 20 Johns. (N. Y.)
229; 11 Am. Dec. 269; Parsons v. Lyman, 20 N. Y. 103;
28 Barb. (N.Y.) 564, reversing 4 Bradf. (N. Y.) 268;
Graham V. Public Admr., 4 Bradf. (N. Y.) 127; Law
Rep. 886; Public Admr. v. Hughes, 1 Bradf. (N. Y.)
126; Burr v. Sherwood, 3 Bradf. (N. Y.) 85; Mercure's
BsUte, 1 Tuck. (N. Y.) 288; Guier v. O'Daniel, 1 Binn.
(Pa.) 849n; DeSobry v. DeLalstre, 2 Harr. & J. (Md.)
191 ; 8 Am. Dec. 178; Blake v. Williams, 6 Pick. (Mass.)
286, 814; 17 Am. Dec. 872; French v. Hall, 9 N. H. 187;
82 Am. Dec. 841; Shultz v. Pulver, 8 Paige Ch. (N. Y>.)
182; Decouche v. Savatier, 8 Johns. Oh. (N. Y.) 190; 6
Am. Dec. 478; Harvey v. Richards, 4 Cow. (N. Y.)
517o; 1 Mason 0. 0. 881; Ennis v. Smith, 14 How. (U.
S.) 400; Pipon v. Pipon, Ambl. 26; Thome v. Watkins,
2 Yes. 85; Sill v. Worswick, 1 H. Black, 690, 691;
Bruce v. Bruce, 2 Bos. & Pull. 229n; Hunter v. Potts,
4 T. R. 182; Potter v. Browne, 6 East, 180; BirtwhisUe
V. Baydil],6Bam.&CresB. 488, 450-466; 9Bligh, 82-88;
2 Clark A Finn. 671; Enokin v. Wylie, 10 H. L. Oas. 1;
Crispin V. Doglioni, 9 Jur. (N. S.) 653, affirmed L. R.
1 H. L. 804; Partington v. Attorney -General, L. R. 4
H. L. 104; Yates v. Thompson, 8 Clark & Finn. 664;
Thornton v. Curling, 8 Sim. 310; Price v. Dewhurst, 8
Sim. 279, 299i Preston v. Melville, 8 Clark A Finn. 1,
12; Moore v. Budd, 4 Hagg. Ecc. 846, 862; In re Ewin,

1 Tyrw. 151; 1 Rose Bank Oas. 478; Phillips v. Hunter,

2 H. Black, 402, 495; Schultz v. Dambmann, 8 Bradf.
(N. Y.) 379.

» Knox V. Jones, 7 N. Y. 889; Desparde v. Church-
ill, 68 N. Y. 192; Dupny v. Wurtz, 63 N. Y. 566.

SI Russell V. Madden, 96 111. 485. Accordingly, one
dying in the State of Sonora, Mexico, leaving no issue,
nor father, his mother would succeed to the whole
estate, to the exclusion of his brothers and sisters.
Russell V. Madden, supra.

try.^ And jurisdiction over the estate of a
decedent, belongs exclusively to the forum
of the domicil, where the assets are situate.^
The succession to and distribution of per-
sonal property, is regulated by the law of the
owner's domicile, not by the lex loci reisitce,^
9. Married Women. — ^The stairis of a mar-
ried woman and her capacity to carry on
business in a foreign State are determined
by the law of her domicile.^ But it is said
that the forms of contract she must use and
the manner in which she must sue are to be
determined by the lex loci actus,^ and the
forms of conveyance used are to be deter-
mined by the lex rei sUoe,^ Personal prop-
Gi^ty given to a married woman is received
under the law of her actual domicile and not
of her matrimonial domicile.^ And a purchase
of personal property by a wife, in a State
where the common law prevails, vests the
same in her husband ; it is governed by the

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