BURTIS BURR BREESE
PROFESSOR OF PSYCHOLOGY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI
COPYRIGHT, 1917, BY
CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS
THE present text aims to give a comprehensive view of
the facts, principles, and theories of human psychology.
Accordingly, the student will find that it represents the
various points of view of modern psychology the analytic
and the descriptive, the structural and the functional, the
genetic and the physiological. At the same time the em-
pirical results of experimental psychology are used as far as
possible. Thus at the beginning the student is given a broader
foundation for the understanding of mental life than could
be~ given by a more limited point of view.
From the very outset an attempt has been made to dif-
ferentiate the metaphysical and the empirical tendencies in
psychology. It is important that the student should know
when he is indulging in naive metaphysical speculation, and
when he is dealing with the results of scientific observation
or the theories based upon such observation.
While I am in sympathy with the present attempt now
being made in some quarters to emphasize the objective and
quantitative aspects of consciousness, nevertheless I confess
the belief that the qualitative aspect is still worthy of psycho-
logical consideration, and that, in order to get at this qualita-
tive aspect, the method of introspection is still a valid method
of psychological procedure.
I am very much indebted to Mr. Schachne Isaacs, In-
structor in Psychology, University of Cincinnati, for prepar-
ing the index, for reading the manuscript and proofs, and
for many helpful suggestions in the preparation of the text.
Acknowledgments are due for the use of illustrations
taken from the following text-books: Villiger's "Brain and
Spinal Cord," J. B. Lippincott Co.; Quain's "Elements
of Anatomy," Longmans, Green and Co.; Angell's "Psychol-
ogy," Henry Holt and Company; Howell's "Text-Book of
Physiology," W. B. Saunders and Company; Pillsbury's
"Essentials of Psychology" and Titchener's "Text-Book of
Psychology," The Macmillan Company; Thorndike's "El-
ements of Psychology"; Ladd and Woodworth's "Physio-
logical Psychology" and Judd's "Psychology," Charles Scrib-
B. B. B.
University of Cincinnati,
I. INTRODUCTORY i
Divisions of Psychology. The Procedure of Psychology.
Consciousness. Subject-Object Nature of Consciousness.
Soul. Mind. Self.
II. THE NERVOUS SYSTEM 21
Consciousness and the Nervous System. The Gross Struc-
ture of the Brain. The Autonomic Nervous System. Nerve-
Cells. Nature of the Nervous Impulse. Kinds of Neurones.
White and Gray Matter. The Fibre Connections of the
Brain. Localization of Function.
III. ATTENTION . . . 53
Forms of Attention. Neural Basis of Attention. Shifting of
Attention. Range or Span of Attention. Effect of Atten- ,,,.
tion. Motor Accompaniments of Attention. Feeling of
Effort in Attention. Interest and Attention.
IV. SENSATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Sensation as an Element of Consciousness. Pure Sensations.
Physiological Basis of Sensation. The Nature of the Nerve-
Impulse. Evolution of Sense-Organs. The Stimuli. After-
Effects of Stimulus. Sensory Adaptation. Attributes of
Sensation. Quality. Intensity. Extensity. Duration.
Other Attributes. Kinds of Sensations.
V. ORGANIC, KIN^STHETIC, AND CUTANEOUS SENSA-
TIONS . . , . no
Organic Sensations. Kinaesthetic Sensations: Muscle, Ten-
don, and Joint Sensations; Sensations from Vestibule and-
Semicircular Canals. Cutaneous Sensations: the End-
Organs; the Brain Centres; Pressure-Sensations; Pain-
Sensation; Sensations of Cold and Warmth.
VI. OLFACTORY AND GUSTATORY SENSATIONS . . . 130
Olfactory Sensations: End-Organ; the Stimulus; Classifica-
tion. Gustatory Sensations: End-Organ; Gustatory Nerves
and Brain Centres; Stimulus; Classification of Gustatory
Sensations; Retardation; Mixtures, Contrasts, Adaptation;
VII. AUDITORY SENSATIONS 144
End-Organ. Brain Centres. The Stimulus. Noises. Tones.
Compound Tones. Timbre. Beats. Combination Tones.
Intensity. Extensity. Musical Tones, Consonance, and
VIII. VISUAL SENSATIONS . 166
The Retina. The Optic Nerve and Optic Centres. Stimulus.
Kinds of Visual Sensations. Brightness of Colors. Purkinje
Phenomenon. Saturation. Complementary Colors. The
Color Pyramid. Color Mixtures. Light and Color Adapta-
tion. Successive Contrasts. Simultaneous Contrasts. Color
Zones of the Retina. Color-Blindness. Color Theories.
The Young-Helmholtz Theory. Bering Theory. Ladd-
IX. PERCEPTION 197
Perception of Objects. Complication. Recognition. Mean-,
ing. Illusions. Hallucinations. Perception of Space: De-
velopment of Space Perception; Third Dimension; Space
Errors and Illusions; Localization and Projection of Audi-
tory Sensations. Perception of Time : Elements of Time Per-
ception; the Psychical Present; Sensory Material of Time
Perceptions; the Psychical Present and the Logical Present;
the Past and the Future; the Measure of Time.
X. MEMORY . . . . ..-.. 238
The Image. Definition of Memory. Organic Memory. In-
dividual Differences in Memory. The Training of the Mem-
ory. Methods of Memorizing. Forgetting. Defects of
Memory. Function of Memory.
XI. IMAGINATION . . ', ' . . 260
Memory and Imagination. Kinds of Imagination. Repro-
ductive Imagination. Productive Imagination. Types of
Imagination. Visual Type. Auditory Type. Motor Type.
Mixed Types. Methods of Determining the Types of Im-
agination. Imagery in Synsesthesia. Concrete and Symbolic
Imagination. Image and Idea. Training of Imagination.
Imagination as a Means of Supplementing the Present.
Imagination and Behavior.
XII. ASSOCIATION 277
Formation of Associations. Motor Connections. Mental
Connections. Associative Recall. The Laws of Associa-
tion. Contiguity. Similarity. Partial and Total Recall.
Falsification of Association. Association Tests. Physio-
logical Basis of Association.
XIII. CONCEPTION 299
Thinking. The Concept. The Formation of the Concept.
The Psychological and the Scientific Concepts. The Gen-
eral and the Individual Concept. The Analysis of the Con-
cept. The Image. Consciousness of Meaning. The Inten-
sion and Extension of Concepts. The Genesis and Develop-
ment of the Concept. Language. Origin of Language.
Thought and Language.
XIV. JUDGMENT 321
Judgment and Perception. The Nature of Judgment. Judg-
ment as Apperception. Judgment as Belief. Judgment as
the Ascription of Meaning. Judgment as Comparison.
Judgment as Evaluation. Kinds of Judgments. Analysis
and Synthesis. Judgment and Concept. Judgment as the
Fundamental Cognitive Activity.
XV. REASONING . . . 338
Inference. Inference and Perception. Inference and Judg-
ment. Inference and Concept. The Nature of Reflective
Thought, or Reasoning. The Steps in Thinking. Kinds
of Reasoning. Reasoning and the Syllogism. Imageless
Thought. The Neural Basis of Reason.
XVI. AFFECTION AND FEELING . 356
Affection. The Nature of Affection. Kinds of Affection.
Attributes of Affection. Adaptation. Affection and Sensa-
tion. Pain and Affection. Affection and Perception. Af-
fection and the Ideational Processes. Affection and Bodily
Expressions. Neural Basis of Affection. The Significance
and Function of Affection. Feeling. Classification of
Feelings. Mood. Temperament. Emotions. Sentiments.
XVII. EMOTIONS 377
James-Lange Theory of Emotions. The Instinctive Reac-
tions and Emotions. Conditions Which Give Rise to Emo-
tions. Significance of Emotions. Classification of the Emo-
tions. Emotions and Memory.
XVIII. CONSCIOUSNESS AND BEHAVIOR 397
Volitional Action. Genesis of Motor Activity. The Connec-
tion between Conscious States and Action. The Law of
Dynamogenesis. Control. Effect of Motor Activity upon
XIX. WILL 419
Conation. Will. Will as Self-Determination. Will and
Knowledge. Will and Character. Freedom of the Will.
XX. THE SELF 432
The Unity, Continuity, and Identity of Personal Conscious-
ness. The Subject Self, or Ego. The Empirical Self. Origin
and Growth of the Self. Contents of the Self. Conscious-
ness of the Self. Self and Sensation. Self and Perception.
Self and Attention. Self and Interest. Self and Feeling.
Self and Will. Sleep and the Self. Dreams and the Self.
Disturbances of the Self. Mental or Psychic Blindness.
Automatic Writing. Somnambulism. Hypnosis. Double
BIBLIOGRAPHY . . .... . . . . . 463
Psychology is that study whose task it is to point out
and organize the observable facts of conscious life, and to
formulate the theories, or hypotheses, necessary to explain
these facts. In this study it is important that the student
should distinguish clearly between fact and hypothesis be-
tween what is obtained through scientific observation and
what is logically constructed through speculation. Psychol-
ogy was in its earliest stages a branch of philosophy, and was
more inclined to speculate about the nature of consciousness
than to observe and systematize the facts connected with it.
This is illustrated in the attempts to explain consciousness in
terms of the soul, a metaphysical being beyond actual obser-
vation. Modern psychology concerns itself more with the
facts and less with the ultimate nature of consciousness.
If we consider all the facts which come from actual ob-
servation we may put them into three groups:
1. Facts about matter.
2. Facts about life.
3. Facts about consciousness.
The first group forms the subject-matter of the material sci-
ences; the second group forms the subject-matter of the bio-
logical sciences; and the third group forms the subject-matter
Divisions of Psychology. There are a number of special
forms of psychology determined by the fields of mental life
from which the psychologist draws his material, and by the
methods and points of view he employs in his study. With
respect to the fields of consciousness we have :
1 . Adult human psychology.
2. Child psychology.
3. Social psychology.
4. Abnormal psychology.
5. Animal psychology.
With respect to methods and special points of view we
1 . Descriptive psychology.
2. Experimental psychology.
3. Genetic psychology.
4. Functional psychology.
5. Physiological psychology.
'7. Comparative psychology.
Adult Human Psychology considers the consciousness found
in the adult human being. It points out -the common quali-
ties, processes, and modes of activity found in human beings
generally. Since individuals differ from each other in men-
tal characteristics, a study of these differences is also impor-
tant. This study has been termed individual psychology.
Child Psychology deals with the conscious states of the
child. It takes account of the stages of mental development
through which the child passes. Since the genesis of con-
sciousness is important here, child psychology is a part of
genetic psychology; and since a large part of the child's life
is spent in school under a formal educational system, child
psychology and genetic psychology often take the form of
Social Psychology has to do with conscious experiences
which are made possible by the presence of an individual
mind in a group of other minds. Such experiences are due to
what has been termed social consciousness. Out of it spring
language, laws and customs, myths and religion all of which
are dependent upon the existence of a community of individ-
uals. The use of the terms "social consciousness" and "col-
lective mind" must not be understood to indicate the assump-
tion of the existence of another kind of consciousness other
than that found in individuals. These terms refer only to
the conscious states in individuals which are due to a com-
munity of minds. Communities of people have the same
language, customs and fashions, religion and mythology.
The conscious experiences back of these institutions we as-
sume to be the same in all individuals. Since much of our
mental life is social, social psychology overlaps normal adult
psychology and draws its material from it. A subdivision of
social psychology, variously named as race psychology, ethnic
psychology, or folk psychology, is interested in the mental
characteristics of different races or peoples. It may include
the comparison of the mental traits found in different peoples.
We may compare the Japanese, on the one hand, with the
Russians on the other; or the primitive races, like the Ameri-
can Indians or Malays, with the more civilized races. A still
further subdivision might take up the study of classes, pro-
fessions, and occupations.
Abnormal Psychology deals with abnormal mental states,
such as hypnotism, double or multiple personality, fixed
ideas, hysterias, mania, melancholia, dementia, paranoia,
idiocy. Here also should be included the study of deficient
and exceptional minds the weak-minded and the genius.
The criminal mind belongs in this list, because most criminals
Animal Psychology takes as its subject-matter the mental
states of animals. The absence of language in animals limits
the possibilities of studying the consciousness which we know
exists there. Man can describe his experience in language,
but animals cannot. However, the behavior of the animal
is a clew to the kinds of consciousness it has. We may
therefore study its behavior and so, indirectly, its conscious-
ness. Since we may proceed from the lowest animal forms
to the highest, animal psychology may be genetic in its point
Descriptive Psychology is really a method of studying con-
sciousness. It analyzes, describes, and classifies conscious
Experimental Psychology is laboratory psychology. Lab-
oratory methods and physical apparatus are used as means
of controlling and studying mental states. Of course, the
psychologist cannot measure or weigh the conscious states of
his subjects. He cannot even observe them directly. He
may, however, measure the time during which a conscious
state exists. He may measure or weigh the physical stimuli
and correlate the results with the intensities of the conscious
experiences. He may also note the physiological changes
which take place in the body while the conscious states are
going on. For all this he uses instruments of precision, but
nowhere in his laboratory has he an instrument that will
measure a mental state itself. A large part of this study de-
pends upon the introspective report given by the subject.
Genetic Psychology considers the successive stages of men-
tal growth and the evolution in the individual and in the
race. We may use a pair of terms that are common to biol-
ogy and psychology to designate the two lines of development
phylogenesis, or racial development, and ontogenesis, or indi-
vidual development. These terms really refer to the growth
and development of organisms as a whole both mind and
body. Mental development in phylogenesis includes all the
stages of conscious life which appear in the evolution of ani-
mal forms from the lowest to the highest. These stages of
development may be considered either as a series now exist-
ing, or as a series constituting the successive stages of evolu-
tion from the earliest time to the present. Mental develop-
ment in ontogenesis includes the stages of development which
take place in an individual from birth to death. The biolo-
gist finds a relation between ontogenesis and phylogenesis
which he states as the principle of recapitulation. According
to this principle, the individual in embryo passes through the
same stages of development that the race has passed through.
Thus, biological recapitulation suggests a problem for genetic
psychology: Does the child in his mental development pass
through the stages of mental development that the race has
passed through ? r The chief problem of genetic psychology,
however, is that of making out the stages of mental develop-
ment of the individual.
Functional Psychology looks upon consciousness as a
process. Formerly the mind was supposed to possess the
functions of knowing and willing. Later a third function,
that of feeling, was added. Knowing, feeling, and willing are,
from the point of view of functional psychology, the functions
of the mind. A more recent functional point of view asserts
the presence in the mind of a purposive factor which deter-
mines the direction and nature of conscious processes. While
external conditions (stimuli) do this to a certain extent, it is
claimed that these factors are not sufficient to explain con-
scious activity adequately. A conscious agency, therefore, is
assumed to account for the character of our conscious states.
Physiological Psychology considers consciousness as either
the direct outcome or the correlate of brain activity. Physio-
logical psychology does not, however, necessarily commit
itself to a materialistic philosophy. For consciousness may
be non-material or spiritual in its nature and yet be depen-
dent upon the brain for an opportunity to manifest itself.
The brain may be only the medium or agent for conscious-
ness and not its real cause. But whether its philosophy is
materialistic or spiritual, it bases its particular point of view
and its method upon the observable fact of correlations be-
tween consciousness and nervous processes in the brain. It
accordingly takes the activity of the nervous tissue as its
starting-point, acquaints itself with the facts of the anatomy,
histology, and physiology of the nervous system, and at-
*For a discussion of this question the student is referred to "Mental De-
velopment in the Child and the Race," by James Mark Baldwin.
tempts to find out what happens in the brain when we are
conscious, or, more exactly, to find out what the correlations
are between the nervous activities on the one hand and men-
tal states or activities on the other. It really combines a
large part of neurology (that which has to do with the higher
brain centres and their connections) with psychology proper.
One of its important problems is the localization of brain
centres for the different conscious processes. For example,
it finds the centre for sight in the occipital lobes of the brain,
the centre for hearing in the superior convolution of the tem-
poral lobes, and so on. In the present state of knowledge of
the physiology of the nervous tissue there is relatively little
known concerning the nervous action in the brain. At the
present time, then, physiological psychology can be little
more than the statement of a series of neurological facts on
the one hand, and of conscious facts on the other.
Psychophysics is the study of the relations which exist
between consciousness and the world of physical objects
which are capable of acting as sense-stimuli. It is a partner-
ship between physics and psychology, and is included under
experimental psychology as now carried on in the psychologi-
Comparative Psychology has taken at least two directions.
In some quarters it has been identical with animal psychology
and has occupied itself with the comparison of the mental
life found in the various types of animals. This might well
include a comparison of the mental life of the animal forms
with that of man, but this is a problem for the future. A
wider significance has been given in other quarters to com-
parative psychology in that it is considered as a comparison
of the normal human adult consciousness with that found in
the child, in abnormal man, in social groups, and in animals
The Procedure of Psychology. Although the array of
psychologies seems rather long and perplexing, the matter
becomes really very simple when we remember that they are
all studies of consciousness, and that consciousness is found
only in human beings and animals. Nearly all these forms
of psychology are simply special methods, or points of view,
used in the study of animal and human consciousness. A
general psychology, such as we are entering upon, takes for
its subject-matter the highest type of consciousness that of
the adult human being. But it may make use of any of the
different special methods and points of view, or even of the
subject-matter of the different psychologies, in so far as it is
helpful in understanding the mental life of normal man.
The fundamental method of psychology is observation:
first, the observation of the mental states and processes tak-
ing place in our own minds, and second, the observation of
the behavior of others by means of which we may infer the
presence and nature of their mental states. These two forms
of observation are necessary in psychology. Without the
first we could never have an intimate first-hand acquaintance
with the facts of consciousness, and without the second we
would know nothing of consciousness outside our own minds.
The first form of observation gives us direct knowledge
of our own conscious life and has been termed introspection^
i. e., looking within. Introspection is the observation of our
own mental states. This self-observation does not, however,
presuppose a new process or method of observation intro-
duced by the psychologist. Introspection does not differ
fundamentally from the observation employed in the other
sciences. The difference lies only in the material upon which
it works. Introspection in psychology is observation of men-
tal facts, while observation in the other sciences is observa-
tion of material facts. Introspection has sometimes been
taken to be an inner consciousness in distinction to an outer
consciousness which knows the outer world of objects. But
there is no valid ground for such a distinction. All conscious-
ness, whether it be awareness of mental states or of material
objects, is of the same character. The distinction of inner
and outer has no meaning when applied to consciousness it-
self. The awareness of a material object is just as much
inner consciousness as the awareness of a mental state. Both
are contents of consciousness. The ability to introspect im-
proves with training and practice. The novice in psychology
is quite as helpless as the beginning student in biology when
given his first high-power microscope. Expertness is needed
no less for the accurate observation of mental states than for
the accurate observation of material specimens in biology,
physics, or chemistry.
Objections have been urged against introspection as a
scientific method on the ground that its results cannot be
verified. The claim has been made that the results of intro-
spection cannot be confirmed because no one can observe
directly the conscious states of another. On the other hand,
the objects of material sciences are said to be common prop-
erty. Any one may observe them and confirm the reports of
others. This distinction of the private nature of consciousness
and the public nature of objects is not as far-reaching as it
seems at first sight.- All the sciences are built up by means
of observation. But every observation is the observation of
some one person. The observation itself is always a private
and personal affair. Different observations can be brought
together and made to agree only when reduced to a common
unit of measurement. By means of this unit of measurement
uniformity may be established, and this is the most important
thing in all observation. In the material sciences the uni-
formities are found in terms of units of quantity the milli-
metre, the gram, et cetera. In psychology the uniformities
are in the terms of quality quality of experience. The units
of quality are descriptive units, or language symbols. The
facts of consciousness discovered by means of introspection
may be reduced to the common terms of descriptive language.
If when measured by these common terms the experiences of
different observers show uniformity, that is sufficient verifi-
Restating this point, we may say that the so-called mate-
rial objects of the sciences always fall within some one's pri-
vate experience. The material object which I observe is my
object, and the material object which you observe is your
object. You can never experience my object and I can never