Charles W. (Charles Woodruff) Shields.

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propessor'shields' course.

FIRST PART.

THEMES AND QUESTIONS

FROM



PRIIVTED FOR THE USE OF THE STUDENTS, AND SOLD
ONLY BY STELLE & SMITH, PRINCETON, N. J.




Entered according to Act of Congress, in the year 1868, by

CHARLES W. SHIELDS,

In the Clerk's Office of the District Court of the United States, for the District of

New Jersey.

Stanharp Office Print.



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* MAR 31 19]



THE LOGIC APPLICABLE TO RELIGION.

(INTRODUCTION. )

PROBABILITY.
I. The Nature of Probability.

1. Probability distinguishable from Demonstration.

How is probable evidence distinguished from demonstrative evidence ?
Between wliat limits does it range ?

What are the two reasons why one slight presumption does not consti-
tute certainty ?

2. Probability susceptible of increase to Certainty.

How may the slightest presumption amount to moral certainty ?
What example is given ?

II. The Foundation of Probabiliit.

1. Probability founded upon Livelihood.

What word expresses that which constitutes probability ?
In what three ways may one truth or event be like another ?
On what ground do we determine that an event will probably come to
pass ?

2. Probability measured by Recurrence.

By what are a presumption, an opinion, or a full conviction that an
event will come to pass respectively produced ?

What examples are given ?

How is it shown that likelihood or analogy enters into our whole expe-
rience ?

What incident illustrates the opposite conclusions which may be drawn
from analogy ?

III. The Value of Probability.

1. Probability limited in its Information.

Why does probable evidence afford only an imperfect kind of informa-
tion?
To what kind of beings alone does it relate ?



Why cannot it relate to the Infinite Intelligence ?

But to us, what is Probabilitj^ ?

2. Piohahility decisive in Speculatioji and Practice.

What questions are described as properlj^ admitting of* probable evi-
dence ?

In matters of speculation what should be the effect of even the lowest
flivorable presumption ?

In matters of practice what should be its force ? and why ?

In questions of great consequence what should be the effect of even a
balance of probabilities ?

How is this shown in the common actions of men ?

EELIGIOUS ANALOGY.

I. Analogy in General.

1. llie Phihscqihj of Analogy.

What are the three topics relating to Probability which Butler decl nes
further to examine ?

What question relating to the formation of our presumptions, opinions,
and convictions does he also waive ?

2. The Logic of Analogy.

To what subject or science does reasoning from analogy belong?
On what grounds does Butler decline to treat of its rules?

3. Hie Uses of Analogy.

Notwithstanding any ignorance of the intellectual powers or the exer-
cise of them, what weight actually has analogy?

What class of persons are most ai)t to object to it ? and on what grounds?
What in general is the proper estimate of it?
What instance is given in which its force would be unquestioned ?
II. Analogy, as applied to Religion.

1. Exampleji of Religious Analogy.

How does Origen apply Analogy to the comparative difficulties of Na-
ture and Scripture?

How may it likewise be applied to the question of the Divine Author-
ship of Nature and Scripture?

How far can analogy go in proving that they both have the same author?

2. Grounds of Religious Analogy.

How does it appear that the analogical method is practical ?

To what extent, and in what proportion, is it conclusive ?

What other reason is given for its introduction into the subject of reli-



What is presuj^posed or assumed in these reasonings? On what grounds
is this assumption made ?

What renders this assumption especially allowable ?
III. The Superiority of Religious Analogy.

1. Analogy superior to mere JL/2)othesis.

What was Des Cartes' method of reasoning ui)cn the constitution and
government of the world?

What other kindred method of reasoning upon such subjects is adduced
and what example is given ?

Wherein do these two methods differ and agree ?

How is the analogical method distinguished from both these methods,
as applied to the Divine government and the future state?

2. Analogy siiperior to mere Speculation.

In what speculations concerning the constitution of nature do another
class indulge ?

What may be said beforehand of the best speculations of the wisest men
upon such a subject ?

What three plans of nature might such a theorist imagine ?

To what extravagant conclusions would such speculations lead in regard
to happiness and virtue and the consistency of one with the other ?

What is a full direct answer to them ?

(1.) The Precise Limits of Religious Speculation.

What must be admitted as to our judgment of ends in general and of
virtue and happiness as ends ?

AVhat consequently must we conclude to be the ultimate ends designed
in Nature and Providence ?

Why, however, are we incompetent to judge of the means necessary to
such ends ?

What are the a fortiori proofs of this incompetency afforded by the
judgments of men concerning one another?

(2.) The True Grounds of Religions Speculation.

By what are we led to ascribe all moral perfection to God ? .

To whom, and why, is this a practical proof of His moral character ?

How do we thence reach the above conclusion as to the true ends of Di-
vine Providence?

(3.) The greater Certainty of Religious Analogy.

What now is recommended in i)lace of such idle speculations ?

To what other sure method of scientific investigation is this likened ?

With what is it proposed to compare the known constitution of Nature
and the acknowledged dispensation of Providence ?

And what is anticipated as the result of this argument ?



THE PllOPOSED ANALOGY.

I. The Extent and Force of the Proposed Analogy.
What will be its extent and de.i^'vec of exactne.s.^ ?
What will be its force in different instances ?

What will it undeniably- show in regard to the sj'stem of religion, both
natural and revealed ?

What class of objections will it almost entirely refute ?

What class will it at least measurably refute ?

What is the difference between these two classes of objections !

II. The Outline of the Proposed Analogy.

In what two departments may Religion or the Divine Government of
the world be considered ?

1. The ArgiuneiLt for Katural Religion.

(1.) . What will be proved as to a Future State ?

(2.) What will be proved as to the destinies of men in that state?

(3.) Vriiat will be proved as to the Divine Government in the future
state ?

(4.) What, as to the relarion of the present state to the future state?

(5.) What, as to the design of the present probation ?

(6.) What speculative objections from the constitution of Nature will

be refuted ?

(7.) What speculative objections from the Divine Attributes will be
refuted ?

'1. Tlie Argument for Revealed Religion.

(1.) What will be proved as to the occasion for an additional dispensa-
tion of Providence ?

(2. ) What, as to the character of its evidences?

(3. ) What, as to our pre-conceptions of its contents ?

(4. ) What, as to its structure or scheme ?

(5. ) Wliat, as to the agency by which it is carried on ?

(6.) What, as to the prevalence and clearness of its evidence 1

(7.) What, as to the evidence itself?

III. The Design of the Proposed Analogy.

What is it designed to show in respect to the things principally objected
against in this scheme of Natural and Revealed Religion ?

What, as to the chief objections themselves alleged against it?

And what, as to the weight and validity of this whole argument from
analogy ?

With what article of religion is it proposed to begin ? and for what
reason ?



THE PROBLEMS OF NATURAL RELIGION,

AS SOLVED BY AxNALOGY.

(PART I.)
PRELIMINARY.

AS TO THE EELiaiOUS CAPACITIES. (Appendix.)

THE QUESTION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY IN A FUTURE STATE.
(Dissertation I.)

THE QUESTION OF A MORAL FACULTY IN MAN. (Dissertation II.)

SECTION I.

AS TO THE SYSTEM OF NATURAL ^^ELIGION. (Chaps. I-V.)

THE PROBABILITY OF A FUTURE LIFE. (Chap. I.)
THE PROBABILITY OF A DIVINE GOVERNMENT. (Chap. II.)
THE PROBABILITY OF A FUTURE PERFECT MORAL GOVERN-
MENT. (Chap. III.)

THE PROBABILITY OF A PRESENT STATE OF PROBATION.
(Chap. IV.)

THE PROBABILITY OF A MORAL EDUCATION FOR THE FUTURE
LIFE. (Chap. V.)

SECTION II.

NATURAL
AS TO THE EVIDENCE OF REVEALED RELIGION.

:Cliaps. V— VII.

THE FATALISTIC OBJECTIONS AGAINST RELIGION. (Chap. VI.)
THE MORAL OBJECTIONS AGAINST RELIGION. (Chap. VII.)



THE PROBLEMS OF REVEALED RELIGION,

AS SOLVED BY ANALOGY.

(PART II.)
SECTION I.

AS TO THE SYSTEM OF REVEALED RELICrlON. (Chap«. I-V.)

THE PRESUMPTIVE IMPORTANCE OF BEVEALED RELIGION.
(Chap. I.)

THE PROBABILITY OF A MIRACULOUS REVELATION. (Chap. II.)
THE PROBABILITY OF A PARADOXICAL REVELATION. (Chap. III.)
THE PROBABLE WI/S'DOM AND GOODNESS OF A REVEALED S^YS-
TEM. (Chap. IV.)

THE PROBABILITY OF THE CHRISTIAN SYSTEM OF REDEMP-
TION. (Chap. V.)

SECTION n.

AS TO THE EVIDENCES OF REVEALED RELIGION.
(Chaps. VI, VIII.)

THE ALLEGED DEFICIENCIES IN THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES.
(Chap. VL)

THE CHRISTIAN EVIDENCES ANALOGICXLLY ESTIMATED. (Chap.
VII.)

THE OBJECTIONS TO THE ANALOGICAL ARGUMENT. (Chap. VIII.)



THE QUESTION OF PERSONAL IDENTITY.

AS PRELIMINARY TO THAT OF A FUTURE LIFE.

(dISSEKTATIOX I, APPENDIX.)

To what extent is the question of a future life important and intelligible ?
How has it been perplexed b}^ the question of personal identity ? And
how are such difficulties to be estimated ?
Personal Identity more readily ascertained than defined.
How should attempts to define personal identity be regarded 1

1. ,The Idea, simple and spontaneous.

To what other simple ideas may it be likened ? and what illustrations
show how these ideas immediately arise to the mind ?

2. The Fact, a matter of consciousness or reflection.
What corresponding facts do these lilustrations show ?

And how is the fact, as well as the idea of personal identity ascertained ?

How is this otherwise described as due to reflection ?

I. The Negative Definition.

L Personal Identity distinguishahle frorti Consciousness.

Why is not consciousness necessary to personal identity ?

What renders this self-evident, and to what is it analogous ?

How may the singular mistake of confounding consciousness with iden-
tity have arisen ?

How is this mistake exposed by distinguishing between present con-
sciousness and past conduct ?

1. Personal Identity distinr/uishahle from Organization.

W^hat are the two reasons why the question of personal identity is to be
distinguished from that of other organized substances, such as vegetables ?

(1.) Sameness of Organization, the loose popular sense of identity.

When a man swears to the identity of a tree, in what sense does he use
the word same ?

Can such identity of organization consist with change of particles ?

(2.) Sameness of Substance, the strict philosophical sense of Identity.



8

Why cannot a man swear to the identity of a tree in a strict, philo-
sophical sense ?

Why cannot 8uch identity of substance consist either with change of
imrticles or properties ?

What now is the difference between the popular and the philosophica
sense of identity, and why cannot personal identity subsist with diver-
sity of substance as well as of organization 1

II. The Positive Definition.

1. Identity in general cousisfs in sameness of substance or being.
How is the question accurately stated by Locke ?

2. Personal Identity consiMs in the sameness of a rational being.
What is Locke's own deSnition of person, and consequently of personal

i .entity ?

Why does the question, "Whether the same rational being is the same
substance, need no answer ?

]st Objection^ That consciousness of one's existence in different periods
imphes different consciousnesses.

What is said to be the ground of the doubt, wdiether the same person
be the some substance 1

How is this refuted by the analogy of dill^rent perceptions of the same
object ?

2d Objection, That different consciousnesses (or states of consciousness)
imply different personalities.

What extreme views of personality are taken by some of Locke's fol-
lowers ?

Upon their theory, why is it immaterial whether our substance is con-
tinually changing or not ?

What absurd consequences flow from their theory ?

And why arc such consequences legitimately deducible ?

How might they seek to evade those conclusions ?

By what abuse of language do they confuse the question, but what must
they consistently mean ?

What is then the best confution of their notion ?

(L ) This notion opposed to all experience.

How is it shown to be opposed to all our natural convictions and daily
ex]ierience ?

How far is it possible to act upon it ?

In what light would it appear, if applied to temporal concerns?

To what then must any perverse application of it to a future life be at-
tributed?

(2. ) Tliis notion opposed to the very definition of an intelligent being.

What distinction is made between«an idea or quality and a being?

What must be confessed as to all beings during their whole existence ?



9

How is this shown to be true of all living beings ?

(3. ) This notion nullified hy consciousness itself.

How does consciousness, by the memory of former actions, assure us of
our personal identity ?

Whence arises the most absolute assurance of an action having been
done ?

If a person be regarded as a substance, what does consciousness testify ?

If a person be regarded as the property of a substance, why does con-
sciousness still testify to the identity of that substance ?

Objection. That our consciousness or memory of personal identity may
possibly deceive iis.

Why might this objection be raised at the end of any demonstration
whatever ?

What other kinds of perception would it equally invalidate ?

How is the absurdity of the objection shown ?



THE PROBABILITY OF A FUTURE LIFE.

(chap. I.)

To what is the present argument restricted, and what is the question to
be pioved ?

I. The Presumption from the Law of Developaient in favor
OF A Future Life.

What do we find to be a general law of nature in our own species ?
How do we ascertain the existence of this law ?

How is this law illustrated in other creatures, in worms, birds, and in-
sects ?
To what extent are instances of it afi'orded ?
How does it establish the probability of a future life ?

II. The Presumption from the Law of Continuance.
With what powers or capacities do we find ourselves now endowed?
What is the presumption from having these powers before death ?
What is the degree of this presumption-, and what alone could remove it ?

1. This Presmnption foimded upon all expeiience.

Upon what general result of our experience is it founded ?

What word expresses this kind of presumption, and how does it appear
that we act upon it in regard to the whole course of the world, or indeed
any existing substance ?

If men were assured that death would not destroy their living powers,
what would they inevitably conclude ?

How does this state of the question show the high probability of a fu-
ture life ?

2. No Rational Presumption to the contrary.

What must be acknowledged, prior to the natural and moral proofs of
a future life ?

Yet, even prior to these proofs, what must still be maintained?

On what two grounds alone can 'the apprehension of annihilation at
death be argued ?



11

(1.) No ADVERSE PRESUMPTION FROM THE REASON OF THE TlIING.

Why cannot we argue the destruction of living agents from the nature
or effects of death ?

Why cannot we argue it from the manner in which our living powers
exist or are exercised ?

What does sleep, or a swoon, demonstrate as to the existence of these
powers, the capacity of exercising them, as well as the actual exercise of
them ?

How then does our ignorance concerning them show that there can be
no rational probability that death will destroy them ?

And what is the effect of the argument from the reason of the thing,
upon the question ?

(2.) No ADVERSE Presumption from the Analogy of Nature.

What is the effect of the whole analogy of nature upon the question?

Why cannot we reason as to what becomes of the living powers of ani-
mals after death ?

What is the only visible bearing of that event upon them ?

What alone is destroyed by that event in respect to them ?

What positive probability is afforded by our knowledge of them as far
as it can extend ?

How is this probability confirmed and made credible by our own experi-
ence and observation ?

3. Qnly Imaginanj Presumptions to the contrnry.

How is the imagination prone to influence the reason in this case ?

How has this influence been aggravated ?

How is that faculty characterized?

Into what kind of conceptions does it mislead us ?

Whence do the imaginary presumptions that death will be our destruc-
tion arise ?

And what will the consideration of them show ?

(I.) The Imaginary Presumption that Death will be the
Destruction of the whole living Being.

Upon what supposition must this presumption proceed ?

(1.) This Presumption unsupported by Consciousness.

{a.) The Divisibility of Self utterly inconceivable.

How does Consciousness attest the indivisibility of Self?

What illustration is employed to show the indivisibility of consciousness
and consequent indivisibility of the living being ?

[b.) The Absolute Oneness of Self perfectly Conceivable.

Is it any more difficult to conceive the supposition just proved than the
reverse ? '

That supposition being proved, what follows as to our organized bodies ?



12

By what analogy is tliis absolute oneness of self, as contrasted with the
dissoluble body, shown to be perfectly conceivable ?

By what imaginary cases of past or future bodies, successively animated,
is this shown to be perfectly conceivable ?

And how is it shown that the dissolution of such bodies would have no
conceivable tendency to destroy the living agent who animated them ?

(2. ) This Presumption unsupported by Experience.

Why cannot the absolute oneness of self be proved properly by experi-
mental observations ?

How then do they bear upon the supposition ?

What question, however, relative to the living substance, do they leave
undetermined 1

What does experience show as to the loss of limbs, organs, and even
the greater part of the body by the living agent 1

What does it also show as to the bulk of the body at different periods
of life?

And what is certain as to the state of the particles in all animal bodies ?

What unavoidable distinction are we taught by such observations, and
how do they affect the question of personal identity ?

{a.) No Experimental Eoidence that Death could dissolve the whole
hodij of a Living Agent.

Why cannot we determine what is the certain bulk of the living agent
or self?

And yet, what must be determined as to its bulk before we can prove
it dissoluble by death ?

Why may the elementary particles or material germ of the body sur"
vive the event of death ?

How does this argument affect the general question of the absolute in-
dissolubility of self?

(5. ) No Experimental Evidence that the Dissolution of the lohole body
would he tfie destruction of the Living Agent.

From our having already lost certain S3'stems of matter, in which we
have been interested, without losing our identity, what follows as to any
other (internal) systems of matter?

What is the ground of this inference respecting them, and what must
we conclude as to any effect of death upon them ?

From our having already several times over lost the greater part or the
whole of the body, without losing our identity, what follows as to the effect
of death upon ourselves?

By what analogous means in both cases is the loss effected ?
1st Objection. That the alienation of matter at death is sudden rather
than gradual as in life.



13

How may ths objection be answered from our present experience?

2d Objection. That the matter alienated at deatli is original rather
than adventitious as in life.

What is the first answer to this objection from our present experience ?

If this be not admitted, what answer then remains?

What is to be maintained as to the relation of such adventitious matter
to the living agent ?

And 5'et what does the relation itself amount to ?

In what respect alone does it differ from that subsisting between the
living agent and all foreign matter?

How far do these observations nullify the imaginary presumption that
the dissolution of the body would be the destruction of the living agent ?

(c.) No Experimental Evidence that the Dissolution of the x^esent Phy-
sical Organnizm icoulcl he the Destruction of the Living Agent.

In what light is it proposed next to consider the body ?

\st. Organs of Perception.

By what experiments and observations can it be shown that our eycg
are mere instruments of perception ?

How may the same thing be shown in respect to the sense of feeling
or hearing ?

How are such artificial contrivances and tne bodily organs shown to be
analogous in their relation to the perceiving agent ?

How are they shown to be analogous in their relation to external ob-
jects? .

Between what sense and what mechanical contrivance is this analogy
most evident ?

What may thence be inferred respecting the other senses ?

In the above comparison, what is acknowledged and what alone is
maintained concerning the apparatus of perception ?

How is this view confirmed experimentally by the loss of the senses ?

How is it also confirmed by the experience of dreams ?

2c?. Instrumsnts of 3Iotion or Volition.

How is it shown from experience that the limbs are mere instniments
of voluntary motion by the living agent?

What artificial contrivances illustrate their relation to the ^hing agent?

How is the analogy between such artificial and bodily instruments of
motion heightened by what appears in the mechanism of the latter "

What illustration is used to show r\tht b -uh


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