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Online LibraryChas. A. Stevens & BrosThe Indian decisions (New series) : being a re-print of all the decisions of the Privy Council on appeals from India and of the various high courts and other superior courts in India reported both in the official and non-official reports from 1875 (Volume 7) → online text (page 2 of 155)
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Pern Singh v. Partab Singh, U A 179 = 12 A W N (1892) 49 (F.B.) 404

Pheku v, Pirthi Pal Singh, 15 A 49 = 12 A W N (1892) 222 747

Phundoo v. Jangi Nath, 15 A 327 = 13 A W N (1893) 110 926

Pirbhu Narain Singh v. Sita Ram, 13 A 94 = 10 AWN (1890) 231 59

Pohkar Singh v. Gopal Singh, 14 A 361 = 12 A WN (1892) 30 ... 599


Quarry, P. W,, In the matter of , 13 A 93 (P C) = 4 Bar P C J 639 = 17 I A 199 58

Queen-Empress v, Bankhandi, 15 A 612 A W N (1892) 114 7*8

v. Bashir Khan, 14 A 346 = 12 A W N (1892) 19 589

. v. Bhagwantia, 15 A 11 = 12 A WN (1892) 141 ... 722

v. Bhure, 15 A 27 = 12 A W N (1892) 221 732

v. Bishambar Lai, 13 A 577 = 11 AWN (1891) 169 ... 365

v. Budh Ben, 13 A 351 = 11 AWN (1891) 109 223

' v, Hat Gobind Sicgb, 14 A 242 = 12 A WN (1892) 83 ... 525



Queen-Empress v. Hawthorne, 13 A 345 = 11 A WN (1891) 102 ... 219

v, Hayfield, 14 A 212 = 12 AWN (1E92) 63 ... 506

v, Hughes, 14 A 25 = 11 AWN (1891) 170 ... 888

v. Lakhpat, 15 A 365 = 13 AWN (1893) 114 ... 952

v, Madho, 15 A 25 = 12 A W N (1892) 220 ... 731

v. Makhan, 15 A 317 = 13 AWN (1893) 101 ... ' 919

v, Makhdum, 14 A 354 = 12 A W N (1892) 32 ... 595

v. Matabadal, 15 A392 = 13 A W N (1893) 146 ... 970

v. Maula Bakhsb, 15 A 205 = 13 A WN (1893) 105 ... 849

v. Muhammad Mabmud Kban, 13 A 337 = 11 AWN (1891) 93 ... 214

v. Mulua, 14 A 502 = 12 A W N (1892) 95 ... 690

v. Narain, 15 A 208 = 13 A WN (1853) 107 ... 851

v. Nathu, 15 A 19 = 12 A WN (1892; 158 . ... 727

v. Niddah, 14 A 38 = 11 A W N (1891) 176 ... 397

v. Pobpi, 13 A 171 (FB) = 11 A WN (1891)48 ... 107

v, RaghuTiwari, 15 A 336 = 13 A WN (1893) 111 ... 932:

- v. Raghunath Rai, 15 A 22= 12 A W N (1892) 220 ... 729,

v. Ram Lai, 15 A 136 = 13 A WN (1893) 50 ... 805

v. , 15 A 141 = 13 A W N (1893) 59 ... 809

v. RamBatan, 15 A 299 = 13 A WN (1893) 142 ... .908

v. Sangan Lai, 15 A 129= 13 A W N (1893) 48 ... 800

v, Soshi Bhuehan, 15 A 210 = 13 A WN (1893) 96 ... . 853

v. Staaton and Fly nn, 14 A 521 = 12 A WN (1692) 110 ... 703

v, Sudra, 14 A 336 = 12 A WN (1892) 21 ... 582

RadhaBai v Nathu Ram, 13 A 66 = 10 A WN (1890) 233 ... 41

Radba Kishen v. Raj Kuar, 13 A 573 = 11 AWN (1891) 157 ... 362

Radha Prasad Singh v. Lai Shib Rai, 13 A 53 (P C) = 17 I A 150 = 5 Sit P C J 600 ... 33

v. Mathura Cbaube, 14 A 50 = 11 AWN (1891) 219 ... 404

. v . pathan Ojah, 15 A 363 = 13 A WN (1893) 148 ... 950

v. Pergash Rai, 13 A 193 = 11 AWN (1891) 83 ... 120

Raghu Nath Sabai v. Offioial Liquidator of the Himalaya Bank, Ltd., 15 139 = 13

AWN (1893) 59 ... 807

Raghunath Singh v. Raghubir Sahai, 15 A 55 = 12 AWN (1892) 222 ... 751

Rahima v. Nepal Rai, 14 A 520 = 12 A W N (1892) 99 ... 702
Raja Bar Narain Singh v. Chaudarain Bhagwant Kuar, 13 A 300 (P C} = 18 I A 55 =

6 Bar P C J 14 = 15 Ind Jur 283 ... 189
Rajah Mokham Singh v. Raja Rup Singh, 15 A 352 (P.O.) = 20 I A 127 = 6 Sar P-C J

327 = 17 Ind Jur 376 ... 943

Ram Gharan v. Debi Din, 13 A 165 (P C) = 5 Bar P C J 616 ... 103

Harakh Rai v. Seodihal Joti, 15 A 384 = 13 A W N (1893) 163 ... 965

Kali v. Kedar Nath, 14 A 156 (F B) = 12 A W N (1892) 22 ... 470

Xiahen Upadhia v. Dipa Upadhia, 13 A 580 = 11 AWN (1891) 166 367

Lall Dube v. Har Narain, 13 A 400 = 11 AWN (1891) 150 ... 256

Manohar Misr v. Lai Behari Misr, 14 A 343 = 12 AWN (1892) 18 ... 587

Raj Tewariv. Girnandan Bhagat, 15 A 63 = 12 A W N (1892) 240 ... 757

Sukh Dae v, Tota Rm, 14 A 339 = 12 A W N (1892) 12 ... 584

Ramphul Tiwari v. Badri Natb, 13 A 103 68

Ramzan v. Gerard, 13 A 100= 11 AWN (1891) 5 ... 63

Rudr Prasad v. Baijnath, 15 A 367 = 13 A W N (1893) 115 953

Ruatam All Khan v. Abbasi Begam, 13 A 407-11 AWN (1891) 146 260



Sabti 7. Ganeshi, 14 A 23- 11 A W N (1891) 205 ... 387

Bakina Bibi v. Bwarath Ri, 15 A 115 = 13 AWN (1893) 11 ... 791

Bant Lai v. Sri Kishen, 14 A 221 = 12 A W N (1892) 66 ... 512
Secretary of State for India in Council v. Bhagwanti Bibi, 13 A 326=11 AWN M891)

97 ... 207

v. Madari Lai, 13 A 296 (F B) = ll AWN

(1891) 85 ... 186

Beth Obitor Mai v. Bhib L*l, 14 A 273 (F B) = 12 A W N (1892) 117 ... 544

Bheo Deni Ram v. Tulshi Ram, 15 A 378= 13 A W N (1893) 147 ... 960

Bher Singh v. Daya Ram, 13 A 564 = 11 A WN (1891) 164 ... 356

Bhib Singh v. Sita Ram, 13 A 76 = 10 A WN (1890) 194 ... 47

Bita Ram Kesho, In the matter of the petition of, 15 A 14 = 12 AWN (1892) 152 ... 724

Bohna v. Kbalak Singh, 13 A 76 = 11 AWN (1891) 1 ... 49

Bri Kishen v. Isbri, 11 A 223 = 12 A W N (1892) 73 ... 513

Sri Niwaa Ram Pandev. Udit Narain Misr, 13 A 330 = 11 A W N (1891) 66 ... 209

Buperunddhwaj** Prasad v. Garuraddhwaja Praaad, 15 A 147 = 13 A.W N (1893) 85... 818


Tarapat Ojha v. Ram Ratan Kuar, 15 A 387 (F B) = 13 A W N (1893) 164 .. 967

TilakRaj Singh v, Chakardhari Singh, 15 A 119-13 AWN (1893) 14 ... 793

TileBhar Rai v. Parbati, 15 A 198 = 13 A W N (1893) 9 a' ... 845

Tulsav. KhubOhand, 13 A 581 = 11 A W N (1891) 193 ... 868


Udit Narain Singh v. Jbanda, 15 A 315 = 13 AW N (1893) 108 ... 918

Udit Singh v. Kasbi Ram, 11 A 185 (F B) = 12 AWN (1892) 38 ... 489

Ummi Fazl v. Rahim un-niasa, 13 A 366= 11 A W N (1891) 129 ... 233


Wali Ahmad Khan v. Ajudhia Kandi?, 13 A 537 = 11 AWN (1891) 196 ... 340

Waltzlee v. Sbarpe, 15 A 270-13 A W N (1893) 151 ... 890


Zabada Jan v. Muhammad Tiiab, 15 A 8 = 12 A W N (1892) 140 719





13 A. 1 (F.B,) = 10 A.W.N. (1890) 207. 1889


Before Sir John Edge, Kt., Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Straight,

Mr. Justice Tyrrell, Mr. Justice Brodhurst and Mr. Justice Mahmood. BENCH.

13 A. 1

MASHIAT-UN-NlSSA (Decree -holder) v. Kani ( Judgment- debtor) .* < F<B ']

[16th January, 1889.] A

(1890) 207

Limitation Executian of decree Act XV of 1877 (Limitation Act), sch. ii,
art, 179, d. (2) "Appeal" "Final decree or rdet" Decree against defendants
severally Appeal by some only of the judgment-debtors Civil Procedure Code,
s. 544.

Where a decree for possession of immoveable property was passed not jointly,
but severally, as against all the defendants individually, and specifically stated the
proportions of which they were severally in possession, as also the costs separately
payable by each of them to the plaintiff ; and where two only of the defendant?
appealed on pleas which did not assail the decree in respect of any right or ground
common to the appellants and all or any of the non-appealing defendants, but
referred merely to the specific property alleged to be in the appellants' hands :

Held by the Full Bench (Brodhurst and Mahmood, JJ., dissenting) that a
first application for execution of the original decree against those defendants who
bad not appealed from it, and which was made five years after the date of the decree,
was barred by limitation, and clause 2 of art. 179, sob. ii of the Limitation Act
(XV of 1877), did not apply so as to make time run from the proceedings in the
appeal preferred by the other defendants. That clause applies only to those cases
in which the parties to the execution proceedings were parties to the appeal, or
to the class of oases to which s. 544 of the Civil Procedure Code applies.
J.P. Wise v. Rajnarain Chu^kerbu'ty (1) and Mullick Ahmed Zumma v. Muham-
mad Syad (2) approved.

[2] Held by Brodhurst and Mahmood, JJ., contra, that art, 179, clause 2,
must be construed as applying without any exceptions to decrees from which an
appeal has been lodged by any of the parties to the litigation in the original
suit. Nur-ul- Hasan v, Muhammad Hasan (3) followed.

[N.P., 26 M. 91 (93) (P.B.); R., 22 B. 500(507); 230.876 (882); 3 A.L.J. 381 = A.W.N.
(1906), 155; 5 O C. 217 (219);32P.R. 1907 = 8 P.L.B 1908; D., 17 A. 103; 25 C.
594 (601) = 2 C.W.N, 556 (562.]

* Second Appeal, No. 672 of 1S87, from a decree of C.W.P. Watts, Esq., District
Judge of Moradabad, dated the 21st January 1887, reversing a decree of the Subordi-
nate Judge of Moradabad, dated the 28th August 1886.

(I)IOW.B. 30. (2) 6C. 194 = 6 C.L.B. 573. (3) 8 A, 573,


1889 THE facts of this case are sufficiently stated in the judgments of

DAN. 16. Straight and Mahmood, JJ.

- Mr. Boshan Lai and Babu Durga Charan Banerjee, for the appellant.

FULL Munshi Madho Prasad, for the respondent.


13 A. 1 MAHMOOD, J. (after explaining the circumstances under which the

(F.B.) 31 case was referred to the Full Bench, continued) :

10 A.W.N, rpj., Q oagQ ifc se if j s fc O m y m ind already governed by authority. The

(1890) 207. f ao (;g o f jfc are> that one Musammat Mashiat-un-nissa brought a suit against
six persons, Ibrar Husain, Mohan Singh, Udai Singh, Musammat Rani,
Syad Muhammad AH, and Iradat Ali, and obtained a decree for possession
of immoveable property on the 12th December 1881. In this litigation
some parties were absent in the first Court. Among them were Ibrar
Husain and Iradat Ali, so that the decree so far as it related to them was
a decree passed ex parte.

Matters stood thus when only two of the defendants, namely, Udai
Singh and Mohan Singh, who were parties defendants to the cause and
had defended it, presented an appeal to the lower Appellate Court, not from
the whole decree, but from a portion thereof. And having read the decree
itself in the original Hindustani in which the matter is dealt with, I have
no doubt that the original decree was not a joint decree, but a several
decree, and that it was in respect of some of the parties an ex parte decree,
, The Court of first appeal decreed the appeal on the 24th April 1882, and

from that decree an appeal was presented to this Court, as a Court of
second appeal, and this Court by its judgment of the 17th April 1883,
restored the decree of the Court of first instance.

The present proceedings began in consequence of an application
made by the decree-holder, Musammat Mashiat-un-nissa, who is appel-
lant before us, on the 15th April 1886, and to those proceed- [3] ings
she impleaded, among others, Musammat Eani, who was one of the
original parties to the original decree, and sought execution against
her. Musammat Eani, on the 17th May 1886, preferred objections on the
ground inter aha, that the decree was barred by limitation. Upon
consideration of these objections, the Court of first instance disallowed
the objections, and allowed execution on the 28th August 1886, but the
lower Appellate Court, by its order of the 21st January 1887, allowed the
objections, and held that the execution of the decree was barred by

It is in consequence of that order that this second appeal has been
preferred. It has been preferred upon two grounds stated in the
memorandum of appeal. The first is that, because the decree was joint
and was executed within three years from the date of the final decree of
this Court, the judgment of the Court below is wrong. The other reason
is that costs having been jointly awarded against all the judgment-
debtors, the decree could not have been executed separately against the
present respondents alone, and so the decree was not barred. The
argument which was addressed to me as a Judge of this Court sitting in
the single Bench, also when sitting with my brother Brodhurst, as also
when sitting in this Court as member of a Bench of three Judges, also
when sitting here in the same capacity as member of a Bench of five
Judges, seems to me to raise three points of law which I must say
Mr. Durga Charan Banerji has argued with much ability. Those points
are :


First, as to the interpretation of art. 179, sch. ii of the Limitation 1889
Act (XV of 1877), especially clause 2 of the third column of the article, JAN. 16.

whether the words " appeal " and " final decree or order of the appellate

Court " are to be limited to any particular class of decrees or are to be FOLL
understood in the broad sense of the words being read without any BENCH,
qualification by importing either epithets or other matters wibh respect to -
the statutory words above mentioned. *' * J

The second question is, if these words are to be qualified by any
qualification outside the statute in which they occur, whether or not the
words to be imported are to be limited to any particular class of epithets.

[4] The third question is, what was exactly the nature of the decree?

Dealing with the third question first it is clear to me that the
decree cannot fall under the words, " joint " or " joint and several,"
though it may fall, to the extent of the two persons Ibrar Husain and
Iradat Ali, under the category of being a decree ex parte. I do not,
however, wish to deal with this poiat at any length, because the views
which I hold are independent of the nature of the decree. I must,
however, refer by way of explanation to the circumstances which to my
mind require consideration as to the meaning of the word " decree."

In the course of the argument yesterday I said from the Bench that
to my mind if the word decree is to be qualified, contemplates possibili-
ties of the following description :

(1) A decree passed ex parte.

(2) A decree passed in default.

(3) A decree in an appeal, in respect of a portion of the subject-

matter of the decree.

(4) A decree passed in appeal by only one out of several parties or
by all the parties.

(5) A decree in an appeal from a decree passed only as to costs.

(6) A decree or order in a Civil Court not governed by the Civil
Procedure Code.

And irrespective of other considerations which may refer to the possi-
bilities of the decree, a decree may be qualified by the words " joint,"
" several," " joint and several."

I have arrived at the conclusion that the real difficulty which arises
in this case is that of interpreting the statute whereby the case is governed.
In doing so, I am within the authority, not only of judgments in the Courts
in England, but also of judgments in British India that the general rule of
interpretation is that a word which is to be understood in the language of
the statute is to be understood in the most general manner unless there is
enough reason to qualify the meaning of the word. In cases where a statute
is [5] peculiar, and limited in its own scope, the principle of interpretation
has been to refer to other portions of the statute, but also in cases where
there are statutes more than one, the Judges have to consider those statutes
which are in pari materia, and with their help to remove the ambiguity.
The rule again is what has been, I believe, called in England the golden
rule of interpretation, that the Legislature deals with the difficulties which
arose before the statute was passed.

I hold this to be a sound principle of interpretation, and I hold also
that in the statute, Act XV of 1877, there is nothing to warrant me, either
in the first column of article 179, or in the third column of the same article,
clause 2, in limiting the word " appeal " or " decree " by any one of the
epithets which I have suggested if a broad meaning is to be placed upon
those words. This is what I have already said on a former occasion in


1889 Nur-ull-Rasan v. Muhammad Hasan (1). I refer especially to the first por-
JAN. 16. tion of my judgment which is reported at page 576. There, in expressing my

concurrence with the views which Mr. Justice Oldfield had already ex-

FULL pressed, I went on to say : " I have arrived at exactly the same conclusion
BENCH, as my learned brother, but I wish to say that the ground of distinction

which he has drawn between the present case and those referred to is, to my

13 A. 1 mind, very clear. The present case is not necessarily inconsistent with what
(F.B.)= wag ru i e( j there. In the 2nd clause of article 179, there are no words limit-
?1890)207 * n ^ or 9 uan fy m S fche application of those words to decrees in which only
one or more of the parties have appealed ; the clause as framed must be
looked upon as intended to apply, without any exceptions, to decrees frorc
which an appeal has been lodged, by any of the parties to the original pro-
ceedings ; and I should say the clause should certainly be applied to cases
such as the present, where the whole decree was imperilled by the appeal."
It is clear that the main principle upon which my judgment proceeded
was that there was no justification for qualifying the words to which re-
ference has already been made by me more than [6] once. I think the
ruling deals not only with the first point, but also with the second, as
stated by me, and I have said enough on the third point. But because in
the course of the argument some difficulty was raised by Mr. Madho Prasad,
for the respondent, as to whether or not in interpreting article 179, we are
to read the Civil Procedure Code as to the words " appeal " and " decree "
I only wish to touch upon one or two points. A Full Bench of this Court
in Lai Singh v. Kunjan (2) in interpreting s. 540 of the Civil Procedure
Code, has held that the word decree as used in that section does not mean
an ex parte decree, and that from such a decree no appeal would lie, and
another Full Bench of this Court in interpreting the same expression has
read that Section with s. 584 and has held that a second appeal from an
ex parte decree is allowable: Ajudhia Prasad v. Balmakund (3). If we
were thus to read in the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code as to
whether an appeal does or does not lie from ex parte [decree, the argument
would raise more complications in this case than those expected by the
arguments of the learned pleaders for the parties, because it so happens
that over that question, I have not been able to agree with the majority
of this Court in their ruling in Lai Singh v. Kunjan (2).

Then again, if we were to read the Civil Procedure Code into the
provisions of the Limitation Act, another difficulty would arise, and again
on account of the Full Bench ruling of this Court as to the meaning of the
words " decree which is capable of execution," that is to say, whether it is
the last decree passed in the case or also a decree which, though passed
by the first Court, contains the mandatory portion of the decree which is
capable of execution : Shohrat Singh v. Bridgman (4) explained in
Muhammad Suliman Khan v. Muhammad Yar Khan (5).

These questions I have only touched upon to show that I do not find
any reasons which would justify me in not interpreting the Limitation
Act, XV of 1877, by the ordinary rules of interpretation. I hold that
the Act is, so far as this point is concerned with [7] limitation,
in pari materia with the Civil Procedure Code, and that the Civil
Procedure Code cannot be imported for deciding questions of limita-
tion unless there is special reference in the Act. Such special reference
occurs in the body of article 179. It occurs also in the latter parts of the
same article, but it is clear to my mind that, so far as explanation I of

(1) 8 A, 573. (2) 4 A. 367. (3) 8 A. 354. (4) i A. 376. (5) 11 A. 267.


the article is concerned, the explanation, like explanation II of the 1889
article, is by its own words limited to clause (4) of the article. There are JAN. 16.

many reasons why the same rule and the same principle which apply to

clause (4) as to the extension of the time within which execution is to be FULL
limited are not to be made to apply to clause (2). The main reason is that
in explanation I the word "appeal" does not occur, and therefore the word
"application" in that clause is not to be taken as applying to "appeal* 13 A. 1
nor even for extending limitation to any decree on account of its having (P.B.)=
been subjected to appeal. Then again as to explanation II, there is no 10 A.W.N.
difficulty connected with this case. (1890) 207.

I only wish now to say that there is a vast distinction between
cases in which an application for execution is made, there having been no
appeal from the decree, and cases in which there has been an appeal as
contemplated by clause (2), article 179. I am particularly anxious to say
this, because what I have said in Nur-ul-Hasan v. Muhammad Hasan (1)
in the second paragraph of my judgment has been somewhat misunder-
stood. I said then, "I think the decree-holders in this case might, as a
consequence of the appeal by the rival pre-empfcors, claim, by analogy,
the same footing with reference to limitation for executing their decree aa
a decree-holder who has taken a step-iu-aid of execution, which is another
ground for extending the time for execution, as provided in the fourth
clause of the article."

Now when I used the word " might," I meant in that case to which
Mr. Justice Oldfield and I were parties, that we were not anxious to
question the authority of the ruling in Sangram Singh v. Bujharat Singh (2),
and we therefore distinguished it from the case before us. but it does not
imply that we adopted it.

[8] Besides the rulings to which I have referred, Mr. Durga Charan
Banerji has relied upon the following authorities : Ram Lai v. Jaggan-
nath (3), Kishan Sahai v. The Collector cf Allahabad (4), Narsingh Sewak
Singh v. Madho Das (5), Basant Lai v. Najm-un-nissa (6), Mullick Ahmed
Zumma v. Mahammad Syad (7), Gunga Moyee Dassee v. Shib Shunker
Bhuttacharjee (8), Chedoo Lai v. Nand Coomar Lai (9), Mr. Madho
Prasad relies upon the following rulings :Har Proshaud Roy v. Enayet
Hussein (10),<7.P. Wise v.EajnarainChuckerbutty (ll),SreenathMojoomdar
v. Brojonath Mojoomdar (12) Khema Debe.i v. Kamola Kant Bukshee (13).
Those authorities I have of course read with profound respect, but it would
be taking up more time of the Court than necessary if I dealt with each
of them separately. It seems to me that those rulings which relate to
enactments antecedent to Act XV of 1877, are applicable only to cases to
which those Acts applied. At least the Full Bench ruling in J.P. Wise v.
Rajnarain Chuckerbutty (11), as also the ruling in Sreenath Mojoomdar v.
Brojonath Mojoomdar (12), have no reference to the present enactment,
although, if the same case arose with reference to this enactment, I
should have considered it necessary to say more than what I have
already said. The rulings antecedent to the enactment then do not throw
much light on the present case. I still adhere to the views expressed
by me in the case of Nur-ul Hasan v. Muhammad Hasan (1), viz , that
art. 179, cl. (2) of the Limitation Act (XV of 1877) must be construed aa

(I) 8 A. 573. (2) 4 A. 36. (3) 4 A.W.N, (1881), p. 138. (4) 4 A. 137.

(5) 4 A. 274. (6) 6 A. 14. (7) 6 C. 194 = 6 C.L.R. 573. (8) 3 O.L.R. 430.
(9) 6 W.R. Miso, 60. (10) 2 C L.R. 471.

(II) 10 W.R. 30=11 B.L.R. 258. (12) 13 W.R. 309.
(13) 10 W.R. 10 = 10 B.L.R. 259, Note.


1889 intended to apply without any exceptions to decrees from which an appeal

JAN. I6i has been lodged by any of the parties to the litigation in the original
- proceedings.
FULL For those reasons T would decree the appeal and, setting aside the

BENCH, order of the lower Appellate Court, remand the case under a. 562 of the

; Civil Procedure Code for being dealt with according to law, because the

13 &. l i ea med Judge of the lower Appellate Court [9] has reversed the order of

(F.B.)= tne g rs (j Court only upon the ground of limitation. As to costs I would

10 A.W.N. ma k e them abide the final result.

(1890) 207. STRAIGHT, J. This is a second appeal upon the execution side, and

it arises under the following circumstances : One Mussumat Mashiat-un-
nissa brought a suit against seven persons, among whom were two
persons, named Mohan Singh and Udai Singh, and a third person called
Musammat Rani, who is the judgment-debtor, respondent to this appeal.
She brought the suit as the daughter of her father Ghulam Raza who had
died on the 8th August 1869, and she claimed that Mujib-un-nissa, her
mother, having also died on the 22nd February 1876, as against her
brother Ibrar Husain, who also was a defendant to the suit, she was enti-
tled to obtain one-third of the estate of which he had obtained possession,
he being only entitled to retain two-thirds. It will therefore be seen
that the principal defendant to that case was Ibrar Husain, her brother,
and ib is clear from the plaint that all the other defendants were
included in the suit as being in possession of portions of the estate as trans-
ferees either directly or indirectly from Ibrar Husain. Each of these defend-

Online LibraryChas. A. Stevens & BrosThe Indian decisions (New series) : being a re-print of all the decisions of the Privy Council on appeals from India and of the various high courts and other superior courts in India reported both in the official and non-official reports from 1875 (Volume 7) → online text (page 2 of 155)