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versy at the time Parker purchased, and for the purposes of
this case it is immaterial which of them had the legal title.
Parker acquired by his purchase all the title each or either
of them had at the time. If the title was still in Barrows,
he parted with it, for he assented to the sale and assisted in
making it. Creditors had no title or interest in the prop-
erty at the time, for they had made no attachment. Owen v.
Dixon, M Conn., 492.

2. The innocent purchaser of personal property from a
fraudulent vendee in possession, acquires a good title. Ifeal
V. WiUiamSy 18 Maine, 391 ; Hoffman v. NobUy 6 Met., 68 ;
Bradley v. Obear, 10 N. Hamp., 477 ; George v. Kimball^ 24



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162 NEW HAVEN AND MIDDLESEX.

Parker v. Crittenden.

Pick., 241 ; Ditson v. Randall j 33 Maine, 202 ; TroUy. War-
ren, 2 Fairf., 227 ; Hilliard on Sales, eh. 21, sec. 11. The
case of Preston v. Crofut is decisive only as regards real estate.
It has never been recognized or affirmed by any subsequent
decision of our own courts, and has beenekewhere repeatedly
overruled. 4 Kent Com., 464 ; Ander^^^^mertB^ 18 iJohns.,
515 ; Bean v. Smith j 2 Mason, ^^^^^HaZ Bank v. Sias-
Mm, 3 Met., 332. ^^j^^B

Seymour, J. It is agreed that the plaintiff is the bond fide
purchaser of the property in dispute. He bought it from the
fraudulent grantee in vrhose possession it then was, in the
presence of the fraudulent grantor, who assented to the sale
and assisted in making it. The defendants had not then
made their attachment, and they therefore then had no inter-
est whatever in the property, legal or equitable. The whole
title was then either in Penn or in Barrows. If in the former
the plaintiff takes that title by direct purchase ; if in the lat-
ter he takes that title by estoppel, for surely upon the facts
stated Barrows could not set up any claim to the property
against the title of the plaintiff.

The defendants insist that the conveyance from the
fraudulent grantor is by.the statute made utterly void. B©
it so ; it thence follows that Barrows remained full and com-
plete owner, the fraudulent conveyance notwithstanding, and,
as before shown, Barrows's title passes to the plaintiff by
estoppel. The defendants claim imder and through Barrows
by attachment of his interest in the property, made after the
plaintiff's purchase. The defendants therefore, as privies in
estate with Barrows, are bound by the same estoppel, and the
plaintiff being a bond fide purchaser may avail himself of the
estoppel.

This conclusion seems just arid founded on settled prin-
ciples and has become familiar law in neighboring states.
But the defendants insist that the law of Connecticut has
been declared to be otherwise in the case o( Preston v. Orofutj
1 Conn., 527. In that case the fraudulent grantor was not
present at the sale to Crofut and did not assist in making it,
and the subject matter of dispute was real estate. These dif-



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JUNE ADJOURNED TERM, 1870. 153

State of Conn. v. New Haren & Northampton Co.^Bristol r. The Same.

ferences between this case and that are such that we have no
occasion to overrule Preston v. Crofut. If however the pres-
ent decision is irreconcileably opposed^to the doctrine in that
ease, then we feel no hesitation in overruling that case to the
extent of the injwnsistency.

It was suggested b; the defendants' counsel that as the
plaintifif had not yet paid for the property, no injustice will be
done to him if we declare his purchase void, because by so
doing we should relieve him from payment and secure to the
defendants an honest debt. But the plaintiff being a bond
fide purchaser we do not feel at liberty to say that he shall
not have the benefit of his purchase. The title to the prop-
erty vested in the plaintifif upon its delivery to him, and great
inconvenience and confusion might follow if we should hold
that such title could be made null by subsequent attachments
by creditors of a former owner of the property.

A new trial is not advised.



In this opinion the other judges concurred.



■ •♦•



State op Connecticut v9. The New Haven & Northampton
Company. Rieb Bristol and others vs. The Same.

The act of 1866 provides that no railroad company shall abandon any depot or
station on its road, after such depot or station has been established for twelve
months, except by approval of tlie railroad commissioners after public notice
and a hearing had. The New Haven & Northampton Co. in 1848 constructed
a railroad, which in 1849 they leased for twenty years to the New York & New
Haven Railroad Co. The latter company soon after taking possession of the
road built a platform for the accommodation of pass^igers at a place on the
road which was thereafter called " Brooks's Station/' and placed upon it an old
baggage-car which served as a shelter for passengers waithig at the station.
No agent was ever placed at the station and no tickets were sold there, nor
was ft«ight way-billed to or from that station, bnt to and ftt>m another station
in the same town. But tickets were sold at other stations to passengers for
that station, and trains were stopped to take np passengers, and trains carrying
the mail stopped regtilarly. Held —

Vol. xxxyii. — 20



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154 NEW HAVEN AND MIDDLESEX.



State of Conn. p. New Haven & Northampton Co.— Bristol r. The Same.



1. That Brooks's Station was a "depot or station" within the meaning of the
statute.

2. That upon the expiration of the lease to the New York & New Haven Rail-
road Co. the road reverted to the New Haven & Northampton Co. in the con-
dition in which it then wae, and that the lessors were concluded by the estab-
lishment hy the lessees of the station in question during the term of the lease.

3 That a mandamus would lie at the instance of the attorney for the state to
compel the New Haven & Northampton Co. to re-establish the station, they
having abandoned the same without the consent of the railroad commissioners.

The first of these cases was an application by the State
Attorney for New Haven County for a mandamus to compel
the respondents, a railroad company, to stop their trains at a
certain station on the road, and the other an application by
sundry citizens, under a statute of the state, to a judge of
the Supreme Court, for an order to tlie same eflFect. The
cases involving the same general question were heard together
in this court.*
The application of the State Attorney was as follows :
" To the Honorable Superior Court, now in session at New
Haven, within and for the county of New Haven, comes Elea-
zer K. Foster, the Attorney for the state of Connecticut,
within and for New Haven County, and respectfully represents

*The act of 1866, upon \Ehich the application of the State Attorney was
founded, is as follows :

** Sec. 1. No railroad corporation shall abandon any dcjiot or station, which
is on its road, and in this state, after the same has been established for twelve
months, except by the approval of the general railroad commissioners, given
after a public hearing held at the depot in question, and of which hearing and of
the intention to abandon, notice shall be given by posting the same conspicuously
in said depot or station for one month previous to the hearing.

" Sec. 2. Any depot or station on any railroad in this state, which has been
abandoned at any time since the first day of January, 1866, shall, upon the peti-
tion to the general railroad commissioners of thirty freeholders residing in the
town where said depot or station was located, be restored upon the approval of
said commissioners given after a public hearing held at the depot nearest to said
discontinued depot, and after notice of said hearing shall have been conspicuously
posted at the place of hearing for one month previous to the hearing.''

The act of 1868, upon which the other application was based, is as follows :

" Sec. 1. Whenever any railroad company in this state shall refuse to stop
nny one or more of its passenger trains at any depot on the line of its railroad,
any numlx^r of citizens not less than ten of the town or dty in which such depot
is situated, may make their application in writing to the Superior Court in tho
county where such depot is located, and if said court is not in session, to any
judge of tbo Superior or of the Supreme Court of Errors, praying that said comi-



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JUNE ADJOURNED TERM, 1870. 165

State of Conn, v. New Haven & Northampton Co. — ^Bristol v. The Same.

that the New Haven & Northampton Company is, and for
more than thirty years last past has been, a corporation duly
created by the laws of the state of Connecticut, and that said
company has an office for the transaction of business and is
located in the town and county of New Haven, and that said
corporation, by an act of the General Assembly passed May
session, 1846, was duly authorized to construct a railroad
from said New Haven, northerly along the line of the said
company's canal, to the town of Parmington, in Hartford
County, and that said company, in accordance with the terms
and provisions of said act, did construct and put in operation
a railroad from said New Haven to said Farmington, passing
through the town of Cheshire in New Haven County, which
road has been operated by said corpoiaiion since the 1st day
of June, 1848, to the present time.

" And the said attorney avers that said corporation, in the
year 1848, established a station, for the purpose of the recep-
tion and delivery of passengers and freight, commonly called
" Brooks's Station," at a point on and along the line of the
railroad in said Cheshire, and that said corporation, and all
persons operating said railroad, with its consent, have from
the 1st day of July, 1848, to the 1st day of August, 1869,
continued said station, so established as aforesaid, and have
during all that period received and delivered passengers and
freight at said station.

"Ajid the said Attorney further avers, that on the 1st day
of August, 1869, and ever since that day hitherto, the said
corporation has abandoned said station, contrary to the stat-
ute in such case made and provided, and has ceased to stop

pany may be ordered to stop the train or trains mentioned in said application
at said depot/'

Section 2d provides for the appointment of a committee of three disinterested
persons who arc to hear the case, upon notice given, and if they shaU be of opin-
ion that the application ought to be granted in whole or in part, are to issue an
order to the company, directing it to stop its trains in the manner stated in the
order/ and make return of their doings to the next term of the Superior Court
in the county.

Sections 3d and 4th provide for final proceedings in the Snperior Court npon
the report, by which the order made by the committee is to bo established or set
aside, and for the enforcement of the order by mandamus.



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156 NEW HAVEN AND MIDDLESEX.

State of Ck)iiii. 9, New Haren & Nortluanpton Cc^Bristol v. The Same.

its trains, running over said road, at said station, to the great
discomforfc, annoyance and inconvenience of the public.

" And the said Attorney avers that the railroad commission-
ers have never approved of such abandonment of said station
by said company, nor has a public hearing been had by them
to approve of such abandonment.

" Wherefore the said Attorney moves tiiis honorable court
to issue a writ of mandamus requiring and enjoining the said
corporation to discontinue its abandonment of said station,
and to stop its trains, passing over said railroad, and by said
station, at said station, for the reception and delivery of pas-
sengers and freight, or to signify cause to the contrary thereof
to this court. And your petitioner will ever pray. Dated at
New Haven, the 11th day of November, 1869."

The respondents filed the following answer : —

*' The respondents, not waiving but reserving to themselves
the benefit of the many errors and insufiiciencies of said ap-
plication and the matters therein contained, say, that they
admit that the New Haven & Northampton Company is a
corporation duly incorporated by the laws of the state of Con-
necticut, by an act of the General Assembly, passed May
session, 1846, to construct a railroad from said New Haven
northerly along or near the line of the Farmington canal to
the town of Farmington, with liberty to extend the same on
or near the line of said canal to the north line of this state.

"And the respondents aver, that while they were engaged
fai the construction of a railroad under said charter, from said
New Haven to the village of Plainville in said town of Farm-
ington, and before the completion thereof, they, by a valid in-
strument in writing, duly executed for that purpose, did
demise, lease, and to farm let, to the New York & New Haven
Railroad Company, a corporation duly incorporated by the
laws of the state of Connecticut, all and singular the said
railroad from said New Haven to said village of Plainville,
with all the rights of way, depot grounds, depot buildings
and fixtures, with all the other privileges and appurtenances
thereto. belonging, for and during the full term of twenty-one
years, commencing on the day that said railroad, with all the



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JUNE ADJOURNED TEBM, 1870. 157



State of Conn, v. New Haven & Nortiiatnpt<m Co. — Bristol v. The Same.

depot buildings, should be fully completed and finished as
aforesaid, and tendered to said Now York & New Haven Rail-
road Company, fully completed and ready for use, and termi-
nating at the end of twenty-one years therefrom ; the said
New York & New Haven Railroad Company on their part
agreeing to manage and operate said road in a judicious and
proper and discreet maimer, in good faith, so as faiily to de-
velop its resources and to produce therefrom the greatest
amount of net earnings.

" And the respondents further show, that in pursuance of
said contract, they, on the first day of July, 1848, having
completed said railroad from said New Haven to said village
of Plainville, delivered their said railroad completed and ready
for use to said New York & New Haven Railroad Company,
who thereupon received the said railroad, and during the
twenty-one years next succeeding, to wit, from the said 1st
day of July, 1848, to the 1st day of July, 1869, the said New
York & New Haven Railroad Company had the entire and
absolute use, management, and control of said railroad from
said New Haven to said Farmington, and passing through
said town of Cheshire, to the exclusion of the respondents.

" And the respondents further say, that said New York &
New Haven Railroad Company, soon after taking possession of
said road, built a platform at the place which in said applica-
tion is termed "Brooks's Station,'* for the accommodation of
passengers, and placed upon or near its southerly end, an old
baggage car with an opening which served as a door-way.
Said car was about twelve feet long and of the width and
height of ordinary baggage cars, and served as a shelter or
protection from the weather. No agent was ever appointed
at said station, and no tickets were sold thereat, nor was any
freight ever way-billed at or to that station, but was way-billed
from or to the station at Cheshire. But tickets were sold at
other stations on said road to passengers for said station, and
trains were stopped to take up passengers at said station when
flagged so to stop, and trains carrying the mail stopjKJd with-
out being flagged, and occasionally, and not to exceed an
average of once in every month, said New York & New Ha-



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158 NEW HAVEN AND MIDDLESEX.

State of Conn. v. New HaTen & Northampton Co. — ^Bristol p. The Same.

ven Railroad Company, under special contracts for that pur-
pose, received and delivered freight of large bulk and quantity
at said station. They also, when requested, left articles of
small bulk, at said station.

" And the respondents further show, that during the period
of said lease, and while said road was operated and controlled
by said New York & New Haven Railroad Company, said
railroad company did not operate said rbad in a judicious,
proper and discreet manner, so as fairly to develop its re-
sources, and to produce therefrom the greatest amount of net
income, nor did they manage the same for the true interests
of the public, but said New York & New Haven Railroad
Company, during the entire period of said lease, were by the
stipulations of a contract between themselves and the Hart-
ford & New Haven Railroad Company, compelled to operate
and manage, and did in fact so operate and manage said road
as to protect the interests of the Hartford & New Haven
Railroad Company instead of the interests either of the pub-
lic or of the respondents, and so as to prevent said road being
operated for the interests of the public, to the prejudice of
said Hartford & New Haven Railroad Company, or so as to
divert cither passengers or freight from said Hartford & New
Haven railroad.

'• And the respondents further show that, at the expiration
of said lease, to wit, on the 1st day of July, 1869, they took
possession of said road and its appurtenances, and have ever
since had the exclusive management and control of the same.
That soon after taking possession they found that the operar
tiou of said road in a judicious, proper and discreet manner,
so as fairly to develop its resources, and at the same time to
secure the best interests of the public, required the discontin-
uance of the stoppage of their passenger trains at the flag
stations on said road, and among these at Brooks's Station,
so called, and they have, with this end alone in view, since
the 1st day of August, 1869, discontinued the stopping of
their passenger trains at said Brooks's Station.

" And the respondents further show that, since taking pos-
session of their said road upon the only application ever made



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JUNE ADJOURNED TERM, 1870. 159

State of Conn. r. New Haven & Northampton Co. — ^Bristol v. The Same.

to them to receive, or deliver freight at said Brooks's Station,
they, for reasons which they deemed sufficient, declined to
contract for its delivery at said Brooks's Station.

" And the respondents submit to this honorable court, that
for the causes aforesaid as hereiinbcforo set forth, said writ of
mandamus prayed for in said application should not be granted,
but that said application should be dismissed, and they pray
that the same be dismissed."

To this answer the attorney for the state demurred, and
the case was reserved for the advice of this court.

The application of Rier Bristol and others was made under
the act of 1868, to a judge of the Supreme Court, by whom a
committee was appointed to hear the parties, make an order
in the premises, if in their judgment such an order should be
made, and report to the Superior Court. The committee re-
ported that, after hearing the parties and their witnesses,
they were of opinion that the application should be granted,
and that they had issued the following order to the respond-
ents : " To the New Haven & Northampton Company : The
committee in the matter of the application of Rier Bristol
and others against you, having come to the conclusion and
opinion, in view of all the facts and circumstances, that said
application ought to be granted, hereby direct you to stop,
for the convenience of passengers, at Brooks's Station, so
called, the morning passenger train running southerly to
New Haven, and due at New Haven at alK)ut nine o'clock and
thirty-five minutes, A. M., and also to stop at said Brooks's
Station for the convenience of passengers, the passenger
train leaving New Haven at about six o'clock, P. M., and
going northerly ; and we direct costs to be paid by said com-
pany. Dated at New Haven, Oct. 16th, 1869."

The Superior Court passed an order accepting the report
of the committee and establishing their doings, and tlic re-
spondents brought the record before this court by a motion
in error. The facts found in this case were substantially the
same as in the other.

DooUttle, for the State, and for Bristol and others, cited
Slcte v. Hartford <f New Haven K R. Co., 29 Conn., 588,



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160 NEW HAVEN AND MIDDLESEX.

^- ~ — ~ -

State of Conn. v. Nev ilayea & Nortbampton Co. — Bristol v. The Some.

647 ; Englihh v. N. Haven Sf NwOxampUm Co., 32 id., 240;
R»>gina v. Lancashire ^ Yorkshire Railway Co., 16 Eng. Law
& Eq., 327 ; S. C, 1 EUis k Blackb., 228 ; Mayor ^c. of New
York V. Lard, 18 Wend., 131 ; WolcoU y. P(md, 19 Conn.,
604 ; Sedgw. on Const. & Stat. Law, 361.

J. S. Bea<Ay for the respondents.

1. Both the statutes under which the proceedings in the
two cases are brought, are intended to guard and secure the
interests of the pubhc as i^inst the antagonistic private in-
terests of the corporations. But they both properly contem-
plate that a station may be abandoned, or that a company
may discontinue stoj^iug a passenger train at a depot, not
only without detriment to, but in Airtheranoe of the public
interests. And each statute provides a tribunal for the deter-
mination of this question as a preH*equisite to the issuing of
any judicial mandate. Where tliere are different statutes
relating to the same subject matter, though made at different
times, and not referring to each other, they shall be taken
and construed together as one system, and as explanatory of
each other. jRexY. Lozdale, 1 Burr., 447 ; 1 Swift's Dig., 12.

2. The court will not, at the instance of the state attoiv
ney, grant a mandamus, where it is conceded that the best
interests of the public will be promoted by withholding such
mandate. Angell Jk Ames on Corp., § 698. Here the answer
of the respondents to the application for the mandamus avers,
and the demurrer admits, that they '^ found that the operation
of said road in a judicious manner, so as fairly to develop its
resources, and at the same time to secure the best interests
of the public, required the discontinuance of the stoppage of
the passenger trains at the flag stations on said road, and
among them at Brooks's Station, so called ; and they have,
with this end in view, since the 1st day of August, 1869, dis-
continued the stoppage of their passenger trains at Brooks's
Station."

8. Where the charter of a corporation, or the general
statute in force and applicable to the subject, imposes a spe-
cific duty, either in terms, or by reasonable implication, and



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JUNE ADJOURNED TERM, 1870. 161

State of C!onn v. New Haven & Northampton Co. — ^Bristol v. The Same.

there is no other specific or adequate remedy, the writ of
mandamus will be fi,warded. But if the statute or the gen-
eral law of the land afford any other specific and adequate
remedy, it must be pursued. Redfield on Railways, 456 ;
Moses on Mandamus, 117 ; Louisville ^c. B. B. Co. v. The
State, 26 Ind., 177. The act of 1866, under the first section
of which the application for a mandamus is brought to re-
store an abandoned station, provides in its second section a
specific and adequate remedy f©r such abandonment. The:
two sections construed together mean, that if any railroad
company shall abandon a station which has been established
by them for a period of twelve months, or, if the abandon-
ment occur after the 1st day of January, 1866, then irrespect-
ive of the period it has-been so established, the railroad
commissioners may, upon application, restore such station.
Any other construction would involve consequences disastrous
alike to the public and to the company.

4. There is not and never was at " Brooks's Station," so-
called, any such station as is contemplated in the act of 1866,
or any such depot as is contemplated in the act of 1868. It
was not a freight station. The record finds " that no freight
was ever way-billed to or from it, but was way-billed from or to.
the station at Cheshire." It was not such a depot or station
as is required by the act of 1866, because the " posting a notice;
conspicuously in said station or depot," could not be complied:
with. A depot, within the ordinary meaning of that term^
— and the legislature must be deemed to have used it \it
that sense, — involves buildings for the accommodation of
passengers, and some sort of facilities for the procuring of



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