David B. Lipsky.

The impact of final offer arbitration in Massachusetts : an analysis of police and firefighter collective bargaining online

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Online LibraryDavid B. LipskyThe impact of final offer arbitration in Massachusetts : an analysis of police and firefighter collective bargaining → online text (page 4 of 5)
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It should be reiterated that the salary change variable that is
being associated with an arbitrated award is not the percentage increase
that the arbitrator (or the parties) might have claimed was being implemented,
but the actual percentage salary change as reflected in the police and fire
salary schedules included in signed collective bargaining agreements in
1975 and 1976. We submit that this is the most accurate reflection of
negotiated salary changes and allows us to compare arbitrated changes
with changes achieved in other stages of the impasse procedures.

The "reference group" for the mediation, fact-finding, and arbi-
tration variables is the group of cities and towns that achieved settlement
without going to impasse at all. Thus, the coefficients obtained with
the stage -of -settlement variables allow us to say, first, whether there
was a significant difference between salary changes achieved at any
stage of the impasse procedures and salary changes achieved without
going to impasse and, second, what the magnitude of that difference,
if significant, was.



46

Table V.l dramatically illustrates that, with only three
exceptions, the utilization of the impasse procedures did not have a
statistically significant influence on the level of salary change for
municipalities settling at any stage of the impasse procedures vis a vis
those municipalities settling without the use of the procedures.

In two of the equations the table shows that the use of mediation
resulted in a statistically significant and positive influence on the rate of
change of salary. The change in police sergeants' salaries, for example,
was 3.4 percentage points higher in mediated settlements than the change
achieved in contracts settled without impasse. In addition, the change
in firefighter lieutenants' salaries was 3.0 percentage points higher in
mediated settlements than the change achieved in contracts settled
without impasse.

In the case of one regression — for firefighter lieutenants — we
found that the use of final offer arbitration had a statistically significant
impact on salary changes in 1975-76. The coefficient in the table indicates
that the rate of change in lieutenants' pay was 3.2 percentage points
greater in arbitrated settlements than in settlements where there was no
impasse. But note that this magnitude is virtually the same as that
achieved by lieutenants whose contracts were settled in mediation.

Firefighter lieutenants and police sergeants , of course , generally
constitute only a small proportion of the work force of public safety
departments. By far the largest proportion of salaries paid by munici-
palities to their public safety employees goes to firefighters and patrolmen.



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Online LibraryDavid B. LipskyThe impact of final offer arbitration in Massachusetts : an analysis of police and firefighter collective bargaining → online text (page 4 of 5)