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PRESENT PROBLEMS
IN FOREIGN POLICY



Books By David Jayne Hill

A History of Diplomacy in the In-
ternational Development of Europe.

Vol. I. The Struggle for Universal Empire.
With 5 Colored Maps, Chronological Tables,
List of Treaties and Index. Pp. XXII-
481.

Vol. II. The Establishment of Territorial
Sovereignty. With 4 Colored Maps,
Tables, etc. Pp. XXIV-688.

Vol. III. The Diplomacy of the Age of
Absolutism. With 5 Colored Maps, Tables,
etc. Pp. XXVI-706.

World Organization, as Affected by the
Nature of the Modern State. Pp. IX-2I4.
Translated also into French and German.

The People's Government.

Pp. X-288.

Americanism What It Is.

Pp. XV-283.

Translated also into French.

The Rebuilding of Europe.

Pp. XII-28p.

Translated also into French.

Impressions of the Kaiser.

Pp. XII-266.

Present Problems in Foreign Policy.



PRESENT PROBLEMS
IN FOREIGN POLICY

BY

DAVID JAYNE HILL

\v

AUTHOR OT "THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT,"
"AMERICAN ISM WHAT IT is," BTC.J




D. APPLETON AND COMPANY

NEW YORK AND LONDON

MCMXIX



COPYRIGHT, 1919, BY
D. APPLETON AND COMPANY

Copyright, 1919, by
THE NOBTH AMEBICAN REVIEW PUBLISHIKO Co.



PBINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF



"Europe has a set of primary interests which
to us have no, or a 'very remote, relation. Hence
she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the
causes of which are essentially foreign to our
concerns. Hence therefore it must be unwise in
us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, m
the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the
ordinary combinations and collisions of her friend-
ships or enmities. It is our true policy to steer
clear of permanent alliances with any portion of
the foreign world so far, 1 mean, as we are now
at liberty to do it; for let me not be understood
as capable of patronizing infidelity to existmg
engagements"

GEORGE WASHINGTON.



/\ .

Go



PREFACE

THE Great War has been on the part of the
Entente Allies avowedly a battle against autoc-
racy. The occasion for it was that autocracy,
having no basis in principles of justice, ruled
by the exercise of arbitrary force regardless of
the restraints of law.

The conflict ended in the triumph of democ-
racy. The autocratic empires were left in ruins.
The task of democracy is to reorganize the eman-
cipated populations and to create responsible
governments which can maintain legal relations-
with one another.

This can be done only by the firm establishment
of law, both national and international; for de-
mocracy without respect for law is anarchy.
Having no unity of interest or constancy of
purpose, a lawless democracy implies a perpetual
conflict without definite aims, in which all the
participants waste their energies in mutual re-
sistance.

If, therefore, democracy is to survive and or-
ganize its victory, it must do so in a spirit of
loyalty to principles of justice. The will of

vii



PREFACE

the victor must be guided by the spirit of obe-
dience to law. Its first necessity, however, is to
prove that law cannot be violated with impunity.

The fundamental problem that confronts us at
the termination of the Great War is, therefore, the
restoration of the rule of law. I say the restora-
tion, and not the inauguration, of the rule of law,
because the idea of law is not a new idea, and a
nominal respect for law is not a new state of
mind. The defect in pre-war international or-
ganization was not that International Law did not
exist or that it was not in theory authoritative,
but that there was no fixed determination on the
part of any nation to enforce it except in its own
interest.

The lesson of the war is that the enforcement
of International Law is a universal and not mere-
ly a national interest; and that, in reality, there
is no human interest that is comparable with it
in importance except the enforcement of just laws
within the nations themselves.

The difference between the ante-war period and
that upon which we have entered lies chiefly in
this : that before the war nations were to a great
extent ruled by autocratic masters who had no
regard for law but were guided by their own
ambitions and the ambitions of those who sup-
ported them ; whereas the dissolution of these im-
perial Powers has left their populations free to

viii



PREFACE

reestablish themselves upon lines of organized
liberty under law.

The task of accomplishing this is a stupendous
one. Without mutual aid, and especially without
the utter extermination of the spirit of military
autocracy, it is impossible. The first step in
the accomplishment of that task is peace, a peace
in which it is made clear to all the world that
the spirit which caused the war is completely sub-
dued and rendered powerless for further disturb-
ance. Such a peace must be a peace of victory, in
which it is made evident that law has been vin-
dicated, and that violations of it can be and are
effectively punished. To speak of peace in any
other sense than this before such a peace is im-
posed is to substitute dreams for realities. Herein
lies the test of what the future of the world will
be.

When that condition of peace is fulfilled, when
it is plainly established that the violation of
International Law can really be punished, there
will be a ground for faith that it can in the
future be maintained. With the certainty of
justice will come the organization of peace, and
it can be attained in no other way.

The object of this little book is to maintain the
thesis that without the rule of law there is no hope
of permanent peace; and that International Law,
being the affair of all nations, requires for its

ix



PREFACE

enforcement that all nations, and not a single
group organized in their own interest, shall freely
have a part in the formulation and protection
of it.

The proper task of the Entente of Free Nations
formed in the prosecution of the Great War is
not, therefore, to create a mere organ of power
but an institution of justice. Such an institution
cannot be established by a League of Nations,
unless as an organization it makes law and not
power the chief object of its existence. If it
dedicates its energies frankly to the perfection of
International Law, it may indeed rise to the height
of world leadership; but, because all sovereign
States are equal before the law, it cannot long
subsist merely as a "League," which is essentially
a group of Powers within the general Society of
States. What is required is the union, not the
division, of that society. Working as an Entente
of Free Nations toward the ultimate establish-
ment of that society on the basis of a common
law, the victors in the war have had their oppor-
tunity to prove that violations of law, even of
great magnitude, can be punished, and that the
time has come, in the light of that result, for
the whole Society of States to unite in the perfec-
tion and the protection of the Law of Nations.

This is not the course that has been pursued in
the Peace Conference at Paris. "The Constitution



PREFACE

of a League of Nations" elaborated there has
been formed under the stress of an unfinished war,
in the face of an unrepentant foe, in the midst
of conflicting national interests, and under in-
timidation by the presence of a wholly new enemy
tending to destroy all responsible government. It
is the work not of jurists building on solid founda-
tions already laid, but of politicians holding a
brief for particular interests or a personal theory.

These conditions have prevented the dispassion-
ate consideration of the fundamental problem of
permanent international organization on the basis
of International Law, for which no provision is
made. The "League of Nations," although con-
templating the preservation of peace by the crea-
tion of a defensive alliance and an imperial syn-
dicate for the regulation of the world under the
control of a small group of Great Powers, is no-
where pledged to the maintenance of International
Law or to the recognition of the inherent rights
of States. It provides for war, and lays down
conditions on which it will be resorted to; but it
does not provide for justice through the perfec-
tion and enforcement of law based upon agreement.

What was needed to give effect to the work of
the Hague Conferences was its further extension
and a provision for applying and enforcing its
results. The proposed League of Nations wholly
disregards historic continuity, makes no reference



XI



PREFACE

to past achievements or provision for completing
them, and simply takes us back to the conception
of the preponderance of power.

That which especially justifies these reflections
is that the League of Nations, as it has been
framed, does not correspond to our American
traditions and ideals. On the contrary, it is in
some respects an abandonment of them. How far
this is true the reader may judge for himself. The
aim of the writer has been, without prejudice, but
with perfect freedom, to discuss the problems
which the "League" raises as well as those which
it attempts to solve. And this, it is believed, can
be done the more freely because the idea of a
"League," although with some evident misappre-
hensions, has been received in Europe as an Amer-
ican idea.

The author is indebted to "The North Ameri-
can Review" for permission to use some of the
papers which first appeared in that periodical.

The fourth and fifth chapters are in substance
two lectures delivered before the George Wash-
ington University.

DAVID JAYNE HILL.



CONTENTS

MMM

PREFACE vii

I. THE ENTENTE OF FREE NATIONS 1

II. GERMANY'S POSE FOR PEACE 38

^III. INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 69

IV. THE CORPORATE CHARACTER OF THE- LEAGUE OF

NATIONS 104

V. THE TREATY- MAKING POWER UNDER THE CONSTI-
TUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 140

VI. THE OBSTRUCTION OF PEACE 180

VII. THE DEBACLE OF DOGMATISM 225

VIII. THE PRESIDENT'S CHALLENGE TO THE SENATE . 263

DOCUMENTS

I. PRESIDENT WILSON'S "POINTS" 303

II. THE COVENANT AS ORIGINALLY AGREED UPON AT .

PARIS 309

III. THE SENATE "ROUND ROBIN" 325

IV. AMENDMENTS PROPOSED 327

V. THE COVENANT AS REVISED 334

INDEX 355



I

THE ENTENTE OF FREE NATIONS

IN every period of warfare since modern
nations came into existence, there have been
serious reflections upon the cost and the hor-
rors of war which have culminated in schemes
for preventing it altogether. Some of these
have been merely abstract theories regard-
ing the manner in which international con-
flicts could be obviated or rendered impos-
sible ; while others have been of a more prag-
matic character, aiming to create in the realm
of actuality a situation which would safe-
guard the interests of peace and possibly of
justice.

The Thirty Years' War, which was ended
by the Peace of Westphalia, in 1648, sug-
gested to Emeric Cruce his "Nouveau
Cynee," written during its progress in 1623,
in which the Republic of Venice was pro-
posed as a place where a permanent corps

1



IN FOREIGN POLICY

should reside and by their
votes settle all international disputes. In
1625 Hugo Grotius, perceiving that such
settlements could not be made except upon
some basis of previously accepted rules and
principles, gave to the world his great work,
"De Jure Belli ac Pacis," the first complete
treatise on the Law of Nations; and to this
he added the proposal of "some kind of a
body in whose assemblies the quarrels of each
one might be terminated by the judgment of
others- not interested," and that "means be
sought to constrain the parties to agree to
reasonable conditions."

In like manner, in 1634, a notable device
for maintaining peace, called the "Great De-
sign," was invented by the Duke of Sully
and attributed to Henry IV of France as
the plan of that monarch for ending the long
struggle between the House of Hapsburg
and the rest of Europe ; but it is now estab-
lished that it was the scheme of Sully him-
self, who as a fallen minister hoped by this
means to procure his own recall to the ad-
ministration of the affairs of his country. All



THE ENTENTE OF FREE NATIONS

Europe, according to this plan, was to be or-
ganized into fifteen States, which should to-
gether constitute one Christian Republic,
in which wars were to be prevented by a Gen-
eral Council, composed of forty delegates,
meeting annually in the most central cities
of the different countries in rotation.

During the Congress of Utrecht, in 1713,
the Abbe de St. Pierre elaborated his
"Project of Perpetual Peace," to which
more particular reference will be made in
discussing the provisions of the League of
Nations proposed at Paris, of which it is
an almost perfect prototype. The Napo-
leonic Wars also brought forth plans for in-
ternational peace, the most conspicuous ef-
fort being that of Immanuel Kant, in 1796,
in his essay on "Eternal Peace," in which the
solution offered by this Prussian philosopher
was that all States should become republi-
can in form; a condition, as he thought,
which would enable them by some kind of
general federation to unite their forces for
the preservation of peace.

It is not surprising, therefore, that, as a



PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN POLICY

result of the defeat of the aggressors in the
Great War now, as we hope, happily termi-
nated by the united efforts of a group of
advanced and liberal nations, these plans,
or modifications of them, should again re-
ceive attention, and that a general desire
should be created for "some kind of body,"
as Grotius expressed the aspiration, which
could prevent the repetition of the experi-
ence through which the world has passed.

What was impossible before the Great
War, it is believed by many, could be easily
accomplished now; and that, therefore, even
before a peace is finally concluded, and as
an essential part of it and a condition of its
perpetuity, a "League of Nations" should be
formed.

There are, it is true, wide differences of
opinion regarding the objects, the methods,
the organization, and the obligations of such
a league, varying from the creation of a
World State by the federation of the ex-
isting nations into one vast political organ-
ism including all, both small and great, to
a limited compact confined to a few Powers



THE ENTENTE OF FREE NATIONS

with no function beyond the peaceable ad-
judication of differences by an international
tribunal without power to enforce its judg-
ments.

The occasion is, no doubt, opportune for
a thorough discussion of these widely differ-
ing plans, and it is timely for their advocates
to express their views and support their con-
ceptions by argument; but it is by no means
to be taken for granted that any one of
these projects, however honestly and earn-
estly its supporters may believe it should
be at once adopted, is either practicable or
desirable. The stress of insistence should
not be placed upon the means of forcing the
acceptance of a particular plan, however
meritorious it may be in itself, but upon the
intelligent comparison of different plans
and a patient examination of their probable
effects.

That which needs, first of all, to be em-
phasized is, that no one Power can expect,
or should desire, to impose upon others a sys-
tem which they do not all heartily approve;
and, in the next place, that if any plan is to

5



PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN POLICY

be permanent and effective, it must have the
support not only of the leading governments
but of the great masses of the people whom
those governments represent. It is, there-
fore, greatly to be desired that the public
should be fully informed before any decisive
step is taken, that nothing should be urged
until it is well understood, and that no
theorist, however competent and trusted,
should be regarded as a trustee of a whole
people in a matter of such import and conse-
quence. The true principle that should be
invoked for guidance in this matter was well
and forcibly enunciated by the President of
the United States when, in 1912, in his first
electoral campaign, he dwelt upon the value
of "common counsel," and, as one of the
people, seeking leadership, expressed his at-
titude regarding public policies in the words :
"I am one of those who absolutely reject the
trustee theory, the guardianship theory. I
have never found a man who knew how to
take care of me, and, reasoning from that
point out, I conjecture that there isn't any
man who knows how to take care of all the

6



THE ENTENTE OF FREE NATIONS

people of the United States. I suspect that
the people of the United States understand
their own interests better than any group of
men in the confines of the country under-
stand them."

It may, of course, be thought that it is not
the "interests of the people of the United
States" that should prevail in the formation
of an organization so general as a "League
of Nations," but the interests of humanity.
This may be true, but the "trustee theory,
the guardianship theory," is perhaps even
less applicable to humanity as a whole than
it is to a single people, who in ordinary cir-
cumstances may at least have an opportunity
to choose, and to some extent direct, their
trustee or guardian.

It would, however, be a fatal error to
overlook the fact that the interests of the
people of the United States, as well as the
interests of other portions of humanity, are
deeply involved in any plan to form a
"League of Nations." Great benefits might
accrue, or serious disadvantages might re-
sult from occupying a place in it. It is the

7



PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN POLICY

duty of the people as well as the statesmen
of the nations that may enter into such a
league, to consider for themselves the alleged
benefits and the possible disadvantages.
This has been done in Great Britain, in
France, in Italy, and in Japan, to mention
only a few of the co-belligerents, and their
interests, which are different, have been care-
fully considered. The signs of this are evi-
dent to those who are familiar with the con-
temporary comments of the European press
upon this subject, especially the great Brit-
ish quarterlies, which have discussed the
"League of Nations" with a candor, a seri-
ousness, and an understanding that have not
been equaled by American periodicals of
the same class, which have inclined to take
the complimentary speeches of Lloyd
George, Lord Grey, Mr. Asquith, and Mr.
Balfour as a complete and authoritative ex-
pression of British opinion, but this is far
from being the case.

No discussion of the subject had been pub-
lished in America to compare in amplitude
of knowledge and solidity of judgment with

8



THE ENTENTE OF FREE NATIONS

the treatment of it under the title "The
Greatest League of Nations," by Lord Syd-
enham of Combe, in "The Nineteenth Cen-
tury and After," for August, 1918, which
concludes: "We shall not win the war by
planning Leagues of Peace to meet circum-
stances which we cannot yet foresee. Like
the paper constitutions of Sieyes they may
prove impracticable; but the Holy Alliance
against the forces of evil remains, and when
it is crowned with victory it can be turned
into a powerful agency for maintaining the
peace of the world. Then, in some happier
future, the vision of Isaiah may be fulfilled,
and 'Nation shall not lift up sword against
nation; neither shall they learn war any
more.' "

Nor had anything appeared in the Ameri-
can periodicals so searching and so well in-
formed as the article by J. B. Firth, under
the title "The Government and the League
of Nations," in "The Fortnightly Review"
for September, 1918. He points out that
the British Government some months before
appointed "a very well chosen Committee,"

9



PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN POLICY

as Mr. Balfour described it, "on which
international law and history were power-
fully represented," to examine and report on
a "League of Nations." "The report," he
says, "has been drawn up, but its contents
have not been divulged. Neither Lord Cur-
zon nor Mr. Balfour alluded to it; they did
not even say that it had been considered by
the War Cabinet. By a curious coincidence
the same official reticence is being observed
in France. There, too, an authoritative
Commission, presided over by M. Bourgeois,
was appointed by the Government, and is-
sued its report last January; but it has not
been published in France, and, according
to Lord Curzon, no copy of it had reached
the British Government on June 26th. Why
this secretiveness, both in London and Paris?
If there had been practical unanimity in
favor of the project there could be no reason
for reserve."

There was, no doubt, however, an excel-
lent reason for this discreet silence. It is the
desire of the officials of both England and
France not to wound the sensibilities of the

10



THE ENTENTE OF FREE NATIONS

Americans, who are credited with being the
sponsors of the "League of Nations." The
British leaders, always without definition,
but in a fine spirit of courtesy, took up the
watchword, a "League of Nations," for
it was so far nothing more, and Lord
Curzon was able to say in the House of
Lords, that opinion in England in favor of
the League was "rather in advance of the
opinion of any of our Allies save the United
States"; and he added, that "if the British
Government went ahead too quickly, or too
abruptly, there was danger of a rebuff." As
a confirmation of this danger, Mr. Firth re-
marks, that, "although the report of the
French Commission has not been published,
it is an open secret that its judgment was
adverse to any proposal for establishing an
international force which shall be always
ready to enforce the decisions of the League
upon a recalcitrant member."

In an admirable historic summary, Mr.
Firth illustrates with instances the tedious
wrangling in the so-called Concert of Europe
over the simplest and most necessary forms

11



PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN POLICY

of cooperative action, and asks: "How can
these idealists talk airily about the estab-
lishment of an international army or the dis-
patch of an international expedition to deal
with an aggressor against the 'League of
Nations,' when they see how long it has
taken Japan and the United States to come
to an understanding on the subject of joint
action in Siberia? Every hour was of price-
less value .... Yet days and weeks were
suffered to slip by for political reasons which
are perfectly well known and thoroughly
understood. Will it be any different when
there is a 'League of Nations' ?"

A passage as instructive to Americans as
it is characteristic of English thought is
found in the "English Review" for October,
1918, in which its editor, Austin Harrison,
illustrates what he conceives to be a general
principle by what he regards as a conspicu-
ous example. "There is and can be no such
thing," he says, "as democratic government,
as loosely understood; for every democracy
is controlled by an oligarchy, whether of in-
tellect, of interest, or of mere popularity,



THE ENTENTE OF FREE NATIONS

and the purer the democracy the greater
would seem to be the authority of its oli-
garchy, as we have all seen in the astonish-
ing singleness, discipline, and elasticity of
the heterogeneous masses of America at war
under what is nothing less than the sov-
ereign will of the President. It is this
acceptance of oligarchical authority in
America that differentiates the democracy
of the New World from that of the Old, as
particularly exemplified in Britain. Take
the case of conscription, which in America
became law overnight, though three thou-
sand miles of sea divided America from the
theater of the war, and in no case was any
motive put forward for war but that of prin-
ciple. Here it took us two years, because
our democracy does not accept its oligarchy,
does not recognize acquiescence, is intellect-
ually and traditionally antagonized by the
very idea of authority, whether of govern-
ment or opportunity."

It is true that the people of the United
States have been singularly united and sin-
gularly obedient to leadership, but the com-

13



PROBLEMS IN FOREIGN POLICY

ment fails to find a true interpretation of the
fact. This nation has never bowed to "the
sovereign will of the President." It has re-
spected the voice of individual conscience.
It beheld in the conduct of Germany an in-
expressible wrong of gigantic proportions.
It shuddered, but it did not hesitate to judge
or condemn. Millions, tens of millions, of
men in America wanted to fight Germany
when the will of the President was not yet
for war, and chafed under the neutrality of


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