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ings, because they referred themselves very much to my disposal."

In the meantime the Committee had received from Sir Adam
Hepburn and Mr. Hatcher, messengers despatched from the armies
of the Scots and Manchester, more precise information of their
condition. They had also learnt that Prince Rupert, " with the
assistance of the Earl of Derby," who was " very active and of great
power," was [busily] recruiting " in Lancashire." Having possession
of Liverpool, it was anticipated that succours would come to him
out of Ireland, and that in a short time he would be in condition
to make another of his dashing forays, the direction of which it was
difficult to foresee, and perhaps even to fight another battle of

a Letter Book of the Committee of Both Kingdoms under those dates.
b Letters received by the Committee 22nd July, 1644.
<■ Ibid. 27th July, Uii.



HISTORICAL PREFACE. xlvii

Marston Moor. The Committee, having " taken these things into
serious debate, at which Sir Adam Hepburn and Mr. Hatcher were
present," reiterated their desire that the three lords would make some
endeavour to avert such a calamity. They allowed that there might
be difficulties in the march of the whole army; they agreed that the
enemy could not " be pursued through difficult passages, nor with
speed, by a great body with artillery and carriages," a and that
u the following a light, flying enemy " would harass out and break
an army, whereof there " had been too much experience;" but they
still urged co-operation with the forces of Lancashire and those
parts, and the despatch of such a body of auxiliaries as, in conjunc-
tion with the local forces, " might be able to go up to the Prince
and fight with him." " What ways to march, what number, and
with what forces," the Committee concluded, "you who are upon
the place can best judge, to whom we leave it." b

Manchester's answer, which is dated from Blyth [in Nottingham-
shire, a few miles south of Tickhill] on the 1st August, 1644,
announced that the generals and other chief officers of the three
armies had held a consultation " what was fittest to be done
upon the letter of the Committee." They found that the informa-
tion concerning Prince Rupert's being in Lancashire could not be
relied upon, for that he and all his best horse had passed over into
Cheshire at Haleford, and that his "dragooners" c and such remainder
of foot as he had were " daily boated over from Liverpool." " The
rest of his horse under the command of Goring, together with some
foot under Colonel Clavering and the Earl of Montrose, are marched
towards Cumberland and Westmoreland, so as Lancashire have only
some petty garrisons left, which the forces in the county, if well
employed, may easily master." Upon this state of things, as if
Lancashire, and not Rupert, had been the object of solicitude with

a i.e. with baggage or things to be carried; the same sense in which the word is
used in the authorised translation of Acts [xxi. 15].
b Letter Book of the Committee under the date.
c Dragoons.



xlviii HISTORICAL PREFACE.

the Committee, the consulting officers had determined "thus" to
divide their forces: "that I," remarks the Earl, " should march
southward, and that the Scots . . . should march for the security
of those northern counties, and to intend the taking in of New-
castle." In pursuance of this resolution Manchester announced his
intention to be at Lincoln by Saturday night, the 4th August,
when he should devote himself to recruiting and refreshing his
troops, and would attend the commands of the Committee which
way they would have him to march and what they would have him
to do. He concludes with some remarks upon his difficulties in
recruiting, and upon a rumour that his troops were " really and
fully paid," which of course was not at all true ; but in spite of every
obstacle he protested his readiness, with that force he had, and
which yet he hoped might do the Committee some service, to obey
their orders. a In a postscript the amiable Earl added : " Since my
coming to Blyth I hear there is two regiments of horse come to
Newark from Prince Rupert, with the assurance that the Prince
will send some foot thither with all speed, but I hope neither his
horse or foot shall do any hurt to that county. I shall make the
more haste into it."

The postscript illustrates not only the comparative activity of the
Prince and the Earl, but confirms the Earl's letter in exhibiting his
affection for "county v considerations in the management of the
war. Xewark was one of the most important places in that part of
England. It belonged territorially to the Queen, and the inhabitants
were full of loyalty to the sovereign lady of the manor. Besides
which, it locally commanded the communications between Lincoln-
shire, and consequently between the eastern counties, and York. It
had been strongly garrisoned by the Marquis of Newcastle, and, at
the beginning of this year, had been besieged by the Parliamentarians
under Sir John Meldrum. It was reduced to the greatest straits,
but Eupert by a masterly march from Shrewsbury came, just in
time, to their relief. He took the besiegers by surprise. Without
» Letter Book of Letters received by the Committee under date.



HISTORICAL PREFACE. xlix

waiting for his foot, he dashed in upon the besiegers with his
cavalry. They took refuge in a place called the Spittle, which they
had fortified. Besieged in their turn, and without provisions, they
soon surrendered upon easy terms, but their losses in the field were
heavy, and they relinquished all their artillery, their arms, and
ammunition. The Earl, it will be observed, did not contemplate
resuming the siege, but, in the interest of the country, expressed in
a jaunty way his kind-hearted desire and intention to restrain the
loyalist foragers.

Pursuing his career of easy but by no means unprofitable victories,
the Earl advanced from Tickhill and Blyth to Lincoln, paying a
triumphant and of course a courteous visit on his way to Welbeck,
the magnificent seat of his vanquished opponent, the Marquis of
Newcastle. In his haste to avoid the sneers of Oxford on his defeat
at Marston, the Marquis had left his family in the seclusion of that
stately home, still rich with the recollections of the vain-glorious
ceremonials which had distinguished it on past visits of the Marquis's
royal master. a The story of the Earl's courteous reception by the
deserted inmates and his own polite returns had best be told in his
own words [from Lincoln, Aug. 6] : —

In my march from York towards Lincoln I was earnestly intreated by
divers in those parts of Yorkshire about Sheffield, that I would consider
of the great spoil that the garrison in Sheffield did unto the places near
adjoining, and likewise of the consequence of the place in regard of the
great commodity of iron- wares that were vented there. I was further
moved by the Committees and gentlemen of Nottingham for the reducing
of the garrison in Welbeck to the obedience of Parliament, because it
was a great annoyance to those parts ; whereupon I resolved to go my-
self with a great part of my forces to Welbeck, and to send General-
Major Crawford with the rest unto Sheffield. Upon my coming near

a Perhaps the most famous of these was Charles's visit to Welheck on his way to
Scotland in the summer of 1633 for his coronation there. Part of the entertainment
consisted in the performance of Love's Welcome, a masque by Ben Jonson, written
for the occasion.— D.M.

CAMD. SOC. h



1 HISTORICAL PREFACE.

Welbeck, I sent in a summons to the place, and they, with great civility,
sent to parley with me. And the next day, being Friday, they rendered
the House unto me upon composition. I was willing to give them the
larger terms, because I was not in a condition to besiege a place so well
fortified as that was, and therefore I gave the officers and soldiers liberty
to march with all their arms, colours flying, and other punctilios of war.
But, when I came to take possession of the house, most of all the soldiers
came unto me to lay down their arms, and would not carry them, but
desired tickets of me to go to their own homes, the which I granted
them ; so as I had 350 muskets in the house, fifty horse arms, eleven
pieces of cannon great and small, whereof one the Governor had liberty
to carry away. I had likewise twenty barrels of powder and a ton of
match. The house I preserved entire, and have put a garrison into it of
Nottinghamshire men, until I know your Lordships' resolution whether
you will have it slighted or not. The place is very regularly fortified,
and the Marquis of Newcastle's daughters, and the rest ©f his children
and family, are in it, unto whom I have engaged myself for their quiet
abode there, and to intercede to the Parliament for a complete mainte-
nance for them. In the which I shall beseech your Lordships that they
may have your favour and furtherance. I am now myself come to Lin-
coln and those forces that were with me I have quartered about Gains-
borough, and those places, that I may give them some refreshing after
the great hardship they have endured.

He concludes with some comments upon a recent ordinance of
Parliament 3 for putting the Associated Counties, of which he was
the military head, « into a posture of defence," by raising fresh
forces of horse and foot, and giving the persons listed upon that
service the power to propound and nominate their own colonels and
other officers, subject to the approval of the lord-lieutenants. b The
Earl suspected, or felt inclined to believe, that these new arrange-
ments were inconsistent with his authority, and desired to know
what were the intentions of the Committee :—



Dated 3rd July, 1644.



b Husband, 516.



HISTORICAL PREFACE.



11



If your Lordships please to have me to deliver over the remainder of
this force I now have into the hands of those colonels and captains that
are to be chosen to give a supply to that army that is now to be raised,
I shall very readily obey your order; if your Lordships' intentions be to
dispose of these forces otherwise, I shall with all care observe your
commands. 11

In all these arrangements of the Earl there was no doubt much
that was agreeable to the Committee. Tickhill and Welbeck were
thorns in the sides of the people dwelling within the Parliamentary '
line. Their garrisons lived by the plunder of their Soundhead
neighbours ; or, if kept in order by forces stationed in neighbouring
towns, such forces could have been far better employed elsewhere,
besides that such fortified places hindered all free communication
across the country. But all these minor victories of the heroes of
Marston Moor were dimmed in the appreciation of the Committee
by the cloud which hung over the movements of Prince Ptupert.
The suddenness and violence of his onslaughts had taught them the
necessity of continual watchfulness and preparedness. For the third
time, writing to the Earl on the date of his letter to them, they
reiterate their directions in unmistakeable language : —

We have taken into consideration the necessity of hindering the recruits
of Prince Rupert, and wholly to break his army, if it be possible. And
to that end we desire you to gather what force you can get together forth-
with. And with them (together with the forces of Nottinghamshire,
Derbyshire, and Lancashire, as also those of Sir William Brereton and
Sir Thomas Middleton, to all of which we have written to that purpose,
and to receive your orders) to march toward Prince Eupert and attend
his motions, and follow him which way soever he shall go, and to take all
advantages against him that shall be offered.

They add that they have taken measures to procure his soldiers
their pay, which shall be sent to him wherever he may be, and that,

n Book of Letters received by the Committee, under date of 6th August, 1644.
[See Documents, pp. 5, 7.]



Hi HISTORICAL PREFACE.

as for the New Ordinance on which he had commented, it would
be rather to his advantage than the contrary in procuring recruits.*
By subsequent letters of the 7th and the 9th they intimate to him
that the House of Commons had ordered that 1800 foot of the
troops levied under the New Ordinance should be sent to him as
recruits, but that in selecting that number he was to take no more
than necessity required out of Essex, because an entire formed
regiment of 1000 men was to be raised by that county.

Orders so peremptory came most unseasonably upon the kind and
considerate Earl. They overturned all his own schemes for refresh-
ing his victorious Marston men. To attend Prince Rupert's motions
and follow him which way soever he should go was " so large a
commission, and work so difficult, considering the weak condition
of his forces with their indispositions and infections," that he called
together such of his chief officers as were with him at the time to
consult what he was to do. The result was a paper of " considera-
tions," or rather objections, which he transmitted from Lincoln on the
10th of August. It does not appear who were the objectors.
Their objections were the merest common-place excuses of un-
willingness. It could not be expected that they should force Prince
Rupert to a second engagement that summer, nor, considering his
defensible position at Chester, was it likely that they could force him
to " go away." If he did and they were to follow him through
Wales, or wherever they went, it would ruin their own army.
Besieging Chester was out of the question ; it would be as great
a work as that which they had just accomplished at York. All
they could do would be to lie near Chester and hinder the Prince
from receiving any accession of force, which would necessarily keep
them there all the winter. Then, how were they to secure their
supplies and recruits, and the back pay they were to receive, which
would have to pass under the walls of Belvoir, Newark, Bolsover,
and Tidbury and other garrisons of the enemies ? Those four fortified
places ought first to be taken or blocked up, and the Earl's forces were
* Book of Letters sent under date of 6th August, 1644. [Documents, pp. 4-5.]




HISTORICAL PREFACE. liii

insufficient for any thing of the kind, his foot, " sick and sound," not
amounting to more than 6,000 men. Finally, it was urged that the
Association of the Eastern Counties, by which Lord Manchester's
forces were raised and should be paid, had been already much dis-
contented at their withdrawal into the north, [and] would, if they
were now to draw off so far westward, have just cause to withdraw
from their recruiting or maintenance, and seek some other body and
head to protect them. 3

A representation which trenched so close upon insubordination
must have tried the temper of the Committee ; but it was their cue,
in the confused and precarious condition of public affairs, not to try
conclusions with anyone. They complimented the Earl on his
successes at Welbeck, and afterwards at Sheffield, where Major-
General Crawford was successful ; they alleged that the state of
Prince Rupert's army being other than they conceived, many of his
forces having marched northward, and a consideration of the reasons
which the Earl had inclosed to them, had caused them to alter their
resolutions. They now desired him merely to send such a party as
he should think fit to join with the forces to be sent from Notting-
hamshire, Derbyshire, ....



CONTINUATION.

[At this point, August 14, 1644, Mr. Bruce's fragments of his
Preface abruptly stop. It was evidently his purpose to narrate the
history of Manchester's campaign, in the same style, partly by
continued abstract of the correspondence between Manchester and
the Derby House Committee, but with light from other sources, on
to the second battle of Newbury, October 27, 1644, when the long-
smouldering quarrel between Manchester and Cromwell publicly
exploded into flame, and then to trace the quarrel itself through
the two Houses in the subsequent months, till, in the beginning of

a [Documents of Manchester's Correspondence, pp. 8-12.]



liv HISTORICAL PREFACE.

1645, it was hushed up in a total recast of the whole army-system of
the Parliament, devised or approved by Cromwell, and rendering the
further prosecution of his quarrel with Manchester quite unnecessary.
The following may pass as a substitute for what might have come
from Mr. Bruce's pen. — D.M.]



The inactivity of Manchester, his evasion of work recommended
to him or even enjoined upon him, his indisposition to leave his
own district of the Associated Counties, continue obvious in the
correspondence between him and the Derby House Committee.
He had arrived at Lincoln on the 4th of August, and he was still
there and idle on the 4th of September, having in the first place
managed to decline the expedition into Cheshire in pursuit of
Rupert by pleading that Newark and other garrisons of the enemy
near Lincoln ought first to be dealt with, and having in the next
place avoided all effort about those garrisons. One can see, even
through the polite phraseology of the letters of the Derby House
Committee, that there was considerable dissatisfaction at head-
quarters with this state of matters, the Presbyterian members of that
Committee, such as the Scottish Lord Maitland, evidently now
agreeing with the Independent members, such as Viscount Sajfe
and Sele, in the opinion that the great success of Marston Moor
ought to have been more vigorously followed up.

But what of Manchester's own army, and especially of those
Ironsides in it, Cromwell's horse, who were the heroes of Marston
Moor? That Manchester's policy of idleness had the sanction of a
considerable number of his officers is to be inferred from the fact
that he had been able to send from Lincoln to the Derby House
Committee on the 10th of August a paper of reasons against the
Cheshire expedition, purporting to be the result 'of a consultation
with such of his chief officers as were then about him ; but that
Cromwell and his adherents were dissatisfied there is abundant proof.
They were more than dissatisfied; they were vehemently roused.



HISTORICAL PREFACE. lv

Among Cromwell's preserved letters as published by Mr. Carlyle
there are but two belonging to this period, one dated from Lincoln,
Sept. 1, the other from Sleaford, somewhat south of Lincoln,
Sept. 5 or 6. The latter, which is addressed to his brother-in-law
Colonel Valentine Walton, then in London, contains this passage: —

We have some amongst us much slow in action ; if we could all intend
our own ends less and our ease too, our business in this army would go
on wheels for expedition. But, because some of us are enemies to rapine
and other wickednesses, we are said to be " factious," to " seek to main-
tain our opinions in religion by force," — which we detest and abhor. I pro-
fess I could never satisfy myself of the justness of this War, but from
the authority of the Parliament to maintain itself in its rights ; and in
this Cause I hope to approve myself an honest man and single-hearted.
Pardon me that I am thus troublesome. I write but seldom : it gives
me a little ease to pour my mind, in the midst of calumnies, into the
bosom of a friend.*

These words, vague in their mournfulness, receive adequate
illustration for the first time in the two documents published in the
present volume under the titles CromwelVs Narrative and Narrative
of the Earl of Manchester s Campaign, which last is in fact Craw-
ford's Narrative. From Cromwell himself we now learn, in the
first of these documents, the exact causes of that mood of sorrow
which he communicated to Colonel Walton. From Marston Moor
to the date at which he wrote, the whole conduct of Manchester's
army had been, in his opinion, a tissue of mismanagement. Newark
might have been taken or blockaded ; there might have been the
march after Ptupert ; at the very least a body of horse might have
been sent for service in Cheshire ; even within the range to which
the Earl had confined himself hundreds of useful things might have
been done, besides the taking of Tickhill Castle and Welbeck
House — which petty exploits themselves had actually been forced
on the Earl and done against his will ! The army had been quar-

» Carlyle's Cromwell, i. 157, ed. 1857.



lvi HISTORICAL PREFACE.

tered upon the friends of Parliament precisely in those parts of the
eastern region where there was nothing to do, leaving other parts
free for the enemy to range in ! Only one Council of War had
been called by the Earl since he left York ! Considering all this,
Cromwell had come reluctantly in his own mind to one conclusion
— to wit, that the Earl's fault was not improvidence only, but an
incorrigible " backwardness to all action," caused by " some prin-
ciple of unwillingness " to see the King brought " too low."

Now, though Cromwell had not publicly expressed his opinion in
this degree of strength at the date we have reached, he had certainly
expressed the substance of it in such ways that the Earl could not
remain ignorant of the fact that he had lost the confidence of his
Lieutenant-General. One infers also that Cromwell had taken means
to convey his impressions to the Derby House Committee and other
authorities in London; and it is worth noting, in this connection,
that Cromwell's disciple, young Fleetwood, had been in London in
August, and was the bearer of some of the Committee's letters of
that month back to the Earl at Lincoln. Clearly the relations
between the commander-in-chief of the Eastern Army and his
lieutenant-general were now those of schism, — Cromwell speaking
out his mind frankly whenever he could ; and the Earl resenting his
advices, and treating him with as much coolness as was permissible
towards a man of such antecedents, who could make himself so
terrible when he chose. Even convenient to the Earl might now
be those Presbyterian alarms about Cromwell's Independency, and
his sympathies with Anabaptism and other heresies, which in the
earlier days of their co-operation had counted for so little. Cries
about Cromwell's sectarian factiousness, and his forcing of his own
religious opinions into the army by ejecting orthodox men from
posts and putting sectarians into them, were doubtless now en-
couraged among the Earl's partisans, and seem to have been the
" calumnies " of which Cromwell speaks in his letter to his brother-
in-law. No mention is made in Cromwell's narrative of Major-
General Crawford's doings at this time, because, when the narrative



HISTORICAL PREFACE. lvii

was written, it was unnecessary to revert to him ; but that Crawford
had a conspicuous part in the schism is only what might have been
expected, and is expressly vouched by himself. Crawford, it is true,
had been out of Lincolnshire during the greater part of August,
employed, with 1,200 foot and a regiment of horse, in that special
service of the taking of Sheffield Castle for which he had been
detached, and to which he had added the capture of Bolsover
Castle and one or two other houses in Derbyshire. 11 But, both
during his absence and after his return to the main army in
Lincolnshire in the end of August, he gives us to understand,
Cromwell had been at his old tricks, " taking all the praise to himself
of other men's actions" (at Marston Moor and elsewhere), promoting
actual " mutiny," screening and protecting men of his own "godly "
sort in any delinquency, and labouring, with his " juncto," to bring
good officers into discredit. Especially had Crawford been the
object of his enmity. " All this time," he says, in his peculiarly
clotted grammar, " the said Cromwell endeavoured to work Major-
General's Crawford's ruin by dissuading the Earl of Manchester's
army not to obey him, and, giving his charge away to others,
making them to do the duty, did in the most notorious manner
traduce and calumniate the said Crawford, to make him odious to
the army and to discontent him, that so he the said Cromwell the
better might advance his wicked ends, uttering many speeches
highly to his disadvantage and utter ruin, and for drawing of
factions in the army, which highly distracted the public good in
Lincoln." The regiments of Colonels Pickering and Montague are
mentioned as chief among those that, on Cromwell's instigation,
" absolutely refused orders from Major-General Crawford." The
correct interpretation of all this is not difficult. Cromwell did
regard the introduction of Crawford into Manchester's army as the
original cause of the mischief, and he was willing for the time to


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Online LibraryDavid MassonThe quarrel between the Earl of Manchester and Oliver Cromwell: an episode of the English Civil War → online text (page 5 of 17)