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"_Admiral Dewey_. Of Aguinaldo and the Filipinos. They were
bothering me. I was very busy getting my squadron ready for
battle, and these little men were coming on board my ship at
Hongkong and taking a good deal of my time, and I did not
attach the slightest importance to anything they could do,
and they did nothing; that is, none of them went with me
when I went to Mirs Bay. There had been a good deal of talk,
but when the time came they did not go. One of them didn't
go because he didn't have any toothbrush.

"_Senator Burrows_. Did he give that as a reason?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; he said, 'I have no toothbrush.'" [100]

However, Dewey ultimately yielded to the pressure exercised on him by
Pratt and Wildman, and allowed Aguinaldo and some of his associates to
be brought to Manila. Having them there he proposed to get assistance
from them, not as allies, but as a friendly force attacking a common
enemy, in its own way.

Let us continue with his testimony as to cooperation between Aguinaldo
and the naval forces of the United States: -

"_Senator Patterson_. Then, Admiral, until you knew that
they were going to send land forces to your assistance you
thought there was a necessity to organize the Filipinos into
land forces, did you?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No; not a necessity.

"_Senator Patterson_. You thought it might prove of value
to you?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I testified here, I think, in a way that
answers that. I said to Aguinaldo, 'There is our enemy;
now, you go your way and I will go mine; we had better act
independently.' That was the wisest thing I ever said.

"_Senator Patterson_. But you stated that you were using
these people and they were permitted to organize, that you
might use them.

"_Admiral Dewey_. They were assisting us.

"_Senator Patterson_. Very well, they were to assist you. Did
you not either permit them or encourage them - I do not care
which term you use - to organize into an army, such as it was,
that they might render you such assistance as you needed?

"_Admiral Dewey_. They were assisting us, but incidentally
they were fighting their enemy; they were fighting an enemy
which had been their enemy for three hundred years.

"_Senator Patterson_. I understand that, Admiral.

"_Admiral Dewey_. While assisting us they were fighting their
own battles, too.

"_The Chairman_. You were encouraging insurrection against
a common enemy with which you were at war?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I think so. I had in my mind an illustration
furnished by the civil war. I was in the South in the civil
war, and the only friends we had in the South were the negroes,
and we made use of them; they assisted us on many occasions. I
had that in mind; I said these people were our friends, and
'we have come here and they will help us just exactly as the
negroes helped us in the civil war.'

"_Senator Patterson_. The negroes were expecting their
freedom -

"_Admiral Dewey_. The Filipinos were slaves, too.

"_Senator Patterson_. What were the Filipinos expecting?

"_Admiral Dewey_. They wanted to get rid of the Spaniards;
I do not think they looked much beyond that. I cannot recall
but I have in mind that the one thing they had in their minds
was to get rid of the Spaniards and then to accept us, and
that would have occurred - I have thought that many times - if
we had had troops to occupy Manila on the 1st day of May
before the insurrection got started; these people would have
accepted us as their friends, and they would have been our
loyal friends - I don't know for how long, but they would have
been our friends then.

"_Senator Patterson_. You learned from Pratt, or Wildman,
or Williams, very early, did you not, that the Filipinos
wanted their own country and to rule their own country;
that that is what they were expecting?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I heard from Williams that there was an
insurrection there against the Spaniards. The Spaniards were
very cruel to them, and I think they did not look much beyond
getting rid of them. There was one, Dr. Rizal, who had the
idea of independence, but I don't think that Aguinaldo had
much idea of it.

"_Senator Carmack_. Then what useful purpose did the Filipino
army serve; why did you want the Filipino army at all?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I did not want them.

"_Senator Carmack_. Did you not want the Filipino forces?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No, not really. It was their own idea coming
over there. We could have taken the city at any moment we
had the troops to occupy it."

Admiral Dewey has made the following statements relative to the
importance of Aguinaldo's military operations: -

"Then he began operations toward Manila, and he did wonderfully
well. He whipped the Spaniards battle after battle, and finally
put one of those old smoothbore guns on a barge, and he wanted
to take this up - wanted me to tow it up so he could attack the
city with it. I said, 'Oh, no, no; we can do nothing until
our troops come.' I knew he could not take the city without
the assistance of the navy, without my assistance, and I knew
that what he was doing - driving the Spaniards in - was saving
our own troops, because our own men perhaps would have had to
do that same thing. He and I were always on the most friendly
terms; we had never had any differences. He considered me
as his liberator, as his friend. I think he had the highest
admiration for us because we had whipped the Spaniards who
had been riding them down for three hundred years.

* * * * *

"_Senator Patterson_ (continuing). You sent this short dispatch
to the Secretary of the Navy: -

"'Aguinaldo, the revolutionary leader, visited the _Olympia_
yesterday. He expects to make general attack on May 31. Doubt
his ability to succeed. Situation remains unchanged.'

"Do you recall that visit?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes.

"_Senator Patterson_. He came to tell you, did he, that he
was going to make a general attack, and you -

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes.

"_Senator Patterson_. And you doubted his ability to succeed?

"_Admiral Dewey_. And he wanted me to assist him. He wanted
me to tow one of his guns up into position. I knew he could
not take the city; of course he could not.

"_Senator Patterson_. Did you urge that he should not make
the attack?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I do not remember that; very likely I did.

"_Senator Patterson_. And was he not persuaded or restrained
by you from doing so?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I do not remember; but it is very likely. I
did not want to see a lot of them killed unnecessarily,
because I knew they could not take that walled city. They had
no artillery, and they could not take it, I knew very well,
and I wanted the situation to remain as it was until our
troops came to occupy it.

"_Senator Patterson_. But you found that whenever you expressed
a strong objection to anything being done at that time that
Aguinaldo yielded to your request?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Up to the time the army came he did
everything I requested. I had not much to do with him after
the army came." [101]

But Dewey's influence over Aguinaldo was not sufficient to prevent
his looting, as the following extracts from his testimony show: -

"_Senator Patterson_. Is that what you mean when you say he
looted - that he made reprisals for his army, took provisions
and whatever was necessary? That is what you meant?

"_Admiral Dewey_. That is one part of it.

"_Senator Carmack_. This was taking provisions for the use
of the army?

"_Admiral Dewey_. That is one thing he did.

"_Senator Carmack_. You said you did not object to that at
the time?

"_Admiral Dewey_. No. It would have been useless; he got
beyond me very soon - he got out of my hands very soon. [102]

"_Senator Carmack_. You said yesterday you suspected that
Aguinaldo took the lion's share of the provisions that were
gathered for the army. What was the ground upon which you
made that accusation?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Because he was living in Malolos like a
prince, like a king, in a way that could only have come about
by his taking the lion's share. Then, in regard to his looting,
I repeat what I said yesterday. He began within forty-eight
hours after he landed in Cavite to capture and take everything
he wanted. I know these things of my own knowledge, because
I saw the loot brought in; and I know that every dollar that
was taken from the workingmen at the navy-yard was taken at
the threat of death. [103]

* * * * *

"_Senator Patterson_. Do you believe in this proclamation he
was uttering falsehoods to the Filipino people?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes; I do absolutely. I think he was there
for gain - for money - that independence had never up to that
time entered his head. He was there for loot and money. That
is what I believe, since you ask me my belief; I believe that
implicitly. [104]

* * * * *

"_Senator Patterson_. And you found nothing to cause any
doubt as to his loyalty up to the time until after Manila
surrendered?

"_Admiral Dewey_. His loyalty to whom?

"_Senator Patterson_. To you and to the cause for which he
was fighting?

"_Admiral Dewey_. I began to suspect he was not loyal to us
about the time our troops arrived, when he demurred at moving
out of Cavite to make room for our troops.

"_Senator Patterson_. Do you mean by that that you feared
that he was commencing to think more of independence than
the success of the American cause?

"_Admiral Dewey_. Yes." [105]

We have seen to what extent Aguinaldo coöperated with the marine
forces of the United States. Now let us examine the claim that he
cooperated with the land forces after their arrival.

One of the things which the Insurgents are said to have accomplished
was the maintenance of an effective land blockade which prevented the
entrance of provisions, and produced a very serious food shortage. Both
Otis and Dewey have stated that they did this, but we learn from the
Insurgent records how erroneous was this conclusion. [106]

The landing of the American troops for the attack on Manila was
not actively opposed by the Filipinos, but it was narrowly and
distrustfully watched.

Necessary transportation requested by General Anderson was ultimately
furnished by Aguinaldo, but only grudgingly after a three weeks'
delay, and as a result of threats that it would be seized if not
voluntarily supplied.

The necessary positions in the trenches around Manila from which to
make the attack on that city were, in part at least, yielded to the
Americans by the Filipinos upon the request of the former.

The Insurgents twice informed the Spaniards in advance of projected
American attacks.

They carried out their own attack on the city without regard to the
plans, or the requests, of the Americans. They secretly treated with
the Spaniards in the endeavour to secure the surrender of the city
to themselves.

After the capitulation to the Americans had been agreed upon, and
on the very morning of the day of the surrender, they endeavoured
to push home an attack. Disregarding the request that they keep out
of the final assault, they crowded into the city with, and after,
the American troops. They fired on Spanish soldiers on the city wall
while a flag of truce was flying, provoking a return fire which killed
and wounded American soldiers.

They demanded for themselves Malacañang palace and other buildings
and a share in "the war booty." They promptly looted the parts of the
city which they occupied, and ultimately retired from their positions
within the city limits on the evening of their last day of grace
after being warned by General Otis that if they did not do so they
would be driven out.

I will now quote from the records in support of these statements.

The following is the programme of "coöperation" outlined to Aguinaldo
by Bray in a letter dated June 30, 1898: -

"I am very anxious to receive the news of the capitulation of
Manila and I hope that General Augustín will be obliged to turn
over his sword to you in person and not to the Americans. You
are by right entitled to it and I should like to see it so from
a political standpoint, as I am of the opinion that you should
declare the independence of the Philippines before the arrival
of General Merritt, appointed by the President to be Governor
with full powers to establish a provisional government.

* * * * *

Any attempt on the part of the Americans to garrison the
interior towns with their troops or any other act which might
be construed as a conquest, should meet with resistance.

* * * * *

"After having written these lines, I had another conference
with Mr. St. Clair of the Free Press, who sent for me regarding
the question of independence. He has had a consultation with
the Supreme Judge of this place, and he is of opinion that you
should proclaim independence at once, notwithstanding what
Admiral Dewey and Consul Williams say against it, and this
should be done before General Merritt can arrive. A Government
having been thus constituted in due form, the Americans would
have no right to invade the Philippines without committing a
violation of international law. They are no longer fighting
against the Spaniards against whom they declared war. The
advice of Consul Williams to delay this, is a diplomatic play
to gain time until the arrival of General Merritt, because he
is well aware of the false position said General would find
himself in. The key to the situation is now in your hands;
do not permit any one to take it away from you. The Americans
have done nothing but bombard and destroy the Spanish fleet
on the high seas; they have not conquered any land, but in
the meantime the control of the Philippines has passed by
conquest from the hands of the Spaniards and the Americans
have no right to enter further. Under certain conditions and
guarantees, permit the landing of American troops; but be
very careful, they must not be permitted to land until they
execute an agreement with the duly constituted government of
the Philippines, respecting all its institutions, and they must
under no pretext whatever be permitted to garrison any place
except the municipal limits of Manila, Cebú, and Iloílo, and
even therein care should be observed ... You must not permit a
single soldier to land without having these guarantees." [107]

When General Anderson, with the first United States troops of
occupation, arrived at Manila Bay, Aguinaldo did not call on him,
as an "ally" might have been expected to do. Later, however, Admiral
Dewey and General Anderson went to see Aguinaldo, but without any
of the ceremony of an official military call, the Admiral saying to
General Anderson: -

"Do not take your sword or put on your uniform, but just put
on your blouse. Do not go with any ceremony." [108]

And they went in that way.

On July 4, 1898, General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo definitely requesting
his coöperation in the following words: -

"For these reasons I desire to have the most amicable relations
with you, and to have you and your force coöperate with us
in the military operations against the Spanish forces." [109]

On July 5 Aguinaldo replied, thanking General Anderson for the

"amicable sentiments which the natives of these islands
inspire in the Great North American nation," [110]

and also for his desire to have friendly relations with the Filipinos
and treat them with justice, courtesy and kindness. There is,
however, not a word relative to coöperation in his reply, and
Anderson apparently never renewed his request for coöperation in
military operations.

On July 6 he wrote to Aguinaldo again, saying: -

"I am encouraged by the friendly sentiment expressed by
Your Excellency in your welcome letter received on the 5th
instant, to endeavour to come to a definite understanding,
which I hope will be advantageous to both. Very soon we expect
large additional land forces, and it must be apparent to you
as a military officer that we will require much more room to
camp our soldiers and also store room for our supplies. For
this I would like to have Your Excellency's advice and
coöperation, as you are best acquainted with the resources
of the country." [111]

To this letter there was no reply. However, in a letter dated July
9, 1898, to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army, General
Anderson says of Aguinaldo: -

"When we first landed he seemed very suspicious, and not at
all friendly, but I have now come to a better understanding
with him and he is much more friendly and seems willing to
coöperate. But he has declared himself Dictator and President,
and is trying to take Manila without our assistance. This
is not probable, but if he can effect his purpose he will,
I apprehend, antagonize any attempt on our part to establish
a provisional government." [112]

Evidently, however, coöperation, even in the matter of getting
necessary transportation, did not materialize, for on July 17
S. R. Jones, Chief Quartermaster, wrote Aguinaldo as follows: -

"We will want horses, buffaloes, carts, etc., for
transportation, bamboo for shelter, wood to cook with, etc. For
all this we are willing to pay a fair price, but no more. We
find so far that the native population are not willing to give
us this assistance as promptly as required. But we must have
it, and if it becomes necessary we will be compelled to send
out parties to seize what we may need. We would regret very
much to do this, as we are here to befriend the Filipinos. Our
nation has spent millions in money to send forces here to
expel the Spaniards and to give good government to the whole
people, and the return we are asking is comparatively slight.

"General Anderson wishes you to inform your people that we are
here for their good, and that they must supply us with labor
and material at the current market prices. We are prepared
to purchase five hundred horses at a fair price, but cannot
undertake to bargain for horses with each individual owner."

Aguinaldo sent this letter by a staff officer to General Anderson
inquiring whether it was sent by authority of the latter, who then
indorsed on it in a statement that it was. Nevertheless, Major Jones
reported on July 20 that it was impossible to secure transportation
except upon Aguinaldo's order and that the natives had removed their
cart wheels and hidden them, from which it is to be inferred that
the transportation requested had not been furnished.

Obviously General Anderson was informed that Aguinaldo had given
orders against furnishing the transportation desired, for on July 21
he wrote the Adjutant-General of the Army as follows: -

"Since I wrote last, Aguinaldo has put in operation an
elaborate system of military government, under his assumed
authority as Dictator, and has prohibited any supplies being
given us, except by his order. As Go this last, I have written
to him that our requisitions on the country for horses, ox
carts, fuel, and bamboo (to make scaling ladders) must be
filled, and that he must aid in having them filled."

On July 23 General Anderson wrote Aguinaldo as follows: -

"_General_: When I came here three weeks ago I requested Your
Excellency to give what assistance you could to procure means
of transportation for the American Army, as it was to fight
the cause of your people. So far we have received no response.

"As you represent your people, I now have the honor to make
requisition on you for five hundred horses and fifty oxen and
ox carts. If you cannot secure these I will have to pass you
and make requisition directly on the people.

"I beg leave to request an answer at your earliest convenience.

"I remain with great respect, etc." [113]

To this letter, Aguinaldo replied as follows: -

"Replying to your letter of yesterday, I have the honor to
manifest to Your Excellency that I am surprised beyond measure
at that which you say to me in it, lamenting the non-receipt
of any response relative to the assistance that you have asked
of me in the way of horses, carabaos, and carts, because I
did reply through the bearer that I was disposed to issue
proper orders whenever you advised me of the number of these,
giving me notice in advance.

"I have sent orders to the nearest provinces in order that
within the shortest time possible horses be brought for sale,
but I cannot assure Your Excellency that we will have the
number of 500 that you need, because there are not many horses
in this vicinity, owing to deaths from epizoötic diseases in
January, February, and March last.

"Whenever we have them collected, I shall have the pleasure
to advise Your Excellency.

"I have also ordered to be placed at my disposal 50 carts that
I shall place at your disposition when you need them, provided
you give me previous notice four days in advance." [114]

General Anderson replied: -

"Your favour of the 26th ultimo in relation to requisitions
for cattle, horses, etc., is satisfactory I regret that
there should have been any misunderstanding about it. The
people to whom we applied even for the hiring of carromatas,
etc., told our people that they had orders to supply nothing
except by your orders. I am pleased to think that this was
a misapprehension on their part." [115]

From this series of communications it appears that it took three
weeks, and a very direct threat to seize transportation, to bring
about Aguinaldo's promise of assistance in securing it. What help
had he given, meanwhile, in other matters?

On July 14, 1899, General Anderson wrote asking him to assist American
officers in making reconnaissance of the approaches to Manila, and
to favor them with his advice. [116]

On July 19, 1899, he again wrote Aguinaldo asking him to allow Major
J. F. Bell, [117] who was gathering information for General Merritt,
to see maps, and further requesting him to place at Bell's disposal any
available information about the force of the enemy and the topography
of the country. [118]

On July 21 he wrote again asking for passes for a Lieutenant
E. I. Bryan and party, who were making a reconnaissance. [119]

Such records as I have been able to find do not show what response,
if any, Aguinaldo made to these several requests, but General
Anderson's original views as to the willingness of the Insurgents to
coöperate with him underwent an early change, for on July 18, 1898,
in a letter to the Adjutant-General of the United States Army he
makes the following statement: -

"The Insurgent chief, Aguinaldo, has declared himself Dictator
and self-appointed President. He has declared martial law
and promulgated a minute method of rule and administration
under it.

"We have observed all official military courtesies, and he
and his followers express great admiration and gratitude to
the great American republic of the north, yet in many ways
they obstruct our purposes and are using every effort to take
Manila without us.

"I suspect also that Aguinaldo is secretly negotiating with
the Spanish authorities, as his confidential aide is in
Manila." [120]

This suspicion was entirely justified, as we shall see later.

On July 24 Aguinaldo wrote a letter to General Anderson in effect
warning him not to disembark American troops in places conquered by
the Filipinos from the Spaniards without first communicating in writing



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