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Mellen. 63 Hun 632, 18 N. Y. Supp.
51s; Hall V. Rixey, 84 Va. 790, 6 S.
E. 215; Jolls V. Keegan, 4 Pen.
(Del.) 21, 55 Atl. 340). Statements
of person with whom he transacts
business for his client (Herman v.
Schlesinger, 114 Wis. 382, 90 N. W.
460, 91 Am. St. Rep. 922; Henry v.
Nubert (Tenn. Ch. App.), 35 S. W.
444; Cummings v. Irvin (Tenn. Ch.
App.), 59 S. W. 153; Gerhardt v.
Tucker, 187 Mo. 46. 85 S. W. 552;
Randolph v. Quidnick Co.. 23 Fed.
278; Brown v. Grove, 80 Fed. 564,
25 C. C. A. 644; Marston v. Downes,
6 Car. & P. 381, 25 E. C. L. 448.

He may also testify that he re-
peated to his client statements of an
opposing attornev (Schaaf v. Fries,
77 _ Mo. App. 346, 359). That he
paid certain purchase money for his
client (Chapman v. Peebles, 84 Ala.
283. 4 So. 273). That client gave
him a check to be used in paying cer-
tain charges, and that he paid such
charges (Aultman & Co. v. Ritter, 81
Wis. 395. 51 N. W. 569). What
money he received for client, how
much and to whom paid out for him
(Shanghnessy v. Fogg, 15 La. Ann.
330; Comstock V. Paie, 18 La. (O.
S.) 479; State 'Z'. Gleason, 19 Or.
159. 22, Pac. 817; Phoebus v. Web-
ster, 40 Misc. 528, 82 N. Y. Supp.
868; Oliver v. Cameron, McA. & M.
(D. C.) 22,7). When summoned as
garnishee, attorney may be com-
pelled to testify where he deposited
his client's money (William Bros. v.
Young, 46 Iowa 140; Shanghnessy
V. Fogg. 15 La. Ann. 330; Comstock
V. Paie, 18 La. Ann. (O. S.) 479).
Whether witness received checks
drawn to order of client by certain
person, and disposition made of
same {In re Aspinwall, 7 Ben. 433,
2 Fed. Cas. No. 591). Knowledge
acquired before formation or after
termination of relation (See notes
under III, 7, D, a. b.). Knowledge
of transaction to which attorney was
a party (See notes under III, 11, K,
ante). Acts and statements of par-
ties to a transaction in which attor-

Vol. X



314



PRIVILBGBD COMMUNICATIONS.



12. Limit of Privilege. — Privilege is limited to communications
between attorney and client, and their necessary intermediaries,
agents or assistants, and does not extend to matters communicated
by other persons to either attorney or client.''^

13. iTo Whom Privilege Extends. — The privilege is applied in
favor of client, and extends to his attorney and necessary inter-
mediaries between attorney and client.^"

Not to Third Persons. — Consequently, privilege does not extend to
third persons whose action is not necessary to transmit communi-
cations between attorney and client, and such person may give in
evidence such professional communications as may come to their
knowledge. ^'^

14. Duration of Privilege. — Confidential communications are
not to be revealed at any time.^^



ney did not act for either (Rodgers
V. Moore, 88 Ga. 88, 13 S. E. 962).
Facts coming to his knowledge while
securing a debt of his client, when
he is called as witness in a contest
in which his client has no interest
(Payne v. Miller, 103 111. 442).

Client's Mental Condition Brand

V. Brand, 39 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 193,
263.

As to whether or not witness is
interested in the result of an action
to the extent of a share in the recov-
ery. Eastman v. Kelly, 49 Hun 607,
I N. Y. Supp. 866.

55. limit of Privilege Green-
law V. King, I Beav. 137, 48 Eng.
Reprint 891, 8 L. J. N. S. Ch. 92;
Ford V. Tennant, 32 Beav. 162, 32 L.
J. Ch. 465, 7 L. T. 733, 55 Eng. Re-
print 63; Brown v. Foster, i Hurlst.
& N. (Eng.) 736, 26 L. J. N. S. C.
L. 249. See "Ordinary Observation,"
ante III, 11, F; "Sources Other Than
Client," ante, III, 11, H.

56. In Whose Favor. _ . See "To
Whom Belongs," III, 5, ante.

A 1 1 r n e y . — See " Attorney. "
III, 7, A, ante.

Intermediaries. — See " Clerk^ "
"Agent," "Interpreter," etc. ante,
III, 7, A, i, j, k.

57. See "Private, Third Per-
sons," III, 7, G, ante.

58. England. — Bullock v. Corry,
47 L. J. Q. B. 352, 3 Q. B. Div. 356,
38 L. T. 102; Wilson V. Rastall, 4
T. R. 754, 2 R. R. 515; Chant v.
Brown, 7 Hare 79, 68 Eng. Reprint
32; Pearce v. Foster, L. R. 15 Q- B.

Vol. X



Div. 114. 54 L. J. Q. B. 432, 52 L. T.
N. S. 886.

Irisli. — Hutchins v. Hutchins, i
Hogan 315.

Illinois. — Granger v. Warrington,
8 111. 299, 308.

Maryland. — Chase's Case, i Bland
Ch. 206, 17 Am. Dec. 277, 288.

New Hampshire. — Sleeper v. Ab-
bott, 60 N. H. 162.

Neiv York. — Bank of Utica v.
Mersereau, 3 Barb. Ch. 528, 49 Am.
Dec. 189.

Virginia. — Parker v. Carter, 4
Munf. 27s, 6 Am. Dec. 513.

" Once privileged, always privi-
leged." Cockburn, C. J., in Bullock
V. Corry, L. R. 3 Q. B. Div. 356.

" He (attorney) should keep his
lips sealed with the solemn seal of
silence to the last moment of his life ;
he should ne^'er communicate ; he
should never divulge; he should keep
buried in his breast that of which he
has obtained the knowledge in the
exercise and discharge of his profes-
sion." Tindal, C. J. in Taylor t.
Blacklow, 3 Bing. N. C. (Eng.) 235.
3 Scott 614, 2 Hodges 224, 6 L. J. N.
S. C. P. 14.

" The seal of the law once fixed
upon them, remains forever, unless
removed by the party himself in
whose favor it was there placed."
Bush V. McComb, 2 Hous. (Del.) 546.

Letters regarding suit which is
compromised and dismissed are priv-
ileged in action subsequently arising
between the same parties and relating
to the same subject-matter. Hughes



PRIVILEGED COMMUNICA TIONS.



315



A. Survives Action. — The existence of the privilege is not
dependent upon the continuance of the action in regard to which
communication was made, and continues after the termination of
such action.^''

B. Survives Relation. — Privilege also survives the relation of
attorney and client between whom the communication in question
was made.^"

C. Attorney Afterwards Executor. — But it has been held
that if an attorney, after acting as such, becomes his client's ex-



V. Garnons, 6 Beav. 352, 49 Eng. Re-
print 862; Holmes v. Baddeley, i
Phil. 476, reversing s. c. 6 Beav. 521,
41 Eng. Reprint 713.

Communications from client to at-
torney may not be given in evidence
at any future time, nor can it be
given in any suit, although client who
makes it is not a party to that suit.
Foster v. Hall, 12 Pick. (Mass.) 89,
22 Am. Dec. 400.

" The law secures the client the
privilege of objecting at all times
and forever to an attorney, solicitor
or counselor from disclosing infor-
mation in a cause confidentially
given while tlie relation exists. The
client alone can release the attorney,
solicitor or counsel from this obliga-
tion. The latter cannot discharge
himself from the duty imposed on
him by law." Weidekind v. Water
Co., 74 Cal. 386, 19 Pac. 173, 5 Am.
St. Rep. 445. Same language used
in In re Cowdery, 69 Cal. 32, 50, 10
Pac. 47, 58 Am. Rep. 545. To same
effect, see Bacon v. Frisbie, 80 N. Y.
394, 36 Am. Rep. 627.

Compare, — Snow v. Gould, 74 Me.
540, 43 Am. Rep. 604, where the court
says : " And privileged communica-
tions may lose their privileged char-
acter by the lapse of time. That
which may be private at a time may
not be private at an after-time. Di-
rections to an attorney to make a
certain contract a confidential com-
munication before, but not after
the contract is made. A solicitor
cannot be compelled to disclose the
contents of an answer in equity be-
fore it is filed, but may be afterward."

In a contest between legatees of
client and persons claiming under
deed executed by client, the attorney
who prepared the deed may testify
as to statements made by client show-



ing what he intended by the deed.
But in a contest between those claim-
ing under client and persons claiming
adversely to client, such statements
are privileged. Scott v. Harris, 113
111. 447.

59. Calcraft v. Guest, L. R. Q. B.
1898. Vol. I, p. 759; Chase's Case,
I Bland Ch. (Md.) 206. 17 Am. Dec.
2y7; Foster v. Hall, 12 Pick. (Mass.)
89, 22 Am. Dec. 400; Clark v. Rich-
ards, 3 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 89.

Matters privileged in an action are
privileged in a subsequent action be-
tween the same parties and relating
to the same subject-matter. Hughes
V Garnons, 6 Beav. 352, 49 Eng. Re-
print 862; Holmes v. Baddeley, i
Phil. (Eng.) 476, reversing s. c. 6
Beav. 521, 41 Eng. Reprint 713.

Documents privileged m an action
are privileged in a cross action. Bul-
lock V. Corrv. 3 Q. B. Div. 356, 47 L,
J. Q. B. 352. 38 L. T. N. S. 102, cited
as authority in Pearce v. Foster, L.
R. 15 Q. B. Div. 114, 54 L. J. Q. B.
432, L. T. N. S. 886.

60. Colorado. — Denver Tramway
Co. V. Owens, 20 Colo. 107, 128, 36
Pac. 848.

Delaware. — Bush v. McComb, 2
Hous. 546.

Illhiois. — Granger v. Warrington,
8 111. 299, 308.

Kentucky. — Carter v. West, 93
Ky. 211, 19 S. W. 592.

Louisiana. — Morris v. Cain's
Exrs., 39 La. Ann. 712, 726, i So.
797, 2 So. 418; Hart V. Thompson's
Exr., 15 La. 88.

Minnesota. — Struckmeyer v. Lamb,
75 Minn. 366, 77 N. W. 987.

Mississippi. — Perkins v. Guy, 55
Miss. 153, 179, 30 Am. Rep. 510.

Nebraska. — Jahnke v. State, 68
Neb. 154, 94 N. W. 158, t66, 104 N.
W. 154-

Vol. X



316



PRIVILBGBD COMMUNICATIONS.



ecutor, and as such is made defendant in an action concerning de-
vised estate, he cannot refuse to answer concerning knowledge de-
rived during the relationship of attorney and client, on the ground
of privileged communication.**^

D. Attorney Devisee: of CuEnt, Immaterial. — The fact that
attorney becomes devisee of the property, concerning which he acted
for his client, does not render communications non-privileged. •*-

15. Waiver. — The privilege may be waived ; and when waiver
is made the attorney may give in evidence matters confidentially
communicated by his client.*'^

A. By Whom Waived. — a. Client. — Privilege may be waived
by client in person, or by his attorney.^*



New York. — Yordan v. Hess, 13
Johns. 492.

Attorney Discharged Privilege

continues after attorney has been dis-
charged by client, without regard to
client's conduct toward him. Hutch-
ins V. Hutchins, i Hogan (Irish) 315.

61. Crosby v. Berger, 4 Edw. Ch.
(N. Y.) 538.

62. Chant v. Brown, 7 Hare 79,
68 Eng. Reprint 32.

63. England. — Merle v. More, Ry.
& M. 390, 21 U C. L. 390; J. c. 2 Car.
& P. 275, 12 E. C. L. 127.

United States. — Hunt v. Black-
burn, 128 U. S. 464.

Alabama. — Rowland v. Plummer,
50 Ala, 182, 194.

Maryland — Chase's Case, i Bland.
Ch. 206, 17 Am. Dec. 277.

Michigan. — Passmore v. Passmore,
so Mich. 626, 16 N. W. 170, 45 Am.
Rep. 62.

New Hampshire. — Sleeper v. Ab-
bott, 60 N. H. 162.

New York. — Benjamin v. Covent-
ry, 19 Wend. 353 ; Britton v. Lorenz,
3 Daly 23, afHrmed 45 N. Y. 51.

Ohio. — King v. Barrett, 11 Ohio
St. 261.

Texas. — Walker v. State, 19 Tex.
App. 176.

Under Georgia statute which pro-
vides that " No attorney shall be
competent or compellable to testify
in any court in this state for or
against his client, to any matter or
thing, knowledge of which he may
have acquired from his client by vir-
tue of his relation as attorney " it was
held that the client could not waive
the privilege. O'Brien v. Spalding,

Vol. X



102 Ga. 490, 31 S. E. 100, 66 Am. St.
Rep. 202.

Client's Loss of Interest, Imma-
terial Client may waive, although

he may have parted with all interest
in the matter to which the communi-
cation relates. Benjamin v. Covent-
ry, 19 Wend. (N. Y.) 353.

Client Disqualified as Witness,
Immaterial — Client may waive, al-
though himself disqualified as a wit-
ness. Benjamin v. Coventry, 19
Wend. (N. Y.) 353. This case was
decided when law disqualified as wit-
ness any person having an interest in
an action.

64. Waiver. — By Client or At-
torney — See generally cases on
waiver. In Britton v. Lorenz, 3 Daly
(N. Y.) 22,, the report shows that
client in open court consented to at-
torney's testifying.

May Require Client to Waive or
Insist. — In McCooe v. Dighton, S.
& S. St. R. Co. 173 Mass. 117, 53 N.
E. 133, it is said that when a party's
nttorney objects to a question con-
cerning confidential communications
of his client, the court may require
the party to state in person whether
or not he waives the privilege. The
trial court made such a requirement,
to which exception was taken. The
supreme court says : " We should not
like to overrule this exception on the
ground that it was waived by the
plaintiff's waiver of his privilege.
For if the court was wrong in re-
quiring a personal expression from
the plaintiff, then the waiver was
made to avoid an inference which
was dangerous to his case, and to



PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.



317



b. Personal Representative, or by his executor or administrator.®^

c. Heir, or heir,"*'

d. Assignee. — Not. — But not by his assignee in bankruptcy."

e. Successor of Client in Representative Capacity. — Nor by one
who succeeds attorney's employer in a representative capacity.®*

f. Several Clients. — When privilege belongs to two or more per-
sons, the consent of each is essential to a waiver.®^



which he ought not to have been ex-
posed. But we are not prepared to
say that the court was wrong or ex-
ceeded the limits of the discretion al-
lowed to the presiding judge by the
law. It is no part of the conduct of
the case to object or consent to evi-
dence which is excluded only because
of a personal privilege. By accidenr,
the privilege in this case belonged to
the plaintifif, but it might as well have
belonged to any one else, and clearly
if it had belonged to a third person
it would not have rested with the
plaintiff's lawyer to waive or to assert
it. Commonwealth v. Shaw, 4 Cush.
594. We do not see that it matters
that the privilege was the plaintiff's
own. Inasmuch as to assert or waive
it was not primarily a weapon for the
trial, but a right standing on inde-
pendent grounds, the court might in
its discretion feel unwilling to as-
sume that control of that weapon
was intrusted to the counsel in the
case without an assurance to that
effect from the party himself. The
plaintiff had testified, and although
this was not of itself a wai\w of
privilege, {Montgomery v. Pickering,
116 Mass. 227, 231,) it was so far a
submission to be examined upon the
same matter that it may have given
the judge an additional reason for di-
recting a personal inquiry."

65. Waiver by Personal Repre-
sentative. — Brooks V. Holden, 175
Mass, 137, 55 N. E. 802; Whelpley v.
Loder, I Dem. (N. Y.) 368; E.v parte
Gfeller, 178 Mo. 248, 77 S. W. 552.

66. Waiver by Heir Privilege

may be waived by heir in proceeding
to compel his ancestor's administrator
to render an accounting. Fossler v.
Schriber, 38 111. 172. In this case
the court says : " The appellant, how-
ever, insists that the evidence of the
attorney was improperly admitted,
because his information was derived



from a professional consultation with
Mrs. Fossler, and that only one of
her heirs is a party to this suit, and
consenting to his giving testimony.
It is sufficient to say that this rule of
professional sanctity is enforced for
the benefit of the client ; that the only
heir of the client who is before the
court is the party that calls for the
testimony, and even if there were
other heirs, and if they had a right
to interpose an objection, not being
parties to the suit, yet in the absence
of such objection, the court would
presume their concurrence with their
co-heir in removing the seal of pro-
fessional secrecy, since to do so was
obviously for their benefit as well as
his. "

67. Not by Assignee — Bowman
V. Norton, 5 Car. & P. 177. 24 E. C.
L. 265.

C8. Client's Successor in Repre-
sentative Capacity Herman v.

Schlesinger, 114 Wis. 382, 90 N.
W. 460, 91 Am. St. Rep. 922. In this
case it is held that a person who suc-
ceeds another as assignee for benefit
of creditors, cannot waive privilege
as to matters communicated by his
predecessor to his attorney.

69. Waiver. — Several Clients.
Where privilege belongs to several
clients, one of them, or even a ma-
jority, cannot, contrary to the ex-
pressed will of the others, waive the
privilege so as to justify an attorney
in giving testimony in relation to
communications made to him as their
common attorney. Chant v. Brown,
7 Hare 79, 87; 68 Eng. Reprint 32;
Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3 Barb.
Ch. (N. Y.) 528, 49 Am. Dec. 189;
Michael v. Foil, 100 N. C. 178, 6 S.
E. 264, 6 Am. St. Rep. 577; Cha-
hoon's Case, 21 Gratt. (Va.) 822,
842; Herman v. Schlesinger, 114
Wis. 382, 90 N. W. 460, 91 Am. St.
Rep. 922; In re Seip's Estate, 163 Pa.

Vol. X



318



PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.



B. Express or Implied. — Client's waiver of his privilege may
be indicated by express words, or implied in his conduct.

a. Express. — Client makes an express waiver of his privilege
when he states in person, or by attorney, that he waives it.'°



St. 423, 30 Atl. 226, 43 Am. St. Rep.
803 ; Whiting v. Barney, 30 N. Y. 330,
86 Am. Dec. 385, reversing 38 Barb.

393-

Partners as Clients. — One mem-
ber of firm of clients cannot waive
privilege. All must waive. People
V. Barker, 56 111. 299.

Accomplices. — In People v. Pat-
rick, 182 X. Y. 131, 74 N. E. 843, it
is held that where accomplices in
crime have employed the same at-
torney in civil matters, one accom-
plice called as a witness by the pros-
ecution, may testify concerning his
statements to the common attorney,
the fact that defendant and witness
•had the same counsel, not preventing
him from waiving his privilege.

In Bank of Utica v. Mersereau, 3
Barb. Ch. (N. Y.) 528, 49 Am. Dec.
189, Chancellor Walworth says that
rule making consent of all clients es-
sential to waiver is especially appli-
cable in a case like that decided,
v/here the testimony related to mat-
ters communicated to an attorney
professionally and equally effect-
ing the moral character of each of
his clients, by showing that they em-
ployed him to assist them in submit-
ting to a fictitious judgment for the
purpose of defrauding certain credit-
ors. In the same case it is held that
it is not material that the client
whose waiver is not obtained is not
a party to the action in which the
attorney is called as a w'tness. To
effect that it is immaterial whether
or not the client is a party to the ac-
tion in which the evidence is offered,
see also Duttenhofer v. State, 34
Ohio St. 91, 32 Am. Rep. 362.

70. Britton v. Lorenz, 3 Dalv (N.
Y.) 23.

Express Waiver. — What Consti-
tutes — In matter of Coleman, iii
N. Y. 220, 19 N. E. 71, the court held
that, by requesting his attorneys to
sign his will as subscribing witnesses
a testator waived his privilege as to
their testimony. The controlling

Vol. X



statute made communications to at-
torneys privileged unless " expressly
waived." After referring to testa-
tor's statements to his attorneys as
to preparation of his will, the court
says : " He must have been aware
that his object in making a will
might prove to be ineft'ectual unless
these witnesses could be called to tes-
tify to the circumstances attending
its execution, including the condi-
tion of his mental faculties at that
time. The condition of the testator's
mind, as evidenced by his actions,
conduct and conversation at the time
of making a will, is a part of the res
gestae of the transaction, and wit-
nesses thereto are competent to speak
thereof, and give opinions in relation
thereto, without any other knowledge
thereof except that derived from his
conduct on such occasions. (Clapp
V. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 190; Holcomb
V. Holcomb, 95 id. 316.) The law
presumes a knowledge on his part
of its provisions, and that what he
does deliberately is done with a full
comprehension of the legal effect of
his act, and the duty which it im-
poses upon those who comply with
his request. It would be contrary to
settled rules of law to ascribe to the
testator an intention, while making
his will and going through the forms
required to make it a valid instru-
ment, to leave in operation the pro-
visions of a statute which he had
power to waive, but which, if not
waived, might frustrate and defeat
the whole object of his action. It
cannot be doubted that, if a client in
his lifetime should call his attorney
as a witness in a legal proceeding,
to testify to transactions taking place
between himself and his attorney,
while occupying the relation of attor-
ney and client, such an act would
be held to constitute an express
waiver of the seal of secrecy imposed
by the statute, and can it be any less
so when the client has left written
and oral evidence of his desire that



PRIVILEGED COMMUKICA TIONS.



319



b. Implied. (!•) Nature of Communication. — Waiver of privilege

may be implied from the nature of the communication.'^

(A.) Letter To Be Cojikunicated. — When client who writes a let-
ter to his attorney authorizes him to communicate its contents to
another, he waives privilege as to the letter.'-

(B.) Verbal Statement To Be Communicated. — So as to verbal
statement intended to be communicated.'"

(C.) Grant of Authority. — By granting attorne}' authority to
enter into a contract with another person, client waives privilege of
objecting to attorney's testimony in regard to the nature of such
authority."*

(2.) Circumstances of Making, — W^aiver may also be inferred from
the circumstance under which the client made the communication in
question.

(A.) Attorney Subscribing Witness. .— Thus, client by requesting
attorney to attest as subscribing witness an instrument which he
has caused his attorney to prepare, waives privilege as to the at-
torney's testimony concerning the execution of such instrument.^^



his attorney should testify to facts,
learned through their professional re-
lations, upon a judicial proceeding to
take place after his death? We think
not. (McKiuney v. G. St., etc. R. R.
Co., 104 N. Y. 352.) The act of the
testator, in requesting his attorneys
to become -witnesses to his will,
leaves no doubt as to his intention
thereby to exempt them from the
operation of the statute, and leave
them free to perform the duties of
the office assigned them, unrestrained
by any objection which he had power
to remove."

See note 75, under III, 15, B, (2)
(A). Such waiver "express" or
" implied."

71. Scott V. Harris, 113 111. 447,

455; Laflin V. Herrington, i Black

(U. S.) 326; White V. State, 86 Ala.

'69, 5 So. 674; Burnside v. Terry, 51

Ga. 186.

In Rosseau v. Bleau, 131 N. Y. 177
30 N. E. 52, 27 Am. St. Rep. 578, the
question was: Can an attorney tes-
tify as to delivery of deed by his
client to him to be delivered to an-
other person. The court held he
could so testify, and uses this lan-
guage: "When the deceased (the
client) commissioned the witness to
deliver the deed to the grantee named
therein, she necessarily waived all ob-
jections she might otherwise make



to proof of that fact by the attor-
ney." Rosseau v. Bleau reverses
same case on appeal from General
Term, where it was held that client
did not waive privilege by requesting
attorney to become subscribing wit-
ness to deed. See Rousseau v. Bleau.
60 Hun 259, 14 N. Y. Supp. 712.

72. Where client who writes a let-
ter to his attorney authorizes him to
communicate its contents to another
lawyer, he waives his privilege as
to the letter. Laflin c'. Herrington,
I Black (U. S.) 326.

73. White v. State, 86 Ala. 69, 5
So. 674; Oliver v. Cameron, McA. &
M. (D. C.) 237. So as to matter
communicated to attorney to be by
him proposed to client's adversary.
(Burnside v. Terry, 51 Ga. 186).

74. Authority — Koeber v. Som-
ers, 108 Wis. 497, 597. 84 N. W. 991.
52 L. R. A. 512.

75. Waiver Implied From Cir-
cumstances. — Attorney Subscribing

Witness to Will When a testator

requests attorney who has prepared
his will to attest it as a witness,' he
waives his privilege as to his attor-
ney's testimony concerning the prep-
aration and execution of the will.
Blackburn v. Crawford's Lessee, 3
Wall (U. S.) 175; McMaster v.
Scriven. 85 Wis. 162, 55 N. W. 149,
39 Am. St. Rep. 828; Dohertyz'. O'Cal-

Vol. X



320



PRIVILEGED COMMUNICATIONS.



Extent of Such Waiver. — It has been held that dient's request to
attorney to become subscribing witness to an instrument does not
constitute waiver as to matters communicated to the attorney in
the course of preparation of such instrument, but is Hmited to fact
of execution.^*'

(B.) Employing Common Attorney. — The rule to the efifect that



Online LibraryEdgar W. (Edgar Whittlesey) CampThe Encyclopædia of evidence (Volume 10) → online text (page 46 of 150)