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Upland. The two other regiments of the Highland
Brigade joined the 93d before Balaklava ; some com-
panies of the rifle battalion of the Second Division
were also posted there ; and Vinoy's brigade of Bos-
quet's corps was so placed as to prevent the enemy
from forcing a passage to the Upland by way of the
Col. The whole of the forces under Sir Colin Campbell
now executed a complete line of defence, strengthened
with powerful batteries, around Balaklava, which might
at last be regarded as secure. Seeing what a source of
weakness the place was to us, by causing the great
extension of our line, and the absorption of so much
of our outnumbered forces, the question had been seri-
ously considered of abandoning it, and supplying our
army from the French harbour of Kamiesch, which
would have infinitely lightened our toils and diminished
our risks. But the Commissary-General declared that
without Balaklava he could not undertake to supply
the army, and the necessary evil was retained.

It was in this interval, between the sortie of the
26th October and the battle of the 5th November, that
a work was thrown up by us on the field which, useless
as a defence, became the object of bloody conflict. It
was observed that the Russians were constructing a work
on the other side of the valley to hold two guns (pro-
bably to support the coming attack), the embrasures
being already formed, and the gabions placed in them.
On this being shown to General Evans, he had two
eighteen-pounders brought from the depot of the siege
train, not far off, and a high parapet with two embra-



I 28 Preparation for an Assault.

sures, made solid with sandbags, was thrown up on the
edge of the cliff to hold them. It was placed about
1400 yards from the enemy's intended battery. In a few
rounds the Russian work was knocked to pieces, and our
guns, as being too far from our lines to be guarded, were
then removed from what became afterwards a point, in
the history of the battle, known as "the Sandbag Battery."

On the 4th of November the French infantry in the
Crimea numbered 31,000; the British, 16,000; the Turks,
who were not permitted to develop their value, 11,000.
They must have been very different from the Turkish
soldiery of the present day if they were not equal in
fighting quality to any troops in the Crimea, and superior
to all in patience, temperance, and endurance. But it was
a tendency of the time to disparage them, partly from
their abandonment of the outposts at Balaklava, the
valorous defence made by a great part of them being,
from some accident, unknown at the time ; and they
were employed in ways which gave them no opportunity
of helping us in battle.

On both the Allied and the Russian side it was
known that a crisis was now rapidly approaching ; but
only the Russians knew that it was a race between them
for delivering the attack. The French siege corps, com-
paratively strong, close to its base, and protected on both
flanks, on one by the sea, on the other by the English,
was now retrieving its disaster of the i/th October, by
diligently pushing its approaches in regular form upon
the Flagstaff Bastion. We were strengthening our bat-
teries and replenishing our magazines ; as has been said,



Assembly of Russian Forces. 129

the Russian daily loss in the fortress far exceeded ours
in the trenches. We were ready to support a French
attack which would now be made over a very short
space of open ground. On the 4th November the Allied
commanders had appointed a meeting on the 5th for
definitely arranging the cannonade and assault which,
they hoped, would at length lay the fortress open to us.
The Russians were, of course, alive to the peril. But, on
the 4th they had completed the assembly of their
forces for attack. For long the corps tfarmee stationed
about Odessa had been in motion for the Crimea. It
had repeatedly sent important reinforcements to the
fortress, and the whole of those, which had reached the
heights beyond the Tchernaya by the 4th November,
raised the total of Menschikoff's forces in and around
Sebastopol, according to Todleben, to 100,000 men,
without -counting the seamen, so that not less than no
to 115,000 men were confronting the 65,000 which,
counting seamen and marines, the aggregate of the
Allied forces amounted to.

Of the Russian troops which took actual part in
the battle of Inkerman, 19,000 infantry, under General
Soimonoff, were within the fortifications of Sebastopol;
16,000, under General Pauloff, were on the heights
beyond the Tchernaya. These were to combine for the
attack, accompanied by fifty-four guns of position and
eighty-one field-guns. On their left was the force which
had been Liprandi's, now commanded by Prince Gortscha-
koff, stretching from the captured hills outside Bala-
klava, across the Fedioukine heights, into the lower valley

H 2



130 Arrival of the Russian Grand Ditkes.

of the Tchernaya. The remainder of the troops formed
the ample garrison of the works of Sebastopol. Long
before the November dawn of Sunday, the besiegers
heard drowsily in their tents the bells of Sebastopol
celebrating the arrival in the camp of the young Grand
Dukes Michael and Nicholas, and invoking the blessings
of the Church on the impending attack, towards which
the Russian troops were even then on the march.



CHAPTER VII.

BATTLE OF INKERMAN.

Rumours before the Battle Description of the Ground British Position
The Russian Plan of Battle How carried out Proximity of Corps
to Battlefield Soimonoff attacks Effects of the Fog Soimonoffs
Right in Advance The British repulse Him Pauloff's Troops
engage Pauloff also repulsed Causes of Russian Repulses Dan-
nenberg's Attacks Greater Obstinacy of the Attack Action and
Death of Cathcart The French drive back the Russians Allies
defeat another Resolute Attack Allied Artillery begin to prevail
What delayed Bosquet Crisis before the French arrived Gortscha-
koffs part Close of the Battle Terrible Carnage The Operations
discussed The Attack suitably met The Sandbag Battery
Russian Exaggerations What was at Stake Consequence of
Victory.

WHEN the Czar Nicholas received the news of the
battle of the Alma, he was, Kinglake tells us, terribly
agitated. A burst of rage was followed by a period of
profound dejection, when for days he lay on his bed,
taking no food, silent and unapproachable. But a
speedy reaction must have followed when his military
counsellors showed how hopeful was the situation. For
his enemies were now definitely lodged in a small
corner of the Crimea, and bound to it by their depend-
ence on the fleet ; Sebastopol was amply garrisoned,
and the fortifications daily grew stronger ; the field
army assured the concentration of the troops which were



132 Rumours before the Battle.

crowding the roads of Southern Russia ; behind them
the resources in men and material were almost bound-
less. Only there was this limitation, that a season was
near when the march of troops towards and along the
Crimea would be almost impossible. But there was ample
time to do all that was needful to raise the Russian
Forces to an overwhelming preponderance ; and their
point of attack, offering at once the greatest advantages
for entering on the battle, and the most complete results
as the fruits of*victory, was so obvious that it might
almost be fixed, and the details arranged, at St Peters-
burgh. Probably it was so arranged ; rumours began
to pass through Europe of a great disaster impending
over the invaders, and a paper was communicated to
our Foreign Office, purporting to be a copy of a despatch
from Menschikoff for transmission to the Czar, and be-
lieved to be authentic, which said, " Future times, I am
confident, will preserve the remembrance of the ex-
emplary chastisement inflicted upon the presumption of
the Allies. When our beloved Grand Dukes shall be
here, I shall be able to give up to them intact the
precious deposit which the confidence of the Emperor
has placed in my hands. Sebastopol remains ours."
This confidence was amply justified by the situation.
But while such were the views of the enemy, only a few
in the Allied Armies foresaw this particular danger.
Evans, whose apprehensions were intensified by his
responsibility as commander of the troops on that part
of the ground, had indeed for long felt uneasy at our
want of protection there, and had even begun a line of




IV&Jter & Boiitall sc.



Description of the Ground. 135

intrenchment to cover his guns ; but it was not more
than begun, and on the day of battle the ground was
marked only by two small fragments of insignificant in-
trenchment, not a hundred yards long in all, and more
like ordinary drains than fieldworks, one on each side
of the road as it crossed the crest behind which the
Second Division was encamped.

Inkerman was not the name of the ground on which
the battle was fought, and which probably had no name,
but was taken from the heights beyond the Tchernaya.
Opposite the cliff which supports the north-eastern
corner of the Upland rises another, of yellow stone,
honey-combed with caverns, and crowned with a broken
line of grey walls, battlemented in part, and studded
with round towers. These are the " Ruins of Inkerman,"
and around them masses of grey stone protrude abruptly
through the soil, of such quaint, sharp-cut forms that in
the distance they might be taken for the remains of
some very ancient city. From these the hill slopes
upward to a plateau, mostly invisible from our position,
where Menschikoffs field army was assembled. It is
from this locality, the features of which are so striking
to the eye when viewed from the British position, that
the corner of the Upland, bounded on the west by the
Careenage ravine, and on the north by the harbour,
has received the name of Mount Inkerman.

The Second Division camp stood on a slope, rising
beyond it to a crest, which, nearly level for most of its
width, bent down on the right to the top of the cliffs
above the Tchernaya, on the left to the Careenage



1 36 British Position.

ravine, the extent from the one boundary to the other
being about 1400 yards. On ascending to this crest,
and looking towards the head of the harbour, the ground
beyond was seen bending downward into a hollow, and
again rising to a hill opposite, which, with its sloping
shoulders, limited the view in that direction to about
1 200 yards. This opposite summit was Shell Hill, the
post of the Russian artillery in the engagement, and
the space between that and our crest comprised most of
the field of battle, the whole of which was thickly clad
with low coppice, strewn throughout with fragments of
crag and boulders. A very few natural features marked
the field. About 500 yards from its right boundary, our
crest, instead of sloping down to the front as elsewhere,
shot forward for about 500 yards, in what Mr Kinglake
calls the Fore Ridge, and from the spine of this emi-
nence the ground fell rapidly, still covered thickly with
stones and coppice, to the edge of the cliffs, where, at a
point abreast of the northern end of this Fore Ridge
stood the famous Sandbag Battery on a point (called
by Kinglake the Kitspur), isolated to some extent by a
small ravine plunging north-east to the valley. Two
other natural features complete the general character
of the field, namely, two glens, which half way between
our crest and Shell Hill, at the bottom of the dip, shot
out right and left, narrowing the plateau between them
to half its width, till it expanded again as they receded
from it at the bases of Shell Hill.

Menschikoff, whose plans of battle always showed how
vague were his ideas about tactics, gave general orders to



The Russian Plan of Battle. 137

this effect : General Soimonoff was to assemble within the
works his force of 19,000 infantry and thirty-eight guns,
and issue from them, near the mouth of the Careenage
ravine ; at the same time, General Pauloff, with his 16,000
infantry and ninety-six guns, was to descend from the
heights, cross the causeway and bridge of the Tchernaya,
and "push on vigorously to meet and join the corps of
Lieutenant-General Soimonoff." In another paragraph of
the orders the object of the operation is stated to be to
attack the English "in their position, in order that we
may seize and occupy the heights on which they are
established." The forces in the valley, lately commanded
by Liprandi, now by Gortschakoff, were " to support the
general attack by drawing the enemy's forces towards
them, and to endeavour to seize one of the heights of the
plateau." The garrison of Sebastopol was to cover with
its artillery fire the right flank of the attacking force,
and in case of confusion showing itself in the enemy's
batteries, was to storm them. These being the general
directions, the execution of them was left to the different
commanders, namely, for the main attack to Soimonoff
and Pauloff, for the auxiliary operations to Gortschakoff
and the commandant of Sebastopol.

If these orders had been destined to be carried out
under Menschikoffs own superintendence, their vague-
ness might be excusable. But, regarding himself ap-
parently as the commander of all the forces in the
locality, he committed the direction of the two bodies
who were to make the main attack to another officer,
General Dannenberg, who was to take command of



1 38 How carried out.

them " as soon as they shall have effected their junction."
This general only received his orders at five o'clock in
the evening of the 4th, and neither he nor Menschikoff
appears to have been then aware of the obstacle which the
Careenage ravine its sides nearly inaccessible offered
to the combined action of troops astride of it, and both
of them dealt with the ground on both sides of it as one
clear battlefield. After many perplexing orders had been
issued, Dannenberg seems to have at length realised the
nature of the chasm which would intersect his front, and
he therefore made further arrangements for the advance
of his two generals on the two sides of it. But Soimonoff
had interpreted the orders of the Commander-in-Chief
as directing him to advance on the eastern side of the
ravine ; he had framed his plan for the movement, and
submitted it to Menschikoff, who, though he must have
seen how it conflicted with Dannenberg's scheme, seems
to have made no attempt to decide between them.
Soimonoff, therefore, followed his own idea, and thus
it came to pass that 35,000 men, with 134 guns, were
crowded into a space insufficient for half their numbers,
while Dannenberg, who possibly only learned on the field
of this wide departure from his design, was left to conduct
an enterprise the plan of which he could not approve.

Here a moment's pause may be made to point out
that, when two bodies of troops, separated by a distance
of several miles, were to move by narrow issues to the
ground where they were to join forces, it would have
been an immense advantage to possess a commanding
fortified point between them and the enemy. Shell Hill



Proximity of Corps to Battlefield. 139

would have been such a point, and that circumstance
will -be seen to be amply explanatory of the Russian
design in the action of the 2Oth of October.

Against the formidable attack in preparation, the
menaced ground was then occupied by very nearly
3000 men of the Second Division, placed on the alert
by the attack on their outposts. On the adjoining slope,
the Victoria, was Codrington's Brigade, which, with some
marines, and three companies brought in the course of
the action from Buller's Brigade, numbered 1400 men,
and, as these might be regarded as partly the object of
the attack, they remained throughout the action on the
same ground. Close to them was the Naval Battery,
which had been placed to fire on the Malakoff, but four
of its heavy guns had been withdrawn to the siege works,
and only one remained, which could not be brought to
bear till the close of the battle.

Three-quarters of a mile in rear of the Second
Division was the brigade of Guards, which was able to
bring into action 1331 men.

Two miles in rear of the Second Division were the
nearest troops of Bosquet's army corps, stretched round
the south-eastern corner of the Upland.

Buller's Brigade, on the slope adjoining Codrington's,
was a mile and a half from the Second Division. Cath-
cart's Division (Fourth), two miles and a half from the
Second Division, and England's (Third), three miles,
were on the heights in rear of our siege batteries.

Soimonoff issued from the fortress before "dawn,
crossed the Careenage ravine, and ascended the northern



1 40 Soimonoff A t tacks.

heights of Mount Inkerman, where at six o'clock he
began to form order of battle. For some reason never
explained, he disregarded that part of the plan which
prescribed that he should combine with Pauloff, and act
under the orders of Dannenberg. Waiting for neither,
he at once commenced the attack. Spreading 300 rifle-
men as skirmishers across his front, he formed his first
line of 6000 men, and the second, in immediate support,
of 3300. The advance of these would cover the heavy
batteries, numbering twenty-two guns, which he had
brought from the arsenal of Sebastopol. These, cor-
responding to our eighteen-pounder guns and thirty-two-
pounder howitzers, were posted on Shell Hill, and the
high slopes which buttressed it right and left. Behind
them came his 9000 remaining infantry, as a general re-
serve, and the light batteries (sixteen guns) which formed
the remainder of his artillery. These operations were com-
pleted by about seven o'clock, when the heavy batteries
opened fire, and his lines of columns descended the hill.
The pickets of the Second Division, each of a com-
pany, and numbering altogether 480 men, were at once
pressed back fighting. But the main body of the
Division, not ranged on the crest as in Evans's recent
action, was pushed in fractions at once down the hill
to support the pickets, by Pennefather, who commanded
in the temporary absence of Evans, then sick on board
ship. He was probably less impelled to this mode of
action by any tactical reasons, though these, too, favoured
it, than by his fighting propensity, which always led him
to make for his enemy. Consequently, the crest was



Effects of the Fog. 1 4 1

held only by the twelve nine-pounder guns of the
Division, and a small proportion of its infantry. The
large Russian projectiles not only swept the crest, but
completely knocked to pieces the camp on the slope
behind it, and destroyed the horses tethered there.

The morning was foggy, the ground muddy, and the
herbage dank. The mist did not, however, envelop
the field. Shell Hill was frequently visible, as well as
Codrington's troops across the ravine, and columns could
sometimes be descried while several hundred yards off.
It was chiefly in the hollow that the mist lay, but even
here it frequently rose and left the view clear. No
doubt it was favourable to the fewer numbers, hiding
from the Russians the fact that there was nothing behind
the English lines, which came on as boldly as if strong
supports were close at hand. It needs some plausible
supposition of that kind to account (however imperfectly)
for the extraordinary combats which ensued, where the
extravagant achievements of the romances of chivalry
were almost outdone by the reality.

On reaching the point of the plateau where it was
narrowed by the glens, the Russian battalions halted
to give their guns time to produce their effect. When
they resumed their march, the battalion columns on the
right passed first, and thus our left was the part of our
line which received the first attack. It is to be noted
as a feature of the field that at the point where the post-
road enters the Quarry ravine, and where we had a picket,
a wall of loose stones, crossing the road and stretching
into the coppice on each side, had been thrown up as



142 Soimonojfs Right in Advance.

a slight defence, and to mark the ground, and this was
known as "the Barrier."

Here it must be remarked that the indefatigable in-
quiries of Kinglake, and the care with which he arranged
the information thus obtained, first disentangled the in-
cidents of the battle from the confusion which long hid
them, and rendered them intelligible, as they had never
been before, even to those who fought in the action.

The enemy, unable to advance through the narrowed
space on a full front, such as would have enabled him to
make a simultaneous attack all along our position, entered
it with his right in advance of the centre and left, and
the first attack therefore took place on our left. Only
his foremost battalions being visible, the nature of the
attack was not at first fully appreciated, and might have
been supposed to be merely a very formidable sortie.
His battalions advanced, some in a column composed
of an entire battalion, some split into four columns of
companies, but the broken nature of the ground dissolved
all these more or less into dense crowds which had lost
their formation. One of these, on the extreme Russian
right, preceding for some unexplained reason the others,
pressed on till it came in contact with a wing of the
49th, which, delivering a volley, charged, drove it back,
and pursued it even on to the slope of Shell Hill.
Soimonoff then led in person twelve battalions, num-
bering 9000 men, against our left and centre, while a
column * moved up by the Careenage ravine beyond our

* Kinglake says this column was composed of sailors, and therefore not
included in the numbers of the army.



The British repulse Him. 143

left flank. At the same time there were arriving on our
left 650 men of the Light Division, and a battery from
the Fourth Division, raising Pennefather's force on the
field to exactly 3600 men and eighteen field-guns.
About 400 of Buller's men (88th), which had at first
passed over the crest, fell back before the Russian
masses, and three guns of the battery which was follow-
ing them fell into the enemy's hands. At the same
time the Russian column in the ravine, after surprising
a picket of the Light Division, was making its way to
the plateau in rear of our line, and close to our camp,
by a glen which led in that direction. It was only just
in time that Buller himself arrived with the remainder
of his 650 men (/^th), who were at once pushed into the
fight, Part of them attacked the head of the turning
column just emerging from the glen, while a company
of the Guards, on picket on the other bank, fired on it
from thence, and the column, which had so nearly
attained to success that might have been decisive, was
driven back, and appeared no more on the field.
SoimonofPs right battalion, advancing on the plateau,
was encountered by a wing of the 47th, spread out in
skirmishing order on a wide front, which harassed it
by so destructive a fire that it broke up and retreated,
and two other battalions of the same regiment (the same
which had just captured our guns) came to a halt, having
before them the troops which had pursued the Russian
battalions that first met us to the slope of Shell Hill,
and had then fallen back. Passing these on the right,
Buller's companies (260 men of the 7/th) entered the



144 Pa,uloff*s Troops engage.

fight, met two Russian battalions, fired, charged, and
drove them quite off the field. Seeing this discomfiture
of their comrades going on so near, the other battalions
just spoken of as halted on our left of these, followed
them in their retreat, leaving the captured guns to be
recovered by our men. It was about this time that
Soimonoff was killed. On our side General Buller was
disabled by a cannon shot which killed his horse.

Five of the twelve battalions, besides that other
which attacked first, and the turning column in the
ravine, were thus accounted for. Seven of SoimonofFs
still remained. One of these diverged to the Russian
left, where it joined part of Pauloff's forces, then arriv-
ing on the field. The remaining six advanced by both
sides of the post-road upon our centre, and were defeated
like the rest, partly by the close fire of the battery on
our left of the post-road (that on the right had been
silenced by the fire from Shell Hill), partly by the
charge and pursuit of some companies of the 49th, and
the pickets which had halted here, and which held the
ground beside the guns.

The part of Pauloff's corps, eight battalions, which
preceded the rest had meanwhile crossed the head of
the Quarry ravine, and, picking up the stray battalion


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