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France, and protested at the forcible separation. Bis-
marck believed that, with the passing away of the genera-
tion that had known French rule, attachment to France
would disappear. The strongest French sympathizers left
the country, and their places were taken by immigrants
from the German states of the Empire. But Alsace-
Lorraine was given a dependent and inferior status, as
the Reichslandy or imperial territory. It had neither
influence in the Empire nor sufficient self-government
for itself. Therefore, as time passed, the feeling of dis-
content did not w\ane; love of the old memories of France
did not die; and German immigrants themselves de-
nounced the treatment of the Reichdand. The German
authorities, who have usually not been able to conciliate
other peoples, as the English and the French have done,
but have relied on strong methods and force, strove to
compel obedience and contentment. They only increased
the irritation. This made a dangerous situation which
they tried to meet by adding to the garrisons and subject-
ing the provinces to very strict military rule. This was re-
sented still further. As far as possible French things were
proscribed, and one boy of twelve was imprisoned for
whistling the Marseillaise. German rulers did not realize
as clearly as some foreigners that what the inhabitants of
the Reichsland wanted most of all was not return to France
but self-government. In 1911 a new constitution was
granted, but it was not satisfactory to the people. After
forty years nothing, aside from force, really held the
population to the Empire except their mcreasingly prosper-




ous industrial life, closely connected with German industry
and mostly dependent upon it.
The Poles The Germans so dealt with these provinces largely be-

in the east- cause of their strategic position, and because military
era districts considerations seemed all-important. German leaders
would have felt safer if the Reichsland had been inhabited
entirely by Germans. The same reasons had much to do
with their treatment of the Poles in West Prussia and
Posen. The Polish districts of Prussia lay right where Rus-
sian invaders might strike deep into the Empire. This
country, when taken from Poland, had contained many
people who spoke German ; and in time, with good treat-
ment, all of the inhabitants might have been made loyal
subjects. It was considered necessary, however, to make
them thoroughly German, especially after the Kultur-
himpf had aroused in the Catholic Poles a strong feeling
of Polish nationality. Bismarck wished to prevent the
use of Polish in their public schools, and he desired to
populate the country with German peasants; but presently
more lenient treatment was accorded. Repressive meas-
ures were undertaken in earnest, however, after a while,
when it was seen clearly that the Poles were not giving up
their own national feeling. As in Alsace-Lorraine, news-
papers were suppressed and many people fined and
imprisoned. In 1901 it was ordered that religious in-
struction in the schools should be given in German.
Polish teachers were taken from their positions, school
children were forbidden to pray in Polish, and Poles were
forbidden to use their language in public assemblies. In
1907 the Prussian Government passed a law by which
Polish owners might be compelled to sell their land, so that
their estates might get into German possession; and in
1913 a large sum of money was appropriated for the pur-
pose of colonizing Prussian Poland with Germans. Polish
peasants were even forbidden to build houses upon their
own land. But despite the severity of this persecution,


little more was accomplislicd than making' the Polish sub-
jects of the Empire l)urii with hatred, and desire free-
dom from the rule of the masters who oppressed them.


General accounts: J. E. Barker, Modern Gennant/ (lOOo, last
ed. 1919); H. Blum, Das Deutsche Reich ziir Zeit liismarcks
(1893); W. H. Dawson, The Evulutiun of Modern Germany (1908,
new ed. 1919); R. H. Fife, Jr., The German Empire Between Two
Wars (1916); Karl Laniprecht, Deutsche Geschichte der Jungsten
V ergangenheit und Gegenwart, 2 vols. (1912-13); Henri Licten-
berger, U Allemagne^Moderne; Son Evolutum (1907), trans, by
A. M. Ludovici (1913); H. von Sybel, Die Begriindung des
Deutschen Reichs durch Wilhelm I, 7 vols, (5th ed. revised, 1889-
94), biassed, but based upon the sources; Charles Tower, Ger-
vianyof To-day (WIS).

Bismarck: the best biography in English is C. G. Robertson,
Bismarck (1919); in German the best is Erich Marcks, Otto von
Bismarck: ein Lebensbild (1918), and a larger work; Bismarck:
eine Biographie, Volume I (1909); H. Blum, Fiirst Bismarck und
Seine Zeit, 6 vols. (1894-5); G. Egelhaaf, Bismarck, Sein Leben
und Sein Werk (1911) ; J. W. Headlam, Bismarck and the Founda-
tion of the German Empire (1899); H. Kohl, Furst Bismarck:
Regesten zu einer Wissenschaftlichen Biographie, 2 vols. (1891-2),
containing important parts of letters and speeches; jVIoritz
Busch (English trans.), Bismarck — Some Secret Pages of Ilia
History, 2 vols. (1898), the diary of one who had official and
private intercourse with Bismarck; Max I^nz, Geschichte Bis-
marcks (1902); C. Lowe, Prince Bismarck: an Historical Biog-
raphy, 2 vols. (1886); Paul Matter, Bis7narck et son Temps.
3 vols. (1905-8), perhaps the best of the longer biographies at
present; J. Penzler, Fiirst Bismarck nach Seiner Entlassung
(1897-8); Munroe Smith, Bismarck and German Unity (2d ed.

Bismarck's utterances and writings: Otto, Fiirst von Bis-
marck, Gedanken und Erinnerungen, 2 vols. (1898), Vol. HI
(1919), Vols. I and II trans, by A. J. Butler, Rejiections and Reini-
niscences, 2 vols. (1899); II. Kohl, Wegweiser durch Bismarcks
Gedanken und Erinnerungen (1898); L. Hahn, Fiirst Bismarck,
Sein Politisches Leben und Wirken, 5 vols. (1878-91), for speeches
dispatches, and political letters; H. Kohl, Die Politischen Reden


des Fiirsien Bismarck, 14 vols. (1892-1905); Hermann Hofmann,
Fiirst Bimiarck, 1890-189S, 2 vols. (1913), contains Bismarck's
important critical contributions to the Hamburger Nachrichten.

Other biographies: Erich Marcks, Kaiser Wilhelm I (5th ed.
1905), excellent.

Government : if the student finds it desirable and convenient,
he will obtain a vast amount of curious and interesting informa-
tion from the proceedings of the Reichstag — Stenographische
Berichte iiher die Verhandhingen des Reichstags (1871-); B. E.
Howard, The German Empire (1906) ; Paul Laband, Das Staats-
recht des Deutschen Reiches, 4 vols. (4th ed. 1901), the stand-
ard treatise, Deutsches Reichsstaatsrecht (6th ed. 1912); H. G.
James, Principles of Prussian Administration (1913); Gaetan
(Vicomte) Combes de Lestrade, Les Monarchies de VEmpire
Alleniand, Organisation Constitutionelle et Administrative (1904),
excellent; Oskar Stillich, Die Politischen Parteien in Deutschland,
Vols. I, II (1908, 1911); W. H. Dawson, Municipal Life and
Government in Germany (1914).

The Kulturkampf: Ludwig Halin, Geschichte des Kultur-
kampfes in Preussen (1881), contains documents; Georges Goyau,
Bismarck et VEglise: le Culturkampf, 1870-1887, 4 vols. (1911-
13), best on the subject.

Protection and economic life: W. H. Dawson, Protection in
Germany (1904), best; Werner Sombart, Die Deutsche Volkswirt-
schaft im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert (1903).

Socialism and the State: Charles Andler, Les Origines du
Socialisme d'etat en Allemagne (ed. 1911); W. H. Dawson, Bis-
marck and State Socialism (1891), The German Workman (1906),
Social Insurance in Germany, 1883-1911 (1912), all excellent.
August Bebel, Aiis Meinem Leben, 3 vols. (1910-14), abridged
trans. My Life (1912).

Alsace-Lorraine: Barry Cerf, Alsace-Lorraine Since 1870
(1919) ; C. D. Hazen, Alsace-Lorraine Under German Ride (1917).



L. L. M. M. I'empereur d'Autriche, roi de Boheme etc. ct roi aposto-
lique de Hongrie, rcmpereur d'Allcmagne, roi de Prusse et le roi
d'ltalie, animeos du dcsir (raugmcnter les garanties de la paix
generale, de fortifier le principe moriarchique et d'assurer par eela-
meme le mantieii intacte de I'ordre sociale et politicjue dans leurs
etats respeetifs, sont tomhees d'accord de conelure uii traite. . .
The Triple iVIliance, May 20, 1882.

Wir liegen mitten in Europa. Wir haben mindestens drei Angriffs-
fronten. . . . Gott hat uns in eine Situation gesetzt, in wel-
cher wir durch unsere Nachbarn daran verhindert werdcn, irgenfl-
wie in Triigheit oder Versunipfung zu gerathen. Er hat uns die
kriegerischste unfl unruhigste Nation, die Franzosen, an die Seite
gesetzt, und er hat in Ilussland kriegcrisehe Neigungen gross wer-
den lassen. . . . Wir Deutschen furchten Gott, aber sonst
nichts in der Welt.

Bismarck in the Reichstag, February 6, 1888; Stenographisc/ie
Berichtc, 1887-1888, pp. 727, 728, 733.

. . . hold fast to the conviction that our God would never have
taken such great pains with our German Fatherland and its people
if he had not been preparing us for something still greater.
Speech of ^YILUAM II at Bremen, March 22, 1905.

After 1871 Bismarck's greater tasks had to do \\\\\\ Bismarck's
foreign affairs. The new German Empire was a powerful ^'^"^^
state of 41,000,000 people. It was larger than France, in
strong military po.sition, flushed with victory, and with the
prestige of unparalleled success. But it was also a new
state, a newcomer among old neighbors, apt to be regarded
as an upstart and an intruder. Its very appearance
had completely upset the old balance of power, and there
was bound to be some difficulty in adjusting the equi-




The prob-
lems con-

The situa-
tion in

librium again. The German Empire had risen on the
defeat of Austria and of France. The Austrians might
try to regain the position they had lost. The French
proclaimed, as some Germans do now, that assuredly
they would have their revenge. The position of Germany
was very strong, for in between other great powers she
could strike out, if necessary, at one or the other; but the
converse of this was that a hostile alliance of surrounding
powers might be able to crush her completely.

It was the task of Bismarck now to consolidate and
keep what had just been gained, to prevent the for-
mation of an unfriendly alliance, to isolate Germany's
foes, to make new friends and keep the old ones, and
see that Germany would never be taken at a disadvantage
during the period of readjustment of affairs. He suc-
ceeded magnificently in all of this. Great as had been his
success in making possible the unification of Germany, his
success in keeping the unity, prosperity, and commanding
position of the German Empire now was still more striking.
When in 1890 he retired from the management of public
affairs, the foundations of the Empire seemed impregnable.
Germany was the center of a powerful alliance; and was on
friendly terms with most of the other great powers; while
France continued in the lonely isolation in which her dis-
aster had left her.

When Bismarck began his great schemes against Austria
and France he had already assured himself of the friend-
ship of Italy and Russia. With these powers he continued
on excellent terms after 1871, and did all that he could to
strengthen the connection. Great Britain had been in-
creasingly alarmed at the actions of Prussia from 1864
to 1871, and among the British people there was no little
sympathy for France during the terrible winter of the war.
But this was a period when historians and novelists in
England loved to think of the Teutonic origin of their
people and the excellence of all things Germanic; so that



for some time many Englishmen felt tliat tliere were very
close ties of relationship between tlie Germans and them-
selves. IMoreover, sinee the ending of the Napoleonic
wars, the activities of Britain had gone mostly into the
administration of her ever -widening Empire, British
leaders wished to avoid entanglements in Europe, and
remain secure in "splendid isolation."

At once Bismarck proceeded to grander designs. He
desired to draw together in close friendship and alliance
the German Empire, Austria-Hungary, and Russia. He
had had something of this in mind in 1866, when terms
were made with Austria defeated. By the Peace of Prague
Austria lost no territory to Prussia, and paid almost no
indemnity, while everything possible was done to soothe
the feelings of the vanquished. Accordingly, it was not
difficult to bring about good understanding again. In
1872, after skilful arranging, the emperors of Russia,
Austria, and the German Empire were brought together
in Berlin, where they arrived at a cordial agreement.
No alliance was concluded; but this understanding of the
three rulers so far effected Bismarck's plan of a new
group of powers which would include the new German
Empire that there was not any great misconception
involved when people spoke of it as the League of Three
Emperors {Dreikaiserhund) .

For six years this condition continued, and Bismarck
had little to fear, with Italy friendly, and England holding
aloof. But now there developed another great change
which made impossible continued intimate connection
with Austria-Hungary and Russia at the same time; for
they came into such opposition that not even his masterly
skill sufficed to hold them together. Russia and Austria
were rivals for the same thing, and by 1878 could no longer
be good friends, since they could not each have the object
desired, which both of them greatly wanted

For a long time the Russian people had been extending

The Drei-

and Russia



Expansion of
Russia to
the south-

Expansion of
Austria to
the south

westward and southward, always hoping for some good
outlet on the sea, and looking forward to the day when
expansion down through the Balkans would bring them to
Constantinople, mother of their civilization and faith.
From the Turk they had already taken much land on the
northern shore of the Black Sea, and now it seemed to
them that ambition and destiny both called them forward
down the west shore, to free the Christian, Slavic peoples
in the Balkan peninsula, and to drive the Turks out of
tlieir great city at last. But meanwhile Austria was
reviving her ambitions to take Balkan territory from the
Turk. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, when
Ottoman power in Europe was at its zenith, Austria was
the bulwark of Christian Europe against the Turk. It
was to her that the submerged Christian peoples to the
south looked for their future deliverance; and she did
enlarge her dominions by southward expansion when
the power of the Turk began to wane. After a while
her ambitions were turned in this direction more than
ever before. Once she had had great influence in northern
Europe. The Treaty of Utrecht (1713) gave her that
part of the Netherlands which was afterward known as
Belgium, and for a long while she was leader among the
German states. But the wars of the French Revolution
took away her Austrian Netherlands, and in 1866 she
was thrust out of the community of the German peoples.
At the same time she had just lost her hold on the Italian
peninsula. But her ambitions rose quickly again. As
soon as the Austrians and the Hungarians reached agree-
ment, and good relations began with the new German
Empire, the hopes of the leaders in the Dual Monarchy
turned to new expansion, and it seemed now that the best
chance for this was down the Adriatic, perhaps, through
the Balkan peninsula to the Mgean. So it happened that
in this period the ambitions of Russia and Austria-
Hungary thwarted each other. Each strove for influence



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n/ U 1>I Vj /\ l\ I ^ MOLDAVIA' ^^

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. R U M A N I


BOSNIA! Ilelsrado i^ >;


^ S^

...Turco Serbian and Turco
Montenegrian Boundaries

\y^/^//\ Bulgaria

Scale of Miles

50 100 150


-• ^^,










The Russo-
Turkish War

The Con-
gress of
Berlin, 1878

Russia and
Prussia drift

among the Balkan peoples and tried by all means to hinder
the other from securing advantage. In 1878 a great
crisis came, when Russia, eager to extend her power, but
also sincerely aroused at the atrocities perpetrated by
Turks on the Bulgarian people, began the Russo-Turkish
"War (1877-8), and, after a fierce struggle, shattered the
enemy's resistance and forced the signing of a treaty which
destroyed the power of Turkey in Europe. The subject
peoples were set free, and most of the Ottoman territory
in Europe was given to a new large Bulgarian state, which,
it was then believed, would be dependent on Russia.

But this treaty was not allowed to stand. A British
fleet prepared for action near Constantinople, and Austria-
Hungary also let it be known that such a settlement was not
satisfactory. In the following critical months the Russian
ambassador to Great Britain reached a partial under-
standing with the British Government; and meanwhile
Russia consented to submit the treaty to a congress of the
powers. June 13, such a congress met at Berlin. Bis-
marck, who had declared that Germany had no territorial
claims in the Balkans, and that he would be glad to act as
an "honest broker" between the others, was elected presi-
dent the first day. By the Treaty of Berlin which fol-
lowed, Russia suffered a great diplomatic defeat. What
she had done in the Balkans was largely undone. The
Bulgaria she proposed to establish was greatly reduced,
while Austria-Hungary, who had taken no part in defeat-
ing the Turks, got the right to administer the two Turkish
provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which lay contigu-
ous to her and now extended her dominion far southward.

The Congress and the Treaty of Berlin mark an epoch
in the recent history of Europe. Many great consquences
were to follow from the work of the diplomats who went
there, but one of the first important results was the ending
of the close friendship which had existed between Russia
and Prussia since Prussia's friendly attitude to Russia



during the Polish rebellion of 1803. Gorlchakov, the Rus-
sian chaneellor, who already disliked Bismarck, believed
that such humiliation would not Iiave come to his country
had he received German support. In 18GC Russia had been
friendly to Prussia, and in 1870 she had even done some-
thing to keep Austria from assisting France. Now in her
time of need the German Empire had done nothing for her.
Russia had desired an ofl'ensive and defensive alliance with
Germany, but Bismarck had refused; and forced at last to
make his choice, he now^ chose Austria rather than Russia.
Perhaps he feared that since Russia was opposing most of
the principal European powers, Germany in alliance with
Russia would have to oppose them also, and would thence
be made too dependent on Russia's good wall in the future.
At all events, cordial friendship between them now came
to an end for the time.

For the moment Germany was isolated, and there was
danger that Russia might seek alliance with either Austria
or France. But the danger soon passed. In October,
1879, after brief negotiations, an alliance was concluded
between the German Empire and Austria-Hungary. By
the terms of this agreement, kept secret then but after-
ward pubhshed, "the two High Contracting Parties"
were bound to stand by each other with all their armed
forces if either one were attacked by Russia; in case either
were attacked by some other power than Russia "the
other High Contracting Party" would observe "at least
an attitude of benevolent neutrality " toward the partner
in the treaty; but if the powder attacking were supported
by Russia, then the two High Contracting Parties would
wage war jointly until peace was concluded by them to-

Scarcely had this Dual Alliance given the security
Bismarck desired when he extended it to make the well-
known Triple Alliance, which endured until the time of
the Great War. This was done by drawing Italy to the two

in Russia

Alliance be-
tween the
German Em-
pire and

Italy joins
the Triple



Italy and

Italy and

Rivalry and

Central Powers. The general interests of Italy did not
seem to lie in such company, since she must have as one of
her partners Austria-Hungary, long Italy's master and
oppressor, who only a few years before had been expelled
from the peninsula, who still held many Italians as un-
willing subjects, and against whom Italians cherished
bitter hatred from recollection of a thousand acts of
tyranny and evil. Moreover, the spirit of the Italian
people and the ties of language, law, and custom, bound
them rather to France than the German Empire. But
there were then, as there were later on, reasons why the
Italians should feel hostile to France.

In 1915 Italy joined the Allies against Austria-Hungary
and Germany, and after valiant and exhausting endeav-
ors contributed to the victory which followed. During
the course of the struggle it seemed to observers that Italy
and France were drawn together by common sufferings
and efforts as never before. But scarcely was the struggle
at an end when bitter causes of difference arose almost at
once. Italy wished to have the opposite coast of the
Adriatic and become the controlling power in what had
been the southern Slavic dominions of the former Austro-
Hungarian state. France hoped that upon the ruins
of the fallen Dual Monarchy would rise new Slavic com-
monwealths partly dependent on herself. Accordingly,
there was such immediate conflict of ambition and desires
between Italy and France, that already in 1919 predictions
were being made that Italy would renew her connection
with Germany as soon as she could.

So it was when Bismarck sought to draw Italy into his
schemes. Only a few years before the Austrian armies had
been overthrown and Italy's unity forwarded through the
powerful assistance of France. But since 1859 several
things had occurred to alienate the Italian people. Na-
poleon III had supported the pope in maintaining his
temporal power, and this was overthrown and uni-



fication completed only in 1870, when France was no longer
able to interfere. Even after the Franco-(iernian War
there was some fear that French intervention might restore
to the pope what he had lost. Fnrthermore, Italy was a
young and ambitious state, and wislied ardently to appear
as one of the greater powers. Actually this was beyond
her resources, but it seemed then more possible if she were
closely associated with great companions. Finalh' the
direct motive was craftily supplied by Bismarck himself.
In Algeria France had long before begun the foundations
of her north African empire. It was evident that she
would be glad to expand into the neighboring country
of Tunisia, but it was also apparent that Italy had high
hopes of getting Tunisia for herself. At the Congress
of Berlin Bismarck had secretly encouraged France to
take Tunisia, lioping that if she were engrossed in distant
enterprises she would think less of a war of revenge, and
probably foreseeing that such seizure would enrage the
Italians and drive them into Germany's arms.

So it came about. In 1881 France established a pro-
tectorate over Tunisia. There was an outburst of in-
dignation in Italy, and the statesmen of Rome, hearkening
to the persuasion of Bismarck, joined Germany and Austria-
Hungary in alliance. Thus did Italy ally herself with
an old enemy and a recent friend. No little gain came to
her. When in 186G she had obtained Venetia from Aus-
tria, the strong places on the border all remained in Aus-
tria's hands, and Italy with weak and exposed frontier
was always at the mercy of an Austrian attack. From
this danger she was now freed by being associated wili
Austria-Hungary, and by being in some sort under German

Online LibraryEdward Raymond TurnerEurope since 1870 → online text (page 15 of 49)