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natives. For a long time great numbers of Germans left
their homes, and many Italians went also, but they settled
in the possessions of other powers, and were lost to the
countries that produced them. There was nothing
which German leaders lamented more than that Ger-
many had no colonies to which her emigrants would
go and there develop a greater and vaster German
Empire. Moreover, the expanding industrialism of coun-
tries like the German Empire and Great Britain fostered
an increasing population, which could not be supported by
domestic agriculture and which could get its food only by
selling manufactured products abroad. Often it seemed
to imperialists that these manufactures could be best sold
in colonial possessions, and it was true that the colonies of



IMPERIAL EXPANSION



393



Britain and France })on^'lit many thinf^s from them.
Furthermore, industriahsm depended on a supply of raw
materials. A considerable portion of such products was
in the colonial empires, especially of Great Britain, Hol-
land, and France. After the old colonial system was
ended in the earlier part of the nineteenth century Britain
did not bar other countries from trading with her colonies,
but some powers were not so liberal, and there was always
the possibility that a state might attempt to monopolize
the resources of its colonial possessions. So, German
imperialists believed it necessary for Germany's greatness
that lands producing cotton, copper, rubber, and oil
should be taken and held.

Even when it was doubtful whether the mass of the
people would be benefited by colonial acquisitions, and
very doubtful whether colonies were wanted by them,
individuals who hoped to gain special privileges of great
wealth, or who wanted protection for their investments,
were often able to arouse the patriotism of the rest of the
people and their love of greatness and glory for their
country, and lead them on to support colonial adventure.
And just as small businesses were being consolidated into
great corporations, so a large part of the resources of the
earth were being gathered into the possession of the
principal powers. It seemed to many that the future
lay only with those powers, like Russia and the United
States, which had vast territory in which to expand, or
with those like Great Britain and France, which had ob-
tained colonies over the sea. The German desire to get
more territory or colonies while time still remained was
probably one of the major causes of the Great War.

The subject populations were, probably, on the whole,
better off than they would have been if left to themselves.
That some of them were harshly and cruelly treated, that
at best they had usually an inferior status, that they were
often exploited, that they were ruled by aliens, that de-



Colonies and

industrial

development



Patriotism

and

colonies



Subject
colonial
populations



394



EUROPE SINCE 1870



Not allowed
to govern
themselves



Sense of

responsibil-
ity in ruling
countries



mocracy and self-government were never extended to
them, that they were denied many things which their
European masters had, is quite true. If all this be con-
sidered from the point of view of what European liberals
wanted for themselves, it appears very lamentable indeed.
But it must be remembered that the people of Algeria, of
India, of Egypt, and of Burma had not been able to
develop democracy or much well being for the masses;
that the negroes of Africa were far down in the scale of
mankind, and that those who could survive were being
rapidly lifted up through whole stages of human progress.
Whatever evils attended imperialism, and they were not
few or small, it is probable that the peoples affected were
benefited and prepared for things better to come. It is
certain, also, that Americans and Englishmen and French-
men were coming to have greater concern for their re-
sponsibilities and ever-greater desire to protect and im-
prove the condition of the peoples over whom they ruled.



BIBLIOGRAPHY

General: Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, De la Colonisation chez les
Peuples Modernes, 2 vols. (6th ed. 1908); Alfred Zimmermann,
Die Europdische Kolonien, 5 vols. (1896-1903), with bibliog-
raphies and maps; S. P. Orth, The Imperial Impulse (1916);
P. S. Reinsch, World Politics at the End of the Nineteenth Century
(1900).

The British Empire: E. G. Hawke, The British Empire and
Its History (1911); C. F. Lavell and C. E. Payne, Imperial
England (1919); Sir C. P. Lucas, The British Empire (1915), A
Historical Geography of the British Colonies, 12 vols. (ed. 1916),
Greater Rome and Greater Britain (1912); The Oxford Survey of
the British Empire, ed. by A. J. Herbertson and O. J. R. Ho-
warth, 6 vols. (1914); A. F. Pollard, editor, The British Empire:
Its Past, Its Present, and Its Future (1909); A. J. Sargent, Sea-
ways of the Empire (1918); W. H. Woodward, A Short History
of the Expansion of the British Empire, 1500-1911 (3d ed. 1912).
Sir Charles Dilke, Problems of Greater Britain (1890), The
British Empire (1899); H. E. Egerton, Federations and Unions



IMPERIAL EXPANSION 395

Within the British Empire (1911); R. Jebb, The Imperial Con-
ference, 2 vols. (1911).

British East Africa: Captain F. D. Luj^'ard, Rise of Our East
African Empire, 2 vols. (189.'}).

Australia: G. W. Ru.sden, Ilistorij of Australia, 3 vols. (1883);
II. G. Turner, The First Decade of the Australian Common-
wealth (1911).

Canada: Sir J.G.BoMrin()t,Ca//f;^/a Under British Rule, J7G0-
PJOO (1900); F. X. Garncau, Ilistoire du Canada,{r){hvi\.,t\\.
by H. Garneau), 2 vols. (1920); William Kinj^sford, Uistiny of
Canada, 10 vols. (1887-97), the fullest account, to 18-H; S. J.
Reid, Life and Letters of the First Earl of Durham, 2 vols. (1906) ;
Lord Durham\^ Report on the Affairs of British North America,
ed. by Sir C. P. Lucas, 3 vols. (1912).

Egypt: Sir A. Colvin, The Making of Modern Egypt (190G);
Earl of Cromer, Modern Egypt, 2 vols. (1908), best account of;
E. Dicey, The Story of the Khedive (1902); C. de Freycinet, La
Question d'Egypte (190.5); E. Gaignerot, La Question d'flgypte
(1901); Alfred (Lord) Milner, England in Egypt (1892); II.
Resener, Aigypten unter Englischer Okkupation (1896); A. E.
P. B. Weigall, A History of Events in Egypt from 1798 to 1914
(191.5); A. S. White, The Expansion of Egypt (1899); F. R.
Wingate, Mahdism and the Egyptian Sudan (1891).

India: V. A. Smith, The Oxford History of India: from the
Earliest Times to the End of 1911 (1919), excellent for an intro-
duction; Sir T. W. Ilolderness, Peoples and Problems of India
(1912), excellent; Sir J. B. Fuller, The Empire of India (1913);
Sir Courtney Ilbert, The Government of India (3d ed. 1915);
Sir John Strachey, India: Its Administration and Progress
(3d ed. 1903); Lovat Eraser, India Under Curzon and After
(1911); Lord Frederick Roberts, Forty-one Years in India, 2
vols. (1898); Sir Valentine Chirol, The Middle Eaatern Question,
or Some Political Problems of Indian Defense (1903); G. N. C.
(Earl) Curzon, Frontiers (1908); P. Loudon, The Unveiling of
Lhasa (1905); Sir Theodore Morison, The Economic Transition
in India (1911); Lajpat Rai, Young India (1916), England's
Debt to India (1917), hostile.

Malaysia: Arnold Wright and T. H. Reid, The Malay Penin-
sida (1912); One Hundred Years of Singapore, ed. by W. Make-
peace, Dr. G. E. Brooke, R. St. J. Braddell, 2 vols. (1920).

South Africa: F. R. Cana, South Africa from the Great Trek to
the Union (1909); G. E. Cory, The Rise of South Africa, volumes



S96 EUROPE SINCE 1870

I-III (1910-19); W. B. Worsfold, Lord Milner's Work in South
Africa (1906), The Union of South Africa (1912). On the Boer
War: The Times History of the War in South Africa, 1899-
1900, edited by L. S. Amery, 4 vols. (1900).

New Zealand: G. W. Rusden, History of New Zealand, 3 vols.
(1883).

The French colonies: Marcel Dubois and Auguste Terrier,
Un Siecle d' Expansion Coloniale, 1800-1900 (ed. 1902); Jules
Duval, Les Colonies et la Politique Coloniale de la France (1864) ;
£mile Levasseur, La France et Ses Colonies, 3 vols. (1890-3);
Alfred Rambaud and others, La France Coloniale (6th ed. 1893).

Algeria: Jules Cambon, Le Gouvernement Generale de VAlge-
rie, 1891-7 (1918).

Indo-China : Albert Gaisman, UCEuvre de la France au Tonkin
(1906); J. M. A. de Lanessan, La Colonisation Frangaise en
Indo-Chine (1895) ; C. Lemire, La France et le Siam (1903).

Madagascar: L. Brunet, La France a Madagascar, 1815-1895
(2d ed. 1895).

Morocco: A. Bernard, Le Maroc (1913); E. Dupuy, Comment
Nous Avons Conquis le Maroc, 1845-1912 (1913); A. Gourdin,
La Politique Frangaise au Maroc (1906); V. Piquet, Le Maroc
(1917).

Tunisia: N. Fancon, La Tunisie avant et depuis V Occupation
Frangaise, 2 vols. (1893); E. Fitoussi, L'^tat Tunisien, Son
Origine, Son Developpement et Son Organisation Actuelle {1525-
1901) (1901).

The German colonies: Kurt Hassert, Deutschlands Kolonien
(2d ed. 1910); P. E. Lewin, The Germans and Africa (1915); H.
Mayer. Das Deutsche Kolonialreich, 2 vols. (1909) ; Alfred Zim-
mermann, Geschichte der Deidschen Kolonialpolitik (1914).

Italy in Africa: A. B. Wylde, Modern Abyssinia (1901);
W. K. McClure, Italy in North Africa (1913); Sir Thomas
Barclay, The Turco-Italian War and Its Problems (1912); A.
Rapisardi-Mirabelli, La Guerre Italo-Turque et le Droit des
Gens (1913).

Belgium and the Congo : G. Blanchard, Formation et Constitu-
tion Politique de VEtat Independant du Congo (1899); R. Brunet,
U Annexation du Congo a la Belgique et le Droit International
(1911) ; A. B. Keith, The Belgian Congo and the Berlin Act (1919) ;
J. S. Reeves, The International Beginnings of the Congo Free
State (1894); E. Vandervelde, La Belgique et le Congo (1911);
A. Vermeersch, La Question Congolaise (1906).



IMPERIAL EXPANSION 397

Africa: Baron Beyens, La Question AJricaine (1918); N. D.
Harris. Intervention and (Colonization in Africa (1914); Sir H. H.
Johnston, A History of the Colonization of Africa by Alien Races
(1899), The Opening up of Africa (1911); J. Keltic, The Partition
of Africa (1898); Raymond Ronzc, La Question (VAfrique (1918);
A. S. ^\^litc, The Development of Africa ("2(1 cd. 189^2); E. L.
Catcllani, Le Colonie e la Conferenza di Berlino (1885), best on
this subject; H. Queneuil, La Conference de Bruxelles et Ses Resul-
tats (1907), for the Brussels anti-slavery conference of 1890;
Sir Edward llertslet, The Map of Africa by Treaty 3 vols. (2d ed.
1896): and H. A. Gibbons, The New Map of Africa (1916).

The Far East: Sir R. K. Douglas, Europe and the Far East,
1506-1912 (1913), best; Ix)rd Curzon, Problems of the Far East
(ed. 1896); £. Driault, La Question d'Extreme Orient (1908),
excellent; A. J. Brown, The Mastery of the Far East (1919) ; S. K.
Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far East (1916); T. E
Millard, The New Far East (1906); B. L. Putnam-Weale, Re-
Shaping of the Far East, 2 vols. (1905), Tlw Truce in the East
(1907).

China: H. Cordier, Ilistoire des Relations de la Chine avec les
Puissances Occidcntales, lSGO-1902 (1902); H. Thompson, China
and the Powers (1902) ; J. O. P. Bland, Recent Events and Present
Policies in Chijia (1912); P. H. Clements, The Boxer Rebellion
(1915); H. A. Giles, China and the Chinese (1902), The Civiliza-
tion of China (1911), China and the Manchus (1912), all excellent
for the beginner: H. H. Gowen, An Outline History of China
(1913); P. H. Kent, The Passing of the Manchus (1912); A. H.
Smith, China in Convulsion (1901).

Korea: H. B. Hurlbert, The Passing of Korea (1906); G. T.
Ladd, In Korea with Marquis Ito (1908).

Japan: K. K. Kawakami, Japan in World Politics (1917);
Lancelot Lawton, Empires of the Far East, 2 vols. (1912), about
Japan, China, and Manchuria; F. McCormick, The Menace of
Japan (1917).

Persia: Lieut. -Col. P. M. Sykes, A History of Persia, 2 vols.
(1915), down to 1906; V. Bcrard, Revolutions de la Perse (1910);
E. G. Browne, The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909 (1910) ; Lord
Curzon, Persia and the Persian Question, 2 vols. (1892); W. M.
Shuster, The Strangling of Persia (1912).

Asia: A. T. Mahan, The Problem of Asia (1900); H. A. Gib-
bons, The New Map of Asia {1900-1919) (1919).



CHAPTER XV

TRIPLE ALLIANCE AND THE
ENTENTES

. . . I'aigle provoque prendra son vol, saisira rennemi dans ses
serres acerees, et le rendra inoffensif. Nous nous souviendrons
alors que les provinces de I'ancien empire allemand: Comte de
Bourgognc et une belle part de la Lorraine, sont encore aux mains
des Francs; que des milliers de freres allemands des provinces bal-
tiques gemissent sous le joug slave. C'est une question nationale
de rendre a TAUemagne ce qu'elle a autrefois possede.

Alleged secret German official report, communicated by the
French Minister of War to the French Minister of Foreign
Affairs, April 2, 1913.

Immer enger werden die Maschen des Netzes, in die es der franzo-
sischen Diplomatic gelingt, England zu verstricken. Schon in den
ersten Phasen des Marokkokonflickts hat bekanntlich England
an Frankreich Zusagen militarischer Natur gemacht.
Die Englische Flotte ubernimmt den Schutz der Nordsee, des
Kanals und des Atlantischen Ozeans. . . . Die Englische
Regierung spielt ein gefahrliches Spiel.

A report of 1913, published in the Norddeutsche Allgemeine
Zeitmig, October 16, 1914.

Preemi- FoR a generation after the Franco-German War the

nence of the German Empire enjoyed midisputed preeminence in
German Europe, not only because of its own enormous strength,

1871-1904 t)ut from the fact that it was the head of the Triple Al-
liance with Italy and Austria-Hungary. Even after the
arrangement between France and Russia in 1892-3 the
supremacy of Germany was not seriously disturbed. This
Dual Alliance was regarded with suspicion not only by the
rival alliance but by Great Britain as well. Therefore,
do^vn to 1900, at least, and actually for a few years after
that time, the German Empire continued to be what it

398



ALLIANCE AND ENTENTES 399



had been during the later period of Bismarck, the domi-
nant power on the continent of Europe. And, indeed,
it did more than hold its phice; for aml)ition increasing
with the marvellous expansion of its power, it became year
by year stronger and more magnificent to friends and
admirers, more threatening and terrible to the others. It
was this increase in power and am])ition that brought
about the large diplomatic changes that now shortly came
to pass.

Hitherto the weaker Dual Alliance had confronted the
stronger Triple Alliance, with Britain on the outskirts of
Europe, aloof from Continental affairs, and usually more
friendly toward Germany than either Russia or France.
In 1904 England and France settled their differences
and made an arrangement, the Entente Cordiale, which
was not an alliance but in the end proved to be just as
effective as one, and three years later, when England and
Russia settled their differences also, in the Anglo-Russian
Accord, Dual Alliance and Entente Cordiale coalesced
in a vaster combination, the Triple Entente. Thereafter
Europe was practically divided into two great combina-
tions; and the Triple Entente was so strong that Ger-
many's old position of easy superiority was gone. The
hegemony of the German Empire, established when Bis-
marck kept her enemies divided, had passed. During this
later time the German leaders tried to recover the old
position and dictate their will to the others. Four times
did they attempt this, and each time a crisis resulted
which shook the European structure and seemed to lead
straight to war. On two of these occasions, the ]Morocco
Crisis of 1905 and the Affair of Bosnia-Herzegovina
in 1908-9, Germany won signal triumph, and seemed
to be master once more. Twice, in the JNIorocco Crisis
of 1911 and the crisis that arose concerning the Bal-
kans in 1912, discomfiture came. Each time, in the end,
war was avoided. But the tension gradually became



Europe
divided:
rival com-
binations,
19C4-1914



The great
crises



400



EUROPE SINCE 1870



Great
Britain and
France



The

Entente

CordialOf

1904



SO great that increasingly people believed another such
difference would make it difficult to avoid war again. The
fifth crisis came in 1914, after the Austrian ultimatum to
Servia. Then the dread catastrophe followed.

The origin of the Entente Cordiale may be traced to one
great cause: fear of Germany in England and in France.
The nations to the north and south of the English Channel
had been rivals or enemies for ages, and so different were
the character and ideals of the two that rarely had they
been able to regard each other with much sympathy and
understanding. In the last part of the nineteenth cen-
tury it might well have seemed hopeless ever to attempt
to bring them together, and Bismarck had not found
any effort needed to keep them apart. As late as 1898
England and France had been very near to war. But
France had once been under the German's heel and had
never forgotten ; for thirty years she had lived right beside
a neighbor who had often been arrogant and sometimes
threatening; Germany was growing in population and
power so much more rapidly than France as to make
Frenchmen see that in another war they could have little
chance, and a new school of French leaders believed that
some day such a conflict could not be avoided. Accord-
ingly, after 1898, with the passing of Hanotaux, who dis-
liked Britain and preferred German friendship, a new
group came into power, among whom Theophile Delcasse
shortly became most important. It was their belief
that France had best seek the friendship of England.

The old school was passing in Great Britain also. Queen
Victoria's German husband had died long before, she
herself died in 1901, and a year later the Marquis of
Salisbury. The German naval laws of 1898 and 1900 were
making the new generation of Englishmen have an appre-
hension of Germany that those before never had. It be-
gan to be said that Britain could no longer, such were the
changed conditions recently developed, afford to maintain



ALLIANCE AND ENTENTES 401



her "splendid isolation"; that she must have her own
friends to stand with if there were need. Foremost
among them was the new king, Edward VII, who was
fond, moreover, of France. So, in 1904 France and
England signed an agreement by which they amicably
adjusted all their differences everywhere, France ac-
quiescing in the British occupation of Egypt, against
which she had often protested, and Britain promising to
support France in her plan to get possession of Morocco:
"The two governments agree to afford each other their
diplomatic support." It was afterward seen, on the
publication of the secret articles in 1911, that the two
powers, while not making an alliance, had given each other
assurances of assistance, should it be needed. In 1914
Sir Edward Grey laid before the House of Commons
correspondence which had passed between Britain and
France two years before with respect to cooperation of
their navies. In 1904 an alliance was not, perhaps, de-
sired, and would probably not have been tolerated by
many people in either of the countries. Moreover, it
was said then that Germany was resolved that such an
alliance should not take place, and was willing to go to
war to prevent it.

AMien the terms of the Entente were made known Ger-
many seemed at first to make little objection. "There is
no need ... to take umbrage," said a German news-
paper in which semi-official announcements were made.
But the kaiser soon spoke of the great days of the German
past, and of need for courage in trials that might be ap-
proaching. A little later Germany intervened with terrible
brusqueness. March 31, 1905, the kaiser suddenly landed
at Tangier, opposite Gibraltar, in Morocco, and told the
sultan that he would uphold his sovereign power. To
France this was as direct a challenge as could be made, for,
following the conclusion of the Entente, Frenchmen were
making ready to end the anarchy which had long existed



"Splendid
isolation"
abandoned



The Kaiser
at Tangier



402



EUROPE SINCE 1870



France not
able to resist



Secret
Treaty of
Bjorko, 1905



The first
Morocco
Crisis,
1905



in ^Morocco, and round out their north African empire by
taking Morocco for themselves. After the kaiser's sudden
assertion it was evident that France must, at Germany's
behest, give up the enterprise or risk almost certain war.

The moment was well chosen for Germany's move.
France herself was weak and in no condition to fight a
great war. It was by no means certain yet how far
Britain would support her, or, in view of political condi-
tions in the British Isles, how far she could give support.
Worst of all, no help could be expected from Russia. She
was involved in a war with Japan, in which she had under-
gone repeated defeats, and just suffered the great disaster
of Mukden. In the course of the struggle, rebellion and
disorder had arisen in her realm, so that she was now dis-
tracted and weak. She had received no vital hurt, but
for the moment her power and prestige were gone, and
her condition was such that years of recuperation would
be needed. Furthermore, we know now, what may have
been suspected but was not known then, that the German
emperor had been secretly intriguing with the tsar, over
whose weak character his own obtained easy ascendancy.
He was busily endeavoring to have Russia attach herself
to Germany against England, who, he said, was the real
enemy, and have her bring France into a Continental
combination, which Germany should lead. A few months
after this time, in July, 1905, kaiser and tsar met on
board a vessel at Bjorko in the Baltic, and there signed a
secret treaty directed against England. This engagement
was rejected by the Russian ministers and so not accepted
by the Russian Government, but such negotiations tem-
porarily weakened the Dual Alliance.

It was a terrible moment for France; but she was not
prepared to fight, and so had to yield to a great humilia-
tion. There was in Paris at this time a German, Count
Haenckel von Donnersmarck, whose business was not
known, but who was understood to be the unofficial repre-



ALLIANCE AND ENTENTES 403



sentative of the kaiser. To a French newspaper lie gave
out an interview the meaning of which was not to be mis-
taken: M. Delcasse's policy was dangerous to Germany
and was leading to war; in such a war France might win,
but if she did not tlie peace would be dictated in Paris; he
meant his advice kindly: "Give up the minister." And
this was done, for as late as 1905 Germany could still
command and France obey. Delcasse was forced to
resign, and France was not only compelled to yield with
respect to her Moroccan policy, but was virtually forced
to appear before a European conference, which was called
to sit upon the matter at Algeciras, in Spain, over the bay
from Gibraltar.

Actually German diplomacy had gone too far, and at
the Conference held in 1906, to which the United States
sent representatives, much less was gained than had been
the case six months before. The French had diligently
strengthened their military resources, and the English,
who had perhaps been more willing to go to war than the
French in 1905, continued resolute, while Russia was now
at peace. The French presented their case much more
skilfully than the Germans, who had relied too greatly
on mere display of force, and France gained a large part
of what she wanted; for to France and Spain jointly was
given the task of preserving order in Morocco. The re-
sults of the affair were none the less a large triumph for
Germany. She had not, indeed, succeeded in breaking
up the Entente Cordiale, which she much desired to ac-
complish; and it was seen now that the agreement was
stronger than ever; nor had she imposed upon France as
great a humiliation as at first had seemed likely. But
she had forbidden France to take Morocco, and France
had yielded, and at her behest a French minister of foreign
affairs had been driven from office. Apparently the posi-
tion of Germany in Europe was as high as in the days when
France stood almost alone.



Warning to
France



The Con-
ference of
Algeciras,
1906



404



EUROPE SINCE 1870



Great
Britain and
Russia



The Anglo-
Russian Ac-
cord, 1907



If fear of Germany and trend of diplomatic events had
drawn France and Great Britain together in an under-
standing which grew closer all the time, the same forces
tended to draw together Russia and Great Britain, and, in



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