George Grote.

A history of Greece: from the earliest period to the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander the Great online

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with a degree of unanimity and promptitude rarely seen in aii
Athenian assembly — springing out of that pressure and alarm of
the moment which silenced all criticism.^ Among other economies,
the Athenians abridged the costly splendour of their choric and
liturgic ceremonies at home, and brought back the recent garrison
which they had established on the Laconian coast They at the
same time collected timber, commenced the construction of new
ships, and fortified Cape Sunium, in order to protect their
numerous transport ships in the passage from Eubcea to Peirssus.'



1 Thnojd. tUL 1 : wdm, M itp6t r^



bueyd. . _ _.

iona of this Board of Probiili,
much has been add for wbkh tliere is
no wuiant in TlniGydidte-^rMr n tcmrl

ikivWtu. oi ri99t «tpi rm¥ wupwrmp m«
ip muAOff ^ frpoSovA«if9o«0t. vau^ra ii

huiot woMty, «routOi Mmr e^rrarrctr.

Upon which Dr. Arnold remark!—
"That is, DO measure was to be nib-
mitted to the people, tiU it had flrrt
been approrea bj this Connoil of
Elders". And snoh is the general Tiew
of the commentators.

No snch meaning as this, howerer,
is necessarily contained in the word
np6fiwkoi. It is indeed conceiTable
that persons so denominated might be
invested with snch a control ; but we
cannot infer It, or affirm it, simply
from the name. Nor will the passiges
in Aristotle's Politic. whenSTlhe
np6fiwAoi occurs, anthoriie any In-
ference with respect to this Board in
the special case of Athens (AriatoteL
Politki I?. 11,9 ;!▼. 12,8; ft 6, 10— IS^



The Board only seems to have lasted
for a short time at Athens, beinx
named for a temporary pnrpose, at a
moment of peculiar pressure and dis-
couragement. During such a state of
feeling, there was UtUe necessity for
throwing additional obstacles in the
way of new propositions to be made to
the people. It was rather of import-
ance to ciMOKitH^ the suggestion of new
measures, from men ofsense and ex-
perience. A Board destined merely
for control and hindrance would have
been mischievous instead of nsefnl
under the reigning melancholy at
Athens.

The Board was doubtless memd in
the Oligarchy of Four Hundred, like
all the other magistracies of the state,
and was not reconstituted after their
deposition.

I cannot think It admissible to
draw inferences as to the functions of
this Board of Prob^ now eonstitated,
from the proceedings of the ProbAhM
lnAristophanisLyBi8trata,aslsdoMlqr
Wachsmuth (Hellenische Alterthuna-
knnde, L 2, p. 19eX and by Watten-
bach (De Quadringentomm Athsals
Vkotione, pp. 17-21, Berlin, 1842).

SchOmann (Ant. Jur. Pub. Grneor.
V. zii. p. 181) says of these Up6$o¥k*t.



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Chap. LXL WIDE-8PRKAD HOSTILriT AGAINST ATHBN& 195

While Athens wa« thus struggling to make head against her
misfortunes, all the rest of Greece was full of excite- prodiir»on»
ment and aggressive scheming against her. So grave effect of
an event as the destruction of this great annament ^^^^n
had never happened since the expedition of Xerxfis ^J,^^
against Greece. It not only roused the most distant and alliM
cities of the Grecian world, hut also the Persian ^wSfal
satraps and the court of Susa. It stimulated the JJ^*^"
enemies of Athens to redoubled activity ; it em- on the
boldened her subject-allies to revolt ; it pushed the '*•"'•■■•
neutral states, who all feared what she would have done if
successful against Syracuse, now to declare war against her, and
put the finishing stroke to her power as well as to her ambition.
All of them, enemies, subjects, and neutrals, alike believed that
the doom of Athens was sealed, and that the coming spring
would see her captured. Earlier than the ensuing spring, the
Lacedaemonians did not feel disposed to act ; but they sent
round their instructions to the allies for operations both by land
and sea to be then commenced ; all these allies being prepared to
do their best, in hopes that this effort would be the last required
from them, and the most richly rewarded. A fleet of 100 triremes
was directed to be prepared against the spring ; 50 of these being
imposed in equal proportion upon the Lacedaemonians themselves
and the Boeotians — 15 on Corinth — 15 on the Phocians and
Lokrians— 10 on the Arcadians, with Pelldnd and Sikydn—lO
on MegaiB, Trcezdn, Epidaurus, and Hermiond. It seems to
have been considered that these ships might be built and
launched during the interval between September and March.^
The same large hopes, which had worked upon men's minds at
the beginning of the war, were now again rife in the bosoms of
the Peloponnesians ;' the rather as that powerful force from
Sicily, which they had then been disappointed in obtaining,

— ** Videtor antem eomm potestu fere ita first inititation.
JS^Iiti^Ji;** l/™i2f. wf^SS ^ Thucyd. Till. J, t. A«.«««irm

U this be hill meaning, I dissent from •'*w»iyi*»', «c
H. I think that the ^>ard lasted untU > TliiKjd. TilL 6. om»r o^My <AA»

the time of the Four Hnndred. which 4 Monrt p 4px«|a'm»>' ^ itwmatuwf rev

wooJd be abont a year and a half from »oX^|mv : compare iL 7.



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19tj OOITOBQUBNOBS OF THE ATHENIAN DEFEAT. PaBT H.

might now be anticipated with tolerable assurance as really
forthcoming.^

From the smaller allies, contributions in money were exacted
Motions of for the intended fleet by Agis, who moved about
King Agto. during this autumn with a portion of the garrison of
Dekeleia. In the course of his circuity he visited the town of
Herakleia, near the Maliac Gulf, and levied large contributions
on the neighbouring (Etsdans, in reprisal for the plunder which
they had taken from that town, as well as from the Phthiot
Achseans and other subjects of the Thessalians, though the latter
vainly entered their protest against his proceedings.*

It was during the march of Agis through Boeotia that the

ana apply applied to him, entreating his aid to enable them to
tldS^^ revolt from Athens ; which he readily promised^
▼oUfngfrom sending for Alkamends at the head of 300 Neodamodu^
the Lea. hoplites from Sparta, to be despatched across to the
^7 and islai^d ^ Harmost Having a force permanently at
g^PJ»- his disposal, with full liberty of military action, tho
Spartan king at Dekeleia was more influential even
than the authorities at home, so that the disaffected allies of
Athens addressed themselves in preference to him. It was not
long before envoys from Lesbos visited him for this purpose. So
powerfully was their daim enforced by the Boeotians (their
kinsmen of the .£olic race^ who engaged to furnish ten triremes
for their aid, provided Agis would send ten others— that he waa
induce to postpone his promise to the Euboeans, and to direct
Alkamends as harmost to Lesbos instead of Euboea,* without at
all consulting the authorities at Sparta.

The threatened revolt of Lesbos and Eubcea, especially the
»n. ^. latter, was a vital blow to the empire of Athens. But
with the this was not the worst At the same time that these
^Sm ap^' ^^^ islands were negotiating with Agis, envoys from
P^n^nto Chios, the first and most powerful of aU Athenian
allies, had gone to Sparta for the same pur]x)ee.
The government of Chios — an oligarchy, but distinguished for
its prudent management and caution in avoiding risks —

1 Thuoyd. fiii % ; oompaie iL 7 : UL '^ Thnoyd. tIU. 8.
86. t Thuojd. TiiL 6.



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Chap. LXI. DEFXCTniG ALUBS OF ATHENS— PERSIA. 197

coDBidering Athens to be now on the verge of ruin, even in
the eetimation of the Athenians themselves, thought itself safe,
together with the opposite city of Erythrse, in taking measures
for achieving independence.'

Besides these three great allies, whose example in revolting was
sure to be followed by others, Athens was now on the
point of being assailed by other enemies yet more fromSaia-
nnezpected — the two Persian satraps of the Asiatic ^"p^.
seabcord, Tissaphem^ and Phamabazus. No sooner



was the Athenian catastrophe in Sicily known at the ^^taat
court of Susa, than the Great King claimed from these ^!*"*
two satraps the tribute due from the Aisiatic Greeks
on the coast ; for which they had always stood enrolled in the
tribute records, though it had never been actually levied since
the complete establishment of the Athenian empire. The only
way to realize this tribute, for which the satraps were thus
made debtors, was to detach the towns from Athens, and break
up her empire ;' for which purpose Tissaphem^ sent an envoy
to Sparta, in conjunction with those of the Chians and £ry-
thneans. He invited the Lacedaemonians to conclude an alliance
with the Great King, for joint operations against the Athenian
empire in Asia ; promising to furnish pay and maintenance for
any forces which they might send, at the rate of one drachma per
day for each man of the ships' crews.* He further hoped by
means of this aid to reduce Amorg^ the revolted son of the late
satrap Pissuthnds, who was established in the strong maritime
town of lasus, with a Grecian mercenary force and a considerable
treasure, and was in alliance with Athens. The Great King had
sent down a peremptory mandate, that Amorgds should either be
brought prisoner to Susa or slain.

At the same moment, though without any concert, there
arrived at Sparta Kalligeitus and Timagoras — two Grecian exiles

1 ThncTd. tUL 7—24. portant ponage at lome length, in its

'Thncyd. Tlii. 6. dvb fiaaiXdtt bearing upon the treaty concluded

w ycMo-ri Myx'^ vcvpayMcVoc thlrty-Mven yean before this time

(liBaapbemes) rois «« ri)f «avrov dfixnt between Athens and Penia. See note

^^fcv%, o(k di' 'A0nrtdovK •xh rwr 'EAAif- to chi^. xlv. of this History.

9l6m¥ «tfA««r Av avFa|MFo« vpio'otof at ^ S Tbuc. viiL 2d. xat fii}rb« iiip rpo^i^r,

i w m^tikiia*. jroiff re oir ^<ipovf ftaAAor wtf-irtp vv4vti^ iv r-g Aaicc^at-

iv6fu^9 KOfntio^ai KCKMOOf roi^ *A0i|- i^ovi^ <f Bpttxif'h*' 'Arru^r iKorr^ wo-

vaiovft Ae» iraiK raU yavo'l JU&tm, rov 6i Aoivod

I have already diMnisrad this im- xpovov ipovKtro rptmfioXop 6i66ya^ Ac



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19S OONSEQUENCBS OF THE ATHENIAN DEFEAT. Part IL

in the service of PLarnabazus, bringing propositions of a similar
character from that satrap, whose government^ comprehended
Phrygia and the coast lands north of jEolis, from the Propontis
to the north-east comer of the Elaeatic Gulf. Eager to have the
assistance of a Lacedaemonian fleet in order to detach the
Hellespontine Greeks from Athens, and realize the tribute
required by the court of Susa, Phamabazus was at the same
time desirous of forestalling Tissaphem^ as the medium of alliance
between Sparta and the Great King. The two missions having
thus arrived simultaneously at Sparta, a strong competition arose
between them— one striving to attract the projected expedition
to Chios, the other to the Hellespont :' for which latter purpose
Kalligeitus had brought twenty-five talents, which he tendered
as a first payment in part.

From all quarters new enemies were thus springing up against
AUdbiadte Athens in the hour of her distress, so that the
EL reSmT Lacedtemonians had only to choose which they would
d t»md **"* pref"^ > * choice in which they were much guided by
the Lace- the exile Alkibiad^s. It so happened that his family
toMnd^ friend Endius was at this moment one of the Boaid
to Chioa. of Ephors ; while his personal enemy, King Agis,
with whose wife Timsea he carried on an intrigue,' was absent
in command at Dekeleia. Knowing well the great power and
importance of Chios, Alkibiad^ strenuously exhorted the Spartan
authorities to devote their first attention to that island. A
Perioekus named Phrynis, being sent thither to examine whether
the resources alleged by the envoys were really forthcomings
brought back a satisfactory report that the Chian fleet was not
less than sixty triremes strong : upon which the Lacedsemonians
concluded an alliance with Chios and ErythrsB, engaging to send
a fleet of forty sail to their aid. Ten of these triremes, now
ready in the Lacedaemonian ports (probably at Gythium), wei-e
. directed immediately to sail to Chios, under the admiral
Melanchridas. It seems to have been now midwinter, but
AlkibiadSs, and still more the Chian envoys, insisted on the
necessity of prompt action, for fear that the Athenians should

1 The latmpy of TisHLphenite ex- > Thuoyd. tUL 6.
tended as far north ae Antandrue and > Thnc TiiL 6—12; Plat Alkibiad. e.
Adramyttium (Thaoyd. tUL 106X SS> ^ i ComeUus Nepos, Alkib. c 8.



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Chap. LXL PELOPONNESIAN aid fob 0HI06. 199

detect the intrigue. However, an earthquake just then inter-
T«ning, was construed by the Spartans as a mark of divine
displeasure, so that they would not persist in sending either the
same commander or the same ships. Chalkideus was named to
supersede Melanchridas ; while five new ships were directed to
be equipped so as to be ready to sail in the early spring along
with the larger fleet from Corinth.^

As soon as spring arrived, three Spartan commissioners were
sent to Corinth (in compliance with the pressing gynodof
instances of the Chian envoys) to transport across the J^J^jJ^
isthmus, from the Corinthian to the Saronic Gulf, the allies at
thirty-nine triremes now in the Corinthian port of measures^
Lechffium. It was at first proposed to send off all, n^oi^od.
at one and the same time, to Chios— even those which Agis
had been equipping for the assistance of Lesbos; although
KaUigeitus declined any concern with Chios, and refused to
eontribute for this purpose any of the money which he had
brought. A general synod of deputies from the allies was held
at Corinth, wherein it was determined, with the concurrence of
Agis, to despatch the fleet first to Chios, under Chalkideus ;
next, to Lesbos, under AlkamenSe; lastly, to the Hellespont^
under Elearchus. But it was judged expedient to divide the
fleet, and bring across twenty-one triremes out of the thirty-nine,
so as to distract the attention of Athens, and divide her means
of resistance. So low was the estimate formed of these means,
that the Lacedaemonians did not scruple to despatch their
expedition openly from the Saronic Gulf, where the Athenians
would have full knowledge both of its numbers and of its
movements.'

Hardly had the twenty-one triremes, however, been brought
aeroes to Kenchress when a fresh obstacle arose to isthmian
delay their departure. The Isthmian festival, oele- ^^|b~
brated every alternate year, and kept especially holy SLJ^u^
by the Corinthians, was just approaching. They — delaj
would not consent to begin any military operations ^^S^dS
until it was concluded, though Agis tried to elude of Athena,
their scruples by offering to adopt the intended expedition as
lus own. It was during the delay which thus ensued that the
1 Thncyd. TiiL 6. S Thucyd. ▼HL 8l



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200 00NBBQX7BNCB& OF THE ATHEIOAN DBFBAT. Pabt IL

Athenians were first led to conceiye suspicions about Chios,
whither they despatched Aristokrat^ one of the generals of the
year. The Chian authoiities strenuously denied all projects of
revolt, and being required by Aristokrat^ to furnish some
evidence of their good feith, sent back along with him seven
triremes to the aid of Athens. It was mach against their own
will that they were compelled thus to act But being aware that
the Chian people were in general averse to the idea of revolting
from Athens, they did not feel confidence enough to proclaim
their secret designs without some manifestation of support from
Peloponn^us, which had been so much delayed that they knew
not when it would arrive. The. Athenians, in their present
state of weakness, perhaps thought it prudent to accept in-
sufficient assurances, for fear of driving ^is powerful island to
open revolt Nevertheless, during the Isthmian festival, to
which they were invited along with other Greeks, they dis-
covered further evidences of the plot which was going on, and
resolved to keep strict watch on the motions of the fleet now
assembled at Kenchreca, suspecting that this squadron was
intended to second the revolting party in Chios.^

Shortly after the Isthmian festival, the squadron actually
started from Eenchre® to Chios, under Alkamen^; but an
equal number of Athenian ships watched them as they sailed
along the shore, and tried to tempt them fisirther out to sea,
with a view to fight them. Alkamends, however, desirous of

iTInicyd. tUL 10. <r M roti^ rd ttdng nniwaal, and meritiiig fpeoi&l

*I#tfMia iyivrro* xal o2 'Atfiqyatoi (/vify- notioe: otherwise. Thncydidea would

y4KBit<rav yip) k9tmoow h mvri, • ical never have thought it worth whila to

KOToiiiKm MoXXor mvroU rA tup XiW mention the prooumation— it being the

i^myri, nniform practice.

The language of Thneydidte in this We most recollect that this was the
passage deserves notice. The Athenians first Isthmian festival which had taken
>vere now at enmitr with €k>rlnth : it place since the resnmption of the war
was therefore remarkaoie, and contrary between Athens and the Peloponnesiaa
to what would be expected among alliance. The habit of leaving oat
Greeks, that they should be present Athens from the Corinthian herald's
with their Theory or solemn sacrifice proclamation had notyet been renewed,
at the Isthmian festivaL Accordingly in regard to the Isthmian festival,
Thneydidte, when he mentions that there was probably greater reluctance
they went thither, thinks it right to to leave her out, beokuse that festival
adatheexplanation— 4 viyyytfA^i) (r«r was in its origin half Athenian— said
y<ip— "for they had been invited"— to have been established, or revived
''for the festival truce had been for- after interruption, by Thesens; and
mslly signified to them". That the the AthenianThe6ry enjoyed a «po«ep^
heralds who proclaimed the trace or privileged place at the gamee (Pin-
should come and proclaim it to a state tarch, Thesens, c S6 ; Argument, ad
in hostility vdth Ck>rinth, was some- Pindar. Isthm. ScfaoLX



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Chap. LXL ATHENIAN VIOTORY NSAB PEnUEUH. 201

aToiding a battle, thought it best to return back ; upon which
the Athenians also returned to Peir»u8, mistrusting p^opon-
the fidelity of the seven Chian triremes which formed nedan fleet
part of their fleet Reappearing presently with a oorinthto
larger squadron of 37 triremes, they pursued Alka- ^^tod^ **
men^ (who had again begun his voyage along the by the
shore southward) and attacked him near the unin- ^
habited harbour called Peirseum, on the frontiers of Corinth and
Epidaurus. They here gained a victory, captured one of his
ships, and damaged or disabled most of the remainder. Alka-
men^B himself was slain, and the ships were run ashore, where
on the morrow the Peloponnesian land force arrived in sufficient
numbers to defend them. So inconvenient, however, was their
station on this desert spot, that they at first determined to bum
the vessels and depart It was not without difficulty that they
were induced, partly by the instances of King Agis, to guard the
ships until an opportunity could be found for eluding the
blockading Athenian fleet ; a part of which still kept watch off
the shore, while the rest were stationed at a neighbouring islet ^
The Spartan Ephors had directed Alkamen^ at the moment
of his departure from Eenchreee, to despatch a gg„j|
messenger to Sparta, in order that the five triremes JgJJ^^^
under Chalkideus and Alkibiad^ might leave Laconia sparta
at the same moment And these latter appear to chamdeos
have been actually under way, when a second JJ^j^jj^^^^
messenger brought the news of the defeat and death to so to
of Alkamends at Peirssum. Besides the discourage- ^^^
ment arising from such a check at the outset of their plans
against Ionia, the Ephors thought it impossible to begin
operations with so small a squadron as five triremes, so that the
departure of Chalkideus was for the present countermanded.
This resolution, perfectly natural to adopt, was only reversed at
the strenuous instance of the Athenian exile Alkibiad^s, who
lurged them to permit Chalkideus and himself to start forthwith.
Small as the squadron was, yet as it would reach Chios before
the defeat of Peireeum became public, it might be passed off as
the precursor of the main fleet ; wnile he (Alkibiad^s) pledged
himself to procure the revolt of Chios and the other Ionic cities^
1 Thncyd. vi«. 11.



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902 GONSBQUENCES OF THE ATHENIAN DEFEAT. Pa&T IL

through his personal connexion with the leading men, who would
repose confidence in his assurances of the helplessness of Athens,
as well as of the thorough determination of Sparta to stand hy
them. To these arguments, Alkibiad^ added an appeal to the
personal vanity of Endius, whom he instigated to assume for
himself the glory of liberating Ionia, as well as of first com-
mencing the Persian alliance, instead of leaving this enterprise
to King Agis.1

By these arguments — assisted, doubtless, by his personal
J. ^ influence, since his advice respecting Gylippus and
advice of respecting Dekeleia had turned out so successful —
^^Jusmftt Alkibiades obtained the consent of the Spartan
JJ^o^S? Ephors, and sailed along with Chalkideus in the
five triremes to Chios. Nothing less than his energy
and ascendency could have extorted, from men both dull and
backward, a determination apparently so rash, yet, in spite of
such appearance, admirably conceived, and of the highest im-
portance. Had the Chians waited for the fleet now blocked up
at PeirsBum, their revolt would at least have been long delayed,
and perhaps might not have occurred at all : the accomplish-
ment of that revolt by the little squadron of Alkibiadds was the
proximate cause of all the Spartan successes in Ionia, and was
ultimately the means even of disengaging the fleet at Peirseum,
by distracting the attention of Athens. So well did this im-
principled exile, while playing the game of Sparta, know where
to inflict the dangerous wounds upon his country I

There was indeed little danger in crossing the ^gean to Ionia,
ArriTal of with ever so small a squadron ; for Athens in her
it^^^ present destitute condition had no fleet there, and
jj^oltof although Strorobichid^ was detached vnth eight
from triremes from the blockading fleet off Peirajum, to

Athens. pursue Chalkideus and Alkibiades as soon as their
departure was known, he was far behind them, and soon returned
without success. To keep their voyage secret, they detained the
boats and vessels which they met, and did not liberate them until
they reached Eorykus in Asia Minor, the mountainous land
sonthward of Erythrse. They were here vidted by their leading
partisans fi-om Chios, who urged them to sail thither at once
1 Thucyd. Tiii. 12.



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rnip rJCL REVOLT OF OHIOB. 203

before their arrival could be proclaimed. Accordingly they
reached the town of Chios (on the eastern coast of the island^
immediately opposite to Erythr® on the continent) to the astonish-
ment and dismay of every one, except the oligarchical plotters
who had invited them. By the contrivance of these latter, the
Council was found just assembling, so that AlkibiadSs was ad-
mitted without delay, and invited to state his case. Suppressing
all mention of the defeat at Peirseum, he represented his squadron
as the foremost of a large Lacedaemonian fleet actually at sea and
approaching — and affirmed Athens to be now helpless by sea as
well as by land, incapable of maintaining any further hold upon
her allies. Under these impressions, and while the population
were yet under their first impulse of surprise and aliurm, the
oUearchical Council took the resolution of revolting. The example
was followed by Erythrse, and soon afterwards by Elazomense,
determined by three triremes from Chios. The Klazomenians
had hitherto dwelt upon an islet close to the continent ; on which
latter, however, a portion of their tovm (called Polichn^) was
situated, which they now resolved, in anticipation of attack fix)m
Athens, to fortify as their main residence. Both the Chians and
Erythraeans also actively employed themselves in fortifying their
towns and preparing for war.^

In reviewing this account of the revolt of Chios, we find
occasion to repeat remarks already suggested by pre-. cteneTmi
vious revolts of other allies of Athens — Lesbos, Akan- 5^^(52°"
thus, Tordnd, Mend^ Amphipolis, &c Contrary to wasdisin-



Online LibraryGeorge GroteA history of Greece: from the earliest period to the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander the Great → online text (page 24 of 62)