George Grote.

A history of Greece: from the earliest period to the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander the Great online

. (page 25 of 62)
Online LibraryGeorge GroteA history of Greece: from the earliest period to the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander the Great → online text (page 25 of 62)
Font size
QR-code for this ebook


what is commonly intimated by historians, we may revolt from
observe, first, that Athens did not systematically a**»«»-
interfere to impose her own democratical government upon her
allies — ^next, that the empire of Athens, though upheld mainly
by an established belief in her superior force, was nevertheless by
no means odious, nor the proposition of revolting from her
acceptable, to the general population of her allies. She had at
this moment no force in Ionia ; and the oligarchical government
of Chios, wishing to revolt, was only prevented from openly
declaring its intention by the reluctance of its own population — a
reluctance which it overcame partly by surprise arising from the
sudden arrival of Alkibiad^ and Chalkideus, partly by the
1 Thacyd. vlii. 14.



Digitized by VjOOQIC



204 00N8BQUBN0E8 OF THE ATHENIAN DEFEAT. Part H.

fallacious assurance of a still greater Peloponiiesian force approach-
ing.^ Nor would the Chian oligarchy themselyes h&ve determined
to revolt, had they not been persuaded that such was now the
safer course, inasmuch as Athens was ruined, and her power to
protect, not less than her power to oppress, at an end.* The
envoys of Tissaphem^ had accompanied those of Chios to Sparta,
so that the Chian government saw plainly that the misfortunes of
Athens had only the effect of reviving the aggressions and pre-
tensions of their former foreign master, against whom Athens
had protected them for the last fifty years. We may well doubt
therefore whether this prudent government looked upon the
change as on the whole advantageous. But they had no motive
to stand by Athens in her misfortunes, and good policy seemed
now to advise a timely union with Sparta as the preponderant
force. The sentiment entertained towards Athens by her allies
(as I have before observed) was more negative than positive. It
was favourable rather than otherwise, in the minds of the general
population, to whom she caused little actual hardship or oppres-
sion ; but averse, to a certain extent, in the minds of their leading
men — since she wounded their dignity, and offended that love of
town autonomy which was instinctive in the Grecian political mind.
The revolt of Chios, speedily proclaimed, filled every man at
Di^Q^^y^^ Athens with dismay. It was the most fearful symptom,
oi^onedat as well as the heaviest a^rgravation, of their faJlen con-
the revolt of dition ; especially as there was every reason to appre-
2&Sr ^^^ ^** *^® example of this first and greatest among
set free and the allies would be soon followed by the rest The
their re- Athenians had no fleet or force even to attempt its
eerredfaiuL jeconquest : but they now felt the full importance of
that reserve of 1000 talents, which Perikles had set aside in the

^ 1 Thacyd. tUL 9. •I'nor 3* iyivtro v6Xt,y, iu^ucowrtu oi^rtStot rote Xioif .

Tijs airo(rroX^ rmv vtuv, ot /liv xai ol fiiv voXXoi iv $aiiiim.Tt

voAXoi TMr XiMr ovx cidtfrcf r A ivmv xai 4icvXi)(«i* rotf Bi

wpava-Sfitym, oi 6* iXtyor fvm^ct, oXiyoiC irapco'xcvao'ro &cr9 fivH

rd re vkri$os ov ^ovXtfucroi v« k^v re rvx*^f (vXXcy«j^Un|r, icol y^w-

voXtffiior lx<»r, vplp ri «cal ivYV- lUimv k6ytp iw6 r« rov *AXjci/ic«S«v, ^

plbr Xafiuot, ical twk Utkowonmo'uvt oXXoa rt viits voXXal irpe^vXtfovot, xmi

WKiri irpoai8«x^fMi«i i|ftir, Srt iUrpi' ri mpl nit woXiopKuus tmt iw Uttpaiif

fiov, ptmv ei ftiXM^db'Twr, ^t<rr«rrM X^

Also tUL 4. 6 M 'A\Kifit4hit mmk km cMtc 'B^pmoh ^AtfiimtW
h XoXxiAcvt . . . wpofvyytvtffMroi < See the remarkable pniwge of

Twr fvfivpaov^6m»r XtWr rto-t, ical kcX«v- Thacyd. viii. t4, about the calcalMioiw

irrmt' Karavktir |ii) irpoturoirac it r«y of the Chian gOTemment.



Digitized by VjOOQIC



CHAP. LXi. Rsvoi/r OF cmoe. 205

first year of the war against the special emergency of a hostile
fleet approaching PeirsuB. The penalty of death had been decreed
against any one who should propose to devote this fond to any
<^er purpose ; and in spite of severe financial pressure, it had
remained untouched for twenty years. Now, however, though
the special contingency foreseen had not yet arisen, matters were
come to such an extremity, that the only chance of saving the
remaining empire was by the appropriation of this money. An
unanimous vote was accordingly passed to abrogate the penal
enactment (or standing order) against proposing any other mode
of appropriation ; after which the resolution was tdcen to devote
this money to present necessities.^

By means of this new fund, they were enabled to find pay and
equipment for all the triremes ready or nearly ready ^y^^^j^
in their harbour, and thus to spare a portion from their force de-
blockading fleet off PeirsBum ; out of which Strom- SS^under
bichidte with his squadron of eight triremes was ^[^^
despatched immediately to Ionia — ^followed, after a
short interval, by Thrasyklds with twelve others. At the same
time, the seven Chian triremes which also formed part of this
fleet, were cleared of their crews ; among whom such as were
slaves were liberated, while the freemen were put in custody.
Besides fitting out an equal number of fresh ships to keep up the
numbers of the blockading fleets the Athenians worked with the
utmost ardour to get ready thirty additional triremes. The
extreme exigency of the situation, since Chios had revolted, was
felt by every one : yet with all their efforts, the force which they
were enabled to send was at first lamentably inadequate. Strom-
bichidds, arriving at Samos, and finding Chios, ErythrsB, and
Elazomens already in revolt, reinforced his little squadron with
one Samian trireme, and sailed to T^ (on the continent, at the
soathem coast of that isthmus, of which Elazomense is on the
northern) in hopes of preserving that place. But he had not been
long there when Chalkideus arrived from Chios with twenty-three
triremes, all or mostly Chian ; while the forces of Erytbrse and
Klazomen» approached by land. Strombichidte was obliged to
make a hasty flight back to Samos, vainly pursued by the Chian
fleet Upon this evidence of Athenian weakness, and the supe-
1 Thncyd. tUL 16.



Digitized by VjOOQIC



206 OONSBQUBNCBS OF TBDI ATHENIAN DEFEAT. Past IL

riority of the enemy, the Teians admitted into their town the

land force withoat ; by the help of which they now demolished

the wall formerly built by Athens to protect the city against

attack from the interior. Some of the troops of TiBsaphem^

lending their aid in the demolition, the town was laid altogether

open to the satrap, who moreover came himself shortly afterwards

to complete the work.^

Having themselves revolted from Athens, the Chian govem-

ment were prompted by considerations of their own

the Chkiia safety to instigate revolt in all other Athenian depen-

ingTO^?!^ dencies ; and Alkibiad^ now took advantage of their

junong the forwardness in the cause to make anattempt on MilStus.
other Athe* •>-> .1.. •■•#•

nian allies— He was eager to acquire this miportant city, the first

detoraSnea cunong all the continental allies of Athens — ^by his
MildtoB own resources and those of Chios, before the fleet could
arrive from Peirseum ; in order that the glory of the
exploit might be ensured to Endius, and not to Agis. Accordingly
he and Chalkideus left Chios with a fleet of twenty-five triremes,
twenty of them Chian, together with the five which they them-
selves had brought from Laconia; these last five had been
re-manned with Chian crews, the Peloponnesian crews having
been armed as hoplites and left as garrison in the island. Con-
ducting his voyage as secretly as possible, he was fortunate
enough to pass unobserved by the Athenian station at Samos,
where Strombichid^ had just been reinforced by ThrasyklSs with
the twelve fresh triremes from the blockading fleet at PeirsBum.
Arriving at Miletus, where he possessed established connexions
among the leading men, and had already laid his train, as at
Chios, for revolt, Alkibiad^ prevailed on them to break with
Athens forthwith : so that when Strombichides and Thrasykles,
who came in pursuit the moment they learnt his movements,
approached, they found the port shut against them, and were
forced to take up a station on the neighbouring island of Lad&
So anxious were the Chians for the success of Alkibiad^ in this
enterprise, that they advanced with ten fresh triremes along the
Asiatic coast as far as Ansea (opposite to SamosX in order to hear
the result and to tender aid if required. A message from Chalki-
deus apprised them that he was master of Mildtns, and that
1 Thucyd. vUi. 1«.



Digitized by VjOOQIC



Chap. LXL REVOLT OF MILfiTUS. 207

Amorgte (the Persian ally of Athens, at lasus) was on his way at
the head of an army : upon which they returned to Chios — hat
were unexpectedly seen in the way (off the temple of Zens,
hetween Lebedos and Koloph6n) and pursued, by sixteen fresh
ships just arrived from Athens, under the command of Diomedon.
Of the ten Chian triremes, one found refuge at Ephesus, and five
at Tdds: the remaining four were obliged to run ashore and
became prizes, though the crews all escaped. In spite of this
check, however, the Chians had come again with fresh ships and
some land forces, as soon as the Athenian fleet had gone back to
Samos, and procured the revolt both of Lebedos and Er» from
Athens.^

It was at Miletus, immediately after the revolt, that the first
treaty was concluded between Tissaphemds, on behalf
of himself and the Great King — and Ghalkideus, for aillanoe
Sparta and her allies. Probably the aid of Tissa- p^JJ^-*'^
phem^ was considered necessary to maintain the neirisDiftiid
town, when the Athenian fleet was watching it so phernlt,
closely on the neighbouring island : at least it is Sl*!^^.
difllcult to explain otherwise an agreement so emi- JS??^
nently dishonourable as well as disadvantageous to
the Greeks: —

<* The Lacedaemonians and their allies have concluded allianoe
with the Great King and Tissaphem^ on the following eon-
ditions. The King shall possess whatever territory and cities he
himself had, or his predecessors had before him. The king and
the Lacedssmonians with their allies, shall jointly hinder the
Athenians from deriving either money or other advantages from
all those cities which have hitherto furnished to them any such.
They shall jointly carry on war against the Athenians, and shaU
not renounce the war against them, except by joint consent
Whoever shall revolt from the king shall be treated as an enemy
by the Lacedsemonians and their allies; whoever shall revolt
from the Lacedaemonians shall in like manner be treated as an
enemy by the king."*

As a first step to the execution of this treaty, Miletus was
handed over to Tissaphemds, who immediately caused a citadel to
be erected and placed a garrison within it' If folly carried
1 Tlnwjd. TfiL 17— 19. > Thocyd. TiH. 18. * Tbacyd. tUL 84— lOa.



Digitized by VjOOQIC



208 OONSEQUISMOBS OF THB ATHSNIAK DEFEAT. Pam II.

oat» indeed, the terms of the treaty would have made the Great
^^ King master not only of all the Asiatic Greeks and

able and all the islanders in the JSgean, but also of all Theasaly
JJSii'J?^ and BoBotia and the full ground which had once
dltions^ been covered by Xerxfie.^ Besides this monstrous

stipulation the treaty further bound the Lacedae-
monians to aid the king in keeping enslaved any Greeks who
might be under his dominion. Nor did it, on the other hand,
secure to them any pecuniary aid from him for the payment of
their armament — which was their great motive for courting his
alliance. We shall find the Lacedaemonian authorities them-
selves hereafter refusing to ratify the treaty, on the ground of its
exorbitant concessions. But it stands as a melancholy evidence
of the new source of mischief now opening upon the Asiatic and
insular Greeks, the moment that the empire of Athens was broken
up— the revived pretensions of their ancient lord and master;
whom nothing had hitherto kept in check, for the last fifty years^
except Athens, first as representative and executive agent, next
as successor and mistress of the confederacy of Dllos. We thus
see against what evils Athens had hitherto protected them : we
shall presently see, what is partially disclosed in this very treaty,
the manner in which Sparta realized her promise of conferring
autonomy on each separate Grecian state.
The great stress ot the war had now been transferred to Ionia

and the Asiatic side of the iEgean sea. The enemies
^^^f^ of Athens had anticipated that her entire empire in
AtheM— that quarter would fall an easy prey : yet in spite of
cai raTo- two such serious defections as Chios and Mildtus, she
§2^^^ showed an unexpected energy in keeping hold of the

remainder. Her great and capital station, from the
present time to the end of the war, was Samos ; and a revolution
which now happened, ensuring the fidelity of that island to her
alliance, was a condition indispensable to her power of maintain-
ing the struggle in Ionia.

We have heard nothing about Samos throughout the whole war,

since its reconquest by the Athenians after the revolt of 440 B.a ;

but we now find it under the government of an oligarchy called

the Gedmori (the proprietors of land) — as at Syracuse bcibre the

1 Thncyd. itiL 44.



Digitized by VjOOQIC



Chap. LXL , PBB8IAK-8PABTAN TBEATT— BAHOS. S09

rule of Gdon. It cannot be doubted that these Qedmori were
dispoeed to follow the example of the Chian oligarchy, and revolt
from Athena ; while the people at Samoe, as at Chios, were averse
to snch a chimge. Under this state of circumstances, the Chian
oligarchy had themselyes conspired with Sparta, to trick and
ecmstrain their Demos by surprise into revolt, through the aid of
five Peloponnesian ships. The like would have happened at
Samoa, had the people remained quiet. But they profited by the
recent warning, forestalled the designs of their oligarchy, and
rose in insurrection, with the help of three Athenian triremes
which then chanced to be in the port The oligarchy were com-
pletely defeated, but not without a violent and bloody struggle ;
two hundred of them being slain and four hundred banished.
This revolution secured (and probably nothing less than a demo-
cratical revolution could have secured, under the existing state of
Hellenic affairs) the adherence of Samoa to the Athenians ; who
immediately recognized the new democracy, and granted to it the
privilege of an equal and autonomous ally. The Samian people
confiscated and divided among themselves the property of such
<^ the Qe6mori as were sledn or banished;^ the survivors were
deprived of all political privileges, and the other citizens (the
Demos) were forbidden to intermarry with them.' We may

1 Thncyd. vill. 21. ^crtro 6i itard. Mr. Mltford nyi (eh. xiz. sect. ilL

T*r xpoi^y TovTor mai ii ip IdfUf 4 ir a- Tol. It. p. 191)— " Meanwhile the body

r^o'rao'if vwh rov ti^fiov roi« of the higher people at Ssunos, more

iitvarois, lUTi, *A9irv«t«r, ot hvx^^ depressed than all others since their

ir rptcn ravo'l wup6vTtt. sol b 6fiiiot h reduction on their former revolt, were

Imfump it Simxovlovs lUw rtvas rovf propoting to seiu the opportunity that

wmitm TMr iwaritr aWxTtivt , rrrpoico- teemed to <^w through (A« prewxlenct of

9wvt Ik ^vyjf ^i|fu«o>ayr«f, icai avroi tA< Petoponn«8ian omM, o/iiwiwitny (Anr

Hy yify ovrwK ic<u oucuif Kciua/uitvot, condUiofk The lower people, ha'wh^Q

'A0iiPaUtv Tt v^ivKV miTovop,t.a» utri, intelliffeTiee of their detigHf rose npon

Tovra it fitfiaioit n^^i ^M*^<itp^' them, and with the asnstance of the

Mtfv, ra Xoini. Si^kovv rriy iroAiy, itaX erews of three Athenian ships then at

TOif yewiAopoit fMrcSiSoaov ovrc oAXov Samos, OTorpowered them," ac, Ac
•bitwbt, ovTt Uiovpoi ovV ayaycof oa *' The mattacro and robberp were

v«p* hceipttp ovS' it iiu(povt ov5cri in rewarded by a decree of the Athenian

rov Srifiov iPtip. people, granting to the perpetrators

s Thncyd. vili. 21. The dispositions thelndependent administration of the

and plans of the ** higher people " at affairs of their island ; which since the

Samos, to call in the Peloponnesians last rebellion had been kept under the

and revolt from Athens, are folly immediate control itf the Athenian goven^

admitted eren by Mr. Mitford, and ment,*'

impUed by Dr. Tnirlwall, who argnee To call this a nuutaere is perversion

that the government of Samos cannot of language. It was an insurrectioB

have been oligarchical, because, if it and intestine conflict, in which the

had been so, the island would already ** higher people " were vanquished, but

have revolted from Athens to the of which they also were the be|innera.

Peloponnesians. by their conspiracy (which Mr. Mitford

6—14



Digitized by VjOOQIC



210



OONSBQUBNOBS OF THE ATHENIAN DEFEAT. Pari IL



feirly euapect that this latter prohibition was only the retaliation
of a similar exclusion, which the oligarchy, when in power, had



himielf admits as a fact) to introdnoe
a foreign enemy into the island. Does
he imagine that the ** lower people "
were bound to dt stUl and see this
done? And what means had thoT of
preventinp: it^ except by insurrection?
which inevitably became bloody,
because the ** higher people** were a
strong party, in possession of the
powers of coTemment, with great
means of renstanoe. The loss on the
part of the assailants Is not made
known to us, nor indeed the loss in so
far as it fell on the followers of the
GoOmorL Thucydidte speciOes only
the number of Oe6mori themselves,
who were persons of indlTidual import-



I do not clearly understand what
idea Mr. Mitford forms to himself of
the goTemment of Samos at this time.
He seems to concelTe it as democratical,
yeiundergreat immediate control from
Athens, and that it kept the " higher
people ^ in a state of severe depression,
irom which they sought to relieve
themselves by the aid m the Pelopon-



But if he means by the expression,
•* under UU immtdiaU control <tf HU
Athenian govemmentt** that there was
any Athenian governor or garrison at
Samoa, the account here given by
Thuqrdidte distinctly refutes him.
The conflict was between two intestine
parties, "the higher people and the
lower people". The onlv Athenians
who took part in it were the crews of
three triremes, and even they were
there l^ accident (oi I r v x o r vaptSyrcc),
not as a regular garrison. Samos was
under an mdigenous coverhment. but
it was a subject and tributary ally of
Athens, like aU the other allies, with
tlie exception of Chloe and Methymna
(Thucyd. vL 86X After this revolution
the Athenians raised it to the rank of
an autonomous ally, which Mr. Mitford
is pleased to call ^'rewarding massacre
and robbery,** in the language of a party
orator rather than of an historian.

But was the government of Samoe,
immediately before this intestine con-
test, oligarchical or democratical?
The lanffoage of Thucydidte carries
to my mina a full oonviction that it
was oligarchical, under an exclusive
aristocracy called the Gedmori. Dr.
Thirlwall, however (wIiom candid and
equitable narrative of this e\«}nt forms



a striking contrast to that of Mr.
MitfordX is of a diflferent opinion. He
thinks it certain that a democratical
government had been established at
Samos by the Athenians, when it was
reconquered bv them (B.a 440) after its
revolt. That the government continuod
democratical during the first years of
the Peloponneidan war, he concdves
to be proved by the hostility of the
Bamian exiles at Ansea, whom he looks
upon as oligarchical refugees. And
though not agreeing in Mr. Mltford's
vievr of the peculiarly depressed con*
dition of the ^' higher people " at Samos
at this later time, he neverthele««
thinks that they were not actually in
possession of the government. " Still
(he says) as the island gradually
reooverea its prosperity, the privileged
class seems also to have looked up-
ward, perhaps contrived to regain a
part of the substance of power under
different forms, and probably betrayed
a strong inclination to revive its ancient
pretensions on the first opportunity.
That it had not yet advanced beyond thU
point may be regarded a$ certain: beeaute
otheneiee Samot votUd have been among
the/oremost to rexolt fnm. Athens; and



on the other hand, it is no less clear
that the state of parties there was
such as to excite a high decree of
mutual Jealousy, and great alarm in
the Athenians, to whom the loss of the
island at this Juncture would have
been almost irreparable" (Hist. Gr.
ch. xxvU. vol. ili. p. 4n, tod edit-X
Manso (Sparta, book iv. toL it p. 266)
is of the same opinion.

Surely the condusion which Dr.
Thirlwall here announce!* as certahi
cannot be held to rest on adequate
premises. Admitting that there was
an olimrchy in power at Samoe, it is
perfectly p<Mdble to explain why this
oligarchy had not yet carried into act
its disposition to revolt from Athens.
We see that none of the allies of
Athens— not even Chios, the most
powerful of all— revolted without the
extraneoos pressure and encourage-
ment of a foreign fleet Alkibiadte.
after securing Chios|. oonddered
Mildtus to be next in order of import-
ance, and had. moreover, peculiar
eonnexions witn the leading men
there (viiL 17) ; so that he went next
to detach that place from Athens.
Miletus behig on the continent, placed



Digitized by VjOOQIC



Chap. LXL



REVOLUTION AT 8AM08.



211



enforced to maintain the purity of their own blood. What they
had enacted as a privilege was now thi-own back npon them as
an insult



him in fmnwdifttft oomrnmiicatioii with
Tiasaphernte. for which reason he
might natonilly deem it of importance
japerior eren to Samoe in hb plans.
MoreoTor, not only no foreign fleet
had yet reached samos, but soTeral
Athenian ships had aniTed there ; for
Strombichidte, hating come across the
^ean too late to sare Chios, made
Samoa a sort of central station (TiiL 1^
These drcnmstances, combined with
the known reluctance of the Samian
Demos or commonalty, are surely
sufficient to explain why the Samian
oligarchy had not yet consummated
its designs to rerolt And hence the
fact that no roToIt had yet taken
j^jace cannot be held to warrant Dr.
Thiilwall's inference that the gOTom-
ment was not oligarchical.

We hate no information how or
when the oligarchical goremment at
Samoa got up. That the Samian
refugees at Ansa, so aettrely hostile to
Samos and Athens during the first ten
years of the Peloponneslan war, were
oHga r ch ic al exiles acting against a
democratical gOTemmeni at Samos
Or. 75X is not in itself Improbable;
yet it is not mitiTely stated. The
government of Samos might have been,
even at that time, oligarchical ; yet, if
it acted in the Athenian interest, there
would doubtless be a body of exiles
watching for opportunities of ii^uring
it, by aid of the enemies of Athens.

Morpover, it seems to me that if we
read and put together the passages
of Thucydidte. i^ 21, SS, 73. it is
imnomible, without the greatest
violence, to put any other sense upon
them, except as meaning that the
coTemment of fe$amos was now in the
Bands of the oligarchy or Gedmori,
And that the Demos rose in insurrection
apinst them, with ultimate triumph.
TOO natural sense of the words iwrnMiv-
rmvit, ivaifiorasuu is that of in*urr0O-
Hon againot an ttablitked gimmmerU;
it does not mean " a riolent attack by
one party upon another"; still less
doen it mean "an attack made by a
party in possession of the goTemment ";
whichj^neTertheless, it ought to mean,
if Dr. Thirlwall be correct in supposing
that the Samian goTemment was now
democraticaL TtmM we have, in the
4iescrlption of the Samian revolt from



Athens— niueyd. L 115 (after Thucy.
didfis has stated that the Athenians
established a democratical fOTom-
ment, he next says that the Samian
exiles presently came over with a
mercenary force)— «at wpmnv itiv r^
<^fiy iwavdo'T^O'ap. xal ijcpan|«>«v
TMr vAc^oTWK, Ae, Again, t. 28— about
the apprehended insurrection of the
Helots against the Spartans— ^r H ^
iovKjtui irari<rri)Tat: compare
Xenoph. Hellen. t. 4, 19; Plato, Be-
publ. iT. 18. p. 444 ; Herodot iiL 8»—
120. So also ivvaroC is among the
words which Thucvdidto uses for an
oliATchical party, either in goTemment
or in what may be called oppoiition Q.
24 ; T. 4). But it is not conceiTable
to me that TliuCTdidte would have
employed the woros ^twaMaffnunt vwh



Online LibraryGeorge GroteA history of Greece: from the earliest period to the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander the Great → online text (page 25 of 62)