George Grote.

A history of Greece: from the earliest period to the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander the Great online

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territory ; after which he sailed to Elazomense, recently re-
transferred from the continent to the neighbouring islet He
here (in conjunction with Tamds, the Persian general of the
district) enjoined the Elazomenians again to break with Athens,
to leave their islet, and to take up their residence inland at
Daphntbg, where the philo-Peloponnesian party among them still
remained established since the former revolt This demand
1 ThncycL riii 80 : oomparo Dr. Arnold's note.

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Crap, lxl pedabitits at omoa S21

being rejected, he attacked Elazomeiue, but was T^nlsed,
although the town was unfortified ; and was presently driven off
by a severe storm, from which he foond shelter at Kym6 and
Iliokflea. Some of his ships sheltered themselves during the
same storm on certain islets near to, and belonging to,
KLasomens ; on which they remained eight days, destroying
and plundenng the property of the inhabitants, and then re-
joined Astyochns. That admiral was now anxious to make an
attempt on Lesbos, from which he received envoys promising
revolt from Athens. But the Corinthians and others in his fleet
were so averse to the enterprise, that he was forced to relinquish
it and sail back to Chios; his fleet, before it arrived there,
being again dispersed by the storms, frequent in the month of

Meanwhile Pedaritus, despatched by land from Mildtus (at the
head of the mercenary force made prisoners at lasus, pedaritm,
as well as of 600 of the Peloponnesian seamen who J^^
had originally crossed the sea with ChaUddeus and f^J^^^^
since served as hoplitesX had reached Erythrse, and agreement
from thence crossed the channel to Chios. To him ^SoTiind
and to the Chians, Astyochus now proposed to under- ABtyochna.
take the expedition to Lesbos ; but he experienced from them the
same reluctance as from the Corinthians — a strong proof that the
tone of feeling in Lesbos had been found to be decidedly philo-
Athenian on the former expedition. Pedaritus even peremptorily
refused to let him have the Chian triremes for any such purpose
— an act of direct insubordination in a Lacedaemonian officer
towards the admiral-in-chief, which Astyochus resented so
strongly, that he immediately left Chios for MilStus, carrying
away with him all the Peloponnesian triremes, and telling the
Chians, in terms of strong displeasure, that they might look in
vain to him for aid, if they should come to need it He halted
with his fleet for the night under the headland of Eorykus (in
the EiythrsBan territory), on the north side ; but, while there,
he received an intimation of a supposed plot to betray Erythraea
by means of prisoners sent back from the Athenian station at
Samos. Instc^ of pursuing his voyage to Miletus, he therefore
returned on the next day to Erythrsea to investigate this plot,
1 Tbvcyd. Titt. 81, 82.

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which tamed out to be a stratagem of the priaonen themfielyee,
in order to obtain their libei-ation.'

The £act of hie thus going back to flrydire, instead of pursoing
^^^jQ^xm ^ voyage, proved, by accident, the salvation of his
abandone fleet For it BO happened that, on that same night,
letiuiis to the Athenian fleet under Strombichidte — 30 triremes,
^dwT accompanied by some triremes carrying hoplites — had
wher^ he its station on the southern side of the same headland.
XSi^buk ^ Neither knew of the position of the other, and
^^^ Astyochus, had he gone forward the next day towards

Miletus, would have fallen in with the superior numbers of his
enemy. He further escaped a terrible storm, which the Athenians
encountered when they doubled the headland going northward.
Desciying three Chian triremes, they gave chase, but the storm
became so violent that even these Chians had great difficulty in
making their own harbour, while the three foremost Athenian
ships were wrecked on the neighbouring shore, all the crews
either perishing or becoming prisoners.' The rest of the Athenian
fleet found shelter in the harbour of Phoenikus on the opposite
mainland — under the lofty mountain called Mimas, north of

Ab soon as weather permitted, they pursued their vuyage to
4|^^ Lesbos, from which island they commenced their

AthoDlMB operations of invading Chios and establishing in it a
fortified permanent fortified post Having transported their
^^^ land force across from Lesbos, they occiipied a strong
rairage the maritime site called Delphinium, seemingly a project-
ing cape, having a sheltered harbour on each side, not
far from the city of Chios.* They bestowed great labour and
time in fortifying this post, both on the land and the sea side,
during which process they were scarcely internipted at all, either
by the Chians, or by Pedaiitus and his gairisou ; whose inaction
arose not merely from the discouragement of the previous defeats,

1 Thacyd. Tiii. 82, 88. aoene of lait preparatloiii, against

s Thuoyd. Tiii. 84— S& AcX^iVtor . . . they again did afterwards (c 100>. I

— Xtu^Kaf Ixof. Ao. do not feel the diflScolty vhich stnQces

That the Athenians should select Dobree and Dr. Thirlwall. DoabtleM

Lesbos on this oocasion as the base of Delphinium was to the north of the

their operations, and as the immediate cityofChio&

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but from the pobtical dissension which now reigned in the city.
A sti-ong philo-Atheniau party had pronounced itself; and
thongh Tyden% its leader, was seized by Pedaritos and pat to
death, still his remaining partisans were so numerous, that the
government was brought to an oligarchy narrower than ever —
and to the extreme of jealous precaution, not knowing whom to
trust In spite of numerous messages sent to Miletus, entreating
succour, and representing the urgent peril to which this
greatest among all the Ionian allies of Sparta was exposed,
Astyochus adhered to his parting menaces, and refused com-
pliance. The indignant Pedaritus sent to prefer complaint
against him at Sparta as a traitor. Meanwhile the fortress at
Delphinium advanced so near towards completion, that Chios
began to suffer from it as much as Athens suffered from Dekeleia,
with the further misfortune of being blocked up by sea. The
slaves in this wealthy island — chiefly foreigners acquired by
purchase, but more numerous than in any other Grecian state
except Laconia — were emboldened by the manifest superiority
and assured position of the invaders to desert in crowds ; and
the loss arising, not merely from their flight, but from the
valuable information and aid which they gave to the enemy, was
immense.^ The distress of the island increased every day, and
could only be relieved by succour from without, which Astyochus
still withheld.

That oiBcer, on reaching Miletus, found the Peloponnesian
force on the Asiatic side of the ^gean just reinforced ])orieiiB
by a squadron of twelve triremes under Dorieus ; JJ^TJJPB^
chiefly from Thurii, which had undergone a political coast with
revolution since the Athenian disaster at Syracuse, and f^J^x^JSJi^
was now decidedly in the hands of the active philo- ^°J°.
Laconian party ; the chief persons friendly to Athens — maritiiiw


having been exiled.' Dorieus and his squadron,
crossing the ^geau in its southern latitude, had Knldna.

1 Thncyd. tIU. 8& - 40. About the ETen in antiquity, though the insti-

abiTes in Chios, see the extracts from tntion of slavery was universal and no-

Theopoinpus and NyniphoilArus in way disapproved, yet the slave-trade,

Athenoeus, tL p. 265. or the buyins and selling of slaTee,

That from Mymphod6ms appears to was accounted more or less odious.

be nothing but a romantic local l^end, % See the Life of Lvuias the Rhetor,

connected with the Ch<i|»el of the in Dionysius of Halikamassns, c. i.p.

KmdhearUd Hero (*Hpwo« tvtiivov%) at 463 Reisk.. and in Plutarch, Vit X.

Chios. Oratt. p. b35.

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anriTed safely at Enidiu, which had already been conqueied
by Tisaaphern^ from Athens, and had received a Persian
garrison.^ Orders were sent £rom Mildtos that half of this
newly-arrived squadron should remain on guard at Enidus,
while the other half should cruise near the Triopian Cape to
intercept the trading-vessels from Egypt But the Atheoiansi
who had also learned the arrival of Dorieus, sent a powerful
squadron £rom Samos, which captured all these six triremes off
Cape Triopium, though the crews escaped ashore. They further
made an attempt to recover Ejiidus, which was very nearly
successful, as the town was unfortified on the sea-side. On the
morrow the attack was renewed; but additional defences had been
provided during the night, while the crews of the ships captured
near Triopium had come in to help ; so that the Athenians were
forced to return to Samos without any further advantage than
that of ravaging the Enidian territory. Astyochus took no step
to intercept them, nor did he think himself strong enough
to keep the sea against the 74 Athenian triremes at Samos,
though his fleet at Miletus was at this moment in high con*
dition. The rich booty acquired at lasus was unconsumed ;
the Milesians were zealous in the confederate cause ; while
the pay from Tiasaphemde continued to be supplied with
tolerable regularity, yet at the reduced rate mentioned a little
Though the Peloponnesians had hitherto no ground oi

complaint (such as they soon came to have) against
Peioponne- ^^® satrap for irregulaiity of payment, still the
■ian treaty powerful fleet now at Miletus inspired the com-
pheraAsT^ manders with a new tone of confidence, so that they
b^^AlS;^** became ashamed of the stipulations of that treaty to
ohos and which Chalkideus and Alkibiades, when first landing
mente. ^t Mildtus with their scanty armament, had submitted.

Accordingly Astyochus, shortly after his arrival at
Miletus, and even before the departure of Theiamends (whose
functions had expired when he had handed over the fleet),
insisted on a fresh treaty with Tissaphern^ which was agreed
on to the following effect : —

1 Thncyd. Tiii. 86—109.

S Thocyd. viiL S5, 86. koX yip tu<r$h% iSUoTo apKOvprut, itO,

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''Convention and alliance ib conduded, on the following
conditions, between the Lacedsemonians with their allies — and
Eong Darius, his sons, and Tissaphernds. The Lacedsemonians
and their allies shall not attack or injure any territory or any
city which belongs to Darius or has belonged to his father or
ancestors ; nor shall they raise any tribute from any of the said
cities. Neither Darius nor any of his subjects shall attack or
injure the Lacedaemonians or their allies. Should the Lace-
demonians or their allies have any occasion for the king — or
should the king have any occasion for the Lacedaemonians or
their allies — let each meet as much as may be the wishes
expressed by the other. Both will carry on jointly the war
against Athens and her allies : neither party shaJl bring the war
to a close without mutual consent The king shall pay and
keep any army which he may have sent for and which may be
employed in his territory. If any of the cities parties to this
convention shall attack the king's territory, the rest engage to
hinder him, and to defend the king with their best power. And
if any one within the king's territory, or within the territory
subject to him,^ shall attack the Lacedsemonians or their
allies, the king shall hinder them and lend his best defensive

Looked at with the eyes of Pan-hellenic patriotism, this second
treaty of Astyochus and Theramends was less dis- compariaon
graceful than the first treaty of Chalkideus. It did ©[^^
not formally proclaim that all those Grecian cities treaty with
which had ever belonged to the king er to Ms ^^©^'^
ancestors should still be considered as his subjects ; nor did it
pledge the Lacedaemonians to aid the king in hindering any of
them from achieving their liberty. It still admitted, however,
by implication, undiminished extent of the king's dominion, the
same as at the maximum under his predecessors — the like

iThncyd. tUL 87. xol ^r «« r&r iBimclentood(Ipre8niiie)ili60oiiiliient

<r r^ aao-tA^Mf x«*pf> 4 oo-iff of Ana, which toe conrt of Sosa looked

^a<riA<^« SipX'h ^^^ ""1^ Aokc- upon, together with all Stf Inhabitants.

UiiLovimv in iv TMv $vmiix*^t ^«^' M a freehold exceedingly ncred and

ktin KmKvirm icoi ifiwihm Kari ih pecnliar (Herodot. L 4) : oy the latter.

hnmrov. as much ftB the satrap should find it

The distinction here drawn between conrenient to lay hands upon, of that

the kin^$ territory, and the territory which had once belonged to Darius,

M«r ^ich tkt kkig Md» mitpirt, de- son of Hystam>te, or to Xerxte, in the

serves notice. By the former phrase plenltnde of their power.


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midefined rights of the king to meddle with Qrecian affairs — ^tibe
like unqualified abandonment of aU the Greeks on the continent
of Asia. The conclusion of this treaty was the last act performed
by Theramends, who was lost at sea shortly afterwards, on his
voyage home, in a small boat — ^no one knew how.*
Astyochus, now alone in command, was still importuned by
the urgent solicitations of the distressed Chians for
frei^P^^ relief^ and in spite of his reluctance was compelled
P<»M«laii by the murmurs of his own army to lend an ear to
oD^^^^n- them— when a new incident happened which gave him
K^Ms^** at least a good pretext for directing his attention
Lichas southward. A Peloponnesian squadron of 27 triremes

as Spartan under the command of Antisthends, having started
^f^onar. ^^ ^P® ^^^^ about the winter tropic or close of
412 B.a, had first crossed the sea to MSloe, where it
dispersed ten Athenian triremes and captured three of them —
then afterwards, from apprehension that these fugitive Athenians
would make known its approach at Samos, had made a long
circuit round by ErSte, and thus ultimately reached Eaunus at
the south-eastern extremity of Asia Minor. This was the
squadron which Ealligeitus and Timagoras had caused to be
equipped, having come over for that purpose a year before as
envoys from the satrap Pbamabazus. Antisthen^ was instructed
first to get to Mildtus and put himself in concert with the main
Lacedaemonian fleet ; next, to forward these triremes, or another
squadron of equal force, under Elearchus, to the Hellespont, for
the purpose of co-operating with Phamabazus against the Athenian
dependencies in that region. Eleven Spartans, the chief of whom
was Lichas, accompanied Antisthends, to be attached to Astyochus
as advisers, according to a practice not unusual with the Lace-
dffimonians. These men were not only directed to review the
state of affairs at Miletus, and exercise control co-ordinate with
Astyochus, but even empowered, if they saw reason, to dismiss
that admiral himself, upon whom the c(»nplaints of Pedaritus
from Chios had cast suspicion, and to appoint Antisthends in
his place.'

IThncjd. fUL 88. iwonk^w 4v hMikirnvA^umtiipovsrAvrtlKkmr
cA^n i^MtW^rroi. |vreircu«Af lo-tfat, i uAA«& ipiora

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No sooner bad Astyochus learnt at Mildtns the arrival of
Antisthen^ at Eaunus than he postponed all idea of Actyochu
lending aid to Chios, and sailed immediately to secure l^fl]^
his junction with the 27 new triremes as well as with ^™
the new Spartan counsellors. In his voyage south- to join
ward he captured the dty of K6e, unfortified and JUrff^T^'
half ruined by a recent earthquake, and then passed BquaUron—
on to Enidus; where the inhabitants strenuously theAthe-
urged him to go forward at once, even without disem- J^ JJ^IeV
barking his men, in order that he might surprise an CThanninus.
Athenian squadron of 20 triremes under Charmtnus ; which had
been dispatched from Samoe, after the news received from M^os,
in order to attack and repel the squadron under AntisthenSs.
Charmtnus, having his station at Symd, was cruising near Rhodes
and the Lykian coast, to watch, though he had not been able to
keep back, the Peloponnesian fleet just arrived at Eaunus. In
this position he was found by the far more numerous fleet of
Astyochus, the approach of which he did not at all expect But
the rainy and hazy weather had so dispersed it, that Charmtnus,
seeing at first only a few ships apart from the rest, mistook them
for the smaller squadron of new-comer& Attacking the triremes
thus seen, he at first gained considerable advantage — diBabling
three and damaging several others. But presently the dispersed
vessels of the main fleet came in sight and closed round him, so
that he was forced to make the best speed in escaping, first to the
island called Teutlussa, next to Halikamassus. He did not effect
his escape without the loss of six ships ; while the victorious
Peloponnesians, after erecting their trophy on the island of Sym^
returned to Enidus, where the entire fleet, including the 27
triremes newly arrived, was now united.^ The Athenians in
Samos (whose affairs were now in confusion, from causes which
will be explained in the ensuing chapter) had kept no watch on
the movements of the main Peloponnesian fleet at Mildtus,
and seem to have been ignorant of its departure until they
were apprised of the defeat of Charmtnus. They then sailed
down to Sym^ took up the sails and rigging belonging to
that squadron, which had been there deposited, and then, after
an attack upon Loryma, carried back their whole fleet (pro-

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bably including the remnant of the squadron of Charmtnus) to
Though the Peloponnesian fleet now assembled at Knidus

consisted of 94 triremes, much superior in number to
giants at ^® Athenian, it did not try to provoke any general
do^bkh" actioi^ The ^^^ of Lichas and his brother com-
deaiing missioners was at first spent in negotiations with
pheraSl Tissaphem^ who had joined them at Enidus, and
^^J^l^ agaiost whom they found a strong feeling of discontent
b^sAd prevalent in the fleet That satrap (now acting greatly

under the advice of Alkibiad^ of which also more in
the coming chapter) had of late become slack in the Peloponnesian
cause, and irregular in furnishing pay to their seamen, during the
last weeks of their stay at Mildtus. He was at the same time full
of promises, paralyzing aU their operations by assurances that he
was bringing up the vast fleet of Phoenicia to their aid : but in
reality his object was, under fiEor appearances, merely to prolong
the contest and waste the strength of both parties. Arriving in
the midst of this state of feeling, and discussing with Tissapher-
n^ the future conduct of the war, Lichas not only expressed dis-
pleasure at his past conduct, but even protested against the two
conventions concluded by Chalkideus and by Theramends, as
being, both the one and the other, a di^;race to the Hellenic
name. By the express terms of the former, and by the implica-
tions of the latter, not merely all the islands of the ^gean, but
even Thessaly and ficeotia, were acknowledged as subject to
Persia ; so that Sparta, if she sanctioned such conditions, would
be merely imposing upon the Qreeks a Persian sceptre, instead of
general freedom, for which she professed to be struggling. Lichas,
declaring that he would rather renounce all prospect of Persian
pay than submit to such conditions, proposed to negotiate for a
fresh treaty upon other and better terms — a proposition, which
Tissaphem^ rejected with so much indignation as to depart
without settling anything.'

His desertion did not discourage the Peloponnesian counsellora.
Possessing a fleet larger than they had ever before had united

iThucyd. viiL 48. ThU defeat of 810, with the note of Paulmitc
Charmlniu is made the subject of a « rrh„_^ win a»
jest by Ariatopbaote - Thesmophor. ^ Thocyd. Tiii 48.

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in Asia, together with a numerous body of allies, they calculated
on being able to get money to pay their men without p^j^ponn^
Persian aid ; and an inyitation, which they just now slan fleet
received from various powerful men at Rhodes, tended Rhodes,
to strengthen such confidence. The island of Rhodes, JSibllahei
inhabited by a Dorian population considerable in itself in
number as well as distinguished for nautical skill,
was at this time divided between three separate city-governments,
as it had been at the epoch of the Homeric Catalogue — Lindus,
lalysus, and Eameirus ; for the city called Rhodes, formed by a
coalescence of all these three, dates only from two or three years
after the period which we have now reached. Invited by several
of the w^thy men of the island, the Peloponnesian fleet first
attacked Eameirus, the population of which, intimidated by a
force of 94 triremes, and altogether uninformed of their approach,
abandoned their city, which had no defences, and fled to the
mountains.^ All the three Rhodian towns, destitute of fortifid^
tions, were partly persuaded, partly frightened, into the step o*
revolting from Athens and allying themselves with the Pelo-
ponnesians. The Athenian fleet, whose commanders were just
now too busy with political intrigue to keep due military watch,
arrived from Samos too late to save Rhodes, and presently
returned to the former island, leaving detachments at Chalkd
and E6s to harass the Peloponnesians with desultoiy attacks.

The Peloponnesians now levied from the Rhodians a contribu-
tion of 32 talents, and adopted the island as the main station for
their fleet, instead of Miletus. We can explain this change of
place by their recent unfriendly discussion with Tissaphem^
and their desire to be more out of his reach.* But what we

1 Thncyd. Till. 44. otjST h t^v 'PtfSov, The powerful men of the iaiand (thoee

iviicnpwuvoiUimv avh ntv Swarmrirmv who, if the gOTemment was demociati-

4v6pMv, rirv ypmiL-nv •Xxov irXccv, Ac cal, formed the oligarchical mlnoribr,

. . . Mu wpovpaX6vm Kafuipm bnt who formed the gOTemment itseu,

T^9 'Fotimt wpmrjn, pwv\ W^vopo-t xoi If oligarchical) conspire and bring in

ir¥*rlitmrra, i$t'^6piiffav fiky rodf the Peloponnedan force, unknown to

iroAAo^f, ovK tti6rat ra wpaa^ the body of the dtlsens, and thus leaTe

0^6fi9va, maX IfcvTov, i\)<m rt k«1 to the latter no free choice. Thereat

irnyUrrw ov^nt r^s w6Xtmf, Ac. feeling towards Athens on the part of

we have to remark here, as on thebodyof the citizens is one of simple

foimer occasions of reroItB among the acquiescence, with little attachment

dq>endent allies of Athens, that the on the one hand, yet no hatred or

general popolation of the allied dty sense of practical saffering on the

manifests no previons discontent nor other,
any spontaneous disposition to rerolt 3 Thncyd. Tiii. 44 : compare c 67.

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cannot so easily explain is — that they remained on the island
without any movement or military action, and actuaUy
ao?o?^ hauled their triremes ashore, for the space of no less
fleet at than eighty days ; that is, from about the middle of

MMi^ng January to the end of March, 411 &G. While their
^^gj" powerful fleet of 94 triremes, superior to that of
pherndB— Athens at Samoe, was thus lying idle, their allies in
S'the Lftoe- Chios were known to be suffering severe and increasing
dMmonian distress, and repeatedly pressing for aid :^ moreover
the promise of sending to co-operate with Phamabazus
against the Athenian dependencies on the Hellespont remained
unperformed.* We may impute such extreme military slackness
nuinly to the insidious policy of Tissaphern^ now playing a
double game between Sparta and Athens. He still kept up
intelligence with the Peloponnesians at Rhodes — paralyzed their
energies by assurances that the Phoenician fleet was actually on
its way to aid them — and ensured the success of these intrigues by
bribes distributed personally among the generals and the trierarchs.
Even Astyochus the general-in-chief took his share in this corrupt
bargain, against which not one stood out except the Syracusan Her*
mokrat^' Such prolonged inaction of the armament, at the

Online LibraryGeorge GroteA history of Greece: from the earliest period to the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander the Great → online text (page 27 of 62)