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A history of Greece: from the earliest period to the close of the generation contemporary with Alexander the Great online

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Orat. xii. cent. Eratosth. a. 55— oi fiip



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400 THE THIRTY AT ATHENS. Part H.

guard, were everywliere in discord and partial mutiny. Those
among them who had been most compromised in the crimes of
the Thirty were strenuous in upholding the existing authority ;
but such as had been less guilty protested against the continu-
ance of so unholy a war, declaring that the Thirty could not be
permitted to bring Athens to utter ruin. And though the
knights or Horsemen still continued steadfast partisans resolutely
opposing all accommodation with the exiles,^ yet the Thirty were
also seriously weakened by the death of Kritias — the ascendant
and decisive head, and at the same time the most cruel and un-
principled among them ; while that party, both in the senate
and out of it, which had formerly adhered to Theramen^ now
again raised its head. A public meeting among them was held,
in which what may be c€dled the opposition party among the
Thirty — that which had opposed the extreme enormities of
Kritias — became predominant It was determined to depose the
Thirty, and to constitute a fresh oligarchy of Ten, one from each
tribe.* But the members of the Thirty were held to be individu-
ally re-eligible ; so that two of them, Eratosthenfo and Pheidon,
if not more — adherents of Theramen^ and unfriendly to Kritias
and Chariklds ' — with others of the same vein of sentiment, were
chosen among the Ten. Charikl^ and the more violent mem-
bers, having thus lost their ascendency, no longer deemed them-
selves safe at Athens, but retired to Eleusis, which they had had
the precaution to occupy beforehand. Probably a number of
Uieir partisans, and the Lacedaemonian garrison also, retired
thither along with them.

The nomination of this new oligarchy of Ten was plainly a
compromise, adopted by some from sincere disgust at the oU-
garchical system and desire to come to accommodation with the
exiles — by others, from a conviction that the only way of main-
taining the oligarchical system and repelling the exiles was to
constitute a new oligarchical Board, dismissing that which had
become obnoxious. The latter was the purpose of the Horsemen,
the main upholders of the first Board as well as of the second ;
and such also was soon seen to be the policy of Eratosthenes and

1 Xenoph. Hellen. il. 4, 24. S. 66, 66— o» Bottovm^ elr«i iraa^uirmm

S Xenoph. H^en. U. 4, 23. XopucAcc iral Kpcrif col if rvhww

1 Lysias, Orat. xU. cont Eratogtb. h<upti^^ Ao



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Chap. LXV^. new oligarchy op ten. 491

his colleagues. Instead of attempting to agree upon terms of
accommodation with the exiles in Peiraens generally, they merely
tried to corrupt separately Thrasybulus and the leaders, ofifering
to admit ten of them to a share of the oligarchical power at
Athens, provided they would betray their party. This offer
having been indignantly refused, the war was again resumed be-
tween Athens and Peiresus — to the bitter disappointment, not
less of the exiles, than of that portion of the Athenians who had
hoped better things from the new Board of Ten.*

But the forces of oligarchy were more and more enfeebled at
Athens,' as well by the secession of all the more vio- The Ten
lent spirits to Eleusis, as by the mistrust, discord, and SS^^f
disaffection, which now reigned within the city. Far tlw Sim.
from being able to abuse power like their predecessors, the Ten
did not even fully confide in their Three Thousand hoplites, but
were obliged to take measures for the defence of Uie city in con-
junction with the Hipparch and the Horsemen, who did double
duty— -on horseback in the daytime, and as hoplites with their
shields along the walls at night, for fear of surprise — employing
the Odeon as their head-quarters. The Ten sent envoys to
Sparta to solicit further aid ; while the Thirty sent envoys thither
also, from Eleusis, for the same purpose ; both representing that
the Athenian people had revolted from Sparta, and required
further force to reconquer them.'

Such foreign aid became daily more necessary to them, since
the forces of Thrasybulus in Peirseus grew stronger, increAdng
before their eyes, in numbers, in arms, and in hope of JiiJSS? ^'
success ; exerting themselves, with successful energy, bolus,
to procure additional arms and shields — ^though some of the
shields, indeed, were no better than wood-work or wicker-work
whitened over.^ Many exiles flocked in to their aid : others
sent donations of money or arms. Among the latter the orator
Lysias stood conspicuous, transmitting to Peiraeus a present of
200 shields as well as 2000 drachms in money, and hiring besides
300 fresh soldiers ; while his friend Thrasydeeus, the leader of

1 The facts which I have here let 82 ; Justin, t. 9.
down result from a comparison of Slsokratds, Or. ZTiiL eont. Kalli-

Lysias, Orat. xii. cont Bratoetb. s. mach. s. 26.
68, 50, 94— ♦ftSftiy, aip^BfU v^af > Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 24, 2&
JtoAAo^ot Koi KarayaytXr, Diod6r. ziv. * Xenoph. Hellen. ii. 4, 25.



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492 THE THIRTY AT ATHKNS. Part VL

the democratioAl interest at Elis, was induced to famish a loan
of two talents.^ Others also lent money ; some Boeotians far-
nished two talents, and a person named Qelarchas contributed
the large sum of five talents, repaid in aftertimes by the people.*
Proclamation was made by Thrasybulus, that all metics who
would lend aid should be put on tiie footing of isotely or eqnal
payment of taxes with citizens, exempt from the metic-taz and
other special burthens. Within a short time he had got together
a considerable force both in heavy-armed and light-armed, and
even seventy horsemen ; so that he was in condition to make
excursions out of Peirseus, and to collect wood and provisiona.
Nor did the Ten venture to make any aggressive movement out
of Athens, except so far as to send out the Horsemen, who slew
or captured stragglers from the force of Thrasybulus. Lysimachns
the Hipparch (the same who had commanded under the Thir^
at the seizure of the Eleusinian citizens) having made prisoners
some young Athenians bringing in provisions from the country for
the consumption of the troops in Peirssus, put them to death —
in spite of remonstrances from several even of his own men ; for
which cruelty Thrasybulus retaliated, by putting to death a horse-
man named Eallistratus, made prisoner in one of their marches
to the neighbouring villages.'

In the established civil war which now raged in Attica, Thrasy-
j^rriTBl of hulus and the exiles in Peirseus had decidedly the
Ly»ndap ta advantage ; maintaining the offensive, while the Ten
& Spartan in Athens, and the remainder of the Thirty at Eleusifl^
force. ^gpQ gj^jj thrown upon their defence. The division

of the oligarchical force into these two sections doubtless
weakened both, while the democrats in Peir»us were hearty and
united. Presently, however, the arrival of a Spartan auxiliary
force altered the balance of parties. Lysander, whom the oligarchi-
cal envoys had expressly requested to be sent to them as general,
prevailed with the Ephora to grant their request While he
himself went to Eleusis and got together a Peloponnesian hmd

1 Platarch, Vit X. Orator, p. 885 ; of the stock may probably have beea

Lysias, Or. xxxi. cont. Philon. s. 19— saved.
34. SDemosth. eont. T>eptin. c 88, p.

Lysias and his brother had carried 602 ; Lysiat cont. Nikomach. Or. xxx.

on a manufactory of shields at Athens, s. S9.
1'he Thirty had plondered it ; but some < Xenoph. Hellen. IL 4, 27.



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cbap. lxy. expedition or king PAUSANIAB. 403

force, his brother Libjs conducted a fleet of forty tnremesto
block up Pemens, and 100 talents were lent to tiie Athenian
oligarchs ont of the large sum recently brought from Asia into
the Spartan treasury.^

The arrival of Lysander brought the two sections of oligarchs
in Attica again into co-operation, restrained the pro-
gress of Thrasybulos, and even reduced Peirseus to oonditlonof
great straits by preventing all entry of ships or stores. £ p^^
Nothing could have prevented it from being reduced
to surrender, if Lysander had been allowed free scope in his
operations. But ihe general sentiment of Qreece had by this
time become disgusted with his ambitious policy, and with the
oligarchies which he had everywhere set up as Mb instruments ;
a sentiment not without influence on the feelings of the leading
Spartans, who, already jealous of his ascendency, were determined
not to increase it further by allowing him to conquer Attica
second time, in order to plant his own creatures as rulers at
Athens.-

Under the influence of these feelings, Eling Pausanias obtained
the consent of three out of the five Ephors to undertake gp^rtan
himself an expedition into Attica, at the head of the ^g
forces of the confederacy, for which he immediately conducts a&
issued proclamation. Opposed to the political tenden- J^*^^^?^^
des of Lysander, he was somewhat inclined to sympa- opposed to *^
thize with the democracy ; not merely at Athens, but ^"^^ *'*
elsewhere also, as at Mantineia.' It was probably understood
that his intentions towards Athens were lenient and anti-Ly-
sandrian, so that the Peloponnesian allies obeyed the summons
generally. Yet the Boeotians and Corinthians still declined, on
the ground that Athens had done nothing to violate the late
convention : a remarkable proof of the altered feelings of Greece
during the last year, since down to the period of that convention
tihese two states had been more bitterly hostile to Athens Uian
any others in the confederacy. They suspected that even the

1 Xen. Hen. ii 4, tS : Died. xir. 88 ; pur rp«;«, «(<yct Apovpir.
LjaskB, Orat zii cont. Eratoeth. s. 60. Dioddr. xiv. 83. UwaayCasii . . .

S Xenoph. Hellen. IL 4, 20. ovtm M ^oWav itiv -nf AvtrdvSfm, Btupmp 8d v^v

vpoxwpovKTwy, nav«'ayia« h fiaaiXtit, ^wipnfv iZo^ovirar wapd rote 'EXXrivif

44or^m Av9&¥hp*f, «l Kart»pya<r|tUvo« Ac

rovra ol^ui yJkv wioKiiiiivw,, ofia hk (8miv Pluturcb, Lvsand. C. 31.
roiii<roiro roc 'Atf^i^ac, wLvnis ruv 'B^ > Xenoph. Uelleo. t. 2, S.



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494 THE THIRTY AT ATHBNB. p^y^^ IL

expedition of Paueanias was projected with selfish Lacedsmonian
view% to secure Attica as a separate dependency of Sparta, ihongh
detached from Lysander.^

On approaching Athens, Paosanias, joined by Lysander and
His dispo. ^^ forces already in Attica, encamped in the garden
sittonsuiifa- of the Academy near the city gates. His sentdmenti
tibe^.^^^ were sufficiently known beforehand to offer en-
Sm^od conragement ; so that the yehement reaction against
luniiutthe the atrocities of the Thirty, which tiie presence of
^^°"^' Lysander had doubtless stifled, burst forth withool
delay. The surviving relatives of the victims slain beset him
even at the Academy in his camp, with prayers for protection
and cnes of vengeance against the oligarchs. Among those
victims (as I have already stated) were NikSratus the son, and
Eukratds the brother, of Nikias who had perished at Syracuse^
the Mend and prozenus of Sparta at Athens. The orphan chil-
dren, both of Nikdratus and Eukrates, were taken to Paosanias
by tlieir relative Diognltus, who implored his protection for
them, recounting at the same time the unmerited execution of
tneir respective fathers, and setting forth their fiunOy daimB
upon the justice of Sparta. This affecting incident, which has
been specially made known to us,' doubtless did not stand alone,
among so many families suffering from the same cause. Fansanias
was furmshed at once with ample grounds, not merely for re-
pudiating the Thirty altogether, and sending back the presents
which they tendered to him,* but even for refusing to identify
himself unreservedly with the new Oligarchy of Ten which had
risen upon their ruins. The voice of complaint — ^now for the
first time set free, with some hopes of redress— must have been
violent and unmeasured, after such a career as that of Eritias and
his colleagues ; while the iJBCt was now fully manifested, which
could not well have come forth into evidence before, that the
persons despoiled and murdered had been chiefly opulent men,
and very frequently even oligarchical men — ^not politicians of the

1 Xenoph. Hellen U. 4, 80. A«mAatMor£owv Wlc iuuHpm* T^^fit

S Lysias, Or. xriii. De Bonis NioUB r^ rAr rpULcorrft vor^pioc. . . .

Frat.B.8.10. 09rmy'^kn^tu9m.Kttjiwmn»€t9kU^

'Lyalss, «l Mtpni, S. 11, IS.^ ofhv xodiMV wtvovMi^os motc nava«r£ac rA

wapaStiyiim. voiov/Mroc wp6t rc/itt oMevf ^V9 Kafiw^ rii M wap* ^M*** ^M^cr*.



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Chap. LXV. REACTION AGAINST THE THIRTY. 495

former democracy. Both Pausanias, and the Lacedemonians
along with him, on reaching Athens, must have been strongly
affected by the facts which they learnt, and by the load cry for
sympathy and redress which poured upon them from the most
innocent and respected families. The predisposition both of the
Eling and the Ephors against the policy of Lysander was ma-
teriaJly strengthened ; as well as their inclination to bring about
an accommodation of parties, instead of upholding by foreign force
an anti-popular Few.

Such convictions would become further confirmed as Pausanias
saw and heard more of the rea] state of affairs. At paosanias
first he held a language decidedly adverse to Thrasy- *ttack»
bulus and the exiles, sending to them a herald, and hii partial
requiring them to disband and go to their respective ■'"«*"•
homes.^ The requisition not being obeyed, he made a faint
attack upon Peirseus, which had no effect Next day he marched
down with two Lacedaemonian morse, or large military divisions,
and three tribes of the Athenian Horsemen, to reconnoitre the
place, and see where a line of blockade could be drawn. Some
li^t troops annoyed him, but his troops repulsed them, even as
&r as the theatre of Peirseus, where all the forces of Thrasybulus
were mustered, heavy-armed as well as light-armed. The Lace-
daemonians were here in a disadvantageous position, probably in
the midst of houses and streets, so that all the light-armed of
Thrasybulus were enabled to set upon them furiously from dif-
ferent sides, and drive them out again with loss — two of the
Spartan polemarchs being here slain. Pausanias was obliged to
retreat to a little eminence about half-a-mile off, where he
mustered his whole force, and formed his hoplites into a very
deep phalanx. Thrasybulus on his side was so encouraged by the
recent success of his light-armed, that he ventured to bring out
his heavy-armed, only eight deep, to an equal conflict on the open
ground. But he was here completely worsted, and driven back
into Peiraeus with the loss of 150 men ; so that the Spartan King
was able to retire to Athens after a victory and a trophy erected
to commemorate it'

The issue of this battle was one extremely fortunate for Thrasy-

i Xen. HelL tt. 4, 81. Thia leems iwl ra imruv, aa we may see by a. 88.
the meaning of the phiaw iiri^^oi > Xenoph6n, Hellen. tt. 4, 81—84.



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496 THE THIRTT AT ATHENS. PiKT IL*

bulos and his comrades ; since it left the hononrs of the day
Peace-pftrty ^^ Pausanias, so as to avoid provoking enmity or
JnAUieM— vengeance on his part — while it showed plainly that
by Paa- the conquest of Peirseos, defended by so mnch conrage
•"**■• and military efficiency, would be no easy matter.

It disposed Pausanias still further towards an accommodation ;
strengthening also the force of that party in Athens which was
favourable to the same object, and adverse to the Ten Oligarchs.
This opposition-party found decided favour with the Spartan
King, as well as with the Ephor Naukleidas who accompanied
him. Numbers of Athenians, even among those Three Thousand
by whom the city was now exclusively occupied, came h>rward to
deprecate further war with Peiraeus, and to entreat that Pausanias
would settle the quarrel so as to leave them all at amity with
Lacedsemdn. Xenoph6n indeed, according to that narrow and
partial spirit which pervades his Hellenica, notices no sentiment
in Pausanias except his jealousy of Lysander, and treats the
opposition againsL the Ten at Athens as having been got up by
his intrigues.^ But it seems plain that this is not a correct account.
Pausanias did not create the discord, but found it already exist-
ing, and had to choose which of the parties he would adopt The
Ten took up the oligarchical game after it had been thoroughly
dishonoured and ruined by the Thirty. They inspired no confi-
dence, nor had they any hold upon the citizens in Athens, except
in so feir as these latter dreaded reactionary violence, in case
Thrasybulus and his companions should re-enter by force.
Accordingly, when Pausanias was there at the head of a force
competent to prevent such dangerous reaction, the dtixena at
once manifested their dispositions against the Ten, and favourable
to peace with Peirseus. To second this pacific party was at once
the easiest course for Pausanias to take, and the most likely to
popularize Sparta in Greece; whereas he would surely have
entailed upon her still more bitt«r curses from without^ not to
mention the loss of men to herself^ if he had employed the amount
of force requisite to uphold the Ten, and subdue Peirsus. To all
this we have to add his jealousy of Lysander, as an important
predisposing motive, but only as auxiliary among many othera

1 Xenoph. HeUen. IL 4, 86. At£m Mktvt «p^ v^ irpoot/roi mc rXcicnwt
M Kou rove i¥ r^ «<rTci (Pausanias) tuu fvAXcyotUrovr, Aryorrw, Ao.



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OBAF. LXV. TBRM8 OF PAOFIOATIOM. 497

Under snch a state of bets, it is not surprising to learn that
PSansanias encouraged solicitations for peace from p^ng^y^^
Thrasybnlus and the exiles, and that he granted them cmntea by
a trace to enable them to send enyojs to Sparta. Along JJdtKf**
with these envoys went Eephisophon and Melitus, ^PgJJSi
•ent for the same pnrpoee of entreating peace, by the
party opposed to the ten at Athens ; under the sanction both of
Pausanias and of the accompanying Ephors. On the other hand,
the Ten, finding themselves discountenanced by Pausanias, sent
envoys of their own to outbid the others. They tendered them-
selves, their walls, and their city to be dealt with as the Lacedae-
monians chose ; requiring that Thrasybulus, if he pretended to
be the friend of Sparta, should make the same unqualified sur-
render of Peineus and Munychia. All the three sets of envoys
were heard before the three Ephors remaining at Sparta and the
Lacedfemonian assembly ; who took the best resolution which the
case admitted — to bring to pass an amicable settlement between
Athens and Peirseus, and to leave the terms to be fixed by fifteen
commissioners, who were sent thither forthwith to sit in conjunc-
tion with Pausanias. This Board determined that the exiles in
Peirseus should be re-admitted to Athens ; that an accommodation
should take place ; and that no man should be molested for past
acts, except the Thirty, the Eleven (who had been the instnmients
of all executions), and the Ten who had governed in Peineus.
But Eleusis was recognized as a government sepanite from Athens,
and left (as it already was) in possession of the Thirty and their
coadjutors, to serve as a refuge for all those who might feel their
future safety compromised at Athens in consequence ol their past
conduct 1

As soon as these t«rms were proclaimed, accepted, and sworn to
by all parties, Pausimias with all the Lacedaemonians
evacuated Attica. Thrasybulus and the exiles marched Utiu
up in solemnprocession from Peirseus to Athens. Their ^SSc^
first act was to go up to the acropolis, now relieved P""^i''*'h
from its Lacedsemonian garrison, and there to offer exUesare
sacrifice and thanksgiving. On descending from thence, bS[1^^7
a general assembly was held, in which — unanimously of Thrasy-
and without opposition, as it should seem — the demo- ^

1 Xeo. HeUen. II. 4, »9 ; Diml. xiv. 88.
6 - 32



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498 THE THIRTT AT ATHENS. Part IL

eracj was restored. The government of tbe Ten, which could
have no basis except the sword of the foreigner, disappeared as a
matter of course. But Thrasjbolns, while he strenuously enforced
upon his comrades from Peirssus a full respect fur the oaths which
they had sworn, and an unreserved harmony with their iiuwly-
acquired fellow-citizens, admonished the assembly emphatically
as to the post events. ^ Ton city-men (he said), I advise you to
take just measure of yourselves for the future, and to calculate
fairly what ground of superiority you have, so as to pn^teud to
rule over u& Are you j uster than we t Why, the Demos, though
poorer than you, never at any time wrongeil you for the puqioees
of plunder ; while you, the wealthiest of all, have done many base
deeds for the sake of gain. Since then you have no justice to
boast of, are you superior to us on the score of courage t There
cannot be a better trial than the war which has just ended.
Again — can you pretend to be superior in policy? you, who—
having a fortified city, an armed force, plenty of money, and the
Peloponnesians for your allies — have been overcome by men who
had nothing of the kind to aid them f Can you boast of your hold
over the Lacedoemonians ? Why, they have just handed you over,
like a vicious dog with a clog tied to him, to the very Demos
whom you have wronged, and are now gone out of the country.
But you have no cause to be uneasy for the future. I adjure you,
my friends from Peirseus, in no point to violate the oaths which
we have just sworn. Show, in addition to your other glorious
exploits, that you are honest and true to your engagements.* *

The archons, the senate of Five Hundred, the public assembly,
R«tom. ^^^ ^® Dikasteries appear to have been now revived,
^c^t^e as they had stood in the democracy prior to the
'* capture of the city by Lysander. This important re-
storation seems to have taken place some time in the spring of
403 B.a, though we cannot exactly make out in what montL
The finst archon now drawn was Eukleidds, who gave his name to
this memorable year— a year never afterwards forgotten by
Athenians.

Eleusis was at this time, and pursuant to the late conventioii»
a city independent and separate from Athens, undor the govern-
ment of the Thirty, and comprising their warmest partisans, it
1 Xsn. Helkii. U. 4, 40 - iS.



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CMAF. LXV. RB8TORATION OF THB DSMOCBACT. 499

was not likely that this separation would last ; but the tliirty
were themselves the parties to give cause for its c^ntareoi
termination. They were getting together a mercenary Eieud*—
force at Elensis, when the whole force of Athens was ^J!um of
marched to forstall their designs. The generals at flj^^^^Jfy^
Elensis came forth to demand a conference, but were sarviTora of
seized and put to death ; the Thirty themselves, and a **** Thirty,
few of the most obnoxious individuals, fled out of Attica ; while the
rest of the Eleusinian occupants were persuaded by their friends
from Athens to come to an equal and honourable accommodation.
Again Eleusis became incorporated in the same community with
Athens ; oaths of mutual amnesty and harmony being sworn by
every one.*



We have now passed that short but bitter and sanguinary in-
terval occupied by the Thirty which succeeded so immediately
upon the extinction of t]ie empire and independence of Athens,
as to leave no opportunity for pause or reflection. A few words
respecting the rise and fall of that empire are now required —
summing up, as it were, the political moral of the events recorded
in the present and in the preceding volume, between 477 and
405 B.O.

I related in the forty-fifth chapter the steps by which Athens
first acquired her empire— raised it to its maximum, including
both maritime and inland dominion — then lost the inland por-
tion of it ; which loss was ratified by the Thirty yean^ Truce
concluded with Sparta and the Peloponnesian confederacy in
445 ao. Her maritime empire was based upon the confederacy
of D^loe, formed by the islands in the iEgean and the towns on
the sea-board immediately after the battles of Platsa and Mykal^
for the purpose not merely of expelling the Persians from the
jEgean, but of keeping them away permanently. To the accom-
plishment of this important object Sparta was altogether inade-
quate ; nor would it ever have been accomplished, if Athens had



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