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proves to us over-abundantly that it is no more in our power to have
a sound mind than to have a sound body." So Spinoza. In my
opinion, each siibstance is an empire within an empire ; but harmoniz-
ing exactly with all the rest it receives no influence from any being
except it be from God, but, nevertheless, through God, its author, it
depends upon all the others. It comes immediately from God and
yet it is created conformed to the other things. For the rest, not all
things are equally in our power. For we are inclined more to this
or to that. Malcuth, or the realm of God, does not suppress either
divine or human liberty, but only the indifference of equilibrium, as
they say who think there are no reasons for those actions which
they do not understand.

Spinoza thinks that the mind is greatly strengthened if it knows
that what happens happens necessarily : but by this compulsion he
does not render the heart of the sufferer content nor cause him to
feel his malady the less. He is, on the contrary, happy if he under-
stands that good results from evil and that those things which
happen are the best for us if we are wise.

From what precedes it is seen that what Spinoza says on the
intellectual love of God (Eth., pt. 4, prop. 28) is only trappings for
the people, since there is nothing loveable in a God who produces
without choice and by necessity, without discrimination of good
and evil. The true love of God is founded not in necessity but in
goodness. Spinoza (de Emend. Intel., p. 388), says that " there is no
science, but that we have only experience of particular things, that
is, of things such that their existence has no connection with their
essence, and which, consequently, are not eternal truths." — This
contradicts what he said elsewhere, viz : that all things are necessary,
that all things proceed necessarily from the divine essence. Like-



184

wise he combats (Eth., pt. 2, prop. 10, schol.) those who pretend that
the nature of God belongs to the essence of created things, and yet
he had established before [Eth., pt. 1, prop. 15] that things do not
exist and cannot be conceived without God, and that they necessarily
arise from him. He maintains (Eth.,pt. 1, prop. 21), for this reason,
that finite and temporal things cannot be produced immediately by
an infinite cause, but that (Prop. 28) they are produced by other
causes, individual and finite. But how will they finally then spring
from God ? for they cannot come from him mediately in this case,
since we could never reach in this way things which are not simi-
larly produced by another finite thing. It cannot, therefore, be said
that God acts by mediating second causes, unless he produces second
causes. Therefore, it is rather to be said that God produces sub-
stances and not their actions, in which he only concurs.



XXYIII.

Kemarks on the Opinion of Malebranohe that We See All
Things m God, with reference to Locke's Examination
OF IT. 1708.

[From the French.]

There is, in the posthumous works of Locke published at London
in 1706, 8vo., an examination of the opinion of Malebranche that
we see all things in God. It is acknowledged at the start that there
are many nice thoughts and judicious reflections in the book on
TTie Search after Truth, and that this made him hope to find
therein something satisfactory on the nature of our ideas. But he
has remarked at the beginning (§ 2) that this Father [Malebranche]
makes use of what Locke calls the argumentum ad ignorantiam, in
pretending to prove his opinion, because there is no other means of
explaining the thing : but according to Mr. Locke, this argument
loses its force when the feebleness of our understanding is con-
sidered. I am nevertheless of opinion that this argument is good
if one can perfectly enumerate the means and exclude all but one.
Even in Analysis, M. Frenicle employed this method of exclusion,
as he called it. Nevertheless Locke is right in saying that it is of
no use to say that this hypothesis is better than the other, if it is
found not to explain what one would like to understand and even
to involve things which cannot harmonize.

After having considered what is said in the first chapter of the
second part of book third, where Malebranche claims that what the
soul can perceive must be in immediate contact with it, Mr. Locke
asks (§ 3, 4.) what it is to be in immediate contact, this not appear-
ing to him intelligible except in bodies. Perhaps it might be
replied that one acts immediately on the other. And as Male-
branche, admitting that our bodies are united to our souls, adds
that it is not in such a way that the soul perceives it, he is asked
(§ 5.) to explain that act of union or at least in what it differs from
that which he does not admit ? Father Malebranche will perhaps
say that he does not know the union of the soul with the body
except by faith, and that the nature of Dody consisting in extension
alone, nothing can be deduced therefrom toward explaining the



186

soul's action on the body. He grants an inexplicable union, but he
demands one which shall serve to explain the commerce of the soul
and body. He claims also to explain why material beings could
not be united with the soul as is demanded ; this is because these
beings being extended and the soul not being so, there is no relation
between them. But thereupon Locke asks very apropos (§7.) if
there is any more relation between God and the soul. It seems
indeed that the Keverend Father Malebranche ought to have urged
not the little relation, but the little connection, which appears
between the soul and the body, while between God and the crea-
tures there is a connection such that they could not exist without
him.

When the Father says (§ 6.) that there is no purely intelligible
substance except God, I declare that I do not sufficiently understand
him. There is something in the soul that we do not distinctly
understand ; and there are many things in God that we do not at
all understand.

Mr. Locke (§^8^ makes a remark on the end of the Father's chap-
ter which is tantamount to my views ; for in order to show that the
Father has not excluded all the means of explaining the matter, he
adds : " If I should say that it is possible that God has made our
souls such and has so united them to bodies that at certain motions
of the body the soul should have such and such perceptions but in
a manner inconceivable to us, I should have said something as
apparent and as instructive as that which he says." Mr. Locke in
saying this seems to have had in mind my system of Pre-established
Harmony, or something similar.

Mr. Locke objects (§ 20.) that the sun is useless if we see it in
God. As this argument applies also against my system, which
claims that we see the sun in us, I answer that the sun is not made
solely for us and that God wishes to show us the truth as to what is
without us.

He objects also (§ 22.) that he does not conceive how we could
see something confusedly in God, where there is no confusion.
One might answer that we see things confusedly when we see too
many of them at a time.

Father Malebranche having said that God is the place of spirits
as space is the place of bodies, Mr. Locke says (§25.) that he does
not understand a word of this. But he understands at least what



187

space, place and body are. He understands also that the Father
draws an analogy between space ^ place, body and between God,
plojce, spirit, Thas a good part of what he here says is intelligible.
It may merely be objected that this analogy is not proven, although
some relations are easily perceived which might give occasion for
the comparison. I often observe that certain persons seek by this
affectation of ignorance to elude what is said to them as if they
understood nothing ; they do this not to reproach themselves, but
either to reproach those speaking, as if their jargon was unintelligi-
ble, or to exalt themselves above the matter and those who tell it,
as if it was not worthy of their attention.

Nevertheless Mr. Locke is right in saying that the opinion of
Father Malebranche is unintelligible in connection with his other
opinions, since with him space and body are the same thing. The
truth has escaped him here and he has conceived something com-
mon and immutable, to which bodies have an essential relation and
which indeed produces their relation to one another. This order
gives occasion for making a fiction and for conceiving space as an
immutable substance : but what there is real in this notion relates
to simple substances (under which spirits are included), and is
found in God, who unites them.

The Father saying that ideas are representative beings, Mr. Locke
asks (§ 26.) if these beings are substances, modes or relations ? I
believe that it may be said that they are nothing but relations
resulting from the attributes of God.

When Mr. Locke declares (§31.) that he does not understand
how the variety of ideas is compatible with the simplicity of God,
it appears to me that he ought not raise an objection on this score
against Father Malebranche, for there is no system which can make
such a thing comprehensible. "We cannot comprehend the incom-
mensurable and a thousand other things, the truth of which we
nevertheless know, and which we are right in employing to explain
others which are dependent on them. There is something approach-
ing to this in all simple substances ; where there is variety of
affections in unity of substance.

The Father maintains that the idea of the infinite is prior to that
of the finite. Mr. Locke objects (§ 34.) that a child has the idea
of a number or of a square sooner than that of the infinite. He is
right in taking the ideas for images; but in taking them as the



188

foundations of notions, he will find that in the continuum the
notion of an extended, taken absolutely, is prior to the notion of an
extended where the modification is added. This must be further
applied to what is said in §§ 42. and 4-6.

The argument of the Father which Mr. Lqcke examines (§ 40.),
that God alone, being the end of spirits, is also their sole object,
is not to be despised. It is true that it needs something in order to
be called a demonstration. There is a more conclusive reason
which shows that God is the sole immediate external object of
spirits, and that is that there is naught but lie which can act on
them.

It is objected (§ 41.) that the Apostle begins with the knowledge
of the creatures in order to lead to God and that the Father does
the contrary. I believe that these methods harmonize. The one
proceeds a priori, the other a posteriori ; and the latter is the more
common. It is true that the best way to know things is through
their causes ; but this is not the easiest. It requires too much
attention to things of sense.

In replying to § 34. I have noticed the difference there is
•between image and idea. It seems that this difference is combated
(§ 38.) by finding difficulty in the difference which there is between
image [se7iti7nent'] and idea. But I think that the Father under-
stands by image [sentimenf] a perception of the imagination,
whereas there may be ideas of things which are not sensible nor
imageable. I affirm that we have as clear an idea of the color of
the violet as of its figure (as is objected here) but not as distinct
nor as intelligible.

Mr. Locke asks if an indivisible and unextended substance can
have at the same time different modifications relating to .inconsist-
ent objects. I reply. Yes. That which is inconsistent in the same
object is not inconsistent in the representation of different objects,
conceived at the same time. It is not therefore necessary that
there be different parts in the soul as it is not necessary that there
be different parts in a point although different angles come together
there.

It is asked with reason (§ 43.) how we know the creature if we
do not see immediately aught but God ? Because the objects, the
representation of which God causes us to have, have something
which resembles the idea we have of substance, and it is this which
makes us judge that there are other substances.



189

It is supposed (§ 46.) that God has the idea of an angle which is
the nearest to the right angle, but that he does not show it to any-
one, however one may desire to have it. I reply that such an
angle is a fiction, like the fraction nearest to unity, or the number
nearest to zero, or the least of all numbers. The nature of con-
tinuity does not permit any such thing.

The Father had said that we know our soul by an inner feeling
of consciousness, and that for this reason the knowledge of our soul
is more imperfect than that of things, which we know in God.
Mr. Locke then remarks very apropos (§ 47.) that the idea of our
soul being in God as well as that of other things, we should see it
also in God. The truth is that we see all things in ourselves and
in our souls, and that the knowledge which we have of the soul is
very true and just provided that we attend to it ; that it is by the
knowledge which we have of the soul that we know being, sub-
stance, God himself, and that it is by reflection on our thoughts
that we know extension and bodies ; that it is nevertheless true
that God gives us all there is that is positive in this, and all perfec-
tion therein involved, by an immediate and continual emanation, by
virtue of the dependence on him which all creatures have, and it is
thus that a good meaning may be given to the phrase that God is
the object of our souls and that we see all things in him.

Perhaps the design of the Father in the saying which is examined
(§ 53.), that we see the essences of things in the perfections of God
and that it is the universal reason which enlightens us, tends to
show that{_the attributes of God are the bases of the simple notions
which we have of things, — being, power, knowledge, diffusion, du-
ration, taken absolutely, being in him and not being in creatures
save in a limited way. ^



XXIX.

Letter to Wagner on the Active Force of Body, on the

Soul and on the Soul of Brutes. 1710.

[From the Latin.]

1. I WILLINGLY reply to the inquiries you make as to the nature
of the soul, for I see from the doubt which you present that my
view is not sufficiently clear to you, and that this is due to some
prejudgment drawn from my essay, inserted in the Acta Erudito-
rum, wherein I treated, in opposition to the illustrious Sturm, of
the active force of body. You say that I have not there sufficiently
vindicated active force for matter, and while I attribute resistance
to matter I have also attributed reaction to the same, and conse-
quently action ; since therefore there is everywhere in matter an
active principle, this principle seems to suffice for- the actions of
brutes, nor is there need in them of an incorruptible soul.

2. I reply, in the first place, that the active principle is not
attributed by me to bare or primary matter, which is merely pas-
sive, and consists only in antitypia and extension ; but to body or
to clothed or secondary matter which in addition contains a primi-
tive entelechy or active principle. I r^ply, secondly, that the resist-
ance of bare matter is not action, but mere passion, inasmuch as it
has antitypia or impenetrability, by which indeed it resists what-
ever would penetrate it but does not react, unless there be added
an elastic force, which must be derived from motion, and therefore
the active force of matter must be superadded. I reply, thirdly,
that this active principle, this first entelechy, is, in fact, a vital
principle, endowed also with the faculty of perception, and incor-
ruptible, for reasons recently stated by me. And this is the very
thing which in brutes I hold for their soul. While, therefore, I
admit active principles superadded everywhere in matter, I also
posit, everywhere disseminated through it, vital or percipient prin-
ciples, and thus monads, and, so to speak, metaphysical atoms
wanting parts and incapable of being produced or destroyed natu-
rally.

3./ You next ask my definition of soul. I reply that soul may be
employed in a broad and in a strict sense. Broadly speaking, soul



191

will be the same as life or vital principle, that is, the principle of
internal action existing in the simple thing or monad, to which ex-
ternal action corresponds. And this correspondence of internal
and external, or representation of the external in the internal, of
the composite in the simple, of multiplicity in unity, constitutes in
reality perception. But in this sense, soul is attributed not only to
animals but also to all other percipient beings/ /_Jii the strict sense,
soul is employed as a nobler species of life, or sentient life, where
there is not only the faculty of perceiving, but in addition that of
feeling, inasmuch, indeed, as attention and memory are joined to
perception. Just as, in turn, mind is a nobler species of soul, that
is, mind is rational soul, where reason or ratiocination from univer-
sality of truths is added to feeling. As therefore mind is rational
soul, so soul is sentient life, and life is perceptive principle. I
have shown, moreover, by examples and arguments, that not all
perception is feeling, but that there is also insensible perception.
For example, I could not perceive green unless I perceived blue
and yellow, from which it results. At the same time, I do not
feel blue and yellow unless perchance a microscope is employed.

4. You will remember, moreover, that according to my opinion,
not only are all lives, all souls, all minds, all primitive entelechies,
everlasting, but also that to each primitive entelechy or each vital
principle there is perpetually united a certain natural machine,
which comes to us under the name of organic body : which machine,
moreover, even although it preserves its form in general, remains in
flux, and is, like the ship of Theseus, perpetually repaired. Nor
therefore can we be certain that the smallest particle of matter
received by us at birth, remains in our body, even although the
same machine is by degrees completely transformed, augmented,
diminished, involved or evolved. Hence, not only is the soul ever-
lasting, but also some animal always remains, although no partic-
ular animal ought to be called everlasting, since the animal species
does nbt remain ; just as the caterpillar, and the butterfly are not
the same animal, although the same soul is in both. Every natural
machine, therefore, has this quality, that it is never completely
destructible, since, however thick a covering may be dissolved,
there always remains a little machine not yet destroyed, like the
costume of Harlequin, in the comedy, to whom, after the removal
of many tunics, there always remained a fresh one. And we



192

ought to be the less astonished at this for this reason, that nature is
everywhere organic and ordered by a most wise author for certain
ends, and that nothing in nature ought to be criticized as unpolished,
although it may sometimes appear to our senses as but a rude
mass. Thus therefore we escape all the difficulties which arise
from the nature of a soul absolutely separated from all matter ; so
that, in truth, a soul or an animal before birth or after death does
not differ from a soul or an animal living the present life except in
condition of things and degrees of perfections, but not by entire
genus of being. And likewise I think that Genii are minds
endowed with bodies very penetrating and suitable for action,
which perhaps they are able to change at will, whence they do not
deserve to be called even animals. Thus all things in nature are
analogous, and the subtile may be understood from the coarse, since
both are constituted in the same way. God alone is substance
really separated from matter, since he is actus jpurus, endowed
with no passive power, whjch, wherever it is, constitutes matter.
And, indeed, all created substances have antitypia, by which it hap-
pens naturally that one is outside the other, and so penetration is
excluded.

5. But although my principles are very general and hold not less
in man than in brutes, yet man stands out marvellously above
brutes and approaches the Genii, because from the use of reason he
is capable of society with God, and thus of reward and of punish-
ment in the divine government. And therefore he preserves not
only life and soul like the brutes, but also self-consciousness and
memory of a former state, and, in a word, personality. He is im-
mortal, not only physically but also morally, whence in the strict
sense immortality is attributed only to the human soul. For if a
man did not know that in the other life rewards or punishments
would be awarded him for this life, there would really be no
punishment, no reward, and as regards morals, it would be just as
if I were extinguished and another, happier or unhappier, should
succeed me. And thus I hold that souls, latent doubtless in semi-
nal animalcules from the beginning of things, are not rational until,
by conception, they are destined for human life ; but when they are
once made rational and rendered capable of consciousness and of
society with God, I think that they never lay aside the char-
acter of citizens in the Republic of God ; and since it is most



193 "

justly and beautifully governed, it is a consequence that by
the very laws of nature, on account of the parallelism of the king-
dom of grace and of nature, souls by the force of their own actions
are rendered more fit for rewards and punishments. And in this
sense it may be said that virtue brings its own reward and sin its
own punishment, since by a certain natural consequence, before the
last state of the soul, according as it departs atoned for or unatoned
for, there arises a certain natural divergence, preordained by God
in nature and with divine promises and threats, and consistent with
grace and justice ; the intervention also being added of Genii, good
or bad according as we have associated with either, whose operations
are certainly natural although their nature is sublimer than ours.
We see, indeed, that a man awaking from a profound sleep, or even
recovering from apoplexy, is wont to recover the memory of his
former state. The same must be said of death, which can render
our perceptions turbid and confused but cannot entirely blot them
from memory, the use of which returning, rewards and punishments
take place. Thus the Saviour compared death to sleep. Moreover
the preservation of personality and of moral immortality cannot be
attributed to brutes incapable of the divine society and law.

6. 'No one, therefore, need fear dangerous consequences from
this doctrine, since rather a true natural theology, not only not at
variance with revealed truth but even wonderfully favorable to it,
may be demonstrated by most beautiful reasoning from my princi-
ples. Those indeed who deny souls to brutes and all perception
and organism to other parts of matter, do not sufiiciently recognize
the Divine Majesty, and introduce something unworthy of God, un-
polished, that is, a void of perfections or forms, which you may
call a metaphysical void, which is no less to be rejected than a
material or physical void. But those who grant true soul and per-
ception to brutes and yet affirm that their souls can perish naturally,
take away thus from us the demonstration which shows that our
minds cannot perish naturally, and fall into the dogma of the Socin-
ians, who think that souls are preserved only miraculously or by
grace, but believe that by nature they ought to perish ; which is to
rob natural theology of its largest part. Besides, the contrary can
be completely demonstrated, since a substance wanting parts cannot
naturally be destroyed.

Wolfenbiittel, June 4, 1710.
13



XXX.

The Theodicy.

Abridgment of the Argument reduced to syllogistic form.

1710.

[From the French.] ^

Some intelligent persons liave desired that this supplement should
be made [to the Theodicy], and I have the more readily yielded to
their wishes as in this way I have an opportunity to again remove
certain difficulties and to make some observations which were not
sufficiently emphasized in the work itself.

I. Objection. Whoever .does not choose the^l^esl. is lacking in
power, or in knowledge, or in goodness.
. God did not choosp the best in creating this world.

Therefore God has been lacking in power, or in knowledge, or in
goodness.

Answer. I deny the minor, that is, the second premise of this
syllogism ; and our opponent proves it by this



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