Herbert Adams Gibbons.

An introduction to world politics online

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Edited by


University of Wisconsin

iNTRODrcnoN TO AiiEBicAX GovEKXiiEXT. By Frederic
A. Ogg, UniTersity of WiscoiLsiii; and P. Orman
Eay, Xorth.'westerii Unirersity.

AiiEEiCAX Parties axd Elections. By Edward ]!kl.
Salt, "Cnivexsity of California.

State Goveexmen-t in the Tnitzd States. By "Walter
F. Dodd, Chicago, Illinois.

Municipal GovERXiiENT. By Thomas H. Eeed, Uni-
versity of California.


■nard S. Cor-«dn, Princeton University.

Constitutional History or the United States. By
Andrevr C. McLaughlin, University of Chicago.

The Conduct of American Foreign Eelations. By
John M. Mathe'ws, University of Illinois.

Outlines of VTorld Politics. By Herbert Adams Gib-
bons, Princeton, Xe"n" Jersey.

European Diplojiacy, 1914-1921. By Charles Seymour,
Yale University.

Introduction to the Study of International Cte-
GANIZATION. By Pitman B. Potter, University of

American Interests and Policies in the Fab East.
By Stanley K. Hornbeck, Washington, D. C.

Latin America and the United States. By Graham
H. Stuart, University of Wisconsin.

Eecent and Contemporary Political Theory. By
Francis W. Coker, Ohio State L^niversity.

Elements of International Law. By Charles G. Fen-
wick, Bryn Mawx College.

Other volumes to he arranged








CopyrigM, 1922. by

Ths Cz:rrT3T Co.


^ c c

PriniEd in U. S. A.

JUN 28 !922




At the beginning of the World War I wrote a book about
the relations among the great powers during the years
immediately preceding the assassination at Serajevo. * ' The
New Map of Europe ' ' dealt particularly with Near Eastern
problems and wars and with the foreign policies of Eussia,
Austria-Hungary, Germany, and Italy in the events affect-
ing the Balkan States, the Ottoman Empire, Persia, and the
countries on the African littoral of the Mediterranean.
The purpose of the book was to attempt to explain how the
relations among the great powers were vitally influenced
by the conflict of interests that arose in their diplomatic
and economic activities in the regions formerly under the
ex-clusive domination of the Ottoman sultans. The recep-
tion accorded ''The New Map of Europe" encouraged me
4o. complete the survey of contemporary international rela-
tions by writing ''The New Map of Africa" in 1916 and
"The New Map of Asia" in 1919. The latter two volumes
outlined the development of European overlordship in
Africa and Asia.

None who lived in daily contact with international ques-
tions, and who was reporting from the spot wars and
rumors of wars during the decade before 1914, could be
satisfied with the prevalent idea that it was unnecessary to
go farther back than the famous "twelve days" of diplo-
matic correspondence, from July 20 to August 2, 1914, to
settle the responsibility for the World War. However
great the guilt of the Imperial German and Austro-Hun-
garian governments for deliberately forcing the war upon
Europe, their power was not so great that their will alone
could have led us into the calamities of 1914-18. The most


bitter and nnthinMng partizan of armistice and peace con-
ference days sees now that the elimination of Germany
and Austria-Hungary from world politics has not brought
us peace. Europe is still in arms, and the victorious
powers are pitted against one another in the Near East
and the Far East. Must we not admit, then, that Realpolitih
and Weltpolitik are human, and not simply German, phe-
nomena, and that they call for attention no less after our
victory than before the war?

This is the justification for the study of world politics
as a separate branch of political science. Anthropologists
write of race; geographers of climate; economists of
finance and trade and commerce ; demographers of popula-
tion; sociologists of living conditions; missionaries of
cultural conquest in the name of religion; jurists of inter-
national law; diplomatists of the technique of dealings
among nations ; military experts of the conduct of wars and
the role of armies and navies in peace and war ; statesmen
of the immediate and ostensible causes of war and aims of
peace; propagandists of national movements and particu-
lar interests; humanists of improving world conditions;
publicists of current events; and general historians set
forth and interpret the activities of nations comprehen-
sively, stressing political evolution and states of mind as
well as recording events. Up to the nineteenth century the
specialist in international relations is not needed. But
since the birth of nationalism, the use of steam in produc-
tion and transportation, and the consequent rise of world
powers, he has a field of his own.

The field is difficult, however, because the problems dis-
cussed and the questions raised have been the storm center
of men's thoughts for the past ten years. These problems
have been approached unintelligently, and opinions have
been formed without knowledge. Teachers of the historical
and political sciences in American universities and colleges
have had a curious experience. Their colleagues in other


departments would be astounded if professors of history
and political science should presume to lay down the law
to them in their particular fields. And yet professors of
philosophy, mathematics, astronomy, languages, engineer-
ing, chemistry, medicine, theology, and law have written
books and articles and have lectured on problems of world
pohtics, without having acquainted themselves with even
the rudiments of the subject. An architect, who has created
masterpieces, told me one day that a lecture I gave on
African colonization was wrong from beginning to end.
He could contradict none of my facts, and when I pressed
him he confessed that he had never read a book on the
extension of European control over Africa. ''But I have
been in Algiers," he declared. "And I have been in a
Gothic cathedral," I answered; ''but what would you think
of me if I contested, without any supporting facts, your
statements in a lecture on Gothic architecture?"

In attempting to put within the compass of one volume
an introduction to world politics, it has been necessary to
omit much of interest and importance, and to exclude,
except where clearness demanded it, historical narrative.
The writer confesses frankly that his sympathies are with
the smaller nations in their struggles to maintain or win
independence, and that he believes it is possible to use "one
weight and one measure" in international relations. But
he has tried to allow the facts to speak for themselves, and
urges the reader to do the supplementary reading indi-
cated for each chapter. Eeferences have been given, not
as sources, but as guides to further information. In select-
ing them different points of view and the general avail-
ability of materials have been taken into consideration.
Some books, excellent as sources, are not widely circulated,
or are not written in the condensed form demanded by the
general reader or student. When used as a text-book, the
chapters are intended to acquaint the student with the
skeleton facts upon which the lectures are based, to amplify


the lectures on certain points, and, above all, to provoke
discussion. In the advanced study of political science no
text-book can take the place of lectures and class-room
quizzes and comment on assigned reading.

If British statesmanship and officialdom come in for a
larger share of criticism in a course on world poHtics than
those of other great powers, it is only because Great Britain
is more involved overseas than any other power. I am of
pure British stock, and am an intense admirer of the civili-
zation and culture that are my heritage. My point of view
is in no sense anti-British. In fact, it is peculiarly Anglo-
Saxon. F^om our ancestors we have learned to lean back-
ward in our desire to be fair to the other man and to put
ourselves in his place. The most precious English intel-
lectual tradition is to write with detachment and impar-
tiality. In the atmosphere of passion and prejudice born
of the war many of us departed from our moorings. But
we are finding ourselves again. Facing facts and holding
to common ideals of hberty and justice are the bases of
Anglo-Saxon solidarity.

I can not adequately express my appreciation of the
help and light in the preparation of this volume that have
come to me from unknown friends in many countries. Ever
since 1914 numerous correspondents have been pointing
out to me errors of fact, or have entered into stimulating
and suggestive discussion provoked by statements in my
books and magazine articles. All this has been grist to my
mill. My friends in American, British, and French universi-
ties have given me encouragement and equally helpful
criticism and admonition. The opportunities for personal
investigation in different parts of the world have been en-
joyed through the constant and generous interest of the
late James Gordon Bennett and of Mr. Rodman Wana-
maker. Professor William Starr Myers, of Princeton Uni-
versity, and my brother. Professor Oliphant Gibbons, of the
Buffalo Technical High School, read the manuscript. Pro-


f essor Frederic Austin Ogg, of the University of Wisconsin,
has edited manuscript and proofs with a thoroughness for
which I can not express too highly my admiration and
thanks. My publishers have shown the interest and care
that long years of happy association have taught me to
expect from them.

Herbeet Adams Gibbofs
Princeton, May 1, 1922



I The Beginnings of World Politics 3

II Nationalism and Steam Power (1789-1848) ... 17

III The Rise of World Powers (1848-1878) .... 30

IV French Colonial Expansion (1830-1900) .... 52

V British Colonial Expansion (1815-1878) .... 65

VI Consolidation of British Power in the Near East

(1878-1885) 83

VII The Near Eastern Question (1879-1908) ... 96

VIII Russian Colonial Expansion (1829-1878) .... 113

IX Consolidation of Russian Power in the Far East

(1879-1903) 122

X^Japan's First Challenge to Europe : The War with
^ China (1894-1895) 130

XI The Attempt to Partition China (1895-1902) . . . 139

XII^ Japan's Second Challenge to Europe : The War
^ WITH Russia (1904-1^)05) 158

XIII The Revival of British Imperialism (1895-1902) . 166

XIV Persia and the Anglo-Russian Agreement op 1907 178

XV Egypt, Morocco, and the Anglo-French Agreement

op 1904 185

XVI The Development of the German Weltpolitik (1883-

1905) 195

XVII The Franco-German Dispute Over Morocco (1905-

1911) 207

XVIII The Young Turk Revolution and Its Reactions

(1908-1911) 219

XIX Italian Expansion in Africa (1882-1911) .... 228

XX The Reopening of the Near Eastern Question by

Italy (1911-1912) 236





XXI Intkigues of the Great Powers in the Balkans

(1903-1912) 246

XXII The Balkan War Against Turkey (1912-1913) . . 254

XXIII The Balkan Tangle (1913-1914) 261

XXIV The Triple Entente Against the Central Empires

(1914) 272

XXV Italy's Entrance into the Triple Entente (1915) . 283

XXVI The Alinement of the Balkan States in the Elt?o-

PEAN War (1914-1917) 294

XXVII China as a Republic (1906-1917) 305

XXVIII Japan's Third Challenge to Europe : The War with
Germany and the Twenty-one Demands on
China (1914-1916) 318

XXIX The United States in World Politics (1893-1917) 328

XXX The United States and the Latin-American Eepl^b-

Lics (1893-1917) 340

XXXI The United States in the Coalition Against the

Central Empires (1917-1918) 358

XXXII The Disintegration of the Romanoff, Hapsburg. and
Ottoman Empires through Self-Determination
Propaganda (1917-1918) 367

XXXIII The Attempt to Create a League op Nations at Paris

After the Defeat op Germany (1919) .... 381

XXXIV The Refusal op the United States to Ratify the

Treaties and Enter the League (1919-1921) . . 390

XXXV World Politics and the Treaty op Versailles (1919-

1922) 399

XXXVI World Politics and the Treaty op St. Gerjiain

(1919-1922) 407

XXXVII World Politics and the Treaty op Trianon (1919-

1922) 416

XXXVIII World Politics and the Treaty op Neuilly (1919-

1922) 422

XXXIX World Politics and the Treat\' op Sevres (1920-1922) 428

XL The Reestablishment of Peace Prevhented by Un-
satisfied Nationalist Aspirations and Divergent
Policies op the Victors (1918-1922) .... 442



XLI The Russian Revolution and Its Aftermath (1917-

1922) 457

XLII Overseas Possessions of "Secondary States" (1815-

1922) 474

XLIII French Colonial Problems (1901-1922) .... 483

XLIV British Imperial Problems (1903-1922) .... 494

XLV The Foreign Policy of Post-Bellum Japan (1919-

1922) 514

XLVI The Place of the United States in the World

(1920-1922) 522

XLVII Bases op Solidarity Among English-Speaking

Peoples (1922) 535

XLVIII The Continuation Conferences: From London to

Genoa (1919-1922) 548

XLIX The Washington Conference and the Limitation of

Armaments (1921-1922) 561

Bibliography 577

Index ..: 589



Asia at the End of the World War Title

Africa about 1850 . 30

The Spoliation of an Asiatic State : Siam before 1893 and after

1910 60

The Great Powers in China 142

FfeENCH Cessions to Germany in the Congo : 1912 218

The Balkan Peninsula in 1914 268

Africa in 1914 404

The Stepping Stones from Asia to Australia 516




WHEN political organisms were small and conmmni-
ties self-sustaining, problems of government were
not complicated by considerations of foreign policy. At
first, travelers were killed and their possessions confiscated,
unless they were stronger than those they met. On sea,
men took their chances with pirates as with the weather.
Until means of transportation and a guaranty of protec-
tion were furnished them, few traveled in inland countries.
None traveled for pleasure, and the quest of knowledge or
gold was attended by great and constant risks. Later,
when means of transportation increased and regular routes
were established, travelers purchased protection by paying
tribute to the strong. And strength was not so much a
matter of numbers and of fighting ability as of geographical
position. Consequently, there was virtually no intercourse,
social or commercial, between peoples of different blood,
language, customs, and religion.

Before the Christian era the history of "civilization,"
as we understand that term, was developed in Mediterra-
nean lands. There the three monotheistic religions origi-
nated and spread, and there the cultures, the written lan-
guages, and the social and political background of modem.
Europe were created. The Egyptians and Chaldeans and



Assyrians did not go far afield in their wars. The Persians
and Greeks invaded each other's countries mainly as ad-
venturous explorers. The Phoenicians and Greeks traded
in the Mediterranean and founded colonies without the
urge of a united racial impulse behind them. Rome did
not allow Carthage to become a consohdated empire; and
the Greeks, like the Italians of the Middle Ages, instead of
standing together in their expansion, exhausted their ener-
gies in fighting each other. Although the Romans colo-
nized, it was rather by taking aliens into partnership and
by organizing a governmental system than by making their
own race dominant. The Roman Empire was not conceived
in the spirit of ruling the world for the benefit of the Italian
peninsula. "When they conquered the Greeks, the Romans
succumbed to Greek culture, and as the empire grew, Rome
itself did not remain the political, much less the economic,
metropolis. There never was a Roman race in the sense
that there was a Greek race and later an Arab race.

The Roman Empire had neither geographical entity nor
national foyer. Rome did not mean a place from which a
race had come and which was the heart of the nation. Pos-
sessing no common economic interests and no consciousness
of oneness of blood, the peoples of the Roman Empire were
easily weakened by, and then fell prey to, the migrating
peoples of Europe and Asia. Our Teutonic ancestors col-
onized Europe by subjugating and becoming assinailated
with, if not by actually exterminating, the indigenous in-
habitants. As soon as new political organisms took the
place of the defunct Eastern and Western empires, migra-
tion ceased. Whole races no longer passed from Asia to
Europe or from one part of Europe to another. In the
medieval period of European history, migratory conquests
ended in every part of the continent simultaneously ^vith
the appearance of stable centralized governments. This
was accompUshed just in time to stem Mongolian and Semi-
tic invaders, who attempted a new migration. Only the


Balkans, parts of Russia, and northern Africa passed un-
der the domination of the later Asiatics.

But our ancestors, once they had settled in their new
homes, still found causes for war. On the surface the wars
were feudal, religious, dynastic; underneath was the con-
flict among large national groups in the process of forma-
tion. Leaders and peoples were instruments of irresistible
currents of whose very existence they did not know. Placed
within certain geographic limits and welded into groups by
the growth of common economic interests, Europeans
evolved different languages and characteristics, and thus
became separate nationaUties. Except in a few specific
instances of borderlands, national evolution was more rapid
and more thorough in western Europe than in central and
eastern Europe.

To illustrate, a Scotchman or a Welshman may retain
his pride in his blood and perhaps in his language, but he
long ago became a Britisher by every instinct in his being.
Proximity, development of intercourse, political equality
with the once dominant Englishman, and, above all, equal
economic opportunities accomplished this. The Irishman,
on the contrary, separated by water from other Britishers,
and as potently by different cultural and religious ideals,
held in economic and poUtical subjection to the dominant
Englishman by means of a land-owning alien element and
by the descendants of a colony of alien conquerors in one
corner of the island, remained unassimilated. A Breton or
a Provengal can be proud of his origin and can cherish the
cult of his language and his local customs, but he is none
the less a good Frenchman. The Breton is isolated on his
peninsula from other than French influences. The Proven-
cal is cut off by mountains from any other race that might
have influenced his national self -consciousness. In this way
geography has played the most important role in assimi-

Border peoples in central and eastern Europe were


worked upon by, and became successively subjects of, rival
national groups. In eastern Europe, where the conquerors
were in the minority and of the ruling class, little attempt
was made at assimilation through education or through the
creation of economic interests in common and mutually
realized between the conquered people and the dominant
alien invaders. Long after the peoples of western Europe
and, to a lesser extent, those of central Europe were freed
from the menace of migratory invasions, and had been left
to themselves to develop their civilization, the peoples of
eastern Europe remained under Mohammedan rule or con-
tinued to be subjected to recurrent Tartar invasions. An-
other disruptive influence, which has persisted through the
centuries and has formed a barrier from the Baltic to the
Adriatic between peoples whose common blood and lan-
guage would othermse have caused them to develop a com-
mon nationality, has been the division of allegiance be-
tween the Roman and the Orthodox churches. Of the two
most powerful branches of the Slavs, Poles looked to Rome
and Russians to Constantinople. The LTj:rainians were
divided, and Serbians were separated from Croats and

Early in the history of modern Europe, international
relations became important from an economic, as well as a
political, point of view. Commerce led to the establishment
of traditions and customs in the dealings among nations.
These were embodied in diplomacy and international law.
Treaties of friendship and commerce were sought as a
means of reciprocally guaranteeing the interests of na-
tionals. When migratory conquests ceased, when religious
and djTiastic wars ended, when nationaUst movements
reached and accepted the limits imposed upon them by ge-
ography and economics, it was reasonable to suppose that
the state of peace attained ^vithin the great political organ-
isms might be extended to the European community of


But when Europeans began to trade overseas, and estab-
lished colonies and companies for exploiting newly discov-
ered regions of the world, competition gave rise to friction
that would not have existed had the European nations been
able to continue to find sources of prosperity within the
borders of their own political jurisdictions. Wars broke
out among Spaniards, Portuguese, Dutch, British, and
French, which, although provoked by religious and dynastic
questions of European origin, were complicated, extended,
and prolonged because of the interests and ambitions of
their governments and private companies in America and
Asia. And the gains and losses to victors and vanquished
have proved to be permanent, and have influenced the
course of history more by the transfer of territories and
privileges outside Europe than by boundary changes in
Europe. That this is true is largely the result of develop-
ments of the nineteenth century. As long as sovereigns and
governments fought, with mercenaries, for prizes of whose
value the contending peoples were dimly if at all aware,
extra-European rivalry and colonial wars did not have a
profound influence upon the relations between the Euro-
pean peoples. A great change, however, began to take
place during the Napoleonic era.

The rapid increase of population in Europe, with the ac-
companying over-production of manufactured articles and
over-consumption of raw materials, radically changed in-
ternational relations. Each nation felt compelled to shape
its foreign policy according to the opportunities and neces-
sities of acquiring beyond the confines of Europe areas for
colonization and new markets. This situation, unique in
history because the conditions that created it have not be-
fore existed, gave rise to a new branch of political science —
world politics.

World politics is the science of government as practised
in international relations, under the influence of real or
fancied interests in other than neighboring countries or


those "vrith which relations of reciprocal advantage are nat-
urally maintained. All nations, for their security and ma-
terial and moral well-being, can not detach their domestic
policies from those of nations near them and with whom
they do business. But when they become friends or ene-
mies because of rivalry for political influence and economic
advantages in regions where their aim is to enjoy, exclu-
sively if possible, the fruits of economic imperiahsm,
friends and enemies are made, not by natural affinities or
by good or e\al done to each other, but by considerations
of world politics.

It is not impossible to build up a thesis for the beginnings
of world politics in the struggle of Syria and Egy^t over
Syria and Palestine, of Greece and Persia over Asia Minor,
of Athens and Sparta over Sicily, of Rome and Carthage
over Spain and the hegemony of the Mediterranean, and,
since the era of overseas exploration, in the wars of the
original maritime and colonial powers. But before the
nineteenth century world poUtics had comparatively slight
influence upon international relations. It was the intro-
duction of steam power into industry that made overseas
markets profitable, and then indispensable, to European
nations. The use of steam power in transportation made
it possible to carry manufactured articles to foreign mar-

Online LibraryHerbert Adams GibbonsAn introduction to world politics → online text (page 1 of 47)