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1901, XV. 57 sqq.; Lehmann Haupt in Beitrdge zur alien
Geschichte, 1905, v. 128 sqq.). The origin and early history of
the Parthian kingdom, of which we possess only very scanty
information, is surrounded by fabulous legends, narrated by
Arrian in his Parthica (preserved in Photius, cod. 58, and Syn-
cellus, p. 539 seq.). Here Arsaces and his brother Tiridates
are derived from the royal house of the Achaemenids, pro-
bably from Artaxerxes II.; the young Tiridates is insulted
by the prefect Agathocles or Pherecles; in revenge the brothers
with five companions (corresponding to the seven Persians
of Darius) slay him, and Arsaces becomes king. He is killed
after two years and succeeded by his brother Tiridates,
who reigns 37 years. There is scarcely anything historical
in this account, perhaps not even the name Tiridates, for,
according to the older tradition, Arsaces himself ruled for
many years. The troubles of the Seleucid empire, and the war
of Seleucus II. against Ptolemy III. and his own brother Antio-
chus Hierax, enabled him not only to maintain himself in Parthia,
but also to conquer Hyrcania; but he was constantly threatened
by Diodotus of Bactria (Justin xli. 4). When, about 238 B.C.,
Seleucus II. was able to march into the east, Arsaces fled to the
nomadic tribe of the Aspasiacae (Strabo xi. 513; cf. Polyb. x.
48). But Seleucus was soon recalled by a rebellion in Syria, and
Arsaces returned victorious to Parthia; " the day of this victory
is celebrated by the Parthians as the beginning of their inde-
pendence " (Justin xli. 4). Arsaces was proclaimed king at
Asaak in the district of Astauene, now Kuchan in the upper Atrek
(Attruck) valley (Isidor. Charac), and built his residence Dara on
a rock in a fertile valley in Apavarktikene (Justin xli. 5; Plin.
vi. 46), now Kelat still farther eastward; the centre of his power
evidently lay on the borders of eastern Khorasan and the Turan-
ian desert. The principal institutions of the Parthian kingdom

• Strabo xi. 515; cf. Justin xli. 4; the Parni are said by Strabo
[ibid.] to have immigrated from southern Russia, a tradition wrongly
transferred to the Parthians themselves by Justin xli. i, and Arrian
a/). Phot. cod. 58. __,. 11



PARTICK— PARTITION



871



were created by him (cf. Justin xli. 2). The Scythian nomads
became the ruling race; they were invested with large landed
property, and formed the council of the king, who appointed the
successor. They were archers fighting on horseback, and in their
cavalry consisted the strength of the Parthian army; the infantry
were mostly slaves, bought and trained for military service, like
the janissaries and mamelukes. But these Scythians soon
amalgamated with the Parthian peasants. They adopted the
Iranian religion of Zoroaster (in the royal town Asaak an eternal
fire was maintained), and " their language was a mixture of
Scythian and Median " (/.c, Iranian). Therefore their language
and writing are called by the later Persians " Pchlevi," i.e.
Parthian (Pehlevi is the modern form of Parthawa) and the
magnates themselves Pehlevans, i.e. " Parthians," a term
transferred by Firdousi to the heroes of the old Iranian legend.
But the Arsacid kingdom never was a truly national state; with
the Scythian and Parthian elements were united some elements
of Greek civilization. The successors of Arsaces I. even founded
some Greek towns, and when they had conquered Babylonia
and Mesopotamia they all adopted the epithet " Philhellen."

To Arsaces I. probably belong the earliest Parthian coins; the
oldest simply bear the name Arsaces; others, evidently struck
after the coronation in Asaak, have the royal title (jSaffiXfcos
'ApccLKcv). The reverse shows the seated archer, or occasionally
an elephant ; the head of the king is beardless and wears a helmet
and a diadem; only from the third or fourth king they begin to
wear a beard after the Iranian fashion. In honour of the founder
of the dynasty all his successors, when they came to the throne,
adopted his name and officially (e.g. on the coins) are almost
always called Arsaces, whereas the historians generally use their
individual names.

Of the successors of Arsaces I. we know very little. His son,
Arsaces II., was attacked by Antiochus III., the Great, in 20Q,
who conquered the Parthian and Hyrcanian towns but at last
granted a peace. The next king, whom Justin calls Priapatius,
ruled IS years (about 190-175); his successor, Phraates I.,
subjected the mountainous tribe of the Mardi (in the Elburz).
He died early, and was succeeded not by one of his sons but
by his brother, Mithradates I., who became the founder of the
Parthian empire. Mithradates I. (c. 170-138) had to fight hard
with the Greeks of Bactria, especially with Eucratides {q.v.);a.i
last he was able to conquer a great part of eastern Iran. Soon
after the death of Antiochus IV. Epiphanes (163) he conquered
Media, where he refounded the town of E.hagae (Rai near Teheran)
under the name of Arsacia; and about 141 he invaded Babylonia.
He and his son Phraates II. defeated the attempts of Demetrius
II. (139) and Antiochus VII. (1 29) to regain the eastern provinces,
and extended the Arsacid dominion to the Euphrates.

For the later history of the Parthian empire reference should
be made to Persia: Ancient History, and biographical articles on
the kings. The following is a list of the kings, as far as it is
possible to establish their succession.

The names of pretenders not generally acknowledged are put
in brackets.
Arsaces I. . . . 248-f. 211 Vonones 1 8-1 1

(perhaps Tiridates I.) Artabanus II. r. 10-40

Arsaces II. . r. 211-190 (Tiridates III 36)

Priapatius . . .c. 190-175 (Cinnamus 38)

Phraates I. . . c. 175-170 (Vardanes 1 40-45)

Mithradates I. .c. 170-138 Gotarzes 40-51

Phraates II. c. 138-127 Vonones II 51

Artabanus I. . .c. 127-124 Vologaeses I. ... 51-77
Mithradates II. the (Vardanes II 55)



Great



c. 124-



Vologaeses II. 77-79; 111-147



Sanatruces 1 76-70 Pacorus . 78-c. 105

Phraates III 70-57 (Artabanus III. . 80-81)

Orodes 1 57-37 Osroes . 106-129

(Mithradates III. . . 57-54) (Mithradates IV. and his son

Phraates IV 37-2 Sanatruces II., 115; Partha-

(Tiridates II. . 32-31 and 26) maspates, 116-1 17; and other

Phraates V. (Phraa- pretenders.)

taces) .2 B.c.-A.D. 5 Mithradates V. . . c. 129-147

Orodes II A.D. 5-7 Vologaeses III. . 147-191

• The names of the following kings are not known ; that one of
them was called Artabanus II. is quite conjectural.



Vologaeses IV. . 191-209 Artabanus IV. . . 209-229

(Vologaeses V. . 209-c. 222)

Authorities. — Persian tradition knows very little about the
Arsacids, who by it arc called Ashkanians (from Ashak, the modern
form of Arsaces.) Of modern works on the history of the Parthians
(besides the numismatic literature) the most important are: G.
Rawlinson, The .Sixth Oriental Monarchy (1873), and A. von
(iutschmid, Ceschichle Irans iind seine Nachbarldnder von Alexander
d. Gr. bis zum Vntergang der Arsaciden (1888).

The principal works on the Arsacid coinage are (after the earlier
publications of Longpericr, Prokesch-Ostan, &c.): Percy Gardner,
The Parthian Coinage (London, 1877), and especially W. Wroth, Cata-
logue of the Coins of Parthia in the British Museum (London, 1903),
who carefully revised the statements of his predecessors. Cf. also
Petrowicz, Arsacidenmiinzen (Vienna, 1904), and Allotte de la Fuye,
" Classement dcs monnaics arsacides," in Revue numismatique, 4
serie, vol. viii., 1904. (Ed. M.)

PARTICK (formerly Perdyc or Pcrthick), a municipal and police
burgh of the parish of Govan, Lanarkshire, Scotland. Pop.
(1891), 36,538; (1901), 54,2q8. It lies on the north bank of the
Clyde, and is continuous with Glasgow, from which it is separated
by the Kelvin, and of which it is a large and wealthy residential
suburb. Shipbuilding yards are situated in the burgh, which
has also industries of paper-staining, flour-milling, hydraulic-
machine making, weighing-machine making, brass-founding and
galvanizing. The tradition is that the flour-mills and granaries
— the Bunhouse Mills — as they are called locally, were given by
the Regent Moray to the bakers of Glasgow for their public
spirit in supplying his army with bread at the battle of Langside
in 1568. Victoria Park contains a grove of fossil trees which
were discovered in a quarry. The town forms the greater part
of the Partick division of Lanarkshire, which returns one member
to Parliament. Though it remained a village till the middle of
the 19th century, it is an ancient place. Morken, the Pictish
king who persecuted St Kentigern, is believed to have dwelt here
and, in 1136, David I. gave the lands of Partick to the see of
Glasgow. The bishop's palace stood by the side of the Kelvin,
and was occupied — or a mansion erected for him on its site — by
George Hutcheson (1580-1639), founder of the Hutcheson
Hospital in the city.

PARTISAN, or Partizan. (i) A thoroughgoing " party " man
or adherent, usually in a depreciatory sense of one who puts his
party before principles; (2) an irregular combatant or guerrilla
soldier; (3) a weapon with a long shaft and a broad bladed head,
of a type intermediate between the spear and the halberd (g.v.).
In senses (i) and (2) the word is derived through the Fr. from
Ital. partigiano, from parteggiare, to share, take part in, Lat.
pars, part. The name for the weapon has also been attributed to
the same origin, as being that used by " partisans," but there is
no historical evidence for this. The form which the word now
takes in French, ptrluisane, has given rise to a connexion with
pertuis, hole; Lat. perliisus, pertundere, to strike through. But
the most probable derivation is from the Teutonic porta, barta,
axe, which forms the last part of " halberd."

PARTITION, in law, the division between several persons of
land or goods belonging to them as co-proprietors. It was a
maxim of Roman law, followed in modern systems, that in
communione vet sociclatc nemo potest invitus detineri. Partition
was either voluntary or was obtained by the actio comniuni
dividendo. In English law the term partition applies only to the
division of lands, tenements and hereditaments, or of chattels
real between coparceners, joint tenants or tenants in common.
It is to be noticed that not all hereditaments are capable of
partition. There can be no partition of homage, fealty, or
common of turbary, or of an inheritance of dignity, such as a
peerage. Partition is either voluntary or compulsory. Volun-
tary partition is effected by mutual conve)'ances, and can only
be made where all parties are sui juris. Since the Real Property
Act 1845, § 3, it must be made by deed, except in the case of
copyholds. Compulsory partition is effected by private act of
parliament, by judicial process, or through the inclosure com-
missioners. At common law none but coparceners were entitled
to partition against the will of the rest of the proprietors, but
the Acts of 31 Henry VIII. c. i and 32 Henry VIII. c. 32 gave a
compulsory process to joint tenants and tenants in common of



PARTNERSHIP



freeholds, whether in possession or in reversion, by means of the
writ of partition. In the reign of Elizabeth the court of chancery
began to assume jurisdiction in partition, and the writ of partition,
after gradually becoming obsolete, was finally abolished by the
Real Property Limitation Act 1833. The court of chancery
could not decree partition of copyholds untU the passing of the
Copyholds Act 1 84 1 . This act was repealed by the Copyholds Act
1894, which empowers the alienation of ancient tenements with
the hcence of the lord. By the Judicature Act 1873, § 34,
partition is one of the matters specially assigned to the chancery
division. An order for partition is a matter of right, subject to
the discretion vested in the court by the Partition Act 1868
(amended by the Partition Act 1876). By § 3 of the act of 1868
the court may, on the request of a party interested, direct a sale
instead of a partition, if a sale would be more beneficial than a
partition. By § 12 a county court has jurisdiction in partition
where the property does not exceed £500 in value. Under the
powers of the Inclosure Act 1845, and the acts amending it, the
inclosure commissioners have power of enforcing compulsory
partition among the joint owners of any inclosed lands. An
order of the inclosure commissioners or a private act vests the
legal estate, as did also the old writ of partition. But an order of
the chancery division only declares the rights, and requires to be
perfected by mutual conveyances so as to pass the legal estate.
Where, however, all the parties are not sui juris, the court may
make a vesting order under the powers of the Trustee Act 1850,

§30-

Partition is not a technical term of Scots law. In Scotland
division of common property is effected either extra-judicially, or
by action of declarator and division or division and sale in the
court of session, or (to a limited extent) in the sheriff courts. Rights
of common are not divisible in English law without an act of parlia-
ment or a decree of the inclosure commissioners, but in Scotland
the act of 1695, c. 38, made all commonties, except those belonging
to the king or royal burghs, divisible, on the application of any
having interest, by action in the court of session. By the Sheriff
Courts (Scotland) Act 1877, § 8, the action for division of common
property or commonly is competent in the sheriff court, when the
subject in dispute does not exceed in value £50 by the year, or £1000
value. Runrig lands, except when belonging to corporations, were
made divisible by the act of 1695, c. 23. A decree of division of
commonty, common property, or runrig lands has the effect of a
conveyance by the joint proprietors to the several participants
(Conveyancing [Scotland] Act 1874, § 35). ^^

In the United States, " it is presumed," says Chancellor Kent,
(4 Comm., lect. Ixiv.), " that the English statutes of 31 & 32 Henry
VIII. have been generally re-enacted and adopted, and probably
with increased facilities for partition." In a large majority of the
states, partition may be made by a summar>' method of petition to
the courts of common law. In the other states the courts of equity
have exclusive jurisdiction. As between heirs and devisees the pro-
bate courts may in some states award partition. The various state
laws with regard to partition will be found in Washburn, Real
Property, bk. i. ch. xiii., § 7.

PARTNERSHIP (earlier forms, partener, parcener, from Late
Lat. parlionarius for partitionarius, from partitio, sharing,
pars, part), in general, the voluntary association of two or
more persons for the purpose of gain, or sharing in the work
and profits of any enterprise. This general definition, however,
requires to be further restricted, in law, according to the
account given below.

The partnership of modern legal systems is based upon the
societas of Roman law. Societas was either universorinn bonorttm,
a complete communion of property; negotiaiionis alicujus,
for the purpose of a single transaction; vectigalis, for the
collection of taxes; or rei unius, joint ownership of a particular
thing. The prevailing form was societas universorum quae ex
quaestu veniunt, or trade partnership, from which all that did
not come under the head of trade profit (quaesius) was excluded.
This kind of societas was presumed to be contemplated in the
absence of proof that any other kind was intended. Societas
was a consensual contract, and rested nominally on the consent
of the parties — really, no doubt (though this was not in terms
acknowledged by the Roman jurists), on the fact of valuable
consideration moving from each partner. No formalities
were necessary for the constitution of a societas. Either
property or labour must be contributed by the socius; if one



party contributed neither property nor labour, or if one
partner was to share in the loss but not in the profit (leonina
societas), there was no true societas. Societas was dissolved
on grounds substantially the same as those of English law
(see below). The only ground pecuHar to Roman law was
change of status {capitis dcminutio). Most of the Roman law
on the subject of societas is contained in Dig. xvii. tit. 2, Pro
socio.

Though the Enghsh law of partnership is based upon Roman
law, there are several matters in which the two systems differ,
(i) There was no limit to the number of partners in Roman law.
(2) In societas one partner could generally bind another only
by express mandatum; one partner was not regarded as the
implied agent of the others. (3) The debts of a societas were
apparently joint, and not joint and several. (4) The heres
of a deceased partner could not succeed to the rights of the
deceased, even by express stipulation. There is no such dis-
ability in England. (5) In actions between partners in Roman
law, the bencficiitm compctentiae applied — that is, the privilege
of being condemned only in such an amount as the partner
could pay without being reduced to destitution. (6) The
Roman partner was in some respects more strictly bound
by his fiduciary position than is the English partner. For
instance, a Roman partner could not retire in order to enjoy
alone a gain which he knew was awaiting him. (7) There was
no special tribunal to which matters arising out of societas
were referred.

Previous to the Partnership Act 1890 the English law of
partnership was to be found only in legal decisions and in
textbooks. It was mostly the result of judge-made law, and
as distinguished from the law of joint stock companies was
affected by comparatively few acts of parhament.

In 1890 the Partnership Act of that year was passed to declare
and amend the law of partnership; the act came into operation
on the ist of January 1891. With one important exception
(§ 23), it appUes to the whole United Kingdom. It is not a
complete code of partnership law; it contains no provisions
regulating the administration of partnership assets in the event
of death or bankruptcy, and is silent on the subject of goodwill.
The existing rules of equity and common law continue in force,
except so far as they are inconsistent with the express provisions
of the act. Indeed, the act of 1890 has to be read in the
light of the decisions which have built up these rules.
On all points specifically dealt with by the act it is now the
one binding authority. The act has made no important changes
in the law, except in respect of the mode of making a
partner's share of the partnership assets available for pay-
ment of his separate debts. This change does not affect
Scotland. The act is divided into the four main divisions
mentioned below.

I. Nature of Partnership. — Partnership is defined to be the
" relation which subsists between persons carrying on a business
in common with a view of profit." From this definition
corporations and companies, such as joint-stock companies
and cost-book mining companies, which differ from ordinary
partnerships in many important respects, are expressly excluded.
The act also contains several subsidiary rules for determining
the existence of a partnership. These rules are of a fragmentary
nature, and for the most part are expressed in a negative form;
they have not introduced any change in the law. Co-ownership
of property does not of itself create a partnership, nor does
the sharing of gross returns. The sharing of profits, though
not of itself sufficient to create a partnership, is prima facie
evidence of one. This means that if all that is known is that
two persons are sharing profits, the inference is that such persons
are partners; but if the participation in profits is only one
amongst other circumstances, aU the circumstances must be
considered, and the participation in profits must not be treated
as raising a presumption of partnership, which has to be rebutted.
To illustrate the rule that persons may share profits without
being partners, the act gives statutory expression to the decision
in Cox V. Hickman (i860, 8 H.L.C., 268), viz. that the receipt



PARTNERSHIP



«73



by a person of a debt or other fixed sum by instalments, or
otherwise, out of the accruing profits of a business does not of
itself make him a partner; and it re-enacts with some slight
modification the repealed provisions of Bovill's Act (28 & 29
Vict. c. 86), which was passed to remove certain difficulties
arising from the decision in Cox v. Hickman. Whenever the
question of partnership or no partnership arises, it must not
be forgotten (though this is not stated in the act) that partner-
ship is a relation arising out of a contract; regard must be paid
to the true contract and intention of the parties as appearing
from the whole facts of the case. If a partnership be the
legal consequence of the true agreement, the parties thereto
will be partners, though they may have intended to avoid
this consequence {Adam v. Ncwbigging, i888, L.R. 13 App.
Cas. 315). Partners are called collectively a "firm"; the
name under which they carry on business is called the firm
name. Under English law the firm is not a corporation, nor
is it recognized as distinct from the members composing it;
any change amongst them destroys the identity of the firm.
In Scotland a firm is a legal person distinct from its members,
but each partner can be compelled to pay its debts.

At common law there is no limit to the number of partners,
but by the Companies Act 1862 (25 & 26 Vict. c. 89, § 4), not
more than ten persons can carry on the business of bankers,
and not more than twenty any other business, unless (with
some exceptions) they conform to the provisions of the act.
(See Company, and also Limited Partnerships below.)

II. Relations of Partners to Persons dealing with litem. —
Every partner is an agent of the firm and of his co-partners
for the purpose of the partnership business; if a partner does
an act for carrying on the partnership business in the usual
way in which businesses of a like kind are carried on — in other
words, if he acts within his apparent authority — he thereby
prima facie binds his firm. The partners may by agreement
between themselves restrict the power of any of their number
to bind the firm. If there be such an agreement, no act done
in contravention of it is binding on the firm with respect to
persons who have notice of the agreement. Such an agreement
does not affect persons who have no notice of it, unless indeed
they do not know or believe the person with whom they are
dealing to be a partner; in that case he has neither real, nor,
so far as they are concerned, apparent authority to bind his
firm, and his firm will not be bound. If a partner does an
act, e.g. pledges the credit of the firm, for a purpose apparently
not connected with the firm's ordinary course of business, he
is not acting in pursuance of his apparent authority, and what-
ever liability he may personally incur, his partners will not be
bound unless he had in fact authority from them.

Apart from any general rule of law relating to the execution
of deeds or negotiable instruments, a firm and all the partners
will be bound by any act relating to the business of the firm, and
done in the firm name, or in any other manner showing an
intention to bind the firm, by any person thereto authorized.
An admission or representation by a partner, acting within
his apparent authority, is evidence against his firm. Notice
to an acting partner of any matter relating to the partnership
affairs is, apart from fraud, notice to his firm.

A firm is liable for loss or injury caused to any person not a
partner, or for any penalty incurred by any wrongful act or
omission of a partner acting in the ordinary course of the partner-
ship business, or with the authority of his co-partners; the
extent of the firm's liability is the same as that of the individual
partner. The firm is also liable to make good the loss (a) where
one partner, acting within his apparent authority, receives
money or property of a third person and misapplies it; and
(b) where a firm in the course of its business receives money
or property of a third person, and such money or
property while in the custody of the firm is misapplied by a
partner. It is not sufficient, in order to fix innocent partners
with liability for the misapplication of money belonging to a
third party, merely to show that such money was employed
in the business of the partnership, otherwise all the members





Online LibraryHugh ChisholmThe Encyclopædia britannica; a dictionary of arts, sciences, literature and general information (Volume v. 20) → online text (page 312 of 353)