Irving Browne Isaac Grant Thompson.

The American reports: containing all decisions of general ..., Volume 36 online

. (page 123 of 123)
Online LibraryIrving Browne Isaac Grant ThompsonThe American reports: containing all decisions of general ..., Volume 36 → online text (page 123 of 123)
Font size
QR-code for this ebook


one of two joint tort feasors does not operate as a bar to action against other
in absence of release or accord and satisfaction.

Cited in note in 36 A. S. R. 149, on agreement not to sue joint obligor.
Release of joint debtor as discharging others.

Cited in Miller v. Beck, 108 Iowa, 575, 79 N. W. 344, holding a release by
debtor of his claim for damages against one of wrongfully attaching creditors
does not operate as a release of his claim against other attaching creditors;
Gilbert v. Finch, 173 N. Y. 455, 93 A. S. R. 623, 61 L.R.A. 807, 66 N. E. 133,
holding directors of a corporation not relieved from liability by a release
granted by themselves to a co-director; Pettigrew Mach. Co. v. Harmon, 45
Ark. 290, on release of one joint debtor as discharging the others; Hood v.
Hayward, 124 N. Y. 1, 26 N. E. 331, 20 N. Y. Civ. Proc. Rep. 47, 26 Abb. N.
C. 271 (dissenting opinion), on release of surety as affecting right of co-
surety to a release.
Several actions against Joint tort-feasors.

Cited in Olwell v. Skobis, 126 Wis. 308, 105 N. W. 777, on right to main-
tain separate actions against joint tort feasors.
Equitable release as given effect in law.

Cited in Case Wagon Co. v. Wolfenden, 63 Wis. 185, 23 N. W. 485, holding
acts which amount to a release in equity might be interposed as such in law
to save circuity of action.
Right of Joint tort-feasor to plead a counterclaim.

Cited In Stolze v. Torrison, 118 Wis. 315, 95 N. W. 114, on right of one
tort feasor in joint action to set up a counterclaim against plaintiff.

36 AM. REP. 840, CHICAGO & N. W. R. CO. ▼. OCONTO, 50 WIS. 189»

6 N. W. 607.
What is a town.

Cited in Cathcart ▼. Comstock, 56 Wis. 590, 14 N. W. 833, as defining the
use of the word ''town" as used in the statute; State ex rel. Atty. €ren. t.
Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 15 L.R.A. 561, 51 N. W. 724, on town as being a
civil subdivision of the state.
What territory may be designated a town.

Cited in Smith v. Sherry, 50 Wis. 210, 6 N. W. 561, holding an uninhabited
tract of country nowhere adjoining an existing village could not be made part
of such village for mere purpose of increasing the corporate revenue by taxa-
tion; Smith v. Sherry, 54 Wis. 114, 11 N. W. 465, on well defined boundaries
as essential to existence of a town.

Cited in note in 25 L.R.A. 756, on physical characteristics necessary to
municipal organization.

Distinguished in Schriber v. Langlade, 66 Wis. 616, 29 N. W. 547, holding
an Indian reservation may be included within the boundaries of a town.
Contignonsness of territory essential to existence of town.

Cited in Denver v. Coulehan, 20 Colo. 471, 27 L.R.A. 751, ^39 Pac 425;
Enterprise v. State, 29 Fla. 128, 10 So. 740, — holding an attempt to incorpo-
rate two distinct detached, tracts of land as corporate territory as one govern-
ment is unauthorized and void; Grunert v. Spalding, 104 Wis. 193, 78 N. W.



Digitized by



Google



1205 NOTES ON AMERICAN REPORTS. [830-848

^6, holding a single tract of land surrounded by an unbroken boundary line
and capable of being traversed from one extremity to the other without leav-
ing its territory may be designated a town though it has a length of over a
hundred miles and a width of from two to three.

Cited in note in 27 L.R.A. 746, on limitation on legislative power to annex
territory to municipality.

36 AM. REP. 845, STATE ▼. GLASS, 50 WIS. 218, 6 N. W. 500.
Admissibility of previoas voluntary testimony by accused.

Cited in Preston v. State, 41 Tex. Crim. Rep. 300, 53 S. W. 127, holding
testimony of accused on a former trial admissible against him; Steele v. State,
76 Miss. 387, 24 So. 910; Anderson v. Stote, 133 Wis. 601, 114 N. W. 112,—
holding the voluntary statement of accused party on preliminary examina-
tion may be put in evidence by the state upon his trial; United States v.
Kirkwood, 5 Utah, 123, 13 Pac. 234, holding same where accused makes volun-
tary confession before the grand jury.
Admissions by accused.

Cited in Yanke v. State, 51 Wis. 464, 8 N. W. 276, holding admissions made
freely by the accused to officers are admissible against himself; Hintz v. State,
125 Wis. 405, 104 N. W. 110, holding confessions made by a party under ar-
rest, are admissible if not elicited by coercion, threats or artifice.

Cited in reference note in 41 A. S. R. 524, on admissibility of confession
under oath.
Verdict delivered in Writing.

Cited in Brewer v. State, 63 Fla. 1, 43 So. 423, 12 A. ic E. Ann. Gas. 79,
holding written verdicts in capital cases may be received in this state.

Distinguished in Koch v. State, 126 Wis. 470, 8 L.R.A.(N.S.) 1086, 106
N. W. 531, 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 389, holding verdict could not orally be
altered or amended after the jury had separated after agreeing upon and seal-
ing up a verdict.
Remarks by court to Jury required to be In writing as part of cliargo.

Cited in Moore v. Platteville, 78 Wis. 644, 47 N. W. 1055, holding remarks
to jury by court, after they had retired and been called back, on their duty
as jurors, not a part of the charge required to be in writing; Gilchrist v.
Brande, 58 Wis. 184, 15 N. W. 817, on remarks of court as forming part of
the charge as necessary to be in writing.

86 AM. REP. 848, BEYER v. BEYER, 50 WIS. 254, 6 N« W. 807.
Cruel and inhuman treatment as ground for divorce.

Cited in Williams v. Williams, 1 Colo. App. 281, 28 Pac. 726, on actual
violence as necessary to constitute the "extreme" cruelty necessary; Car-
penter V. Carpenter, 30 Kan. 712, 46 A. R. 108, 2 Pac. 122, on facts necessary
to justify a divorce for cruel and inhuman treatment.

Cited in notes in 73 A. D. 629, on single act of cruelty as entitling one to
divorce; 40 A. R. 463, on what constitutes cruelty within divorce law; 61
A. R. 736, on accusations of adultery as ground for divorce; 65 A. S. R. 74,
on cruelty as ground for divorce; 6 L.R.A. 187, on cruelty and inhuman treat-
ment as ground for divorce; 6 L.R.A. 188, on extent of cruelty sufficient to
authorize divorce.



Digitized by



Google



Sa AM. R£P.] NOTES ON AMERICAN REPORTS. 1209

86 AM. REP. 850, McK£SSON t. STANTON, 50 WIS. 307, • N. W.

881.
Validity of married woman's deed or land contract.

Cited in Heal v. Niagara Oil Co. 150 Ind. 483, 50 N. E. 482, holding lease
by married woman of her lands, for purpose of operating gas or oil wells with-
out joining husband therein not void.

Cited in note in 72 A. D. 515, on when separate estate of married woman
chargeable with her debts and contracts.

86 AM. REP. 856, WHITTAKER T. STATE, 50 WIS. 518, 7 X. W.

481.
Degree of resistance essential in rape.

Cited in People v. Clemens, 37 Hun, 580, 3 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 565, holding
on facts resistance was of a sufficient nature to convict of rape, the sub-
mission being to overpowering force; Hammond v. State, 39 Neb. 252, 58
N. W. 92, on same point; Bohmann v. State, 98 Wis. 617, 74 N. W. 343,
holding on facts the resistance was not sufficient to convict of rape; Beard
V. State, 79 Ark. 293, 97 S. W. 667, 9 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 409 (dissenting opin-
ion) ; Reynolds v. State, 27 Neb. 90, 20 A. S. R. 659, 42 N. W. 903; Sowers
V. Territory, 6 Okla. 436, 60 Pac. 257; Brown v. State, 127 Wis. 193, 106 N.
W. 536, 7 A. & £. Ann. Cas. 258,— on the necessity of utmost resistance;
Loescher v. State, 142 Wis. 260, 125 N. W. 459, holding that offense of rape
is consummated where intercourse is had after victim is rendered insensible
through fright or ceases resistance because of fear of great bodily harm.

Cited in reference notes in 65 A. D. 509, on force as essential to commission
of rape; 80 A. D. 367, on consent after penetration as defense in rape; 38
A. R. 366, on degree of resistance necessary to constitute rape of woman in
possession of physical and mental powers; 20 A. S. R. 661, on necessity of
resistance on part of female to constitute crime of rape; 48 A. S. R. 248,
on rape accomplished by force; 63 A. S. R. 164, on force necessary to consti-
tute rape.

86 AM. REP. 862, BAILEY v. RAOATZ, 50 WIS. 554, 7 N. W. 564.
Arrest vrithout warrant.

Cited in note in 84 A. S. R. 696, on place where arrest without warrant
may be made.
Right to force entry to serve process.

Cited in reference note in 42 A. S. R. 388, on entering third person's premises
to serve process.

36 AM. REP. 866, HAMILTON v. PROUTY, 60 WIS. 592, 7 N. W. 659.
Validity of agreement to extend time of payment of bill or note.

Cited in Moulton v. Posten, 52 Wis. 169, 8 N. W. 621, holding an agreement
upon sufficient consideration to extend the time of payment of a note "until
after threshing** sufficiently definite to give it validity and work a discharge
on an nonassenting surety; Fanning v. Murphy, 126 Wis. 538, 110 A. S. R.
946, 4 L.R.A.(N.S.) 666, 105 N. W. 1056, 5 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 435, on elements
essential to the .validity of an agreement for the extension of the time of
payment of a note.



Digitized by



Google



1207 NOTES ON AMERICAN REPORTS. [850-866

— Sufficiency of usurious consideration for extension.

Cited in Vary v. Norton, 6 Fed. 808, nolding payment of a usurious con-
sideration constituted a valuable consideration for the extension of time of
payment of note; Fay v. Tower, 68 Wis. 286, 16 N. W. 568, holding an usurious
note given by the principal maker of another note to the holder thereof is a
sufficient consideration for an extension for the time of payment of the latter.
Discharge of surety by extension of time of payment of bill or note.

Cited in Niblack v. Champeny, 10 S. D. 166, 72 N. W. 402, holding surety
on note discharged by extension of the time of payment without his consent, on
a usurious consideration; Dillaway v. Peterson, 11 S. D. 210, 76 N. W. 926;
on extension of time of payment on note as discharging surety.

Cited in reference notes in 35 A. R. 685, on surety's discharge by indulgence
to principal; 7 A. S. R. 372, on nature and extent of surety's liabilities.

Cited in notes in 53 L.R.A. 317, 318, on effect of pa3rment of usury in con-
sideration of extension of time to principal on surety's liability; 63 L.R.A.
322, on effect of contract to pay usury in consideration of extension of time
to principal on surety's liability.
Usary as personal defence.

Cited in Lemmon v. Whitman, 75 Ind. 318, 39 A« R. 150, on who maj set
up usury as a defense.



Digitized by



Google



Digitized by



Google



Digitized by



Google



Digitized by



Google



Digitized by



Google



Digitized by



Google



Digitized by



Google



Digitized by



Google




Digitized by



Google



Digitized by



Google






Online LibraryIrving Browne Isaac Grant ThompsonThe American reports: containing all decisions of general ..., Volume 36 → online text (page 123 of 123)